REFERENCE LIBRARY

OF THE

STATE TEACHERS COLLEGE

WHITEWATER, WISCONSIN

No. 41923

Bought 12 Sept. *19* 46

Students of the State Teachers College are allowed to draw the books for use at their rooms on the following conditions:

1. No book must be taken from the library until it has been properly charged to the student drawing it.
2. Bound magazines, most Reference books and Reserved books may be taken from the library at 4 p. m. and must be returned at 8 a. m. the following day.
3. All other books may be kept for two weeks.





Courtesy of the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan

A MAP OF NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA IN 1676

Notice the indefinite drawing of the Great Lakes, and the Strait of Anien, the fabled passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

THE UNITED STATES

BY

THEODORE CALVIN PEASE

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

WITH MANY MAPS

E
178
P35

NEW YORK

HARCOURT, BRACE AND COMPANY

41923

COPYRIGHT, 1927, BY
HARCOURT, BRACE AND COMPANY, INC.

SET UP AND ELECTROTYPED BY T. MOREY & SON

PRINTED IN THE U. S. A.

TO

M. E. J.

PREFACE

My preface is naturally a statement of my purposes and of my reasons for them. The book is shorter than some others because I believe that college teachers have found the time allotted by the ordinary college to introductory American history too limited to permit of covering adequately text, documentary books, outside readings, and lectures. Believing that documents and outside readings deserve more emphasis than text, I have aimed to present the essential details of American history in an interesting fashion as a point of departure for more detailed study. By stressing interpretations, I have endeavored to provoke the thoughtful student to weigh and to reject where he is not convinced.

The phases of history emphasized require a word or two of explanation. My intention is to trace the growth of the present American nation as a self-conscious political, social, and economic organization. Stating the purposes thus necessarily to a certain extent determines the treatment. Paradoxical as it may seem, the successive mighty economic revolutions in the life of the American people have lessened the importance of the economic element in our present history. It is difficult in the days of international oil syndicates and United States Steel, with railroads an old story, to make even the intelligent student understand the vital importance of the West India trade to the eighteenth century. On the other hand, the colonists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the storm and stress of political struggle evolved the modes and theories of political organization that in outward form are our own. At the moment when they seem likely to be modified the story of how they came about assumes importance. Political theory and the history of political thought I have therefore treated with fullness. The men of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-

turies in America were intellectual children of contemporary England. Necessarily I have had to weave much English history into the story of colonial foundations.

Social history has been treated in a series of sketches by which the reader can value the social habits and standards of his own surroundings by comparison with those of the past. The A. E. F. and the war are vital things in the consciousness of many millions of American men now in the prime of life. These topics are therefore treated in detail. My treatment has drawn a distinction between European events affecting and interesting us and those which have not. The framing of the Versailles Treaty is an important chapter of American history. Not until American interest in Europe reawakens will it be possible to select those details in the seven years' aftermath of Versailles that will concern our future history.

Finally my treatment has not been apologetic. Certain hero tales, if one chooses to call them such, are engrained in the national consciousness of American citizens. Apart from their intrinsic importance or lack of it, they must be mentioned in any account of the growth of that national consciousness. I believe that the men who made the American Revolution had a valid interpretation, even if not the only valid one, of English constitutional history. I believe that the interpretation of the American Revolution, and of its results on which the Civil War was fought by the North, was at least as valid as that of Calhoun. I have stated my belief frankly; I hope that the frankness of the statement will provoke the students' thought.

Special attention has been given to maps. A good number of reproductions of early maps of America and contemporary maps of the Revolution have been included. All sketch maps illustrating American history before 1800 have been drawn on outlines of contemporary maps. Thus, it is hoped, the fallacy of assuming that former ages had the geographical knowledge of our own may be excluded from the minds of students.

The account of my indebtedness to others is a long one. Professor Claude H. Van Tyne of the University of Michigan read and

corrected the manuscript from beginning to end, offering much criticism, all of which was helpful, kindly, and encouraging. Professor W. S. Robertson also read the manuscript carefully at an early stage, offering valuable comment; so also did my colleagues, Professors J. G. Randall, A. O. Craven, A. S. Roberts, and Dr. F. S. Ronalds. My brother has supplied many pertinent suggestions on the literary style. My debt is great to Dr. Randolph G. Adams who generously opened to me the resources of the William L. Clements Library at the University of Michigan, and gave me the benefit of his very great knowledge of cartography in supplying many of the maps. For permission to use the two war maps from the Clinton Headquarters Papers my thanks are due to the William L. Clements Library.

Miss Marguerite Jenison, Miss Ernestine Jenison, and Mrs. Elizabeth Zimmerman have given me most valuable assistance at all stages in the preparation of the manuscript and in seeing it through the press.

THEODORE CALVIN PEASE

Urbana, Illinois
August 15, 1927.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I.	The European Heritage	1
II.	The Colonies of Adventurer and Merchant	16
III.	The Puritan Colonies	36
IV.	The Evolution of Puritan New England	52
V.	The Colonies under the Restoration	71
VI.	The Colonies under the Restoration (*continued*)	91
VII.	The Period of Transition, 1689–1760	106
VIII.	The Colonial Rivalry of Spain, France, and England	125
IX.	The Beginnings of the American Revolution	145
X.	The Evolution of Independence	164
XI.	The War for Independence	179
XII.	The Achievement of Political Organization	198
XIII.	The Federalist Administrations	219
XIV.	The Days of Jeffersonian Simplicity	241
XV.	Blundering into War	261
XVI.	The Beginnings of Nationalism	281
XVII.	Jacksonian Democracy and Nationalism	305
XVIII.	The Reign of Andrew Jackson	322
XIX.	The Shadow of Slavery	338
XX.	Manifest Destiny	356
XXI.	Slavery Extension and the Compromise of 1850	372
XXII.	The 'Fifties: The Kansas-Nebraska Act	384
XXIII.	The Republican Triumph	404
XXIV.	The War for the Union	426

CHAPTER		PAGE
XXV.	The Triumph of the North	445
XXVI.	The Era of Reconstruction, 1865–1877	469
XXVII.	The New Order in American Life	487
XXVIII.	Economic Expansion, 1873–1897	505
XXIX.	Politics, 1877–1897	523
XXX.	Unrest and Change, 1873–1897	538
XXXI.	A Generation of American Foreign Policy and Expansion, 1880–1914	554
XXXII.	Economic and Social Development, 1897–1917	572
XXXIII.	The Age of Roosevelt and Wilson	590
XXXIV.	The World War: The Diplomats	606
XXXV.	The World War: The War Workers	630
XXXVI.	The World War: The Crusaders	646
XXXVII.	The World War: The Politicians	665
XXXVIII.	The Age of Harding and Coolidge	685
	Index	699

LIST OF MAPS

	SEE PAGE
A Map of North and South America in 1676	FRONTISPIECE
An Early Sixteenth Century Map of America	10
Physical Map of North America (*in color*)	18
A Map of Virginia and Maryland, 1676	30
Belgii Novi	78
An Early Eighteenth Century Map of Louisiana	136
Outposts of Colonial Rivalry	140
Europe, Africa, and America	146
New York and New Jersey, with Part of Pennsylvania	180
A Plan of the Battle of Monmouth	186
Sketch Map of the Hudson	192
New Map of North America, 1777	204
Density of Population in 1790	208
The United States in 1782–1792	228
War of 1812	271
Density of Population in 1820	286
Disputed Boundaries of Florida, Louisiana, and Texas	300
Density of Population in 1840	340
The Oregon Question	357
The United States, Texas, and Mexico	370
Railroad Development	385
Density of Population in 1860	392
Civil War Railroad Lines	428

SEE PAGE

Campaigns in the East, 1861–1865 432
The West, 1860–1870 495
Railroads in 1880 508
Density of Population in 1880 514
Density of Population in 1890 518
The Pacific 556
The Caribbean 562
The United States (*in color*) 600
France and the World War 651
Western Front 654
Railroads in 1920 686
Population by Counties, 1920 694

CHAPTER I

THE EUROPEAN HERITAGE

I

The history of the United States is the history of the planting of European races and European institutions in the central North American continent, and of the growth from them of new ideas, new institutions, and new habits of human society. American history, therefore, begins with fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Europe and the historical background of that Europe.

The beginning of American history

At the beginning of the Christian era a civilization had developed around the Mediterranean Sea, concretely expressed in the Roman Empire. Improving on successive borrowings from the ancient civilizations of the Tigris-Euphrates and Nile Valleys which had been recast in the mold of the Greek intelligence, Rome had developed a system of military order, government, and law, protecting high achievements in literature, art, science, and civilization. Roughly speaking, the physical frontiers of her empire were the deserts of Africa and Western Asia on the south and east, and the Danube and the Rhine on the north. Britain was its extreme outpost in the northern ocean. From end to end of it ran the great military roads connecting cities rich in art and in the civilized luxury of material wealth.

The Roman Empire

About the fourth century A.D. the means to maintain this structure were no longer forthcoming. Peasant proprietors, the backbone of its strength, had long since been displaced by cultivators bound to the soil, or by slaves laboring on vast estates. Wealth had concentrated in the hands of the rich and had flowed away to pay for the luxuries of the Far East, or had been taxed away by imperial or municipal authorities. Barbarians from the forest and plains beyond Rhine and Danube had drifted over these ram-

parts of the Empire, first as its slaves, then as its soldiers and colonists. In the fourth century whole tribes pushed across the frontier in search of new homes. Settled as tribes among the older population of the Empire, they disregarded its authority, and finally jostled it down. The mighty edifice of Roman civilization, representing scores of centuries of past achievement, decayed; as the centuries passed, wing after wing came crashing down in ruins. Even as the people of medieval Arles huddled their habitations in the old Roman amphitheater as in a fort, so the early Middle Ages cowered uncomfortably in the ruins of the Roman civilization. Superstitiously wondering at its might even while they overset it, they substituted narrow tribal rule-of-thumb laws for the majesty of the Roman code and lived a barbarous life amid the remains of a luxurious and sophisticated culture.

Decay of Roman civilization

The remnants of pagan opinion at the fall of the Roman civilization laid the blame on the new Christian religion which had been officially adopted by the Empire on the eve of its downfall. Confronted with the sack of Rome, the "Eternal City," in 410, St. Augustine answered the pagan critics by pointing to the City of God, the eternal city of the future, that could never decay. Christianity more and more taught men to disregard the comfortless present, to forego attempts to remedy it, and to turn their eyes to the future life. In comparison with the world to come and the Scriptures that taught of it, the glory of the world that was past, its art, its literature, its science, its organization were inconsiderable trifles.

Influence of Christianity

Deeper and deeper grew the darkness over Western Europe. Mohammedanism, an offset of Judaism and Christianity planted by Mohammed the Prophet, arose in Arabia in the seventh century and unleashed hordes of fanatical horsemen to the conquest of the world. For seven centuries Constantinople kept them from flooding Europe from the East; but a hundred years after Mohammed's death they had swept through Africa and Spain, and had met their first repulse on the plains of Touraine in Central

The Moslem and Barbarian Menace, 700–1000 A.D.

France. Non-Mohammedan raiding hordes from Central Asia scoured the plains of Russia and Poland to attack Europe from the northeast. On its northwestern coasts fell the lash of the Norsemen, pirates of the Scandinavian peninsula. The last flickering spark of Roman civilization seemed about to be snuffed out.

Western Europe became a narrow little place in territory and in vision. The man of thought took refuge in the livery and service of the Church. Esteeming the present world a slight matter soon to pass away, no longer willing to study the physical facts of its being, he sought to deduce its nature from far-fetched interpretations of the Scriptures, from the fathers of the Church or the ancient philosophers, and found it useful only as an allegory of the world to come. He pictured the physical world with heaven above it, hell beneath it, and the devil and his imps actually contending with God and His saints for its control and for the souls of its inhabitants. Around his little Western Europe he imagined terrible oceans and desert plains filled with demons to trap the souls and bodies of men who ventured thither. The ancient world had known trade routes that brought silks, spices, precious stones, and objects of art from the Far East of India and China. The medieval man scarcely knew his way to the Holy Land of his faith. Of the great world of Asia he did not know and did not care to know.

The Dark Ages

The man of action could not supply the shortcomings of the man of contemplation. He was mainly concerned in France, Italy, and Germany in beating back the Hun, the Norseman, and the Saracen. Kings like Charlemagne and Alfred, eager to recover fragments of the old Roman knowledge, had continually to turn back to the task of protecting society from overthrow by barbarians more uncivilized than themselves. Hence arose the feudal castle and the feudal horseman. The kings, successors of the old tribal chiefs, could protect their peoples only by hiring military leaders to whom they gave the incomes from landed estates with jurisdiction over the inhabitants. The feudal vassal was held to his overlord the king by no stronger ties

Feudalism

than the bargain which gave him revenues in return for military support. His thoughts ran no further than the reach of his lance.

By the eleventh century Europe was saved. The feudal chief, lawless and cruel as he was, and the feudal castle, a comfortless stronghold with stone walls a dozen feet thick, had turned back the Hun and were pushing a military frontier eastward. The Norseman had been hastily civilized and settled as a guard on the coasts he formerly had ravaged. The Saracen tide had been dammed at the Pyrenees and in Sicily; and for three hundred years to come in moments of religious enthusiasm the feudal soldiers of Europe were to spend themselves in a series of great clumsy campaigns to rescue Jerusalem and the Holy Sepulchre of Christ from the Moslem.

The salvation of Western Europe

The Holy Land, recovered at first, was held for less than a century; but the crusades ushered in a new birth of Europe. Geographical knowledge enlarged; men learned again of the existence of India and China, and of the goods that came from them. The increased demand for luxury in Western Europe multiplied the numbers of craftsmen; with craftsmen came cities, which either fought or bought their way to a recognized position in the feudal organization, and to charters which granted them immunities and privileges of self-government as against king and feudal noble alike. The peasants began to assert themselves, and to demand relief from the serfdom that burdened the lower classes in the feudal scale. City and peasant formed the bases on which in the twelfth century kings built the new national states of England, France, Castile, Aragon, and Portugal.

The dawn of enlightenment

The cities grew in wealth and importance as the trade routes on which they lay were worn deeper and deeper. International commerce developed. Genoa and Venice in Italy acquired wealth as middlemen in supplying Western Europe with eastern goods. From Asia, either by caravan across the Great Desert or by ship to the Persian Gulf, came Chinese silks; by sea from the Spice Islands and India came spices and precious stones and other rare commodities. Transferred through the hands of a dozen successive merchants, subjected to

The recovery of world commerce

robbery or to tolls by petty chieftains over thousands of miles, by the time Venetian and Genoese had carried them from the Eastern Mediterranean ports over the Alps to Germany or in the Venetian fleet to the Atlantic seaboard of Europe, they were expensive to the last degree.

With trade, exact knowledge enlarged. While the man of medieval mind was still dreaming over his imaginative round map of the world, with Jerusalem in the center, the nations in tiers around it, and seas, deserts, and monsters bounding the whole, the mariner was steering his course by a portolano in which coasts were laid down with accuracy. Compass, astrolabe, and quadrant were adopted or invented, and made the navigator master of his position beyond sight of land. Travelers like Marco Polo found the way to China and India and brought back tales of their magnificence. Scholars like Roger Bacon imagined microscope and telescope as tools to study nature as it really was. In every way open minds reached out for what might lie behind the horizon.

The rebirth of science

Self-interest led men outward in the track of their minds. For eastern goods the Genoese and Venetian middlemen exacted high prices. War and confusion attendant on the rise and decline of nomad monarchies in Western Asia in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries caused occasional interruption of trade and increased expense. Formerly men had thought of extending the sphere of Christianity to the east; now they began to speculate on new trade routes thither.

Trade routes to the West

The crusading spirit had glowed in Spain and Portugal for two centuries after it had grown dim elsewhere in Western Europe, for Portugal and Spain had the Moslems at their gates. In the fifteenth century the Spanish kingdoms of Castile and Aragon completed the conquest of Moorish Spain. At the beginning of that century, Portugal, no longer in contact with Moslem territory, had begun a crusade in Northern Africa at Ceuta. Prince Henry the Navigator, of the Portuguese royal house, devoted his life to promoting the national interest in exploration of the west coast of Africa. The succession of his motives is hard to disentangle: the Guinea Coast of Africa

Prince Henry the Navigator

with its negro slaves and gold; the search for fabulous Christian princes like Prester John, supposed to exist in the heart of Asia, who might coöperate in a crusade against the Moslem; latterly a route by sea around Africa to the land of spices.

Portuguese exploration of the African coast

Slowly Prince Henry's sea captains felt their way down the shores of West Africa. At first they were quick to yield to their fears of the unknown and to turn back at the first discouragement; gradually their superstition yielded to their experience. The landmarks on their advance are Cape Boyador in 1434, Cape Blanco in 1441, Cape Verde in 1445—the "green cape" whose tropic vegetation gave the lie to the old fables of blazing deserts and boiling seas in the zone of the Equator. For ten years they paused to exploit the slave trade; then in 1455 Cadamosto the Venetian reached Guinea with its riches in gold and ivory. Prince Henry died in 1460 and the king of Portugal took up his task; in the 'sixties and 'seventies the caravels crept down the seemingly endless African coast line.

The lure of a New World

Western Europe was ripe for expansion. Both legend and knowledge had long pointed to the existence of lands beyond the Atlantic. Plato's fable of the continent Atlantis, sunk in the ocean that bore its name, had been echoed in various legends of rich islands far out in the ocean suddenly disappearing from the view of those who sought them. The Norsemen had long known of western lands. From Scandinavia they had felt their way over the comparatively narrow seas to Iceland, then to Greenland, and in the year 1000 to a land of grapes they called Vinland, located somewhere on the North American continent. Of Vinland they lost trace; Greenland supported a Norse colony till the fifteenth century. In 1476, probably on the request of Portugal, the King of Denmark sent out one John Scolvus in a search for a way to the land of spices by the northwest, and Scolvus discovered the northern coast of the continent. Lands such as these were of interest only to inhabitants of lands as poor or poorer; but the Atlantic nations of Europe were at last economically able to exploit with success a new world that promised riches.

On a stage thus set there enters one of the historical puzzles of all time—Christopher Columbus. Both Columbus and his friends and relatives after him made contradictory statements about his early career, his experience, and his purpose in his first voyage to the west. The son of a Genoese wool carder, a seafarer from his youth, latterly living in Portugal, a maker of maps, he claimed to have hit on the idea that, supposing the world a sphere—a conclusion some men of science had long accepted—new lands could be reached by sailing boldly to the west. He had undercalculated the size of the globe, believing China and Japan lay where the east coast of America is in reality. For years he made advances to the sovereigns of Portugal, Spain, France, and England for the equipment of an expedition to test his idea. In 1492 he came to terms with Queen Isabella of Castile, mentioning specifically rights in islands he expected to discover. Falling on an islet of the Bahamas on October 12, 1492, and later discovering Hispaniola, he returned to Spain insisting that he had reached the Indies.

Christopher Columbus

Perhaps the explanation of Columbus is the paradox that, sailing with the ostensible purpose of discovering a shorter route to India and the actual hope of discovering new islands, he returned after discovering the islands to insist that he had found his route to India. His delusion was accepted long enough to fasten on the American aborigines the name of Indians; and when a certain Amerigo Vespucci claimed a landfall somewhere to the south, it was thought he had found a fourth continent; thus on the New World as a whole was ultimately fixed the name "America."

The naming of America

But whether Columbus had discovered what he sought or not he had discovered something that fifteenth-century Spain thought worth having. There was gold in the new country; and the Spanish nobles, just deprived of warlike occupation by the capture of Granada, the last Moorish stronghold in Spain, greedy for wealth and disdaining to acquire it save by the sword, hastened out to the New World. Centuries of warfare with the unbeliever had made them brave, contemptuous of hardship, cruel to enemies,

intolerant of dissent. They seized on the most desirable portions of South and Central America. Within the present United States before the seventeenth century they had settled only in Florida. By 1542 their expeditions, setting out from Florida and Mexico, had actually spanned the continent; but it seemed to offer no precious metals or precious stones and they returned to the exploitation of the South. Generations in the tropics crumbled the savage vitality and energy of the Spanish noble. Large masses of the population became amalgams of white, Indian, and negro blood. But Spain retained a great empire in the South that as late as the nineteenth century, in population, wealth, and culture was the peer of the settlements in North America.

Spanish exploitation of the New World

Spain shared the exploitation of South America with Portugal. In 1494 the Treaty of Tordesillas had drawn a line of longitude in the Atlantic 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands to divide Spanish and Portuguese spheres of influence. It cut the eastern shoulder of South America, and in 1500 Cabral, sailing for India via the Cape of Good Hope and standing out far into the Atlantic had touched the eastward bulge of the continent. Brazil therefore was settled and developed under Portuguese influences. Diaz had discovered the Cape of Good Hope in 1487; its passage by Vasco da Gama ten years later on his way to India, and his return to Lisbon in 1499 with a cargo of spices had completed the Portuguese triumph in searching out the way to the east. Portugal, however, was destined to exhaust herself in the exploitation of her empire. Part of it was lost to the foes of Spain between 1580–1640 when she was annexed to the Spanish crown; Brazil had become independent by 1824; and a few African and Indian possessions are all that is left of what at the beginning of the sixteenth century was the most ambitious of the colonial empires.

The Portuguese Empire: Brazil

For the sixteenth century therefore Spain and Portugal were left with little competition by the rest of Europe to exploit the Far East and Southern America. The North American continent in spite of intermittent attempts at its use by France and England

remained a mystery. The Spaniards could have told of its extent if they had cared to do so. Coronado, marching from Mexico to the northeast, had lost a runaway slave who a few days later was picked up by the expedition of De Soto, which, starting from Florida, had journeyed as far as the Mississippi and Ohio rivers; but almost to the last quarter of the seventeenth century the interior of North America and the drainage of its great rivers was to France and England a sealed book.

North America neglected

Whatever these nations accomplished before 1575 can be quickly told. For England, John Cabot the Venetian in two voyages of 1497–1498 had reached the North American mainland before Columbus had reached the southern; thereby he gave England an important priority on which to base her colonial claim. In the first years of the sixteenth century French explorers had been in the St. Lawrence region; in 1535 Cartier penetrated to the present sites of Quebec and Montreal. In 1565 a French colony of Huguenots in Florida was wiped out by the Spaniards. Some unofficial exploitation there was. French, English, and Portuguese fishermen had used the Grand Banks as early as 1500, perhaps even earlier.

English and French enterprise before 1600

II

As we approach the period of English expansion to the North American continent it is necessary to see what the England of the sixteenth century was and how it had come about; for the events of twelve centuries had made England unique among European nations. The Germanic colonists that had entered England in the fifth and sixth centuries settled in a land largely denuded of its Romanized inhabitants. The invaders were not as in France and Italy gradually reabsorbed in the Roman tradition. In the ninth and tenth centuries there was a fresh influx of invaders from Scandinavia to reënforce the Teutonic influence. What Roman influence played upon the little English tribal kingdoms came from without upon the introduction of Christianity.

England: The Teutonic origins

In the eleventh century, just as the feudal influence was transforming the old English kingdoms, England was conquered by William, Duke of Normandy; and a series of strong Norman kings wielded great power and established a machinery of government stronger and more efficient than any other in the Europe of that day. In England, as on the continent, the feudal system existed—the contract between baron and king for military service in return for the use of or revenue from lands; but in England the feudal noble was usually made to feel he was also a subject of the king, and liable to the process of the king's courts.

The Norman Conquest

So strong was the central government that by the beginning of the thirteenth century it had demonstrated that in the hands of a bad king it could be a terrible instrument of despotic oppression; and churchmen, nobles, and towns combined to extort from King John the Magna Charta, or Great Charter, by which they hoped to bind king as well as subject to the supremacy of the law. By the end of the century the king had been reduced to calling on an assembly of his subjects to grant him such extraordinary revenues as he needed. This had been taking place elsewhere in Europe; but the English Parliament soon came to differ from all others in form. In a House of Lords sat the nobles, the bishops, and the abbots of great monasteries; in a lower house sat delegates elected by small landholders in the counties—the "knights of the shire," and the burgesses, representatives of the boroughs or trading towns.

Magna Charta: The Parliament

By the fifteenth century this assembly had gained, subject to the king's veto, a complete right of legislation. It had indeed gained so much power at the king's expense that he was no longer able to maintain order. The nobles felt themselves strong enough to defy the king's courts, even to make kings and unmake them. The House of Commons was not strong enough to wield the power it had taken from the king; its elections were controlled by the nobles; when, taking advantage of a disputed succession to the throne they waged from 1450 to 1485 an intermittent civil war that we

Decay of Parliamentary government after 1450

La table des Isles neufues, lesquelles on appelle isles d'occident & d Indie pour diuers regardz.
Terra florida
Nouus orbis
Die Nuw
Welt

Courtesy of the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan

AN EARLY SIXTEENTH CENTURY MAP OF AMERICA

Note that it limits the "New World" to South America, and places Zipangri or Japan close to the Pacific Coast.

call the Wars of the Roses, the House of Commons was reduced to serving as the tool of the faction that chanced for the time to be dominant.

In 1485 Henry VII, first of the Tudor kings, succeeded to the English throne and initiated a policy of government developed and generally followed by the succeeding sovereigns of his line to the death of the last, Elizabeth, in 1603. This policy essentially was to take the leadership of the middle class of his subjects—the lesser landholders and the merchants—and to trust to their acquiescence in a strong royal policy to restore order. With their tacit assent the sovereign assumed many powers that had been denied him by the legislation of the Middle Ages. In his council the King laid and altered taxes, legislated, tried offenders too great to be dealt with by the ordinary courts. Occasionally he called Parliaments to secure needed legislation and to convince foreign powers and malcontents that the nation was behind the king. Through the middle-class representatives acting as justices of the peace the Tudor king carried on local government. Sitting in quarter sessions, the justices of the peace governed the counties, a sheriff and lord lieutenant appointed in each county by the king acting as executive and military commander. The King's Council manipulated the House of Commons and by frequent letters to the justices of the peace spurred them to efficient discharge of their duties. Tudor government may be represented graphically by an equilateral triangle, the Council at the apex resting on and directing the middle class in their twin functions as members of the House of Commons and justices of the peace.

The Tudor system of government

In Tudor days the English law courts and the laws they administered were not simple. Certain of the courts—King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer—were common law courts. Their justices sometimes sat at Westminster to try cases; sometimes they went on circuit to hold court in the various shires or counties. The law they administered was the common law, an elaborated body of legal principles to be deduced from the decisions in long series of cases reaching back to

The Common Law

the twelfth century; statute after statute made by Parliament had become incrusted with decisions explaining, or even modifying it. Often based on the precepts of Roman law the common law had grown to be something very different. It had evaded statutes by quibbles; its procedure was full of pitfalls; its criminal code regarded a trial as a game between court and prisoner in which the rules favored the court. But it enshrined certain principles of liberty. It taught that a man could not be sentenced to death without the verdict of thirty-five of his equals and neighbors—the grand jury that indicted him and the petty jury that tried him. Already it doubted if a man could be compelled to testify against himself; it had processes such as habeas corpus by which a man imprisoned might demand to hear the charges against him, though the judges were still uncertain if a man might not be held by the king's order. The common law was a vital growth characteristic in faults and virtues of the English soil from which it came.

Other Law Codes

By no means was it the only law in England. In some outlying counties it did not run; in the forests it was superseded by forest law; ecclesiastical courts settled questions of marriage and probate of wills on the principles of the canon law; various so-called prerogative courts emanating from the King's Council exercised a jurisdiction independent of the common law courts. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the common law was still far from recognition as the supreme law of England; it might have to recognize other codes, like the canon law, as its coördinates; it might perhaps go the way other current national codes were going in contemporary Europe, and be replaced by the Roman law.

The Anglican Church

The church in the sixteenth century was passing through a period of revolution. Ever since the later Middle Ages the pope and king had shared between them the appointment of bishops and abbots and the control of the English church; sometimes amicably, sometimes not. In 1517 the Protestant revolt had begun in Germany and threatened for a time to sweep all Europe. Its spokesmen demanded a revision of the doctrine of the church to coincide with what they thought the

true teaching of the Bible, the simplification of church ceremonies and observances,and a revision of church government; finally they denied the papal authority. By 1534 Henry VIII of England had cast off the dependence of the English church on the pope, making himself its supreme head; he suppressed the monasteries and abbeys, confiscating their property to enrich his supporters; but only reluctantly did he adopt even in part the further principles of the Reformation, and recede from the theology of Rome. With his son Edward VI (1547–1553), the church became completely Protestant; under Mary (1553–1558), it reverted to Catholicism; and under Elizabeth it took up a compromise position between the Catholic and extreme Protestant positions.

The church was a far more important factor in the life of the sixteenth century than in the life of to-day. Schools in the modern sense were almost nonexistent and were for the few; only an inconsiderable fraction of people could read. Whatever instruction the people had the church gave them. The medieval Catholic church had sought to guide them by graphic teachings; using symbols, it sought to catch their attention by pictures, ceremonies, processions, rich vestments, all employed for the purposes of moral instruction. The church of Elizabeth had discarded most of these methods of teaching, substituting appeals to the intellect in homilies and sermons, read in the English tongue.

The Church and the People

The towns of Elizabethan England were a scene of bustling commercial life. Governing themselves by grace of ancient royal charters and usually sending members to Parliament, they were legal entities. Expanding trade had developed some of them, such as London, Bristol, and Norwich, and had caused others like Old Sarum to dwindle to the point of disappearance. The expanding commerce of the century was fast increasing the nation's wealth. Merchants were engaging as never before in distant foreign trade, with the continent, with Russia, with Turkey and the Levant, and by the end of the century, with India and China. England did not as yet dream of a naval force to protect these distant trades; the merchants who engaged in them formed monop-

The Towns

olies and undertook to protect themselves. The capital for expansion in the New World was gathered in the sixteenth-century municipalities. From their town charters with royal grants of self-government, from the charters of trading monopolies, from the earlier craft guilds and social guilds, the townsmen were familiar with the idea of acting under a formal conveyance from the king of needed rights and privileges; and so into American colonial history came the charter.

Agricultural distress

Another force urging England to American expansion in the sixteenth century was a revolution in agriculture. From the fifteenth century landholders had found it more profitable to graze sheep over great tracts of land with a single shepherd to guard them than to leave the soil in tillage under a score of plowmen; accordingly, by right or might the class of small peasants was being forced off the land by the new system of inclosures. It could hardly be absorbed in the towns. Elizabethan legislation strove to deal with it by elaborate statutes providing for local levies for the relief of the poor. Elizabethan courts sought to deal with it when in desperation it became criminal by hanging it in batches. By the end of the century men were pointing to the new lands of America as a divinely appointed refuge for this surplus population.

The leaders of colonization

For the new enterprise the necessary leadership was at hand in the court of Elizabeth. The older national sentiment of England had developed a high national pride in memories of great warrior leaders like Richard I, and of glorious victories and conquests against odds in Spain and France. The national pride and affection for England found expression in bold gentleman-volunteers for the wars of religion on the European continent, and for war on the oceans against Spain—such men as Hawkins, Grenville, Drake, Sir Philip Sidney, and Sir Walter Raleigh. The spirit of adventure in such men as these led the first swarming of the English to the New World.

The England they left had had a physical influence on the men who had lived in it that North America replaced by one all its own. Lapped in the airs of the Gulf Stream the English climate

is equable, with few violent extremes of heat and cold. A misty atmosphere wards off the sharp bright sunlight and prompts the mind to leave mental things in hazy nuances as well, and not to cleave too obstinately to one or the other principle. It is a kindly land that calls for friendly neighborhood amusements like the festivities of the Maypole and the early morning trip to the May woods, amusements that so easily slip into moral looseness. The race that had developed in the climate of England was to face the climates of the New World and to alter in them.

English institutions in America

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

E. P. Cheyney, *European Background of American History* (*American Nation*, vol. I). New York, 1904.
W. C. Abbott, *The Expansion of Europe*, 2 vols. New York, 1918.
E. Channing, *A History of the United States*, vol. I. New York, 1905.
W. T. Laprade, *British History for American Students*. New York, 1926.
L. M. Larson, *History of England and the British Commonwealth*, New York, 1924.

CHAPTER II

THE COLONIES OF ADVENTURER AND MERCHANT

I

From the accession of Queen Elizabeth in 1558, the tide of English interest in the New World never ebbed until half a century later a permanent colony was established in Virginia. As in this period England by the method of trial and error was learning the principles of successful colonization her attempts and her failures are important. Out of them evolve in the end economic and political systems destined to leave a deep impress on the United States.

English colonization

Rivalry and hatred of Spain were the primary motives to western adventure. In the reign of Mary, the predecessor of Elizabeth, England had seen herself bound to the chariot wheels of Spanish continental ambitions through Mary's infatuation for her husband, Philip II of Spain. Thenceforth an aggressive minority of Protestant Englishmen looked on Spain as the national enemy. For a full quarter of a century Elizabeth's tortuous policy of giving aid to the enemies of Spain in the Netherlands and among the Huguenots, or French Protestants, called for outward peace with Spain; but between Englishmen and Spaniards outside European waters there was open war. English traders like John Hawkins, pillaged by Spanish officials for violating Spanish trade regulations, thenceforth carried on private wars of revenge against Spaniards in the New World. The English seaman's saying that the law did not hold beyond the line sent Francis Drake in 1577 on his three-year voyage around the world, to return enriched with the spoils of Spanish treasure ships; and neither the adventurer nor his booty would Elizabeth surrender to the nation with which she was supposedly at peace.

English rivalry with Spain

But such peace could only lead in the end to open war, and

Spain, far surpassing England in might, sent the Invincible Armada to the English Channel; but in the choppy seas of the English Channel the great row galleys of the Mediterranean and the lofty galleons built to run before the tropic trade winds were helpless against the English ships, fewer, smaller, but armed with heavy guns and built to maneuver in a sea on a head wind. The triumph of England had been won by her naval architects a generation before; and it set her on the way to naval supremacy and world dominion.

The Armada

During Elizabeth's reign Englishmen had been engaged in other things than buccaneering war on the Spanish possessions. Reaching out for one world trade after another they followed the lure of India and the Far East. Did the way thither lie, as the traveler Anthony Jenkinson urged, across Russia, or was it to the northwest, through the fabled Northwest Passage? Between 1576 and 1587 Martin Frobisher and John Davis had made six voyages in search of the route to India through the Polar Sea.

English exploration in the sixteenth Century

A decade before the Great Armada the hope of a Northwest Passage, of a base in the New World for attacks on the Spanish Empire, and of a feudal estate of royal size for himself, led Sir Humphrey Gilbert to attempt an English settlement in Northern America. As the Queen's subject he secured from her a patent or grant authorizing him to make settlements and to exercise certain powers of government in them. He was to hold his lands as a fief of the crown by payment of a fifth of all gold and silver ore mined in them. His colonists were to retain their allegiance to Elizabeth, but were to be governed by Gilbert conformably to the laws of England and were to worship in the rites of the Church of England. Gilbert's patent is of interest mainly as marking out a few of the larger principles on which England's colonial system was to develop, especially the continued allegiance of English colonists in America to the English king. Both Gilbert's attempts at settlement in 1578 and 1583 led to failure; in the second he lost his life at sea.

Sir Humphrey Gilbert's colonial attempts

Gilbert's work was carried on by his half brother and associate, Sir Walter Raleigh, the man perhaps most typical of renaissance England in vice and virtue alike. Sir Walter's bravery, grace, and intelligence had secured him the favor of Elizabeth and a chief seat in the government. In an age when the highest stakes of political contests were a cell in the Tower and the headsman's ax for the loser, he acquired the name of a daring and unscrupulous politician. His personal morals were those of the age; but he had the breadth of interest that led him, prisoner in the Tower in his later years, to write in stately prose the beginnings of a history of the world, and in his earlier days made him first among Englishmen to grasp the possibilities of English settlement in the New World. His commentary on his own failures in colonization was the prophecy, verified before his execution in 1619, "I shall yet live to see it an English nation." The kindliest verdict that can be framed on his life of tempestuous intrigue and high achievement is in his last words as he laid his head on the block, "What matters it which way the head lie, so the heart be right?"

Sir Walter Raleigh

Raleigh in 1584 had secured as Gilbert's successor a royal grant with similar powers. But he turned his attention to a different part of the continent. From England westerly winds carry one either to the northern part of the continent, or southerly to the West Indies or Bermudas and thence to the coast; and Raleigh planted his colony at Roanoke Island, where his captains Amidas and Barlow had found him a land named by the maiden queen in her own honor, Virginia—a name for more than a quarter of a century applying vaguely to the central portion of the North American continent. The first colonists, failing in searches for a gold mine or a route through the continent to the South Sea, soon returned to England. A second colony sent out in 1587 was necessarily neglected during the stress of the Armada, and simply disappeared, probably among the savages. Raleigh's funds were well-nigh exhausted and he necessarily abandoned further attempts. He permitted voyages of exploration in 1602 and 1603 by Gosnold and Pring. Then on

Raleigh's colony in Virginia



ARCTIC OCEAN
ASIA
BERING SEA
WRANGELL I.
Bering Strait
Pt. Barrow
C. Pr. of Wales
ARCTIC CIRCLE
Yukon R.
Mt. McKinley
Alaskan Mts.
ALASKA PEN.
KODIAK I.
Mt. St. Elias
Mt. Logan
Mackenzie R.
Great Bear L.
Great Slave L.
Peace R.
Athabasca L.
Reindeer L.
Churchill
Athabasca R.
Nelson R.
Lake Winnipeg
Saskatchewan R.
L. Manitoba
Yellowstone R.
Mt. Rainier
Mt. Hood
Columbia R.
C. Flattery
VANCOUVER I.
QUEEN CHARLOTTE IS.
Cascade Mts.
Rocky Mo
Central Lowland
Melville Sound
ARCTIC ARCHIPELAGO
BAFFIN BAY
Davis Strait
GREENLAND
ARCTIC CIRCLE
Denmark Strait
ICELAND
C. Farewell
Hudson Strait
HUDSON BAY
Laurentian Plateau
NEWFOUNDLAND
C. Race
Gulf of St. Lawrence
CAPE BRETON I.
PEN. OF NOVA SCOTIA
C. Sable
C. Cod
Mt. Washington
St. Lawrence R.
L. Superior
L. Huron
GREAT LOW
PACIFIC OCEAN
ATLANTIC OCEAN


PHYSICAL MAP OF
NORTH AMERICA
SCALE OF MILES
0 200 400 600 800 1000
ELEVATIONS
0 to 500 feet
500 to 2000 feet
2000 to 5000 feet
Over 5000 feet
OCEAN DEPTHS
0 to 500 feet
500 to 5000 feet
Below 5000 feet
Pikes Peak
Arkansas
Ozark Mts.
Ohio
Mt. Mitchell
C. Hatteras
BERMUDA IS.
Mt. Whitney
Nevada
SANTA BARBARA IS.
Red
Mississippi
Pecos
Rio Grande
Gulf Coast Plain
PEN. OF FLORIDA
Florida Strait
BAHAMA ISLANDS
C. Sable
GULF OF MEXICO
PENINSULA OF LOWER CALIFORNIA
Gulf of California
TROPIC OF CANCER
C. San Lucas
Sierra Madre
Yucatan Channel
PEN. OF YUCATAN
CUBA
WEST INDIES
HAITI
PORTO RICO
JAMAICA
CARIBBEAN SEA
REVILLAGIGEDO IS.
Popocatepetl
Mt. Orizaba
CENTRAL AMERICA
L. Nicaragua
ISTHMUS OF PANAMA
SOUTH AMERICA
EQUATOR
ATLANTIC OCEAN
30°
20°
10°
0°
120° Longitude 110° West 100° from 90° Greenwich 80°

the accession of James I in 1603 he was accused of treason and was imprisoned; and his monopoly lapsed.

The day was past when any royal favorite or ambitious gentleman could seek to turn all North America into a feudal fief. The merchants, to whom both Gilbert and Raleigh had turned to finance their feudal ambitions, were thinking and acting in terms of trade and national expansion. The achievement of the India trade had culminated in 1600 with the founding of the East India Company; and the men concerned in it were ambitious to risk their money on other trading and colonizing ambitions. Henceforth merchant and noble shared in the directing of colonial enterprise in America.

The merchants and colonization

II

Various causes brought the Virginia project to a head soon after the accession of James I in 1603: the disgrace of Raleigh and the abrogation of his patent; peace with Spain, which promised outward security to a colony; the discoveries of Gosnold, Pring, and Weymouth in New England in 1602, 1603, and 1605; the lure of gold mines and a route to India by a waterway through the continent; a new perception of the desirability of an outlet for England's surplus agricultural population. It was felt that such an enterprise should be national and therefore honored by the king's direction; for a model for the projected settlements merchants naturally turned to the trading posts of the great companies such as the East India Company. All these things helped call into being the Virginia charter of 1606.

The Virginia enterprise

That charter is easily misunderstood. James's action was based on the supposition that two groups of his subjects desired to invest their money in an enterprise of colonization and trade in the New World; and he assumed the outward regulation of it for them. The two groups, centering at London and Plymouth respectively, were assigned two overlapping zones of the North American continent in which they could colonize; each one was not to approach within one hundred miles of a settlement begun by the other. Government of the enterprise was to

The Charter of 1606

come from three councils. One general council in England was nominated by the king from the persons interested. One council was to be in each of the settlements; originally appointed by the Royal Council it could fill vacancies and had a president with very shadowy powers. Leaving to the future the Plymouth Company's essay at a colony in New England, we may trace the London group's attempts at colonization in Virginia.

When in April, 1607, the first colony reached the Chesapeake, the English people were about to purchase by lives and money knowledge of how not to colonize. Almost every move at first was a mistake. The typical English ships built to maneuver, to fight, and to carry a small and valuable cargo were not so well fitted to transport and supply a colony as the great Spanish galleons they had beaten in 1588. Indeed, they could carry no great surplus of supplies beyond what their crews would consume on the ocean or while waiting in Virginia harbors. Packed as thick as herrings in the ships, the colonists were landed enfeebled in a climate to which they were unaccustomed, and the Virginian summer and fall year after year took its two-thirds toll of the new arrivals. Compelled to settle near the mouth of one of the great Virginian estuaries to insure easy communication with the mother country, the unacclimated colonists found that the location of Jamestown in the James River marshes was death. Only dire experience taught men to abandon English wheat for Indian corn, grown in hills with beans and pumpkins as the Indians grew it. Such hardships as malaria and lack of food had never confronted trading posts in the ancient and populous east. Men had to learn to master them in the desolate North American continent.

The deadly climate: Jamestown

Other difficulties arose from the economic basis of the enterprise. Shareholders demanded dividends; they did not realize that for years such a settlement must give its whole time to establishing itself and its food supply on a sound basis; instead they demanded of the struggling disease-racked colony cargoes of naval stores, potash, glass, discovery of a route to the South Sea or a gold mine; one ship actually was loaded with

Economic difficulties

iron pyrites mistaken for gold ore. Many of the first colonization party were gentlemen who had embarked to escape crops of wild oats, to get rich, to seek adventure. Their social code did not include manual labor unless such a task as felling trees was adroitly introduced to them by Captain John Smith as a fascinating outdoor sport. They were ready for adventure or combat but not for the thing more necessary—work.

Finally, the Council appointed for governing the colony was a most unworkable affair, since the chiefs of a few scores of men became "so governmentish, so noisy and open in . . . dissatisfactions," to borrow a phrase from William Penn. By deposition and execution of fellow members, membership in the Council changed and decreased in numbers with startling rapidity. The first president, Wingfield, was soon deposed. A certain Gabriel Archer, not at first a member of the Council, appears to have been the moving spirit in a number of changes. It was said he planned to set up a parliament in the little colony. He had a somewhat Puritanical view of life, evidenced by his attempt to have Captain John Smith condemned to death under the Levitical law because men under his command had been killed in action with the Indians. It has been said that the "first supply" or reënforcement of the colony arrived just in time to save Smith's life, the second to put an end to his arbitrary power as sole ruler. The commentary on the council system of government is obvious.

Defects of government

Captain John Smith is the interesting personality of the infant colony. He had served in wars in Eastern Europe, had been taken prisoner by the Turks and had escaped, all amid marvelous adventures; and Smith was the type of narrator whose achievements do not suffer in the telling. He served Virginia well in his day, bartering with the Indians for corn to save it from starving, enforcing labor on all who drew rations, writing plain truths to the company when they demanded early financial returns too vociferously, and finally acting as the colony's chronicler and advertiser. One would not use him as a sole source, but the former theory that his writing was pure fabrication is now discredited. His famous rescue from the Indian executioners by

Captain John Smith

Pocahontas quite possibly took place, though hardly for the romantic reason of our earlier histories. Perhaps the fairest summary of Smith is the concluding line of the inscription on his engraved portrait:

"So, thou art Brass without but
Gold within."

The Sea to Sea Charter

By 1609 it was apparent that only a complete change of policy could save the enterprise from complete disaster. The king now granted a charter incorporating the investors in the London Company, and vesting control in a treasurer and a council whose successors were to be elected by the "adventurers," or stockholders as we would call them. In 1612 a supplementary charter allowed the stockholders in quarterly meetings to direct the affairs of the Company. The Virginia Company thenceforth was definitely an English corporation owning and ruling a colony in America. The new charters defined a vast tract of land set off by lines running west and northwest from the Atlantic Ocean across the continent—the first of the sea-to-sea charters granted in the belief that the continent was much smaller than was the case.

Leaders of the Company

In the new Virginia Company, several typical figures stand out. Sir Thomas Smith, treasurer until 1619, was a London merchant, formerly a financial associate of Raleigh, and then active in the East India Company; he was insistent that the Virginia Company be made to pay. Opposed to him was the drafter of the charter, Sir Edwin Sandys, a man who thought of Virginia in terms of a free English commonwealth in the New World. He was one of a group of men in James's Parliaments who had progressed so far from Tudor theories of government as to criticize sharply the extent of power claimed by the king. In the House of Commons he had dropped remarks to indicate his belief that kings were elected for the good of their subjects and might be controlled by them. Of such a man it might well be whispered that he had greater designs in Virginia than a tobacco plantation.

The most pressing task of the new Company was to save the remnant of the colony; of three hundred persons sent to Virginia under the first charter not a hundred survived. Sir Thomas Gates was dispatched with five hundred colonists and absolute authority over the colony. Gates with part of his fleet was wrecked on the Bermudas, an incident which Shakespeare utilized as the basis of *The Tempest*. The four hundred men who reached Virginia had no leader. Smith had been injured and invalided home. All the former difficulties of sickness, hunger, and Indian peril appeared in the "Starving Time," and when Gates arrived from Bermuda with boats built from his wrecks scarce sixty men were left in Virginia. Only the arrival of Lord Delaware with supplies and one hundred and fifty men saved the colony from abandonment.

Gates and Delaware

Delaware governed the colony on strict lines of military discipline, alternating the inhabitants in drill and husbandry. To curb the "soldiering" inevitable under such a system Delaware's successor, Sir Thomas Dale, a soldier who believed the martial law as sacred as the laws of the Medes and Persians and no penalty too severe for its faintest infraction, applied a savage discipline. By allotting lands for a rent in corn and allowing servants of the Company a part of their time, he began the abandonment of the older system by which the colonists worked for their master the Company.

Dale's Laws

In 1619 a revolution in the Virginia Company brought Sir Edwin Sandys and his group into control. They at once completed the transmutation of Virginia from a private farm, belonging to the Company and worked by its servants, into a community with a large group of financially independent citizens. Sub-patents were granted various persons for tracts of land on which they settled their own servants as farmers. Seven years' service on public land by a servant of the Company entitled him to land of his own.

Sir Edwin Sandys' policy

True to the almost republican ideas of Sandys his faction pressed on the evolution of Virginia into a political commonwealth. In 1619 Sir George Yeardley, the governor, was instructed to call a

legislative assembly made up of two delegates from each settlement or patented plantation. The first representative legislature in the New World met in the Jamestown church eighteen months before the Pilgrim fathers landed at Plymouth. Had their original plans been carried out they might have sent William Bradford and William Brewster to sit in some future Virginia House of Burgesses. The same rising force of self-government in English life at widely removed points was influencing the aristocratic opposition leaders like Sandys and humble Separatist exiles like Bradford. Compared with either, Sir Thomas Smith represents the Elizabethan influences that had established Virginia and were now passing from the scene.

Representative government

The House of Burgesses met in June, 1619, with twenty-two burgesses from eleven boroughs. It framed various petitions to the Company, enacted as laws various instructions which the Company had sent out, and initiated some acts of its own. It suggested that Company and Burgesses have a mutual veto on each other's legislation. The Company took the work of the Burgesses under consideration; in 1624 it seemed to approve the Assembly's suggestion as to the veto. A second Assembly, whose acts are not preserved, met in 1621, and a third in 1624.

The House of Burgesses, 1619

Meanwhile the royal disfavor hung over the Company, for its new management was in the hands of James's most bitter opponents. He vainly tried to interfere with the yearly election of treasurer in order to oust them, but only replaced Sandys by Sandys' supporter, the Earl of Southampton. In 1621 the Company proposed a new scheme of government for the colony: there was to be a governor and council appointed by the Company, and Burgesses elected by the colonists; the governor and ultimately the king were to have the veto power. The Company planned to secure Parliamentary sanction to this scheme; but neither of the first two Stuart kings admitted that Parliament had any concern with the colonies.

The king's displeasure

Affairs in Virginia gave the king a handle against the Company. After 1610 the mortality had been almost as great as before.

Between 1619 and 1622, three thousand five hundred emigrants to the colony had increased its population but two hundred and forty. An Indian massacre in March, 1622, gave another pretext. It was easy to frame complaints on such a basis, and, obsequious to the royal wish, they came. **Complaints of the Company**
In 1623 the king sent out a commission to inquire into matters, meanwhile vesting control of the Company in his Privy Council.

The end was in sight. James offered to go back to the arrangement of 1606 by which he supervised the government, and the Company took the profits, if any. The Company refused; it tried to appeal to Parliament but James forbade the Parliament to interfere. In 1624 a writ of *quo warranto* was sued out against the charter, citing the members for an undue use of their corporate powers. The effect of the writ when granted was not to annul the charter but to lodge in the king's hands the powers enjoyed under it. The Company made a series of attempts to regain control; all of them were unsuccessful. Henceforth Virginia was governed directly by the king. **The end of the Company**

Government in Virginia nevertheless followed the line it had already taken. The first royal governors called in citizens to consult with the Council on public business; and in 1628 Charles I permitted an elected assembly, recognizing the existence of such a body in instructions to his governors in 1639 and 1641. **Royal governors**
The earlier royal governors indeed were little more important than their councils. One of them, Sir John Harvey, was "thrust out of his government" by his Council for alleged arbitrary acts; and though Charles for the moment reinstated the deposed governor, to "save his face," he soon recalled him. The office swayed back and forth between Harvey and the opposition till Sir William Berkeley was sent out as governor in 1642.

In his two terms in the office, 1642–1652, and 1660–1677, Berkeley left a deep impress on it, and on the colony as well. In his younger days, vigorous, fearless, and upright, he led the colonists rather than governed them. The colony was loyal to

Charles I during the English Civil War between king and Parliament from 1642 to 1649. Charles II was proclaimed in one Virginia county after the execution of Charles I; and the colony yielded in 1652 only to a strong Parliamentary military and naval expedition sent to secure the obedience of Virginia, Maryland, and Barbadoes. From 1652 to 1660 Virginia's governor was elected by the Assembly. Then on the restoration of Charles II as king in England, Berkeley consented to become provisional governor; later he was confirmed in office by the king.

Sir William Berkeley

III

Such political events of Virginia history, however, are inconsiderable beside the forces that were molding a distinctive system of local government and life destined to leave its imprint on great portions of the future United States. The first of those forces was Virginia's staple crop, tobacco. In the sixteenth century English adventurers had picked up the use of the weed in Spanish America and had introduced it to England where it speedily became popular despite the fact that James I assailed it with both influence and pen.

Economic factors in Virginia life

The first tobacco was grown in Virginia in 1612 by John Rolfe. Dale tried to limit the acreage to one-half that of Indian corn, but the culture flourished. At twelve shillings, even at three and sixpence a pound, it was tremendously profitable. Sandys had expected the control of the tobacco trade to make good to the Company its loss from the abandonment of the plantation system. Repeatedly it was proposed that some person or group be given a monopoly of the tobacco trade. James I in spite of moral objections seized the main chance and laid a duty of a shilling a pound on all tobacco imported into England. The Virginia Company acquiesced on condition that tobacco-growing in England be prohibited; the prohibition was more or less effectively enforced.

Tobacco

If Virginia was to bear such a revenue duty it was necessary to protect its produce against the more popular Spanish tobacco by

prohibition of its import, by limitation of the quantity imported, or by heavy duties. All these were tried. When the importation from Virginia rose to millions of pounds, the £100,000 more or less that the duty yielded the royal revenue was a very important item. The royal influence therefore was opposed to its export to Europe at large by the ubiquitous Dutch traders; this was intermittently prohibited. In 1627 the amount to be imported into England was limited, but this was unusual.

Regulation of tobacco trade

Tobacco requires much careful labor in transplanting the young plants to the field, in tending them, in picking, curing, and packing the leaves. While a large crop can be grown in a comparatively small area it speedily exhausts the soil; and seventeenth-century tobacco culture demanded more and more fresh acreage to be substituted for worn-out fields. For the necessary labor with which to expand, the Virginia planter relied on the head-right system, generally in force after 1618—fifty acres of land for each person black or white, free or slave, imported into the colony. As the seventeenth century drew to a close, as plantations grew larger and colonial magnates more ambitious of broad acres, head rights were fraudulently collected two or three times over by various documents relating to the same imported servant. In later years the quit rents or annual dues to the crown on lands thus granted were not often paid; and the legal provision for escheat or forfeiture to the colony of unimproved grants was evaded in various ways.

Tobacco culture

The labor system of indentured servants lent itself to this state of things. Probably the majority of men imported into the colony by the Virginia Company before 1618 had been bound to service for a term of years to pay for their passage. With the abandonment of the plantation type of colony, individual planters could likewise bring in men and women indentured to serve for a term of seven years. Soon it became a business in England to send out cargoes of indentured servants whose time of service was auctioned off on their arrival in the colony. These shiploads were sometimes recruited from ne'er-do-wells and persons convicted of what we should to-day call minor offenses; more

Indentured servants

often they were laborers from city or country who looked for a new start in a new world. Many people, children especially, were kidnaped. Probably the "redemptioners" generally fared no worse in treatment and better in food and clothing than they had in Old England.

At the expiration of their terms of service, the redemptioners received a little clothing and equipment; they might work for wages; and if enterprising enough they might finally acquire farms of their own. Negro slaves appeared in the colony in 1619; but their number was insignificant before 1650, and only increased in the later seventeenth century as masters recognized that in buying negro slaves of both sexes they bought labor not for a term of years but for generations. Probably the indentured servant down to 1660 generally established himself as a Virginia small farmer; after that date he probably found it more difficult to do so, and often drifted out to the frontier or south to North Carolina. The small farmer, not the planter, was the prevailing type in early Virginia; only in the later seventeenth century did the great planters control the vestries, hold the county offices, by their seats in the governor's Council secure exemption from taxation, build the great houses which still dominate the Virginia landscape, and add thousands upon thousands to their acres.

Virgina's aristocratic tendencies

Tobacco culture and the nature of the country at least encouraged the extension of settlement over a wide area. In early Virginia names implying massed population like "Charles City," "Argall's Town," the "Borough of Henrico" appear with almost pathetic frequency as if men hoped the thing might follow the name. But as Company control and the Indian peril disappeared, population spread ever thinner and thinner. The farmer and planter needed elbow room to change from exhausted tobacco fields to fresh ones. Even building town houses at public expense could hardly provide a colonial capital large enough to accommodate the government. Jamestown and Williamsburg, successive capitals of a populous province, were barely hamlets in size. In the late eighteenth century a popula-

Thin settlement

tion of a half million supported but one town of 6000 inhabitants. The great river estuaries on which ocean-going ships could tie up at plantation wharves to load tobacco made seaport towns unnecessary. No commercial class developed in Virginia. The farmer or planter sold direct to shipowner or factor, or hired ships to carry the tobacco consigned to his Bristol or London agent in payment for goods exported directly to him.

Hence the town, the essential unit of New England local government, in Virginia was nonexistent. In its absence government clustered around the parish and the county. The parish was taken primarily from English usage as the unit not merely of ecclesiastical service and instruction, but also of much local government. The parish vestries levied poor rates and controlled assessment of taxes. Parishes were large; there were about fifty in seventeenth-century Virginia. Until 1660, the vestries were elected by the people; afterwards for a time they were self-perpetuating.

The parish

The counties were, however, the essential units of Virginia's local government. Just as in Tudor England, the justices of the peace severally had judicial powers, and acting jointly as a county court administered county government. The justices, the sheriff as executive of the county, and the colonel of its militia were all appointed by the govornor. Except for the Burgesses, the people of 1660 chose none of their rulers; what voting they did was on the basis of manhood suffrage of all freemen. In 1670 and again in 1684 the suffrage was limited to freeholders. As the plantation system developed, the great planters as members of the council of county courts and as members of the vestries came more and more to dominate Virginia life in their own interests.

The county

If we inquire about legislation and taxation, once again we come on the odor of tobacco. Since tobacco both good and bad was fatally easy to grow, we find all manner of laws prescribing methods of curing and packing to keep up the quality and to preserve the English and European markets. We find laws for inspection and the destruction of inferior leaf. Sometimes if the market was glutted, as was often the case, we meet proposals to

Taxation

limit planting or to destroy a fixed proportion of the crop; though such measures, as likely to reduce the royal revenue, were opposed by the home government and its governor in Virginia. Colonial taxation too turned mainly on tobacco. There were taxes on export; but the main tax levy was on the tithables; that is, on persons of an age to work at tobacco, whether bond, slave, or free. If the tithable was unfree, the owner paid the levy; if free, the man paid it himself. Local and general taxation alike was levied with the tithable as a unit. The assembly would not tax land because much private land was unused. It taxed instead capacity to make tobacco.

IV

In economic environment colonial Maryland was the complement of Virginia. In spite of a somewhat greater diversification of crops in the more northern colony, the staple tobacco had the same effects in both. The especial interest of Maryland in the evolution of the United States is as the typical proprietary colony and as one of the first abodes of religious toleration. To understand its contribution in these respects we must examine its origin.

Maryland

During the reign of James I, religious, social, and political influences were drawing many not overzealous Protestants of the upper class to the bosom of the Roman Church. After 1623 Sir George Calvert, an English politician who had favored the marriage of Prince Charles with a Spanish Catholic princess, became openly a Roman Catholic; and, giving up public life in England, he turned his thoughts to colonization. Charles I created him Baron Baltimore in the Irish peerage, granted him a charter for a tract he had acquired in Newfoundland, and, when he sought a more genial climate, gave him, in spite of Virginian opposition, a portion of Virginia, approximately the present State of Maryland.

Lord Baltimore

Maryland, first of the proprietary colonies later amalgamated into the United States, was granted to Baltimore as a feudal holding of an extraordinary kind. In the Middle Ages certain

Courtesy of the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan

A MAP OF VIRGINIA AND MARYLAND OF 1676 BASED ON SMITH'S MAP

great fiefs called palatinates had existed on the borders of England, most notable among them being Durham. The Bishop of Durham owed allegiance to the King of England; but practically to the inhabitants of Durham he stood in the place of the king. Similar powers were conferred on Baltimore when his charter specified the rights of the Bishop of Durham as the measure of his powers. He might coin money, appoint officials, execute justice; but, a significant departure from the model of Durham, he might legislate for his colony only with the advice and consent of the freemen or their representatives. The laws must be consonant with those of England. Baltimore was empowered to establish churches according to the Anglican form; this provision, since one of his objects at least was to establish a refuge for those of his faith, was of no particular value to him. When he died, a little before the charter was formally granted, it was made out to his son Cecilius Calvert.

The Palatinate

The history of Maryland suggests a few general tendencies in proprietary colonies. The proprietor was always under temptation to regard his colony as a sort of personal estate, with its unoccupied lands, its quit rents and its taxes as his private perquisites. The proprietor especially after 1660 selected as governor a member of his family, and filled the Council and great offices with his relatives by blood or marriage. The people on the other hand persisted in regarding the proprietor as merely a stated part of the colony government, bound to think first of its welfare. As the proprietor in his real person was only a seventeenth-century English noble, his few servants hired as men of peace rather than war, the military means of enforcing his authority were usually lacking, and in the long run the inhabitants had their own way.

Problems of proprietary colonies

Baltimore's first settlement at St. Mary's in 1634 was in every way a success. It enjoyed good health, was untroubled by the Indians, and was abundantly supplied with provisions. For much of its good fortune it had to thank the near-by colony of Virginia, which served as a most convenient base. Other settlements grew up in Maryland. In spite of their Catholicism the Calverts wel-

comed colonists, Anglican and Puritan alike; and while they sought to keep the leadership in the group of their Catholic relatives and friends, they made the religious question as unobtrusive as possible. They made liberal grants of land to emigrants: those paying their own passage received one hundred acres for each adult or fifty for each child; those who brought in five settlers received manors of 2,000 acres or more. Prior to 1676 about sixty of these Maryland manors had appeared averaging 3,000 acres; in some of them certain rights of local government pertained to the lords of the manors. Generally local government turned on the counties and hundreds; county government followed the English plan of justices of the peace enjoying judicial powers as individuals and sitting together for purposes of local government; sheriffs, similarly appointed by the central authority, served as county executives.

Settlement of Maryland

Maryland's early history is interesting mainly for two things—the evolution of government and the religious issue. For the first, the governor of Maryland, usually chosen by the proprietor from his kinsmen, was not merely the chief executive but also the military and naval commander-in-chief, the highest common-law judge, and, for most of the time, the chancellor or head of equity jurisdiction. He was essentially the proprietor's agent on the ground. Most of his executive powers were exercised with the advice of a council also appointed by the proprietor and ranging in numbers up to nine or ten.

The proprietary governor

The proprietary charter, requiring laws to be made by and with the consent of the freemen, laid the foundations of representative government in Maryland. It took fifteen years of contest to evolve an orderly procedure. As to the make-up of the lower house, sometimes the proprietor introduced proxies for freemen who did not attend, side by side with elected representatives; sometimes the house was wholly representative. In 1638 certain designated freemen were invited to attend in person; others were allowed to attend in person or send proxies. In 1639 the lower house was made up partly of gentlemen summoned by name, partly of elected representatives. In 1640

Evolution of the Assembly

it was almost wholly representative; in 1642 it was constituted on the system of personal attendance or proxies. Not till 1650 was the representative system definitely adopted, and council and burgesses established in two different houses instead of in one as hitherto. In such fashion were painfully evolved institutions and procedures which we have long since come to regard as matters of course.

A further difficulty arose from the proprietor's early claim to initiate legislation. He rejected all the acts passed in 1635, perhaps because they originated in the Assembly. He submitted to the Assembly in 1638 twelve bills, all of which it rejected; in his turn he rejected all the acts of that Assembly. He sent over sixteen bills in 1649; the Assembly passed a portion, but protested against the practice. Generally thereafter he abandoned claim to the legislative initiative.

Proprietor and legislation

To understand the religious policy of Maryland culminating in the Toleration Act of 1649, several other elements in the situation must be considered. Virginia and Maryland had been on bad terms from the beginning, the Virginians resenting the setting off of Maryland from their province. When Maryland forcibly exerted her authority over a Virginia settlement within her jurisdiction at Kent Island under William Claiborne, the situation became worse. Matters were further complicated by the outbreak of the English Civil War in 1642, the Puritans generally supporting the Parliament and the Roman Catholics, the king. To be safe Baltimore inclined to the side of the Parliament; but, even so, there was a Puritan revolt in Maryland in 1645 that was not put down by Leonard Calvert, the governor, until 1646.

Maryland and her neighbors

In this situation Baltimore could only hope to win the more radical wing of the English Puritans by subordinating the Roman Catholic element in Maryland, and by enacting into law the toleration practiced in the colony for some time. In 1648 he had placed the government in the hands of a Protestant governor and council, and had issued an ordinance aimed at the Jesuits, forbidding religious societies to appropriate land: and in 1649 he sent over the draft of the famous Toleration Act, granting freedom of worship to all professing belief in Jesus Christ.

Toleration

Baltimore's government was left undisturbed by the Parliamentary forces that in 1652 secured the submission of Virginia; but a Puritan revolt against him in which William Claiborne seized the opportunity to make trouble, left affairs in confusion until the eve of the Restoration in England in 1660 when the proprietor recovered authority.

The interregnum

By 1660 Virginia and Maryland revealed the outlines of a political system that the American Revolution was to transmute into state governments. They exhibited the rudiments of a system of county government that was in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to be carried over into many a State of the west and south. Above all, in their economic life, they displayed the plantation system and the single staple crop, destined to be the ruling motif for two centuries in southern economic life.

The Plantation Colonies

In closing this chapter on non-Puritan colonization before 1660 a brief account must be given of affairs in New England. The Plymouth Company, which was the coördinate of the London Company, planted a colony at Sagadahoc on the Maine coast in 1607; but the cold winter of 1607–1608 caused its abandonment and for a dozen years there was no further English colonial activity in the north. The French settlements in Maine and Nova Scotia had preceded the English and remained till they were broken up by the Virginian Captain Argall in 1613. DeMonts in 1604 had settled at the mouth of the St. Croix. Three years later he had mapped the coast as far as Cape Cod. The Dutch, following up the discovery made in their name by the English seaman, Henry Hudson, established themselves in the island of Manhattan on one of the world's finest harbors at the foot of the great river that was the main artery of the northern fur trade. The claims of this little Dutch settlement stretched out vaguely, reaching on the one hand to the Delaware, on the other to the Connecticut.

New England

But as a result of the presence of these rivals English interest in the north persisted. Voyages of exploration went on; the coast was mapped in 1614 by that indefatigable adventurer Captain

John Smith. Sir Ferdinando Gorges, governor of Plymouth, one of the founders of the Plymouth Company of 1606 and later proprietary of Maine, contrived to set on foot expeditions for exploration and trade. He knew of the plague that in 1616–1617 had destroyed the Indian population in the later Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay region. One of his captains had kidnaped the Indian Samoset and another had left him at Plymouth a few months before he welcomed the Pilgrims there with words spoken in the English tongue.

Sir Ferdinando Gorges

The English government tried to improve the situation by creating in 1620 the Council for New England. The name recalls the organization of 1606. The Council, appointed by the king from the nobles and gentlemen of the court faction, had powers to govern New England and to patent lands for plantations vesting authority for government in the patentee. Its importance, beyond one or two futile attempts to establish a central government over the New England settlements, down to its dissolution in 1635 was limited to serving as a source of titles to New England colonists. Those titles were frequently overlapping and contradictory. Twice the Council sliced New England like a cake and passed the pieces among its members. But most settlements in New England before 1635 based their title to the soil on a grant from the Council for New England. It furnished the legal basis on which the Puritan colonies were built.

The Council for New England

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

L. G. Tyler, *England in America* (*American Nation*, vol. IV). New York, 1904.
G. L. Beer, *The Origin of the British Colonial System, 1578–1660*. New York, 1908.
P. A. Bruce, *Economic History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century*. 2 vols. New York, 1896.
——, *Institutional History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century*. 2 vols. New York, 1910.
——, *Social Life of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century*. Richmond, 1907.
N. D. Mereness, *Maryland as a Proprietary Province*. New York, 1901.
H. L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century*. 3 vols. New York, 1904–1907.
E. Channing, *A History of the United States*, vol. I. New York, 1905.

CHAPTER III

THE PURITAN COLONIES

I

The Puritan Revolution, that religious and political upheaval which shook the foundations of seventeenth-century England, in its earlier phases was responsible for the establishment of a group of Puritan colonies in New England and for various scattered settlements in Long Island, New York, New Jersey, and Maryland. Immediately, it was of vital importance in securing English control of the regions between the Susquehanna and the Kennebec at the moment when they seemed likely to fall to the Dutch and French; in its effect on the institutional development of the future United States and a strong American philosophy of life its ultimate force was infinitely greater. The Puritan colonies should be studied as laboratories whose experiments made distinct contributions to the institutions and ideas of the future America.

Influence of Puritanism in America

To understand the Puritan we must understand the sixteenth-century Reformation. In accepting it the Northern European states had abandoned the medieval dream of the Church as the Catholic and universal bond of the diverse nations and tongues of Christendom, and had substituted for it the idea of the national church, the handmaid of the state in the promotion of civil order. Protestantism had eschewed the Catholic appeal by ritual to the senses and emotions, substituting for it by sermon and catechism and Bible appeal to the intellect. In the long run the inevitable result has been to set the individual conscience free, face to face with God, to work out its own salvation. But in the seventeenth century, Protestant minister and statesman shrank from this conclusion and by the use of coercive powers of church and state sought to make the

The Reformation and the individual conscience

individual accept the intellectual interpretation of the Scriptures and the way to salvation which they themselves deduced from the Word of God.

In England with the definitive establishment of Protestantism on the accession of Elizabeth in 1558, a national church was set up. Governed by bishops and deans appointed by the crown, its ceremonies a compromise between the Roman order and the Protestant, it was speedily attacked by zealous reformers steeped in extreme Protestant doctrines learned in exile in the cities of the continent during Mary's Catholic reaction. This group, stronger in aggressiveness and social standing than in numbers, criticized as "rags of popery" the vestments of the service, the sign of the cross, the bishops. At their personal disregard of the Anglican service, the astute Elizabeth winked; their attempts to set up governments, within the church, of the Presbyterian order with representative assemblies of godly laymen and ministers, she sternly repressed. In 1603 at the accession of James I, king of Presbyterian and Puritan Scotland, they had hopes of success. But when the Hampton Court Conference of 1604 made it clear that the only essential changes which James contemplated were to make the Anglican church more efficient, they fell back on Parliament as the last hope of enforcing their opinions on the church. Through the reigns of James I and Charles I until 1629, Puritan members of the House of Commons worked for a reform of the church; always they were sharply checked by the king.

The Puritans and the Anglican church

The Puritans, mustering strong among the country gentlemen and the merchants and craftsmen of the towns, were distinguished by their opinions not merely of the church but of life in general. In the old, easy England there had been much looseness and immorality attached to the early morning celebration of May Day in the woods, much brutalizing cruelty in the battles to the death between chained bull or bear and mastiffs, much viciousness in the stage play; and the Puritan, setting his face against these things, seemed to forbid men all pleasure that did not come from the intellectual contemplation of religion. More and

Puritanism and life

more engrossed in the things of the mind and the spirit, he shut his eyes to the outward beauties of the world around him.

Inevitably the Puritan forced his will on others. To him the world appeared as a battleground between God and the forces of evil in which the highest ambition of man was to be God's agent in remaking the world after the image of heavenly perfection.

Puritan religious ideas

The Puritan generally held the Calvinistic theology that the sin of Adam filtered through his descendants and so poisoned their wills that though their minds recognized the will of God they could not pursue it, and therefore justly merited damnation. Only God's saving grace meted out to the elect, chosen from the beginning of the world, could purify their wills and lift them from the depths of sin and damnation to be the partners of God in His work. Before men imbued with the belief that they were the chosen agents of God in remaking the world, all opposition went down.

Very important in the Puritan mind was the idea of the law of God. Primarily he sought to derive that law from the Bible, the inspired word of God, often making strange interpretations of seemingly simple texts to meet his ends. He strictly judged and condemned all ecclesiastical institutions and ceremonies not

The Law of God

expressly authorized by the law he deduced from his Bible. The idea was even more important when in seventeenth-century England and America he transferred it to the field of civil government, and searched there for a supreme overruling law to which all other law must conform. The Puritan idea of the supremacy of law is one of the roots of the American concept of a constitution as a law paramount to all lesser enactments.

The same principle helped to determine the Puritan's political course in England. Not only did the Puritan oppose James I and Charles I because they supported the established order in the Church of England and the so-called Arminian group which would elaborate her ceremonies; he opposed also their theories of government. The Tudor sovereigns by skill in leadership had ruled much as they had liked, disregarding older settled forms and precedents of government when they thought it necessary.

James I and Charles I attempted to formulate the Tudor practice under the principle of the divine right of kings, holding that the king enjoyed a prerogative to disregard stated rules of government whenever he thought best, and need account only to God for its exercise. The advocates of the English common law like Sir Edward Coke set counter to this the doctrine that the ancient ways of government embodied in statute and precedent were binding on king and Parliament alike. That the Puritans, fervent believers in the supremacy of God's law in the sphere of religion, should believe in a supreme law in England higher than the king's prerogative, was but natural. In the contest between king and Parliament that ran through the reigns of James I and Charles I until in 1629 Charles attempted a ten-year experiment of rule without calling a Parliament, both religious opinion and philosophy of government enlisted the Puritan on the Parliamentary side.

The Supremacy of Law

II

Brownism, Separatism, Independency, Congregationalism—such are the successive terms under which the most anarchical of religious ideas has been transmuted into a commonplace of our own day. First, a church can originate only in the covenant or compact of its members to walk with Christ in his steps; secondly, such a church can consist only of Christians pure and regenerate enough to enter such a covenant; thirdly, such a church can never be a state church in the sense of including in its bosom the whole population of a nation. The last concept of course was a challenge to the whole Anglican church system.

Separatism

These doctrines were first set forward about 1580 by Robert Browne in a series of little books in which he advocated separation from the Anglican church, and the formation of new churches by covenant. That private men should take the liberty to do so was inexcusable alike to the Anglican and to the conservative Puritan. Separatism whenever it appeared was met with persecution that forced Browne to recant and sent his intellectual successors Barrow and Green-

Robert Browne and his ideas

wood to the gallows. Several "separated" churches before 1600 had taken refuge in Holland, a businesslike country that believed religious persecution poor business. There they did not prosper.

The Scrooby Church

Still another congregation near Scrooby in Nottinghamshire, fostered by William Brewster, was served in the pulpit by the Reverend John Robinson, "the most learned, polished and modest spirit that ever separated from the Church of England," a man with a learning worthy of his age and a liberalism so far beyond its domination that he could bid his followers follow him no further than he followed Christ, and in his last advice urge them to close as much as possible with the Puritans who remained in the English church. The impress of this man on his congregation made them fit for great things.

The Pilgrims in Leyden

Persecution, not very severe, followed the attempt of the little congregation to escape to Holland after 1604. There they settled at Leyden and were justly proud of the good opinion Dutch magistrates expressed of their sobriety and uprightness. But a little colony of rustics was at a sad disadvantage in gaining a living in a city of the most industrial nation of Europe; they bewailed the tasks poverty compelled them to lay as burdens on their children, and even more the corroding influence on them of city life. They began to speculate on the possibility of removal to the New World where they might retain their English speech and their religious beliefs.

Financing the Pilgrim colony

Deciding to encounter the dangers of settlement in America, they had to borrow the necessary funds of certain English investors, who specified in the terms a seven-year pooling of all profits that might accrue from the colony; the emigrants were to devote their labor to a fund to return dividends to the investors. Various difficulties delayed them until late in 1620 when they finally set out with one ship, the *Mayflower*, with about a hundred emigrants, the lesser part of the Leyden church.

Their original plan had been to settle in the bounds of the Virginia Company and establish one of the little autonomous

plantations that Sir Edwin Sandys was fostering. But carried out of their course by foul weather and compelled to land in the Cape Cod region, they established themselves at a place already named Plymouth, resolving to seek a grant of it from the Council for New England. This unforeseen change of location threw them into great difficulty. They had relied on their sub-patent from the Virginia Company as the basis of their government; outside Virginia, as some unruly ones among them reminded the leaders, the patent was null and void. In this dilemma, their notion of the origin of church government in the agreement of the members led them to the revolutionary notion of establishing civil government in the same way. By the Mayflower Compact the men of the colony agreed to submit themselves to the majority and the laws it should enact.

The Mayflower Compact

Much of late has vainly been written in depreciation of this document. Undoubtedly it recognizes the authority of King James; it may be merely the first of the Plantation Covenants; but the startling thing in it, pregnant with promise for future American institutions, is the faith of a little body of humble men that they can establish government over themselves by agreement. For the first but not the last time on the American continent, the Puritan notion of law expresses itself in the government of a new-born state.

Government by consent of the governed

Much of the history of Plymouth has to be left untold. Brewster, the first governor, was succeeded by the young William Bradford, a vigorous man of action and moral purpose who was later to write the history of the colony in one of the epics of American literature, *The History of Plymouth Plantation.* The Puritan fathers of New England were prone to see God's hand in the afflictions of their enemies; Bradford, a man the world had battered only to temper his metal, invoked divine judgments only to explain the misfortunes of men who had been callous to human suffering. At first, all Bradford's leadership was needed, for the little colony hung by a thread. Sickness and exposure in the New England winter decimated it; but then came the New England spring as well as a friendship with the Indians which the little

William Bradford

group of whites maintained by kindness, self-respect, and a show of military readiness. It became possible to send for the remainder of the Leyden Church, though Robinson was not to live to see his flock reunited. The orderly little settlement perforce had to assume a police jurisdiction over other more lawless settlers in the Massachusetts Bay region.

Economically the little enterprise was saved by the trade in furs from the New England rivers. The colony exploited the beaver from the Maine rivers to the Connecticut. The fur trade enabled Bradford and his associates to assume the responsibility of the money owed to the London investors and enabled their charge to pass completely from a state of enforced community of labor and produce to a system of private property. The English government, following King James's indirect promise that he would "connive at them, and not molest them; provided they carried themselves peaceably," did not interfere. From the Council for New England they obtained a patent under which they could exercise government over the lands they occupied.

Plymouth and the fur trade

The constitution of the little colony grew in a most interesting way. The first government was the assembly of the freemen of the colony, who elected a governor as executive. As the tasks of the governor multiplied it seemed good that first one assistant and then more be chosen for him. When the number of assistants annually elected with the governor rose to five or seven, they became a council. As the colony spread into outlying towns, it became necessary to differentiate between the government of Plymouth town and that of the colony. Other towns were established with rights of self-government vested in their freemen. As it became less and less convenient for the freemen in outlying towns to attend the meetings for legislation, in 1639 the towns were allowed to send deputies; but their legislation was subject to repeal by the assembly of all the freemen in the annual courts of election. Not until 1652 were the freemen allowed to send their votes for governor and assistants by proxy. A rudimentary government of the people and their elected leaders

Evolution of government

had differentiated into local and general government, while the general government had become a governor and a council of seven assistants annually elected, and a lower house of representatives of the towns. The process is as practical and inevitable as the cell division by which a simple form of life becomes complex.

In numbers Plymouth Plantation was always small. The little Leyden Church was its motive for being and its main source of supply. The colony did not welcome settlers not of its type; it might ask them to depart or refuse them admission to the privileges of freemen. Its great importance in American history is in its exemplification of the origin of government in the consent of the governed; and the Mayflower Compact is to be traced back directly to the Separatist theory of the origin of church government in covenant, and still further to the underlying idea of the sanctity of the individual conscience.

Significance of Plymouth

III

The second of the great Puritan experiments in colonization in New England was grafted on one of the little commercial settlements that had sprung up in the neighborhood of the Plymouth enterprise. Dorchester merchants had established a fishing station on Cape Ann in 1623; they abandoned it in 1626. Then the Puritan rector of Dorchester, John White, bestirred himself to reawaken interest in it as a possible basis of Puritan operations in the New World—"a Bulworke against the kingdome of Ante Christ." Accordingly a grant was obtained from the Council for New England of a tract from a point three miles north of the Merrimac to a point three miles south of the Charles. John Endicott, a stiff Puritan of the most uncompromising type, was sent out with more settlers to Salem.

The origins of Massachusetts Bay

The patent from the Council of New England was really only a release of all its rights in the region, which left the patentees "face to face with the King." In March of 1629 therefore the group obtained a royal charter creating the "Governor and Com-

pany of the Massachusetts Bay in New England." Save in one important particular, the charter resembled the Virginia charter of 1609. The freemen or members of the Company were to transact its business in four general courts each year; in one of them they were to elect a governor, a deputy governor, and eighteen assistants who were to hold monthly meetings. In its first stages the Company is best understood by comparison with a modern corporation, the freemen corresponding to the stockholders, the governor and deputy governor to president and vice-president, and the assistants to the board of directors. The peculiar thing about this charter was that it did not specify, as ordinary charters do, the place where meetings of the corporation should be held.

The Charter of 1629

March, 1629, was the month in which Charles I dissolved the last Parliament that England was to see for eleven years. The House of Commons a few minutes before its forced adjournment had passed a resolution denouncing the high Anglican party, and any persons who should voluntarily pay taxes levied without consent of Parliament. Puritan and Anglican, Parliament and king stood definitely aligned against each other. And for the moment the king and the Anglican had the upper hand.

The Puritans on the defensive

In these weeks, apparently, it occurred to one John Winthrop to cast in his lot with a Puritan enterprise in the New World. He had lost a court place and his patron; his means were too narrow for his expenses; above all, he could see the divine wrath hovering over England, and he looked to the New World as a refuge. Winthrop was a man of good ability, of fine and sensitive fiber that made him almost femininely cruel when his dignity was contemned; a man who had lived a sheltered life, tended by three wives in succession, with the last of whom, to his own amazement, he fell deeply in love. Such was the man who undertook the leading of the Massachusetts enterprise on strange terms.

John Winthrop

Seizing on the fact that the charter did not specify the corporation's place of meeting, the members of the Massachusetts Bay

Company in the summer of 1629 decided to carry their corporation over to New England and there establish it as the body politic of their colony. Instead of a nonresident master of the colony in England, the corporation was to be the colony itself. Accordingly the offices in it were to be transferred to men like Winthrop who would agree to emigrate, and they might carry on the corporate life in the midst of the colony across the Atlantic. By this device the breadth of the ocean would protect the Company from possible interference from the king; and the grants of power in the charter could be used to mold the colony to the shape its projectors designed.

Transfer of the corporation

The intentions of the founders of Massachusetts Bay Colony are far more remote from our present consciousness than those of the founders of Plymouth and must be carefully studied if they are to be understood. The essential aim was the establishment in the New World of a Puritan State. The idea of such a state developed more or less consciously on the model of the Jewish polity as it is revealed in the books of Moses. The magistrate and the minister must work hand in hand like Moses the lawgiver and Aaron the priest. The minister must teach obedience to the magistrate. The magistrates must be "nursing fathers of the church," to guide it in the ways of orthodoxy, and to check and control any individual church that strays or runs counter to accepted beliefs. The ministers must continually be consulted as to the will of God revealed in his word, not merely in matters relating to church government but also in such secular affairs as the law of property, the division of land, the election of magistrates, and the levying of war. In this ideal system there is no room for freedom of thought or dissent; for the Bible is the sole rule and the ministers and magistrates its sole interpreters; and the individual conscience must think as they think and reach their conclusion. Still less is there any room for democracy; for the men of wealth and quality, like Governor Winthrop and Deputy Governor Thomas Dudley, his rival, must govern as Moses and the princes of the tribes of Israel governed in the wilderness.

The Bible Commonwealth

Indeed the leaders of the enterprise, attempting at first to make it an oligarchy of the most narrow type, found the letter and spirit of the charter too democratic for them. For if the corporation were transformed into a body politic, the freemen as enfranchised citizens would enjoy the privilege of electing year by year the governor and assistants who were the sole government of the colony. To escape this, at the General Court held October 19, 1630, the oligarchy decided that the assistants should hold office indefinitely, electing the governor and making laws. In March of 1631 it was decided that if fewer than nine assistants were present in the colony, a majority of those present might hold a court. This provision might put the sole power into a group of five or six men. When one knows that the company had brought out with Governor Winthrop a considerable number of indentured servants who were released only because they could not be fed over winter, one can see how nearly the Puritan experiment became an autocracy, political and economic.

Oligarchy

March of 1631, however, marked the high tide of autocracy. Thereafter the reaction in the direction of a broader basis of government slowly gathered force. In May, 1631, Winthrop was chosen governor "by the generall consent of the Court, according to the meaneing of the pattent" which probably meant he was elected by the freemen; the assistants were prevented from becoming a self-perpetuating body; and 116 new freemen were elected into the company—they had to be members of the Puritan congregations or churches that were being "gathered."

Defeat of the ruling clique

The freemen had vindicated their right of electing their magistracy; they were next to limit the powers it exercised. The governor and assistants had levied a tax on the settlements for fortifying Newtown, and in 1632 the elders of Watertown protested its payment; their protest bore no immediate fruit and in 1633 the assistants levied another tax. But in 1634 the crisis came. Two freemen deputed from each plantation met and demanded a sight of the charter, which they rightly interpreted as assigning legislation to the freemen and not to the

The Watertown Protest

assistants. In May of 1634 the General Court decided that only a General Court including the freemen could levy taxes, make laws, or elect officers.

In the further provision that the freemen in each town might choose two or three deputies to sit with the assistants, prepare business for the General Court and do all but choose officers, representative government began. Henceforth the freemen met only in the annual court of election. When in 1637 they were further permitted to send their proxies to Boston in lieu of personal attendance on the court of election, the evolution of goverment under the charter was complete. The body politic of the colony was the freemen, admitted as such by name in the General Court. In a yearly court of election they might either come in person to vote for governor, deputy governor, and assistants or might send up their ballots. In each town the freemen might elect deputies to sit with governor and assistants and as a legislature to tax and make laws. Not until 1644 did this body divide into a legislature of two houses, each assenting separately to all measures.

Representative government

The years of 1630–1634 had seen the rescue of Massachusetts from the autocratic government of a half dozen men of wealth and position; but even so it was far from democracy. The freemen had vindicated their right as the basis of government; but the freemen were themselves but a small minority, and the provision of 1631 that they must be members of a Puritan church necessarily limited them to a group inclined to be in sympathy with the aims of the leaders of the enterprise. The rank and file of the colony, small men, perhaps drawn in by the hope of economic betterment, remained ciphers in church and state.

Narrow basis of government

As to religion, the leaders of the enterprise before they migrated had, like the great majority of Puritans, conformed outwardly to the forms and services of the Church of England. Once in Massachusetts, however, they gravitated into a form of Congregationalism partly borrowed from Plymouth. As to just how far they repudiated the Church of England they were conveniently vague. But while the individual congregations

The Churches

in theory were autonomous, the magistrates, and the synods, or church representative assemblies, often interfered with the liberty of individual churches. Above all it must be remembered that church membership was open only to those who could recite religious experiences of a fruitful sort, and thus included but a minority of the population, mainly the upper classes.

More illuminating than generalization about the Massachusetts system is the dealing of the Bay with typical cases of dissent from the religious or political ideas of the ruling body.

Roger Williams

Roger Williams was a brilliant, lovable, young minister from England; friend of the Indians, founder of colonies, writer of books the rapt style of which makes them to-day unreadable, prolific in ideas, some of them vague, some of them ludicrous, some of them bulwarks of human liberty. He taught in the church at Salem that civil magistrates had no authority over offenses of "the first table," that the civil government has no right to punish religious beliefs or acts which are sins against God and not man. Implicit in this teaching was the then revolutionary doctrine of separation of church and state. At Plymouth he wrote a book in which he denied that the king's patent could take from the Indians their rights to the soil, which might be construed at home as a denial of the king's authority.

In 1635 the colony prescribed an oath of loyalty to all residents; Williams, again at Salem, denounced it for the strange reason that an oath was an act of worship, and to worship with the unregenerate was a sin. This was the last straw. He was summoned before the assistants. Salem supported him, but the General Court reduced her to submission by refusing her a needed grant of land. Williams was again summoned before the ministers and the General Court and banished. In the dead of winter he made his way to the desolate shores of Narragansett Bay. There he was to have a hand in a colony which became the future shrine of his noblest ideas—the separation of church and state, and religious liberty.

Banishment of Williams

An even more interesting revelation of the Puritan theocracy at work was the case of Mistress Anne Hutchinson. She was

a woman who in the seventeenth century had performed the remarkable feat of merging her husband's entity in her own. Mr. Hutchinson only dimly flitted across the background on which the colorful Anne played her part in the drama of Puritan intolerance. She came over in 1634 bringing with her, as Winthrop later recorded in the precise terms a twentieth-century sanitary officer would apply to a typhoid carrier, two dangerous heresies. The spiritual typhoid that she brought, put in modern terms, was that she believed in the direct guidance of the divine spirit working in her own, independently of the teachings of Scripture, of the church, or even of the moral law. This doctrine, the quintessence of Protestantism as emphasizing the responsibility of the individual soul to God, has sometimes been made the cloak for immorality. While Mistress Anne made no such application of the Antinomian doctrine, the conservative Puritan felt assured that sooner or later others would.

Mistress Anne Hutchinson

Mrs. Hutchinson's doctrine first began to appear when she held little conferences for women and men of the Boston Church, in which she discussed and enlarged on the sermons of the ministers Cotton and Wilson. Cotton, dear to Mrs. Hutchinson's heart, she distinguished as preaching a "Covenant of Grace." The dour John Wilson, a Puritan of the stiffest and most intolerant type, she dismissed as preaching a "Covenant of Works." In other words, the one taught the spiritual communion of the soul with its Creator, and the other the duty of obedience to the word of God.

The Covenant of Grace

Mrs. Hutchinson drew over to her side the greater part of the Boston Church and the inhabitants generally, including the governor in 1636–1637, Sir Harry Vane. Vane, a young English aristocrat, was one of those gentle, flighty souls with ideas too vague ever to be realized, who are peculiarly maddening to men of action. "Sir Harry Vane, Sir Harry Vane, the Lord deliver me from Sir Harry Vane," stormed Cromwell some fifteen years later as he turned Sir Harry and the Rump Parliament out of doors; and the same sentiment doubtless moved in the souls of Wilson and his supporter John Winthrop.

Sir Harry Vane

The warfare between Mrs. Hutchinson and her opponents produced the first contested election in American history. The General Court held the election at Newtown or Cambridge to avoid the atmosphere of the "Covenant of Grace" that pervaded Boston.

The Newtown election

John Wilson mounted a tree and harangued the voters against the Antinomian ticket; governor, deputy governor, and all, it went down in defeat. The children of the "Covenant of Works" were savagely vindictive. They called a synod or representative assembly of the churches at Newtown in August; the synod with true Puritan acuteness of analysis detected and listed eighty-odd different positions of Mrs. Hutchinson's group as blasphemous and erroneous. John Cotton turned his sails to the storm and abandoned the cause of his admirer. The General Court banished Mrs. Hutchinson and her followers. Vane had returned to England.

The established order stood in Massachusetts Bay. Mrs. Hutchinson had come near enough to overturning it to fill the sensitive soul of Winthrop with unspeakable malice at every misfortune that befell her thereafter until her death at the hands of Indians on Long Island a few years later. The desperate fight against the Antinomians was natural; for they were an unpractical lot and put in control of the state they undoubtedly would have wrecked the Massachusetts system altogether. But in the vindication of that system its advocates had had to become more remorseless to opposition than ever. The voices of the ministers when consulted on public affairs were more than ever for war and bloodshed. In the first clashes in American history between autocracy and liberty, if political autocracy had met with reverses, religious autocracy had held its ground. If Winthrop and his immediate associates had not vindicated their rights to be princes in Israel in Massachusetts Bay the ministers had at least induced the rather larger governing class of the freemen to accept their leadership. For almost three centuries their successors have retained a measure of their authority.

Ministerial control in the Bay

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

C. M. Andrews, *The Fathers of New England* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. VI). New Haven, 1919.
L. K. Mathews, *The Expansion of New England*. Boston, 1909.
J. T. Adams, *The Founding of New England*. Boston, 1921.
E. Eggleston, *The Beginners of a Nation*. New York, 1896.
W. Bradford, *Bradford's History of Plymouth Plantation* (In *Original Narratives of Early American History*, vol. VI). New York, 1908.
E. Channing, *A History of the United States*, vol. I. New York, 1905.
L. G. Tyler, *England in America* (*American Nation*, vol. IV). New York, 1904.
H. L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century*. 3 vols. New York, 1904–1907.

CHAPTER IV

THE EVOLUTION OF PURITAN NEW ENGLAND

In seventeenth-century Puritanism there was no such thing as uniformity. Men as diverse in character and view of life as Roger Williams and John Winthrop, as Thomas Hooker and John Wilson, each wrought passionately to establish on earth what he conceived to be the divine will in church and state. Their results were as diverse as their aims. Between 1635 and 1640 to the states already existing in Plymouth and Massachusetts were added other types of Puritan commonwealths, Connecticut, New Haven, and the Rhode Island towns. A study of these is necessary to an understanding of the Puritan contributions to American constitutional theory.

Multiplication of the Puritan states

The economic motives connected with the settlement of the Connecticut Valley may first be mentioned. The Dutch traders, who had been selling goods to Plymouth as early as 1627, pointed out to her the advantages of the Connecticut Valley for trade with the Indians in furs. The Dutchman was a sufficiently modern business man to grasp the importance of helping a customer expand his business; ultimately his colony of New Netherland on the Hudson fell a victim to the latent Anglo-Saxon imperialism he had thus aroused. Plymouth in 1633 invited Massachusetts to coöperate in a Connecticut Valley enterprise. Massachusetts at first refused; later, not very ingenuously, she plunged in, allowing her citizens to push the Plymouth men out of most of their holdings, exactly as the Dutch were to be pushed out a decade later. The rich grazing lands of the Connecticut Valley tempted three Massachusetts towns, Newtown, Watertown, and Dorchester, which in 1634 petitioned the General Court for leave to remove thither. Permission was that year withheld on the ground that it would unduly weaken the colony; it was accorded in May and June, 1635.

The settlement of the Connecticut Valley

A certain political philosophy distinct from that of Massachusetts Bay and in many respects a repudiation of it is traceable in the policy of the various Connecticut groups before and after they migrated. It was Watertown that, on the grounds of English freedom, protested against taxation without representation in 1632. Thomas Hooker, the minister chiefly responsible for the formulation of the distinctive Connecticut ideas, criticized keenly the Massachusetts system of allowing the magistrates to decide cases according to their own interpretation of the vague "law of God." In vigorous language he protested that where the magistrate has no fixed and known law to judge by, tyranny exists. Further, whereas John Winthrop argued against democracy, alleging that the best part was always the smallest and of that smallest part the wisest was always the least, Hooker advocated what, at least in contrast with the Massachusetts practice, was real democracy. In a famous sermon of May 31, 1638, Hooker enlarged his doctrine; public officers with definite and limited powers should be elected by a body of freemen, chosen by a "moral" test that they might act according to the will and law of God. Compared with Massachusetts this was liberty indeed.

The Connecticut political philosophy

The doctrine of Hooker was embodied in the "Fundamental Orders" of Connecticut of January, 1639. They prescribed the holding of two general courts each year. One of them was a court of election to choose the governor and other magistrates; in it all freemen might vote in person or by sending their ballots. For legislative purposes, the governor, four other elected magistrates, and four deputies from each town were to sit as a legislative court, exercising the supreme power in the commonwealth. No religious test was prescribed.

The Fundamental Orders of Connecticut

Very striking is the preamble of the document, restating the doctrine that by covenant men can establish government over themselves. Admit that the men who framed it acknowledged the authority of the English king and other lesser governments, and, therefore, were not *ipso facto* creating sovereignty, yet this, like the other so-called Planta-

The formation of government by agreement

Among the first of the settlers of Rhode Island was Roger Williams, exiled from Massachusetts Bay in 1636. At Providence he established a little settlement on land the gift of his friend, the Narragansett Sachem Miantonomoh. He conveyed his rights in 1638 to a group of twelve associated with himself and to such others as they chose to admit. He had cause to regret his liberality when his associates later tried to maintain a close proprietorship among the twelve instead of an equal association of settlers. In 1641, protests arose among those left at an economic disadvantage. The business of the little settlement seems at first to have been done by heads of families; and at this the younger men protested. Slowly the informal little organization widened into a sort of compact.

Providence

In 1637 another group of exiles from Massachusetts, Mrs. Anne Hutchinson's followers, Coddington, Dr. John Clark, and others, settled at Aquidneck on land bought of the Indians, later removing to Pocasset or Portsmouth. In March, 1638, they "in the presence of Jehovah" entered into a compact incorporating themselves into a body politic, submitting persons, lives, and estates, to the Lord Jesus Christ, to be guided by his holy laws. Under it Coddington was elected chief magistrate. No religious test attached to citizenship.

Aquidneck

In 1639 a group from Pocasset headed by Coddington moved to Newport at the south end of the island. Here a new compact was framed, of submission to decisions of judge and elders, according to the Word of God. A general court of magistrates and freemen held yearly and a court of magistrates appear. Those left at Pocasset now entered into a new covenant acknowledging themselves subjects of King Charles and as such binding themselves into a body politic under his laws. The next year the two Rhode Island colonies of Newport and Pocasset, now Portsmouth, united into one colony modeled on the Massachusetts system except for the religious test. In 1641 the government was declared to be "democratic or popular," the legislative power and that of choosing officers residing in the freemen. In 1644 the name Rhode Island was adopted.

Newport: The formation of Rhode Island

Meanwhile Samuel Gorton had founded a colony of his own at Warwick on the west side of Narragansett Bay, a region that was a bone of contention for well-nigh half a century. Gorton was a highly picturesque individual. He had successively been in difficulties in Massachusetts, Plymouth, and Pocasset and, as Williams wrote, had been "bewitching and madding poor Providence" when in 1643 he had secured a grant of land from Miantonomoh. Massachusetts disputed Miantonomoh's right to grant the territory in question and undertook to maintain a title based on a grant from other chiefs. A military force from the Bay seized Gorton, carried him off a prisoner, and kept him at hard labor. With Miantonomoh, the orthodox Puritans pursued a devious course. They permitted him to attack Uncas, the Mohegan Sachem, and when Miantonomoh was taken prisoner, authorized Uncas to put him to death. Probably his grants to Gorton and Williams were the cause. Gorton departed for England in search of justice; he returned to Warwick in 1648 under the protection of the English authorities.

Samuel Gorton and Massachusetts

Roger Williams had already gone to England in an attempt to secure an official authorization for the existence of his settlement. He brought back a patent from the Parliamentary Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, bounding his grant vaguely by Plymouth, Massachusetts, and the Pequot or Pawcatuck River. It authorized the inhabitants to govern themselves according to the will of the majority in conformity to English law. By 1647 the four settlements had united under it in one body politic. After 1648 a General Court of six deputies from each town sat apart from the yearly elected governor and assistants. All laws had to be approved both by the four towns and the General Court. Between 1651 and 1654 the colony was divided by a patent secured by Coddington, allowing him to govern Rhode Island and Connecticut with six assistants appointed by himself. Williams returned to England and secured the recall of the patent which had never been put into full effect, and in 1654 government under Williams' patent was resumed.

Williams' Patent

The lesson of the early history of Rhode Island was a hopeful one. A series of distinct settlements of Puritans whose vagaries had unfitted them for the more conservative colonies had been able to overcome sufficiently their centrifugal tendencies to unite into a state. That state had survived internal dissension; thanks to a Parliamentary patent it had survived also the hostility of Massachusetts and her avowed intent to dismember it. Once again Puritan settlements exhibited the influence of the idea of compact; but more important still in this case they exhibited in operation the novel theories of the separation of church and state and of liberty of conscience.

The significance of Rhode Island

Liberty of conscience represents a stage of development in religious thought, at which a state no longer seeks to prevent a citizen from holding and teaching doctrines contrary to those generally accepted, provided his teaching does not directly entail disorderly conduct or immorality. This position one can reach by reflection on the sacredness of the individual human soul or intellect and the duty of men to leave it unchecked in its endeavor to find and know God however childish the way it takes may seem. Or one may argue that since men cannot agree as to the way God has ordained for them to know Him, the simplest may have as much chance as the wisest to hit the mark. The idea of liberty of conscience was pointed at by Williams when he denied the civil magistrates of Massachusetts the right to punish offenders against religion and God. It was developed by him in a series of pamphlets written in controversy with John Cotton during 1643–1645, the most famous of which is Williams' "The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution." One or two English statements of the doctrine had forestalled Williams by only a few months.

Liberty of conscience

Liberty of conscience is a principle, toleration is a policy. A statesman believing that he has the moral right to enforce religious uniformity, for reasons of policy may think it inexpedient to do so in certain cases, and may permit worship and religious teaching other than that prescribed by the state.

Toleration

Such a policy was of course practiced in many places; notably in Holland long before the Pilgrims left it.

But Rhode Island stands apart among contemporary communities as one whose leaders had set for themselves as an ideal the principle of liberty of conscience. When Dr. John Clarke procured her royal charter in 1663 under the great seal of the cynical Charles II, the Rhode Island idea received official sanction in the great words "to hold forth a livelie experiment, that a most flourishing civill state may stand and best bee maintained, and that among our English subjects, with a full libertie in religious concernements." **The Rhode Island Charter**

In considering the individuality of the various Puritan colonies and the contribution of each to American political thought, it must be remembered that New England in the formative period was also a unit with interests and history best described as a whole. From 1630 to the Restoration in 1660 Massachusetts Bay dominated the New England settlements; the largest, most aggressive, most imperialistic among them, she took the lead in their concerns. What was done in New England generally, or in Old England with reference to the New, is best told by reference to Massachusetts herself. Even her own internal policies she endeavored to force on the other colonies. To her neighbors, the Indian on her coat of arms seemed to hold his arrow ever ready for aggression. **Massachusetts and New England**

First of the course of events in Old England. When the great Puritan migration began, in 1629, two members of the Council for New England, Sir Ferdinando Gorges and Captain John Mason, had received grants stretching along the present coasts of Maine and New Hampshire respectively. By 1630 Gorges was convinced that the Massachusetts Bay Company was trespassing, and set himself to stir up trouble. An inquiry of 1632 resulted favorably to the Company. King Charles I probably still regarded it as an important colonizing enterprise that promised to extend the Empire, and forbade interference with it. By 1634, however, Gorges and Mason had brought to the notice of William Laud, Archbishop **Massachusetts and her English enemies, 1629–1650**

of Canterbury, the enemy of the Puritans, some of the colony's religious misdeeds: expulsion of men for use of the English prayer book, establishment of new church governments, etc. The king's attitude to the colony changed. In 1635, a writ *quo warranto* was issued against the charter, and revealed the fact that the officials of the Company were in New England where the writ could not be served on them. The only effect of the legal proceedings was to expel from the Company its inactive English members.

Other devices were considered. The Council for New England made one last wholesale division of territory, which it prayed the king to confirm, and then passed out of existence. A new Committee for Plantations was created. Sir Ferdinando Gorges was commissioned governor of New England that he might enforce the royal authority there in person. But Charles I, striving to rule without a Parliament and therefore compelled to do without Parliamentary taxation, had to pinch his pennies too closely to afford the expense of a royal expedition to coerce Massachusetts. While the Bay fortified Boston and mustered troops in case of need, John Mason died in 1635. Alone, Gorges had not the means to make good his authority, and never came out; he died in 1647. For forty years he had been a prime mover in New England affairs. His heirs and those of John Mason respectively inherited titles to the Maine and New Hampshire coasts which the courts later held valid. Gorges in 1639 had secured a royal charter granting him powers of government in Maine. Such titles were to avail little in maintaining authority against the neighboring power of Massachusetts.

Massachusetts defies the king

In 1640 ended the eleven years during which Charles I had governed England without a Parliament. Needing money and confronted by a rebellion of his Scotch subjects he had to resign himself to the will of the Long Parliament which met in November, 1640. The Puritan element in its House of Commons was very strong from the first and by 1642, when war broke out between king and Parliament, it had come to control the policy of Parliament. It abolished the government of the English church by bishops, along with its

The English Great Civil War, 1642

prayer book and ritual, setting an assembly of divines to devise a new church polity in their place.

These events gave New England a position of importance. True, certain Puritan members of the House of Lords like Lord Say and Sele had looked askance on the ministerial dominance in the Bay; the same misgivings had deflected much Puritan colonization to New Providence in the West Indies and to other southern colonies. But New England represented a practical experiment of Puritanism applied to church government and to relations of church and state; these were just the problems that were to perplex Puritans in England for a score of years. New England men were therefore looked up to as having something to teach. The New England church order, its successes and failures, were canvassed in scores of controversial pamphlets. John Cotton's writings on church government were carefully studied; ministers like Hugh Peters and Thomas Welde, returned from New England, held positions of great influence. Three of the New England ministers were invited to sit in the Assembly of Divines.

Importance of New England to Puritanism

Nor were elements wanting in England to lend sympathy to Gorton and the radicals of Rhode Island. Sir Harry Vane, sometime governor of Massachusetts Bay, and General Oliver Cromwell were reaching toward toleration and could welcome Roger Williams, help him to get a patent for Rhode Island, and support him in his controversy with John Cotton on liberty of conscience. To Puritan radicals in England, "carrying things in a New England way," meant high-handed intolerance. Liberal Puritans clearly perceived the autocracy of the Massachusetts system.

Radical English Puritans and Rhode Island

As far as the Puritan England of 1642–1660 was concerned, Massachusetts Bay preserved a most independent attitude. In 1644 the General Court decided that Massachusetts was represented in Parliament through the legal fiction that her lands were held of the crown as part of the Manor of East Greenwich; but in 1646 it denied any allegiance to England whatever. In the same year the Bay sternly repressed

Independence of Massachusetts 1642–1660

a movement of protest against the lack of civil liberty and the exclusion of members of the Church of England from the franchise. The movement was an appeal to the Presbyterian faction then in power in the English Parliament; when in 1647 and 1648 the English Independents overthrew the Presbyterians, Massachusetts was free to go on her way unchecked.

Her policy, after the deaths of Winthrop and Cotton in 1649 and 1652, became more and more repressive. An act against Baptist opinions, passed in 1644, was enforced by John Endicott by whipping and imprisonment. The belief of the Quaker will be considered elsewhere. When he first appeared in Massachusetts in 1656, he seemed a bearer of heretical opinions, who kept his hat on in church, refused to take oaths of any kind, and addressed all men, even magistrates, with the *thee* and *thou*, then used only to inferiors and children; worse still he was given to speaking his contempt openly against magistrates and ministers alike. Here was not merely heresy, but denial of all authority; and Endicott and the Reverend John Norton set the executioner to build up a barrier against the infection as frantically as men ever established a shotgun quarantine against smallpox or yellow fever. With fines for those who harbored them, with whipping, hard labor, branding and death, Massachusetts vainly endeavored to keep the Quakers out. She rattled the saber to induce Plymouth and Rhode Island to pass similar laws. But not even the execution of three Quakers could quell the spirit of their fellows, and in 1661 the newly restored King Charles II remanded those under sentence to trial in England. The other New England colonies had not gone so far against the Quakers; but New Haven had on its statute books laws for branding, hard labor, and banishment, Connecticut for banishment and whipping, Plymouth for banishment.

Massachusetts persecutes Baptists and Quakers

In other things than the enforcement of religious conformity Massachusetts Bay took the lead. Her policy of aggressive expansion, more or less consistently followed since 1636, was in great measure forced on her by the theocracy in government she maintained. It is the nemesis of absolute

Massachusetts expansion

government that it has ever to enlarge its borders because free communities near by are rallying places or examples for opposition.

Her first expansion was in the direction of Connecticut. Taking advantage of the murder of John Oldham, a trader on the river whom Bradford had expelled from Plymouth in earlier days, she set on foot a punitive expedition against the Block Island Indians. War with the powerful Pequot tribe broke out as a result. Roger Williams prevented disaster by inducing the Narragansetts to remain neutral, and in 1637 the destruction of the Pequots in their fort by a combined expedition of Connecticut, Plymouth, and Massachusetts opened their lands to exploitation. In the valley, however, the Connecticut colony was active in enlarging her bounds; she absorbed the Plymouth post, and hemmed the Dutch in Fort Good Hope at Hartford, their last foothold on the river; in 1644 she took over Saybrook, a post at the mouth of the river founded under the auspices of Lord Say and Sele and Lord Brooke.

Plymouth and the Dutch expelled from the Connecticut

From an early date Massachusetts had contemplated expansion to the north. By using imagination in interpreting her charter she could claim up to a line drawn three miles north of the most northern source of the Merrimac. Settlements had existed there since 1623. In 1635 Massachusetts refused to help Plymouth against the French who had broken up her trading post on the Penobscot; but there remained a little chain of settlements, some founded under grants from Gorges and Mason and some founded by those proprietors as fishing or fur trading stations. Massachusetts had set up a trading house at Hampton in New Hampshire in 1636; in 1639 a Puritan party in Dover asked to be annexed to the Bay. Dover was turned over to Massachusetts by its proprietors, Say and Sele and Brooke, in 1641. Exeter accepted Massachusetts' protection in 1643; the citizens of the three New Hampshire towns thus annexed were exempted from the requirement of church membership for voting or holding office.

Massachusetts absorbs the New Hampshire towns

In Maine, Sir Ferdinando Gorges had a governor from 1640 to 1643; but rival claims were set up by patentees whose titles con-

flicted. The death of the proprietor in 1647 caused a lapse of authority and the inhabitants endeavored to organize for themselves; but Massachusetts stepped in and between 1651 and 1658 had enforced the acceptance of her rule in the whole settled area. Various defenses might be urged for her aggression. She had acquired some of the numerous paper titles made by grants of the Council for New England; as the strongest legally authorized power in the near neighborhood she might deem it her duty to enforce order; above all she probably feared dissent near her borders.

Massachusetts absorbs Maine

The need of concerted action among the more orthodox Puritan colonies, and of a common arbiter of their boundary disputes had been apparent from an early date. Some form of federal association had been discussed intermittently since 1637. In 1643 the threat of Indian war led to the establishment of the New England Confederation. Its nucleus was a body of eight commissioners, two from each of the colonies of Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven. Rhode Island was not admitted, nor "Those of Sir Ferdinando Gorge, his province beyond Pascataquack . . . for they had lately made Acomenticus (a poor village) a corporation, and had made a taylor their mayor, and had entertained one Hull, an excommunicated person and very contentious, for their minister." The commissioners were to meet annually in the various colonies in rotation, and by a three-fourths vote determine questions of war and peace, treaties, and the quota in men and money of each colony. Contributions were to be levied according to population as determined by a census.

The New England Confederation

In practice this organization was really a formal bridle put on the powerful and aggressive "Bay mare" by her three weaker neighbors; and Massachusetts periodically, on various pretexts, defied the decisions of three-fourths of the commissioners. Thus in 1645 Connecticut attempted to levy on Springfield, a Connecticut Valley town within the Massachusetts line, a duty paid by all the Connecticut River trade. Massachusetts refused to pay, the commissioners

Massachusetts' independent attitude

decided against her and she retaliated by laying a duty on articles imported for Connecticut through Boston. After a year she yielded, but with an ill grace. The commissioners had to call her to account for interfering in an armed contest between rival French governors in Acadia, a thing made worse by the fact that Massachusetts opposed the man who had the sanction of the French government.

The main difficulties of the Confederation arose from the Dutch rivalry with New Haven and Connecticut both in the Connecticut region and on the Delaware where both sides were attempting to expand. In 1650 Governor Stuyvesant of New Netherland negotiated a boundary treaty with the Confederation, abandoning all Long Island east of a line through Oyster Bay and all Connecticut east of Greenwich Bay. The English government never ratified the treaty. When an English war with the Netherlands broke out, commissioners of the three small colonies declared in 1652 for an attack on New Netherland; but Massachusetts refused to be bound by them, taking no active part even when an English expedition appeared in 1654. Peace intervened to save New Netherland for a decade. From that time the Confederation was moribund. After New Haven was absorbed in Connecticut, meetings were held but once in three years. The last use of the Confederation came in King Philip's War.

The Confederation and the Dutch

In economic environment and political and social institutions New England had an inward unity, even if she was not to achieve it in outward political union. The first economic uses to which men put her were the establishment of stations for drying fish, and posts for carrying on Indian trade in beaver and other furs. The fisheries remained a constant source of a narrow livelihood; but the fur trade of the New England streams was a source of wealth soon exhausted. Compared with the vast water systems to be tapped from the Great Lakes and the Mississippi Valley, compared even with the channel of trade on the Hudson River which the Dutch monopolized, such rivers as the Connecticut and the Merrimac were inconsiderable.

Economic life of New England: fur and fish

From the demands of fisheries and fur trade came ship- and boat-building. Where diversified primeval forest touches navigable water, shipbuilding is profitable. In later years, the New England colonies were esteemed by the British government an important source of masts for the navy, and forests were reserved in the king's name; but on every side the first settlers on tidewater had scarcely built their houses before they built ships to trade in or to sell abroad.

Shipbuilding

These first seacoast settlements have well been called the English frontier. When they began to expand and send off shoots into the surrounding wilderness, New England had a frontier of her own to distinguish from her older settlements. The conditions of her advance were often an Indian war or treaty that, as in the case of the Pequot war, threw a new area open to settlement, allowing new towns to be plotted in the wilderness. The New England soil helped to make New England settlement what it was. A little choice land is in the river bottoms; elsewhere it grades speedily into marsh or into stony upland that holds its fertility for centuries to yield a bare living to the man who tills it. Such lands yielded no surplus for a landlord. Indentured servants or indifferent farmers of any sort could not make a living on them; only the vital interest of a man wresting out a living for himself and his loved ones would unlock their meager treasure. The plantation tilled by unfree labor had here to be abandoned at once.

The New England soil and the New England town

This fact and the New England church system helped to make the New England town the distinctive unit that New England contributed to American local government. There was no reason why a farmer who had to gain a living from the few acres his personal labor could till should not live near his fellow farmers, and find convenience in pasturing his cattle along with his neighbor's on marshes or uplands that would not take the plow; an added reason in the more Puritan settlements was the conviction that in every community there must be a church and a minister.

Towns were bound together not merely by a community of interest in religion but also by a common property of land. From

an early time in the more southern New England colonies, towns began with a grant of land from the colonial government to a group of proprietors. It then fell to these owners in common to divide a portion of the arable land among themselves, and to reserve a portion for future division or for the use of newcomers admitted to the town as freemen; they also had to decide on the use of common or grazing land for the stock and to settle common questions of cultivation. The proprietors remained owners of the unused lands; but the larger group of the freemen decided in town meetings pertinent questions relating to local government and taxation. The town, too, was the unit of representation in the colonial legislature.

The town as a landed corporation

A New England town was more than a comparatively thickly settled locality; it was an economic and political unit. It was self-conscious because most of the life of the inhabitants was subject to scrutiny and regulation. It was exclusive because admission to the town implied admission to valuable economic rights. Its records were the sources of all local land titles. The town meeting, electing town officers and settling town business, was a training in self-government, and the franchise for it was broader than for the colony as a whole. The struggle between freemen and proprietors over the undivided land was instruction in practical politics, and an ever-recurring epitome of the contest between aristocracy and democracy.

The town as training in self-government

The town, as we have seen in Rhode Island, might be the nucleus of a colony. It was for a hundred and fifty years the unit of the expansion of the New England frontier. New towns in each generation were created, one tier beyond the old frontier, by grants to groups of proprietors. And old towns might grow too large and, like primitive forms of life, split up into several; on the New England map a town name is often surrounded by three or four more made by prefixing or suffixing a point of the compass or the word "Corners" to it, each new town being endowed in its creation with a share of the lands of the old. The town was the unit by which in the seven-

Multiplication of the towns

teenth century New England planted seeds of new settlement in Long Island, New York, New Jersey. In the nineteenth century a new town planted in the wilderness might in personnel and name be an offshoot of an old one. Many a settlement in the old Northwest or beyond bears the name of a New England town to show the origin of the migrating party that founded it.

Beside the town in New England local government, the county, so important in Virginia and the States that are her children, was comparatively insignificant. In Massachusetts counties were judicial units after 1639, their courts held by members of the court of assistants and associates appointed by the General Court. In a sort of quarter sessions these courts also exercised a local jurisdiction, but their importance was almost purely judicial.

Education was based on the towns. The Puritan was forced into popular education where he could afford it because the humblest man must seek God's will in God's book. True if he deduced it otherwise than his minister or his magistrate, he got into trouble; but that merely meant he must be taught to deduce correctly. Hence Massachusetts and Connecticut laid the foundations of universal education. Town schools already existed in them when Massachusetts enacted in 1647 and Connecticut in 1650 that every town with fifty householders must have some one to teach the children to read and write, and every town of a hundred households a grammar school teaching Latin and similar subjects. To insure a supply of college-trained ministers for the next generation Massachusetts voted in 1636 an appropriation of £400 towards a school or college at Cambridge. In 1638 John Harvard left it his library and half his estate of £700; and the college thereafter bore his name.

Public schools

Criticism of the conservative Puritan attitude toward life has long since become conventional. Faulty as that attitude was it can be understood only from the Puritan's point of view—the world a battleground between God and evil in which the Lord had deigned to enlist him as a soldier on His side, an arena for combat with the powers of darkness. In gratitude for the inscrutable goodness of God who might have damned all men, but

elected to send His saving grace to a few, it was the Puritan's duty to make his place of abode one where the men to whom this divine grace was to be vouchsafed might be taught of it; a place where the will of God might prevail in the organization of His church, the preaching of His doctrine, the practice of His moral laws.

As God's agent burdened with these dreadful responsibilities, the conservative Puritan did not dare trust to chance; to say that if left alone right and truth would triumph seemed sinful slackness. His eyes shadowed by the world to come, he could not see men waste the passing hours in vain, coarse, or frivolous amusements. In morals, manners, in church and civil government, in doctrine it was his duty to make the will of God prevail. In considering how far he should go to do it if necessary, he turned to the tales of blood and punishment and retribution in the books of Moses, who also had covenanted with God for his people.

Why Puritanism was intolerant

The Puritan therefore repressed heresy, dissent, or insubordination in the churches by whatever penalty seemed necessary; this is the main charge against him. He insisted on length of sermon and extempore prayer, and wakeful attendance on it. He legislated against extravagant dress as England had done before. He cut Christmas out of the calendar; he abolished the Yule log, the Maypole and whatever else he could find with a popish or heathen origin; but he allowed other days of feast and thanksgiving. He rebuked drunkenness, but in 1647 the General Court of Massachusetts voted "to send 12 gallons of sack and 6 gallons of white wine, as a small testimony of ye Co^{r}ts respect to yt revrend assembly of Eldrs at Cambridge."

The Puritan on amusements

Undoubtedly he repressed boisterous amusement till men of coarse mold, unable to take pleasure in the rarified theological atmosphere, were driven to gross sin. Undoubtedly he erred in trying to legislate against outward frivolity before he had remolded minds with a bent that way. Puritanism tortured weaker souls with maddening self-examination and doubt as to their personal salvation until occasionally they plunged deliberately into some soul-blasting crime

Weakness and strength of Puritanism

that might end the dreadful suspense with a certainty if only of damnation. Undoubtedly the exclusive cultivation of theology in literature, the condemnation of all real artistic expression, the continual emphasis on the hereafter, produced the glacial age of New England literature, though a dour climate and a hard soil may have helped. But when all is said, Puritanism was a glowing forge at white heat that molded strong souls like iron and crushed weak ones like brass.

The foundation of the Puritan colonies has been treated at considerable length because their influence lies heavily on the United States to this day. Our idea of state and federal constitutions as paramount law, made by the sovereign people, go back to the Puritan faith, expressed in the Mayflower Compact, that just governments may originate in the consent of the governed.

Present-day Puritanism

More important still, the zealous minister or church member of the present, insisting on more and more stringent laws and more and more violent enforcement to impose on the unregenerate the moral code of the zealot, suggests the figures of Winthrop, Dudley, Wilson, and Endicott in the past. The ideals of freedom in thought and action with which they are assailed may in their turn be traced back to Roger Williams and his fellowmen who, Puritan also, were the fathers of individual liberty.

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

C. M. Andrews, *The Fathers of New England* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. VI). New Haven, 1919.
L. K. Mathews, *The Expansion of New England.* Boston, 1909.
J. T. Adams, *The Founding of New England.* Boston, 1921.
E. Eggleston, *The Beginners of a Nation.* New York, 1896.
W. Bradford, *Bradford's History of Plymouth Plantation.* (In *Original Narratives of Early American History*, vol. VI). New York, 1908.
E. Channing, *A History of the United States*, vol. I. New York, 1905.
L. G. Tyler, *England in America* (*American Nation*, vol. IV). New York, 1904.
W. L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century.* 3 vols. New York, 1904–1907.

had

combat w

scrutable go

CHAPTER V

THE COLONIES UNDER THE RESTORATION, I

1. THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

To the history of the English colonies in America after 1660 an understanding of the situation in England and of how it had come about is vital. The Great Civil War between Charles I and the Long Parliament ended in the king's military defeat in 1646. Then for two years rival Puritan groups, Presbyterians and Independents, struggled for control of the Parliament and nation, each striving to come to terms with the king as a valuable asset. The Independents, controlling the New Model army, finally gained the upper hand. Suppressing a dangerous Royalist uprising in 1648, they tried and executed the king as morally responsible for the blood shed in it; the nation looked on the deed with horror. For eleven years to come the passing governments maintained themselves in power only by the sword of the New Model army. Until April, 1653, England was governed under the name of a Commonwealth by the Rump, a small Independent minority of the Long Parliament, from which a protesting majority had been excluded by military force. Then Cromwell with a file of musketeers turned the Rump out of doors and from December, 1653, to September, 1658, ruled as Protector. For twenty months after his death there was a rapid succession of governments ending with the restoration of the monarchy in the person of Charles II, son of Charles I, in May of 1660.

English history, 1640–1660

By the end of his reign in 1685, Charles II was able to bequeath nearly autocratic power to his brother James II; but he enjoyed no such authority at the beginning. It was not the Royalists only that had brought him back; it was also the old Presbyterian group, and the influential conservatives who had enjoyed Cromwell's favor in his later years. The Anglican church indeed was restored and all men must worship in it or be persecuted; the Presbyterians had expected to modify it to suit their

The Restoration

beliefs, but were overreached and with their old Independent rivals had to conform or suffer. But much of the work of the Long Parliament was left untouched. Except when Charles II could extort bribes from Louis XIV of France for not calling Parliaments, he was left dependent on them for necessary revenue.

The Whigs and the Tories

In the course of Charles's reign two parties developed in England. The Tory party were defenders of the Church of England as it was restored in 1660, were eager for persecution of the nonconforming Puritans, and supposedly were supporters of the king's authority, and advocates of the divine right of kings. The backbone of the party was the English country squire. The Whigs, led by a few of the greatest and richest nobles of the kingdom, were in favor of tolerating the nonconformists in Puritan worship, were vehemently opposed to Catholicism, and sought to extend the powers of Parliament at the expense of those enjoyed by the king. Some of their leaders may have desired the substitution of an aristocratic republic for the monarchy. The rank and file of the party was mainly recruited from the nonconformists and from the merchants.

The second Stuart despotism

From 1678 to 1681 the Whigs, controlling Parliament by the use of the nation's terror at the so-called Popish Plot, attempted to exclude the Catholic James from the succession to the throne. In 1681 Charles recovered control of the situation, thanks to a subsidy from Louis XIV which enabled him to dispense with calling Parliament. Voiding old borough charters for violations more or less technical, he issued new ones, putting control of the towns in the hands of men sure to return Tories to Parliament. At this juncture he died suddenly in February, 1685, and his brother James ascended the throne.

James II, 1685–1688

James II's brief reign, 1685–1688, was marked by the highest idiocy. A bigoted Catholic, he undertook to restore Roman Catholicism in England, counter to the advice of the pope and of all sane Roman Catholics. In the hope that the Whig nonconformists might help him, he turned the Tories out of the borough governments and put Whigs in. He sought to win the nonconformists by the promise of tolera-

tion; one or two of them like William Penn were among his close associates. By two Declarations of Indulgence of 1687 and 1688 he suspended the operation of penal laws against Roman Catholics and Dissenters, and permitted them to hold office. Meanwhile he took college after college away from the Anglicans for the Catholics, and put into Anglican bishoprics men suspected of being secretly Catholic.

The Anglican Tories, now thoroughly alarmed, invited in James's nephew, William of Orange, Stadtholder of the Netherlands, apparently with no very clear idea of what they wanted him to do. William landed with a strong army, James's troops deserted him, and he fled from the kingdom. The Tories were nonplused. If James and his infant son were passed over, his daughters, Mary, the wife of William of Orange, and Anne, were next in line of succession; but Mary refused to ascend the throne except at her husband's side. An extraconstitutional Convention Parliament finally voted that William and Mary should reign as joint sovereigns with the administration in William's hands, the succession going next to William, then to Mary's children, then to Anne and her children, lastly to William's children by any other wife than Mary. Such a settlement made havoc of the Tory notion of a divinely ordained line of hereditary sovereigns, but force of circumstances compelled its acceptance.

The Revolution of 1688

In fact, the nature of the English government in 1688 had altered very much more than at first sight appeared. It was not merely that the Whigs had imposed fresh constitutional limitations on William, nor that William, dislike it as he might, was compelled to assume the pose of a constitutional sovereign ruling in accord with his Parliaments. The nature of royalty had changed; the hereditary lines of succession had been violated; most people looked to see William's government sooner or later overthrown by an uprising in favor of James, and therefore considered it but a temporary makeshift; William was personally unpopular; and all these things tended to lower the prestige of the kingship. The reign of Queen Anne, 1702–1714, saw the last glow of the old reverence for the

Decline of the royal authority after 1688

royal ruler; but her successors, the distant German line of Hanover, men with strange names and uncouth manners, speaking broken English, falling asleep at Council meetings, speedily became nothing more than figureheads, leaders neither in society nor in government. At last government in practice, if not in theory, lay in a Parliament long since dominated by the Whig nobles, landholders, and merchants. The Tory party sank into a permanent minority.

The age of political theories, 1640–1714

The three-quarters of a century, 1640–1714, in which these changes were taking place was a time prolific of political ideas. The continually changing situation challenged men's thought to remodel it nearer their desires. Formulating their ideals of government, they had to maintain them in print against opponents. Especially in the feverish years 1640–1653, 1659–1660, pamphlets seeking to fit theories of government to the situation of the moment came off the presses by hundreds and thousands. This thinking did not immediately influence the New World; rather the example of New England was studied by the Old. The influence of that mass of thinking, especially one type of it, became more evident in the colonies after 1660.

The idea of supremacy of law and sovereignty of Parliament

It will be remembered that the Parliaments of James I and Charles I had begun their contest with the Stuart claims to exercise a discretionary authority that at need could override all known rules of law and government; against this doctrine of divine right they insisted on the supremacy of law. They argued that the fundamental laws of the land, enshrined in ancient charters, statutes, and precedents, were not to be overridden whenever the king deemed it expedient, but were to be a binding rule to him in all cases. All the earlier action of the Long Parliament was based on this principle. But when in 1642 they found it necessary to make war on the king, they needed powers beyond what any previous Parliament had enjoyed. They claimed them by insisting that Parliament was the final interpreter of the law and constitution of the realm, and could read it in the light of the maxim that the safety of the nation is the highest law.

Very likely they saw that in so doing they were claiming powers as arbitrary as those they had resisted in Charles I. As they passed from one high-handed war measure to another, some of their own adherents among the radical Independents protested. A political group, known as the Levellers, between 1645 and 1653 evolved a startlingly modern constitutional and political program. They believed in the supremacy of law; they believed also in democracy. They believed the war had put England into a state of nature and that the English people could of their own accord establish over themselves a written constitution that would limit the powers of government—a constitution above legislative amendment or repeal because it originated in the people and created the legislature. Many of the other Leveller demands, thought radical in their day, have by now become commonplaces—manhood suffrage, liberty of conscience, reform of the law, more just and merciful criminal procedure, freedom of the press, freedom of speech.

The Leveller ideas: Supremacy of law

Even more interesting are the fundamental political concepts of the Levellers. From 1642 on, Parliamentary writers had been urging that the king's power rested on a contract or compact with his people. The whole doctrine was rather vague. Perhaps the contract was made with the people by the first king; perhaps it was renewed by every succeeding king in his coronation oath, but a contract it was. If the king violated it by ruling tyrannically he could be checked, perhaps by the people, perhaps by Parliament. The Levellers developed this doctrine. They conceived of human society as originating in a state of nature, governed by a law of nature, the Golden Rule; because men in this state of nature had no common judge to settle their disputes impartially, they had come together and by compact and agreement had established a central authority and judge. But in doing so they had retained certain natural rights. Violation of those rights by tyrannical conduct of the governor destroyed the government, cast everything back into a state of nature, and left men free to frame a new and better government for preservation of their rights.

Origin of government in contract

Practical application of the Compact theory

This theory may be profitably compared with what actually had been done in plantation covenants in the New World before 1642. The combination of New England practice and Leveller theory, distilled to the eighteenth century through the phrases of John Locke, supplied the political theories of the American Revolution.

In the period of the Great Civil War still other writers, like James Harrington, endeavored to outline the economic legislation and the elaborate devices of interlocking councils and successive elections necessary to keep government in the hands of a large landholding class and prevent the formation of political factions. Harrington's ideas appear in the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina; in the electoral college and the rotation of the terms of United States senators, his influence persists in our own day. Harrington in his writings had in mind the aristocratic constitution of the Venetian Republic, which served as a sort of model of emulation for the English Whigs for a generation after his time. An aristocratically ruled England with the king a figurehead like the doge of Venice—that was what they actually enjoyed after 1714, what they had sought in 1678.

Harrington's influence on America

Nevertheless this change was a matter of practice, not of theory. The Parliament after 1688, certainly after 1714, exercised supreme authority; it settled the succession to the throne; it controlled the king by impeaching the ministers through whom he must govern, or by refusing to vote him money; but it could point to no documentary formulation of its new authority. The English constitution, unlike the Constitution of the United States, is not to be compressed within a single document. It consists of rules of practice; it is continually changing. Very often obsolete rules are not abrogated, but merely left to fall into disuse. In theory the king held in the eighteenth century and still holds certain powers quite at odds with the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty.

Nature of the English Constitution

This lack of stability in the English constitution is of the greatest importance in understanding the American Revolution. In

the seventeenth century when Parliament took over the king's power of directing the government of England, how far had it taken over powers he formerly exercised outside of England in the colonies and Ireland? Was it true that by 1763 Parliament had become the legislature of the Empire? Such questions cannot be answered with finality. The constitutional history of England is a series of nuances and to regard it or the English constitution as at any period a fixed thing is an error. In a sense the American interpretation of that constitution and history in 1763–1774 was as valid as the British; it was as much an historical outgrowth, had as much historic background as the other.

What was the English Constitution in 1763

II. THE CHAIN OF SEABOARD COLONIES COMPLETED 1660–1688

In rounding out the system of English colonies in North America one of the first steps of the Restoration government was to dispose of the Dutch colony on the Hudson. Its history under Dutch rule may here be sketched. Before the English navigator Henry Hudson had sailed to his death in the Bay that bears his name, he had made a voyage in 1609 in search of the Northwest Passage for the Dutch East India Company, in which he had come upon and explored part of Hudson River. He announced the possibilities of its fur trade and in 1612 Dutch merchants founded a little trading post on the Island of Manhattan. Dutchmen had also voyaged over Long Island Sound, exploring the Connecticut River and naming Rhode Island. The Dutch merchants now obtained a charter giving them rights of trade in New Netherland between the parallels of 40° and 45°.

The Dutch in North America

In 1621 the enterprise was taken over by the Dutch West India Company, chartered primarily to expel the Spaniards from Brazil. They established posts at Fort Nassau on the Delaware, a little south of the present site of Philadelphia, and at Fort Orange where Albany stands to-day. In order to give a backbone of settlement to the little fur-trading posts the Company took to granting patroonships—manorial holdings with land and

New Netherland

jurisdiction—based on the great rivers for eight miles of their length and extending back from them. The most famous and permanent of these was the great patroonship of Van Rensselaer on the Hudson below Fort Orange.

In holding with a handful of settlers the vast areas they claimed, the Dutch encountered difficulties. The great Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, had opened a golden age for his country, his military prowess giving her prestige far above her actual strength; and in 1638 the Swedish West India Company established Fort Christina on the Delaware near the present Wilmington. Even more dangerous than the Swedes were the English. By 1640 the new colonies of Connecticut and New Haven were spreading over on Long Island, and reaching out toward the Delaware. There they were checked; but the Dutch governor with his little colony of two thousand could offer no resistance to their appropriation of the whole Connecticut region.

The Swedes on the Delaware, 1638–1655

Three successive Dutch governors wrestled with these problems, Peter Minuit, Wouter van Twiller and Wilhelmus Kieft. Their names, thanks to Washington Irving's *Knickerbocker's History of New York*, are household words, but his account of them is more a satire on the presidency of Thomas Jefferson than a sober history of the Dutch régime. In 1650 Peter Stuyvesant, last of the Dutch governors, secured a boundary by negotiation with the New England Confederation. In 1655 he conquered the Swedish posts on the Delaware.

The Dutch governors

Meanwhile New Netherland had developed a constitutional problem. The first impulse of course was to leave the little trading post autocratically governed by the governor and a small council. But the inhabitants steadily protested against absolute rule. The existence of representative institutions in New England towns settled inside the boundary gave the Dutch an incentive to demand similar privileges. Since 1641, in emergencies, the governor had been in the habit of choosing or having chosen a certain number of men from the community to advise him. Sometimes these men were

Government in New Netherland

AMERICÆ SEPTEN
NOVA FRANCIÆ
PARS
NOVA ANGLIA
NOVA BELGICA NIEUW
TRIONALIS
Lacus
NIEUW ENGL
Irdcoisi
LANDT
ASMQU
Exeter
Merrimac R.
CH.
Hampton
Cape Ann
Salem
Cambridge
Boston
Watertown
NEDER LANDT
Springfield
Windsor
Hartford
Wethersfield
Connecticut R.
Providence
Plymouth
Cape Cod
Greenwich Bay
Guilford
Brantford
New Haven
Fairbrook
Pequot R.
Warwick
Portsmouth
Newport
Susquehanna R.
PARS
New Amsterdam
Oyster Bay
Southampton
BLOCK ISLAND
MARTHA'S VINEYARD
NANTUCKET
Ft. Christina
Ft. Nassau
MAR DEL NORT
Annapolis
KENT ISLAND
VIRGINIÆ PARS
Potomac R.
James R.
York
Henrico
Charles City
Bermuda Hundred
James R.
Cape Charles
BELGII NOVI
ANGLIÆ NOVÆ ET PARTIS
VIRGINIÆ

expected to levy needed taxes; but they soon became vociferous in criticism of the governor and his policy. In spite of the West India Company complaints against Kieft finally reached the States-General of the Netherlands and secured his recall; his successor, Peter Stuyvesant, a thorough professional soldier, banished two of the men who had complained against Kieft; and they in turn appealed to the States-General. The difficulty came to a head in 1653 with a meeting of delegates from four Dutch and four English towns, which on the basis of the compact philosophy of government demanded that laws be made by consent of the people or their representatives. Stuyvesant warned the congress not to meet again; and no further meetings occurred until after the English conquest in 1664.

As early as 1621 the English government had protested against the Dutch settlement as an invasion of English rights in Virginia. The States-General had finally admitted that it had merely granted a trading charter, and laid no claim to sovereign rights of possession. The consistent policy of the English government thenceforth was to take no official notice of the Dutch settlement. England had failed to ratify the treaty of 1650. Long before, the English ambassador in Holland had counseled the Connecticut settlers to "crowd on, crowding the Dutch out of those places where they have occupied," without provoking open hostilities. To the English government of the Restoration, intent on enforcing the Navigation Acts, it seemed impossible to keep Dutch ships out of coastwise trade to colonial ports so long as the Dutch held New Netherland. The weakness of the settlement, and the considerable number of English inhabitants within its bounds in English towns on the east of the Hudson and on Long Island seemed to invite attack.

The English ignore the Dutch claim

On March 12, 1664, Charles II gave his brother, James, Duke of York, a patent granting him the territory between the Connecticut and Delaware rivers, and also all territory between the Kennebec and the St. Croix, with Long Island, Martha's Vineyard, and Nantucket. An English military and naval expedition set out under command of Colonel Richard Nicolls, destined to be

governor for the duke. Stuyvesant was a gallant soldier and disposed to make a desperate defense; but with both Dutch and English disaffected by arbitrary rule he had no chance of success against the overwhelming English force. In 1663 and 1664 the inhabitants had protested the defenseless state of the colony; but since 1644 the Dutch West India Company had been in difficulties and it could or would afford no help. The Dutch settlements at Fort Orange and at New Amstel on the Delaware capitulated as New Amsterdam had done and all three were renamed Albany, Newcastle, and New York.

Capture of New Netherland, 1664

Nicolls showed great tact and ability in smoothing the transition from Dutch to English rule. New Amsterdam since 1653 had had a municipal government, the officers of which, schout, burgomaster, and schepens, were supposedly elected by the burghers; actually they were appointed by Stuyvesant, who before 1658 had not even allowed the city to name a list from which he should select. Other villages and towns had long before received town governments chosen by such joint action and charged with local administration and jurisdiction.

Reorganization of New York

Nicolls made over New York into an English corporation of mayor, aldermen, and sheriff, to be appointed by the governor. In 1665 he promulgated the Duke's Laws, copied partly from the New England and Dutch systems. They transferred local government in the New England towns on Long Island from town meetings to an elected constable and eight overseers. Landholding was made the basis of the franchise and toleration in religion was allowed. These laws were primarily for the English parts of the colony and were not extended to New York City until 1674.

Government under the English

The Duke of York had not desired a legislative assembly in his province; but the English towns on Long Island chafed under the Duke's Laws. Repeatedly they petitioned for reforms in them. The western towns in 1668 asked for an Assembly; in 1670 they protested against the levy of a tax on them without their consent. The eastern towns that had been formerly attached to

Connecticut and New Haven were even more troublesome; they petitioned for annexation to Connecticut, and in 1672 offered to contribute to a tax for the fort at New York if they might enjoy the same privileges that "other of his majesty's subjects in these parts have and do enjoy." They were on the point of open trouble with Governor Lovelace, who had succeeded Nicolls in 1668, when war broke out with Holland, and New Netherland was retaken by the Dutch in 1673. The eastern Long Island towns with the support of Connecticut refused to submit to the Dutch government; but when English possession was reëstablished by treaty in 1674, the new governor, Sir Edmund Andros, enforced their submission.

Demand for a Representative Assembly

New York alone among English colonies in America enjoyed no colonial assembly, mainly because the Duke of York, its proprietor, an autocrat to the backbone, thought one of dangerous consequence. But the decay of the colony and its refusal on technical grounds to pay customs duties in 1681 finally induced him to promise a representative legislature. It met in 1683, passing, among other legislation, a charter of franchises and liberties to serve as a sort of constitution. James at first was disposed to accept this; but succeeding to the crown in 1685 he decided to unite all the northern colonies under one arbitrary government. He contemplated no second representative assembly. His governor, Thomas Dongan, 1682–1688, had ruled with tact and ability, strengthening the English influence as against the French among the Iroquois tribes and granting charters to New York City and Albany in 1686 which lasted until the State revised her constitution in 1821. Providing for appointment by the governor of mayor, recorder, and sheriff, and election of aldermen by the freemen of the corporation they symbolized that aristocratic rule that characterized New York politics long years after the Revolution.

The Assembly of 1683

The State of New York is a geographical absurdity. Its metropolis is more closely linked by natural configuration with eastern New Jersey and western Connecticut than with nine-tenths the area of its own State. For a reason we must search in colonial

origins. Connecticut during and after the Dutch régime had expanded westward, relying on her sea-to-sea charter; and Andros and Dongan checked her within her present bounds only by threatening to press the terms of the Duke's patent that set the Connecticut River as his eastern boundary. For the presence of the independent jurisdiction of New Jersey, and the northward extent of Pennsylvania, the Duke himself was responsible.

Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York

In 1664 he had granted to his friends, Lord John Berkeley of Stratton and Sir George Carteret, all the lands between the Hudson and the Delaware from the 40th parallel south. It was an open question whether he had granted or could grant rights of government over the region; and the defiance by settlers of such rights, a series of conveyances of doubtful validity by the proprietors, and the occasional interference of the Duke's own governors of New York, made the proprietors' position an uneasy one.

Grant of New Jersey

The proprietors began their control auspiciously in 1665 by the issue of a set of "Concessions" which were also issued by them in their capacity as proprietors of Carolina. The "Concessions" guaranteed freedom of worship and the rights of self-government that colonists were reaching out for. Before he knew of the grant to Berkeley and Carteret, Governor Nicolls had encouraged Puritan settlers from Long Island, who purchased lands from the Indians and set up towns; migration continued in 1666. Branford and Guilford in New Haven sent out colonies that drew up their plantation covenants, enforcing the old New Haven system in church and state.

Settlement of New Jersey

Philip Carteret as governor for the proprietors clashed with these new settlers. In 1667 three of the towns held a legislative assembly on their own account; in 1668 Carteret called another which broke up in a quarrel between the governor and the Puritan element. The colonists, insisting they held their lands by Nicolls' patent and purchase from the Indians, refused to pay quit rents to the proprietors until Charles II himself indorsed their authority.

Proprietary quarrels with the settlers

In 1674 Berkeley had sold his share of the province to John Fenwick acting in trust for Edward Byllynge, both Quakers; both were soon forced by financial difficulties to temporary assignments by which William Penn and other Quakers acquired interests. As these new proprietors were not likely to be congenial with the Carterets, a division was agreed on in 1676 between East and West New Jersey; but it was questionable whether the title Berkeley conveyed had not lapsed as a result of the Dutch conquest, and it was not recognized by the Duke of York till 1681.

Sale of New Jersey

Into the region, therefore, came colonies of Quakers to reënforce the former Swedish and Dutch settlements on the Delaware. In 1677 a Quaker group had settled Burlington, on the basis of a set of concessions and agreements to which they assented before leaving England; save for the appointment of the executive by the proprietors it gave complete rights of self-government and guaranteed such liberties as trial by jury and freedom from imprisonment for debt.

Quaker influence

In 1682 trustees for Sir George Carteret sold East Jersey to a body of twelve Quakers who afterward associated twelve others with them, mostly Quakers also. East and West Jersey were now both under Quaker influence. In 1688 both colonies were taken over by Andros, governor for the king of the northern colonies, after writs of *quo warranto* had been issued against the proprietors in 1686. Three years later both parts of the colony were restored to the proprietors. But liberal as were the Quaker proprietors, their maintenance of rights of government over Puritan and Quaker settlers was difficult, and in 1702 they surrendered all power to the crown; and until the revolution New Jersey remained a royal colony.

Later history of New Jersey

While the Quaker influence was extending in New Jersey, it founded also the idealist colony of Pennsylvania. Quakerism in England begins in the storm and stress of the English Civil War in the search of George Fox after spiritual peace. Seeking it in vain among the older faiths, he found it for himself in a sort of Antinomianism that taught the existence in men of an "inner

light," the spirit of God. Quakerism in its earlier phases was highly aggressive. The spirit might move the enthusiast to denounce and defy minister and magistrate alike. The settled doctrines of the group, which, interpreting literally the Christian teaching, refused to take any oath or to play any part in military affairs, led to continual trouble with authority. In spite of it, Quakerism throve, gaining converts not merely among the lower classes but among the gentle and wealthy as well. The wealthy Quaker merchant in the eighteenth century in his plain gray clothes is a conventional figure on both sides of the Atlantic.

Quakerism

Among the upper-class converts to Quakerism was William Penn, son of the admiral who had served Cromwell and was as well the trusted friend of the Duke of York. After a boyhood at college and a brief military apprenticeship on the continent (responsible for the familiar portrait looking most unquakerlike in half-armor) he turned Quaker; he suffered persecution that he disdained to evade through his social position, and wrote pamphlet after pamphlet on behalf of his coreligionists. In 1680 he petitioned the king, in consideration of the fact that a royal debt to his father stood unpaid, for a grant of land in America beyond the Delaware. Penn later used every ambiguity of the grant to enlarge his claims with the result that every boundary of Pennsylvania save the Delaware River was later a subject of controversy with neighboring colonies. With New York the zone between the 42d and 43d parallels was in dispute. Baltimore's Maryland grant, which ran as far north as the 40th parallel, would have taken in Philadelphia. The Duke of York in 1681 had the boundary between Pennsylvania and Delaware defined to protect Newcastle. In 1682, however, he ceded to Penn all his rights over Delaware, which were uncertain and had to be adjusted with Baltimore, who under his charter laid claim to the whole of it.

William Penn and the founding of Pennsylvania

The charter obtained by Penn was of the usual proprietary order save that it specifically provided royal review of his legislation and appeals to English courts. His criminal jurisdiction was

limited. Above all, harbinger of the discontent of imperial officials with proprietary grants, he was especially enjoined to enforce the Navigation Acts. Penn's officials assumed authority over the settlers already on the west side of the Delaware, Dutch, Swedes, and English. In 1682 the town of Philadelphia was founded.

Penn's Charter

In April of that year Penn issued his Frame of Government for Pennsylvania. A council of seventy-two and assembly were both elected by the people; the governor, appointed by the proprietor, had no power independent of the council. The council was to prepare business for the assembly and adjourn it; in the whole arrangement there is a smack of Harrington's delight in novel devices; but the spirit of democracy that pervades it is not Harrington's. Coming out to the colony in 1682, Penn held a representative assembly at Chester which adopted a Great Law, so advanced in humanity that it inflicted the death penalty only for murder and treason. Thanks to the idealism of Penn's government, and to his land grants to poor settlers with quit rents of but a penny an acre, his colony grew rapidly. Welsh settlers and a few Germans led by Pastorius came along with the English. By 1685 there were 8,000 inhabitants. Trade and manufacture flourished. Philadelphia at once became one of the important seaports of America.

The frame of government

The government was in continual flux. The Assembly proved too unwieldy and was replaced by a council of eighteen and a lower house of fifty-four. Council and lower house jangled over the right of initiating legislation; members of the Council failed to attend, and Penn transferred the executive power to five and then to a single governor. The governor encountered opposition, and Penn recalled him, leaving the Council to reassume executive functions.

Disorder in government

Meanwhile Penn in England had been drawn into the attempt of James to establish toleration and Romanism. His influence had been strong enough with James to secure in 1688 the exemption of Pennsylvania and Delaware from Andros' consolidated government. He was indeed so closely

Penn and the Revolution of 1688

associated with James that after 1689 he was under suspicion of complicity in plots to restore him, and from 1692 to 1694 was deprived of control of his province.

Pennsylvania was the creation of a man of unselfishness, of readiness to concede his own opinions to others, and withal of a keen business sense. Penn's good judgment in securing material advantages for his colony and his willingness to sacrifice his own interests, insured material prosperity. Penn's weakness was that he was a dilettante and theorist in government, drawing his ideas too much from Harrington, the most artificial of all the seventeenth-century commentators on English government. Penn's expressed belief that the nature of men as good or bad determined the excellence of governments, and not at all their outward form, cannot be accepted. The anarchy of the unwieldy plural executive, its members unwilling either to attend their duties, or to resign their powers to executives who would, is Penn's sufficient refutation. In colony after colony in the New World the force of conditions and events was transmuting one fine scheme of government after another to a single model—governor, upper house or council, and lower house. In colony after colony the foundations of a structure of government were being laid; distinct at first in their plans they were unconscious preparations for the day when their upper tiers should be arched over into a single edifice.

The evolution of Pennsylvania

Besides closing in the line of English colonization from Maine to the Chesapeake, the Restoration established a new proprietary government south of Virginia. Before 1663 there had been a proprietary charter for the region granted to Sir Robert Heath in 1629, the last claims under it being compensated for in 1768 by a hundred thousand acres in New York. There had been several attempts at settlement; the only one successful was the planting of a group of Virginians on the Chowan River, the nucleus of the future colony of North Carolina.

The Carolinas

The establishment of the sugar plantation system in Barbadoes was driving out small landholders, and a certain Barbadian, Sir

John Colleton by name, thought of colonizing them in Carolina; he associated with him first Anthony Ashley Cooper, later Earl of Shaftesbury and founder of the Whig party, and then a group of old cavaliers—Sir George Carteret and Lord John Berkeley, later proprietors of New Jersey, Lord Craven, Sir William Berkeley, governor of Virginia, the Earl of Clarendon, first prime minister of Charles II, and the Duke of Albemarle, who, as General George Monk, had restored the king. In 1663 the group received a charter making them proprietors of a district from sea to sea between 31° and 36°. The proprietary powers were great; but a legislature of the freemen of the colony was expressly provided; the proprietors could grant freedom of conscience, and free trade so far as consistent with English statutes.

The Charter of 1663

Like most of the later proprietors the eight grantees of Carolina were not disposed to spend great sums in establishing colonies of servants in their new possessions, and it behooved them therefore by liberal offers of easy land, self-taxation, self-government, and freedom of conscience to attract voluntary settlers. Yet they could never waive sufficiently their dignities and prerogatives to make their offers really attractive. Several tentative sets of concessions were drawn up. Finally the same set granted to the Jerseys was published for Carolina in 1665. An attempted settlement from Barbadoes in that year lasted only two years. All the proprietors accomplished was to send out a governor for the North Carolina colony where a general assembly was held in 1665. The personnel of the proprietors changed fast. By death, alienation, and sale, proprietorships changed hands. By 1669 the only ones left of the original group were Craven, Ashley, Carteret, and Sir William Berkeley. In this group Ashley took the lead. True to the passion of his day for political theory and paper constitutions, he employed John Locke, his secretary, to draw up the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina.

Early settlements

Locke's name was afterwards permanently associated with the compact theory of political government and with its democratic

tendencies; the reconciliation of his views in the Two Treatises of Government of 1690 with the Fundamental Constitutions of 1669 is difficult. The latter, although they included toleration and trial by jury, simply established a feudal aristocracy after the Whig model. Since for thirty years the proprietors intermittently strove to put them in force, the Constitutions are worth citing as an illustration of what the forces engaged in the evolution of the American form of government had to contend against.

Locke's scheme of government, 1669

The eight proprietors were to hold eight great offices of state, palatine, admiral, etc., each one with administrative functions and an appropriate court. Each was to have a deputy in the province. In Carolina there were to be hereditary nobles, graced, in view of the charter prohibition of the granting of English titles, with the sonorous appellations of landgraves and caciques. Each county in the territory was to contain eight seignories to be held by the eight proprietors, divers baronies and manors to be held by the landgraves and caciques, and colonies of freemen. In the baronies and manors were to be villages of leet men and leet women, bound to the soil for endless generations, with the free American wilderness stretching out to the sunset before them! There was to be a parliament with four estates or houses, proprietors, deputies, landgraves, caciques and representatives having five hundred acres of land elected by those possessed of fifty acres. A grand council made up of the proprietors, deputies and other of their appointees, was to initiate all legislation. The whole document smacks of Harrington.

The Fundamental Constitutions

With the execution of this document there was the same difficulty that often befalls children's play when enough playmates cannot be found to fill all the various rôles of the game. Hence the proprietors were compelled to make numerous abridgments; but the background of this feudal government and its feudal rules of landholding was always present to irritate the settlers.

Failure of the Constitutions

In 1670 a small group of colonists was located on the Ashley

River opposite the later site of Charleston. The proprietors had promised them a tentative parliament of five proprietors' deputies and twenty elected freemen; when the proprietors postponed it, the inhabitants chose a parliament of their own, led by a certain William Owen, "a Magna Carta and Petition of Rights man." Additional settlers came. French Huguenots contributed an element later to be one of the foremost in the colony. A parliament for the southern settlement was held in 1671 with a council of five proprietors' deputies and five freemen elected by the people to prepare legislation. In 1680 the settlement was removed to the present site of Charleston; by 1685 it contained 2500 people.

Government in Carolina

By 1682 Shaftesbury had dropped out and only Lord John Berkeley and Craven were left of the original proprietors. They sought to bargain with the colonists for the acceptance of the Fundamental Constitutions. However in 1688 the legislature of southern Carolina voted that the royal charter and not the Constitutions should be the rule of government. In 1690 they rose against their governor, Peter Colleton, under Seth Sothell, purchaser of a proprietorship. Next year the proprietors expelled him, appointing Ludwell governor in his room.

In the northern Carolina colony, reënforced by a group of Quakers in 1663–1664, the proprietors had little interest. The inhabitants were poor, their little trade was carried on mainly by New Englanders, and they refused to have their settlements pushed out to strategic points. The enforcement of the Acts of Trade on the New England commerce, and the constant threat of the Fundamental Constitutions with their feudal land law, provoked a rebellion in 1677. Seth Sothell, governor from 1683 to 1688, was expelled by the people, presumably for corruption and tyranny.

North Carolina

North Carolina was developing already a character of its own. The Virginia gentlemen looked down with contempt on its small farmers and traders as shiftless, ignorant, dissenters from the Anglican Church, almost without religious worship. In an age when piracy flourished on the Atlantic seaboard, pirates could be

sure of shelter in the estuaries and sounds, and of willing sellers of the supplies they needed. A rendezvous of smugglers and pirates, it seemed to the proprietors a nuisance; but they had not the force to shackle their feudal system on this backwoods community, and the people repeatedly defied them; protected by their poverty, they were too poor to make strict government over them profitable to the governors.

Character of North Carolina

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

C. M. Andrews, *Colonial Self Government, 1652–1689* (*American Nation*, vol. V). New York, 1904.
G. L. Beer, *The Old Colonial System, 1660–1754*. 2 vols. New York, 1912.
P. A. Bruce, *Economic History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century*. 2 vols. New York, 1896.
——, *Institutional History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century*. 2 vols. New York, 1910.
——, *Social Life of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century*. Richmond, 1907.
J. T. Adams, *The Founding of New England*. Boston, 1921.
H. L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century*. 3 vols. New York, 1904–1907.
C. M. Andrews, *The Fathers of New England* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. VI). New Haven, 1919.
E. Channing, *A History of the United States*, vol. II. New York, 1908.

CHAPTER VI

THE COLONIES UNDER THE RESTORATION, II: THE ACTS OF TRADE AND IMPERIAL AUTHORITY

The government of the Restoration took over, as we have seen, many of the statesmen of the Commonwealth. More important for our purposes, it took over the economic policy of regulated colonial trade, embodied in the Navigation Acts. Designed to foster the trade and power of the mother country, these acts bore heavily on the colonies; and by smuggling and evasion as well as by formal protest the colonies registered their complaint. Opposition to imperial control led the last Stuart kings to draw that control even tighter into a political despotism. The Revolution of 1688 broke the Stuart autocracy on the American as well as the English side of the Atlantic; and for three-quarters of a century the control of the mother country was exercised in illogical, haphazard fashion, the colonies generally having much their own way, obeying the Acts of Trade about as they chose.

The colonies and the Restoration, 1660–1688

The political economist gives to the Restoration commercial policy the name of mercantilism, the theory of political and economic life that dominated Europe to the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Mercantilism is essentially the outgrowth of the new spirit of nationalism which arose from the Middle Ages. The first purpose of a mercantilist state is to be strong in war; to be strong in war she must have a strong navy, a great merchant marine from which to recruit it, and ready money in plenty to pay armies, supply them, and subsidize auxiliary states. On a nation's reputation for ability to do these things rests her prestige.

Mercantilism

Merchant marine and money, the mercantilist teaches, come from the same thing—a great trade abroad, and excess of exports over imports that must be made up by specie payments from

debtor countries. One way to get trade abroad for one's own merchant marine is to keep foreign ships from engaging in trade except with the countries where they are owned. The Dutch in the early seventeenth century were carrying on the trade of Europe, bringing goods to each country from all others, conducting the trade between the New World colonies and Europe. The simplest way to check this was to keep the trade for Englishmen: hence the Navigation Acts of 1651, 1660, and subsequent years reserving the trade for English ships—English or colonial built after 1662—and requiring the captains and three-quarters of their crews to be subjects of the king of England.

Mercantilist legislation for a merchant marine

A state that would practice the mercantilist policy to secure a favorable balance of trade—an excess of exports over imports—must carry on her trade with her own capital, financing the voyages and providing the insurance. She must manufacture as much as possible at home, import as little manufacture as possible from her rivals, and sell as much as she can in her colonies. For manufacture she will need raw materials. Some she must obtain in tropical quarters of the globe, along with tropical commodities such as sugar and rice, demanded by her people: naval stores are an important raw material for a mercantile marine that she must find in an abundant and assured supply. Hence the purpose of colonies in the mercantilist system—markets to buy manufactures of the mother country, sources of supply for needed raw materials.

Balance of trade

The mercantilist state therefore must by legislation force her colonies to buy of her or through her what they consume, and to send to her all tropical products she would have otherwise to purchase of her rivals. Accordingly the Navigation Act of 1660 specified certain "enumerated articles"—sugar, tobacco, cotton, indigo, dyewoods—to be brought to England or Ireland only: the Act of 1663 embodied the principle of "the staple"—it required all colonial buying from Europe to be done in or through England. Exceptions were wine from Madeira and the Azores.

"The Staple" and "The Enumerated Articles"

European salt needed in the New England fisheries, and servants, horses, or provisions from Scotland or Ireland.

The choicest colonies in the Western Hemisphere, according to the mercantilist, lay in the tropics. There Spain, first in the field, had jealously engrossed the lands rich in gold and silver; but of the islands of the West Indies she in general had taken only the Greater Antilles—Cuba, Porto Rico, Jamaica (which she lost to England in 1655), and Haiti which she ultimately shared with France. Since early in the seventeenth century England, France, and Holland had been acquiring the smaller islands, notably the Lesser Antilles. Here the Dutch had St. Eustatius and Saba; the French, Guadeloupe, Martinique, St. Barthélemy, Dominica, St. Lucia; the English, Barbadoes, Barbuda, Anguilla, Antigua, as well as their posts in the Bermudas farther to the north. In the seventeenth century the islands were resorts of the buccaneers or pirates of the Spanish Main, who preyed on Spanish commerce, and sacked Spanish towns. They soon acquired a new value for their cane sugar and other tropical produce. While the mainland colonies supplied the islands with foodstuffs for their slaves, horses to work their sugar mills, and timber to build them, the West Indies supplied their mother countries with the precious tropical produce.

The West India colonies

The ideal system of mercantilism ran into all sorts of difficulties in practice. Devised primarily for imperial strength, it cut off certain people, especially the continental colonists, from many sources of profit. When Virginia was allowed to sell her tobacco to Dutch traders to carry to the best European market, she fared better than when compelled to send it all to England in English or colonial ships. When Dutch ships could freely enter New England harbors to sell European goods at the lowest price, the colonists got them cheaper than when the English merchant could exact a monopoly profit. Above all, in later years when New England traded freely with the French sugar islands, she fared better than when confined to the British. The Navigation Acts in imperial

Hardships of the continental colonies under the Acts of Trade

interests caused individual hardship. However sound the political theory involved, the persons on whom they were enforced could not be expected to forbear attempting their evasion. Such attempts in the semi-independent charter and proprietary colonies caused the last Stuart ruler to consider grouping all the colonies under more or less arbitrary royal government. The Revolution of 1688 quashed his attempt and substituted for it a compromise under which imperial administration drifted stern foremost for three-quarters of a century; smuggling in violation of the Acts of Trade became a recognized and respectable business. The attempt at revision that began in 1763 ended in a colonial explosion.

Virginia, 1660–1688

The Navigation Acts were only one of the political forces that during the last forty years of the seventeenth century were very rapidly remodeling Virginia. Their working is illuminated for us by the flash of Bacon's Rebellion, which reveals an American armed protest against oppression, and the engaging figure of a young American leader dreaming of the Revolution a century before it occurred. Most important of all, for an instant it reveals the frontier background of American life, the existence of which was to mold America for the next two centuries. Then the darkness drops again and the forces of the seventeenth century renew their silent work.

Virginia tobacco and the Acts of Trade

The mainspring of the change in Virginia was probably the falling price of tobacco. This was partly due to increased production; Virginia could not take up new products to diversify her agriculture, and rival tobacco-growing communities in North Carolina, in Maryland, and elsewhere rendered futile every plan to limit production artificially. The English government, deriving its huge revenue from the import tax, did not care to see less tobacco grown and imported. The Navigation Acts had driven away the Dutch traders who by their commercial skill had found markets for the Virginia product; and English merchants, secure of a legal monopoly, paid what they chose for tobacco and charged what they would for European goods.

In such conditions the small-scale farmer lay under a heavy disadvantage as compared with the great planter with wider

knowledge of conditions and with the reserve capital to take a loss for a bad year. The rich Virginia soil would always give the small farmer his family's bread but often accorded him no more. After 1660 it became more and more difficult for the indentured servant, once his term was out, to establish himself as a small farmer. He gravitated to other colonies, especially to North Carolina. The planter found that owning his labor and its progeny was better than hiring it for terms of years. In the later seventeenth century, therefore, negro slaves were rapidly replacing indentured white servants.

Hardships of the Virginia small farmers

The well-to-do in Virginia had found a new source of wealth, surer than tobacco, in the Indian trade. From their bases at the forts of the fall line of rivers, such as the James, where Richmond and Petersburg stand to-day, fur trading expeditions were traversing the Virginia Piedmont; their pack trains of loaded horses were crossing the passes of the mountains to the southward, gaining the tributaries of the Tennessee River, and penetrating far into the interior of the continent. By the beginning of the eighteenth century the traders had reached the present states of Illinois and Arkansas. Men like the first Colonel William Byrd became wealthy in the fur trade; Governor Berkeley himself was interested; and the governor and Council from their fur-trading interests deprecated any trouble with the Indians. This excited the disgust of the frontiersmen who were pushing their farms into the Piedmont, and felt the natives were neighbors to be gotten rid of speedily.

The fur trade in Virginia

The wealthier classes were riveting their hold on the colonial government, general and local. In 1662 the vestries, charged with parish assessment and government, became self-perpetuating. The county governments had always been appointed from above. It is questionable if one general election for members of the House of Burgesses was held between 1661 and 1676. In 1670 the suffrage had been limited to freeholders, and the control of the great landholders over elections hitherto secured through influence was safeguarded by legislation. The Council, practically appointed by the governor,

Aristocratic control in Virginia after 1660

was made up of the great planters and fur traders; its members were exempt from taxation.

Taxation both local and general was heavy—for building forts that did not stop the inroads of Dutch cruisers during the war in 1664–1666, for building towns in a country where nature had decreed they should not be. In old age Governor Berkeley had become tyrannical and avaricious; and, as the people supposed, in the course of the fur trade he supplied the Indians with arms and ammunition. The king, too, provokingly treated the Old Dominion, proud of her loyalty to him in the evil days of Cromwell, as a chattel to be cast to any favorite. In 1672 Charles had made a grant of certain rights in the colony to Culpeper and Arlington and they had to be bought off. A commission was in England endeavoring to secure a charter to protect the colony for the future when Bacon's Rebellion occurred.

Other grievances of Virginia

In 1676 Indian massacre of the frontiersmen of the upcountry had begun, and Berkeley, refusing to allow punitive expeditions, clung to the old policy of the expensive forts at the heads of the rivers that served as bases of the fur trade. A headstrong young Englishman lately arrived, Nathaniel Bacon, in defiance of the governor led an expedition from his frontier county on the James River, and inflicted a decisive defeat on the enemy. Berkeley meanwhile had issued a proclamation against him, but was speedily compelled to call a general election for burgesses at which all freemen voted. Bacon boldly returned to Jamestown to be arrested and promptly pardoned by the governor and to secure liberal legislation from the new Assembly. Vestries were once more to be elected every three years; no man should be sheriff for two terms; the people were to elect representatives to assist in making county levies.

Bacon's Rebellion

Bacon nevertheless distrusted the governor's good faith. Slipping away from Jamestown he was soon at the head of a popular uprising. He returned with an armed force, overawed the Council, and forced the defiant old governor to grant him a commission against the Indians. It was now Berkeley's turn to flee. Bacon, styling himself "general by consent of the people,"

Death of Bacon

called a convention to prescribe an oath of fidelity to the new order and departed on a new Indian expedition. In his absence the governor returned to Jamestown. Bacon retraced his steps, took the town once more and burned it as untenable. Facing the fact that the governor would secure English troops to put down the insurrection, Bacon was pondering the possibility that Virginians with their knowledge of Indian warfare might hold the wilderness against the redcoats, when he died.

No one was found among the insurgents to take his place as leader. Berkeley recovered full authority. Savagely he punished his defeated enemies with death and confiscation, he and his adherents appropriating the confiscated property on the pretext of making good their own losses. Charles II had already sent out troops and a commission to restore order. Berkeley defied both the commission and the king's proclamation of amnesty and was finally recalled in disgrace. He was succeeded by Culpeper, who used the government to feather his own nest, and by Lord Howard of Effingham, the Assembly quarreling freely with both. So events in Virginia approached the Revolution of 1688.

Berkeley's vengeance

In a sense the colony of Massachusetts Bay was the crux of the whole imperial problem of the Restoration government on the American continent. To force a strong, well-organized, defiant commonwealth to submit to the Acts of Trade and forbear the illegal commerce that was enlarging her wealth, to mold an intolerant Puritan theocratic republic into a docile colony such as the Stuarts approved —here was indeed a task. For a quarter of a century, by delays, evasions, soft letters, and arrogant acts, Massachusetts Bay fought to keep her form of government, her acquisitions in Maine and New Hampshire, and her trade. Her course was rendered more devious by a division in the interests and counsels of her people. The members of the churches in the interior were narrower and more unyielding even than the earlier generation had been. But her relative independence of imperial control made it possible for her merchants to defy openly the Navigation Acts

The Massachusetts Puritans and the Restoration

and import European goods directly for reëxport to other colonies, where the acts were enforced. The merchants of Boston, enriched and broadened by this trade, were prepared to sacrifice much of the old ideal of the Bible Commonwealth, and to tolerate Anglicanism, if so the colony might retain enough autonomy to continue to nullify the Acts of Trade. This group was destined to become the dominant factor in eighteenth-century Massachusetts. But for the moment the narrower Puritans of the country districts had their way. They checked attempts on the part of the commercial class to yield something of theocracy in government to save the trade. Fighting to maintain a plan of government in complete variance with modern American ideals, they ultimately lost the colony charter; but the vain struggle of the seventeenth-century colony for its virtual independence of the British Empire nevertheless arouses our sympathy.

Massachusetts' troubles naturally began with the Restoration. She had made numerous enemies, and many of them were in London seeking a hearing against her. The heirs of Gorges and Mason of course complained of their lost lands in Maine and New Hampshire. Samuel Maverick, pioneer settler before the days of the Bay Company, fined by Massachusetts in 1646 for the Presbyterian Plot, was on hand with his catalogue of the shortcomings of the theocratic régime. A commercial corporation taxing and governing those not its members, substituting for the king's oath of allegiance one of fidelity to the corporation, excluding all but members of the Puritan churches from the franchise, and forbidding appeals to England—these were serious complaints to din in the ears of a Restoration government.

Complaints against Massachusetts

That government, it must be said, acted with moderation. In 1662 the king asked only that Anglicans be allowed freedom of worship and that a property franchise be substituted for church membership. The first request was ignored, the second evaded by an ambiguous enactment that had precisely the effect of the former rule. Perhaps the liberal royal charters to Connecticut and Rhode Island of 1662 and 1663 were

Massachusetts ignores the king

intended to strengthen them as permanent bulwarks against Massachusetts and protect them from absorption by her.

The need of settling the numerous boundary disputes and of inquiring on the spot into charges against Massachusetts caused the dispatch of a commission in 1664 accompanying the expedition against New Netherland. In Plymouth, Connecticut, and Rhode Island the commission was well received, but Massachusetts pleaded her charter to deny it any authority within her borders. The commission gave up the task and departed for the north, where it checked, but only for the moment, the authority of Massachusetts. The royal government, despite Massachusetts' reception of the commission, did no more than require that agents be sent to England to settle matters in dispute; the colony neglected to send them.

Massachusetts defies the commission of 1664

It is hard to find a fully satisfactory reason for the forbearance of the English government. The influences friendly to the dissenters after the fall of Clarendon in 1667; the Dutch wars of 1664–1666 and 1673–1674; the secret pro-Catholic policy of Charles; the fact that the complaints against the colony were partly for lack of due respect, and that Charles cared little for such punctilios—all these help to explain the delay. However, the Gorges and Mason heirs continued their petitions in 1670 and 1671; in 1675 the law officers of the crown pronounced their titles valid. More important still, the merchants were at last complaining of the wholesale violations of the Acts of Trade; New England rather than Old England was making herself the staple of supply to the colonies of European goods. Above all, King Philip's War had rendered Massachusetts more vulnerable than hitherto.

Forbearance of Charles II

By 1675 the Indian in New England was but a shadow of his former might. About 4,000 under the ministrations of Eliot and Mayhew had been Christianized and settled on Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket Island or on the frontier. That frontier had extended a third of the way across Massachusetts. Most of the Indians remaining near the settlements, the remnant of the Wampanoags and Narra-

The New England Indians, 1675

gansetts, were blocked in the neighborhood of Narragansett Bay. The colonies were taking a more and more autocratic method with them, confiscating their firearms, charging them with heavy debts for expeditions against them, and requiring larger and larger surrenders of desirable lands. The little remnant of Indian warriors, few in proportion to the whites, lifted the tomahawk in 1675. Philip, the son of Massassoit, the friend of the Pilgrims, has given his name to the war, but neither he nor any other chieftain exercised real control in it.

The uncoördinated efforts of the little group of hostiles were at first successful. Stormed and ruined towns and ambushed detachments struck terror into the colonies. The New England Confederation displayed little ability in concerting the efforts of the various colonies. The outstanding military achievement of the war was the capture of the Narragansett fort, at dead of winter, and the breaking of the tribe at the moment it was about to turn on the whites. Desiring Indian lands, the whites had originally welcomed the war, but for the final expulsion of the redskins from southern New England they paid a heavy toll: sixteen Massachusetts and four Rhode Island towns destroyed, widespread devastation in Maine, the loss of one out of every sixteen men of military age, a ruined fur trade, and wasted crops that necessitated purchases from the southern colonies. Then appeared Edward Randolph, the archfiend of the old Puritan chroniclers.

King Philip's War

Stripped of the literary embellishments that Hawthorne and others have given him, Randolph appears as a typical royalist official, small enough to cherish dislike against those who failed to treat him with deference; and deference on his first visit to Massachusetts to investigate complaints, Randolph did not receive. "Who is this Mr. Coventry?" asked the governor contemptuously on seeing the signature of a secretary of state. Hats were kept on during the reading of the king's letter and Randolph was told its contents were trivial matters. He soon accumulated material for a report, emphasizing the defiance of the Acts of Trade, and the independent attitude

Edward Randolph

of the colonial government; he urged that the charter be voided.

After a long delay Massachusetts finally dispatched the required agents but with powers limited to discussion of the Gorges and Mason claims. On examining into the Massachusetts Bay charter the law officers of the crown in a studiously fair opinion pronounced the legality of the removal of the corporation to New England, and the noneffect of the *quo warranto* of 1635. They even indorsed the Massachusetts holdings south of the Merrimac which had been attacked by Mason and Gorges; but they pronounced the colony's larger territorial claims to the north unfounded. Then Massachusetts agents, greatly to the king's displeasure, bought out the Gorges heirs and received a new title to Maine; but in 1679 New Hampshire was definitely set off from Massachusetts as a royal province. The General Court had meanwhile made some attempt to conciliate the home government. In 1678 an act was passed enforcing the Navigation Acts, bearing out the Massachusetts contention that acts of Parliament had force there only when specially adopted. In 1678–1679 the Court ordered the administration of the oath of allegiance and abandoned the use of the term "commonwealth." But the agents announcing these concessions were met with fresh demands.

Massachusetts tests the king's patience

In 1681 the colony was warned to send agents prepared to adjust all complaints against the colony under penalty of *quo warranto;* again she delayed. The patience of the home government at last was exhausted. Randolph had been in the colony again from 1680 to 1683 as collector and searcher of customs; again he sent voluminous reports of the violation of the Navigation Acts, claiming that he could not get convictions from local courts or juries, and was blocked by a naval office in the colony that levied fines for itself. In 1683 the long threatened writ was sued out. Service of the first two writs was delayed till after the time for return. The king's attorneys then used the more summary writ of *scire facias;* and on the grounds of violation of the charter in levying taxes on nonfree-

The Voiding of the Charter, 1684

men and in exacting the oath of fidelity the charter was voided in 1684.

No royal government was established for Massachusetts till 1686, after the accession of James II. By then it had been decided to unite all the New England and northern colonies into one great government. Plymouth with no royal charter fell an easy victim. It was added to Massachusetts along with New Hampshire, where royal governors since 1679 had had hard work enforcing the regal authority and the legal claims of the Masons on a people dominated by ministers like the Reverend Jonathan Moody, and in sympathy at every point with the Massachusetts system. Andros came out as governor in 1686; already an attack on the charters of Rhode Island and Connecticut was planned on grounds of illegal taxes, denial of appeals to the king, passage of laws repugnant to the laws of England, and in Connecticut, the forbidding of Anglican church services. Rhode Island submitted, and finally Connecticut followed her example rather than be annexed immediately to New York. The government of all New England was thenceforth vested in Andros and a council representing the various sections of the greater province. In 1688 the proprietors of East and West Jersey surrendered, Andros succeeded Dongan in New York, and the authority of Greater New England ran from the St. Croix to the Delaware.

Greater New England, 1686–1688

Andros was by no means the gloomy tyrant he has been pictured. He was a well-meaning soldierly official whom tact or discretion never influenced to deviate from the execution of his orders. He made the mistake of questioning land titles on the reasonable ground that they derived from town grants and that the Massachusetts corporation had never had authority to create other town corporations. Nothing could have been more certain to cause trouble, not even a measure of 1688 limiting town meetings to one a year, or the attendance of the governor in state at Anglican service on Christmas Day.

Sir Edmund Andros

Then came the Revolution of 1688 in England, with its after-effects in the New World. On April 18, 1689, on learning of events in England, Boston rose against the authority of Andros,

arresting him and his chief associates; a provincial government formed of the old magistrates of charter days was established by a convention held May 24; and on orders from England, William and Mary were proclaimed. The Reverend Increase Mather, who had been in England endeavoring to procure a renewal of the charter from James, now turned his blandishments on William.

The Revolution of 1688 in Massachusetts

The English government kept the question of its policy toward New England in abeyance for a time. In view of the necessity for condemning and undoing the arbitrary acts of the Stuarts, it restored the charters of Rhode Island and Connecticut, court proceedings against which had never been completed. New Hampshire it set off as a royal colony, perhaps because of the importance of the Merrimac Valley as a source of masts for the royal navy, perhaps because of backstairs influence exerted in behalf of the Mason heirs. About Massachusetts it hesitated. The charter had been voided and on good grounds; the provincial government showed itself incompetent to deal with the menace of the French and Indians; and a greater measure of imperial control seemed necessary.

William III's policy toward New England

Accordingly the Province Charter of 1691 was issued. It retained the old outward forms and names, but provided a royal governor who selected the assistants from nominees of the lower house. Maine was added to the colony. Massachusetts was disappointed in the loss of her old independence. It remained for the generation of the Revolution to advance the theory that the Province Charter was a compact on the basis of which Massachusetts had acquiesced in the king's accession, and that a royal violation of it dissolved the colony's allegiance.

The Province Charter of 1691

In the other colonies excepting New York and Maryland the Revolution passed without note. In Maryland, through an accident, the orders of Lord Baltimore to proclaim William and Mary were not received; and the English government, in view of the suspicion attaching to all Catholics after James's attempt to establish that religion in Eng-

Maryland a royal province till 1715

land, deemed it advisable to take over the administration of the province. Not until a Lord Baltimore turned Protestant in 1715 was it restored to the status of a proprietary province.

The Revolution of 1688 in New York

In New York the Revolution of 1688 was marked by the tragic episode of Leisler. On the eve of the Revolution the city was shaken by fear of French and Catholic plots, distrusting alike its government and its king. When the news of the Revolution in New England reached New York on April 26, the Council, made up of the aristocratic group, called on the city government and the militia to maintain order. Soon a revolt broke out in the trainbands against the Council. Jacob Leisler, a merchant of the lower class outside the aristocratic circle, became the leader of the movement. Setting out with the idea of holding New York for William of Orange, he erected a provisional government of his own, disregarding the royal order that all Protestant officials be continued in office. He called a provisional assembly June 26 which elected a committee of safety that under pressure from Leisler made him captain of the fort. Leisler and his associate Milburne held elections for a city government in New York, at which only a few voted, and secured a group friendly to them. They endeavored to secure Albany by force, and in February and March, 1690, issued writs for the election of a representative assembly, which met in April, 1690, and levied taxes.

Fate of Leisler

In January of 1691 a detachment of royal troops arrived at New York, two months before the new governor, Slaughter. Leisler refused to submit till Slaughter appeared; a clash with the royal troops made him technically guilty of treason for which he was tried and found guilty along with Milburne and others. The Council and Assembly, now in the hands of his aristocratic enemies, urged his execution, and with Milburne he was executed May 16, 1691. He had been violent and autocratic, but had genuinely endeavored to secure New York against danger; his fate revealed how deeply aristocracy had rooted itself in the colony.

So ended the period of the Restoration in the colonies. The

Stuarts had followed a clear and consistent colonial policy, even if latterly it had become an autocratic one. They adopted centralization and strong government as means of enforcing the mercantilist imperial policy of the Acts of Trade, and of protecting the northern colonies against possible French aggression. As their policy developed, it met steady opposition from classes in the colonies who found both their liberties and their interests threatened. The successors of the Stuarts for three-quarters of a century elected to let colonial affairs follow the line of least resistance.

The Restoration and the colonies

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

C. M. Andrews, *Colonial Self Government, 1652–1689* (*American Nation*, vol. V). New York, 1904.
G. L. Beer, *The Old Colonial System, 1660–1754*. 2 vols. New York, 1912.
P. A. Bruce, *Economic History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century*. 2 vols. New York, 1896.
——, *Institutional History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century*. 2 vols. New York, 1910.
——, *Social Life of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century*. Richmond, 1907.
J. T. Adams, *The Founding of New England*. Boston, 1921.
H. L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century*. 3 vols. New York, 1904–1907.
C. M. Andrews, *The Fathers of New England* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. VI). New Haven, 1919.
E. Channing, *A History of the United States*, vol. II. New York, 1908.

CHAPTER VII

THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION, 1689–1760

"Mr. Speaker," Queen Elizabeth once asked in the days when the House of Commons was supposed only to register her sovereign will, "what hath passed in the Commons' House?" "May it please your Grace," replied the Speaker, "six weeks." Such is the answer the historical student finds it easiest to give in summing up the seventy years of American history that follow 1690. Changes were taking place and great ones; population was increasing, foreign elements coming in, trade expanding, the frontier beckoning to the restless; religious enthusiasms were boiling up; new ruling classes were acquiring experience in government; in many respects Old England and her colonies were drifting away from each other. Yet when one attempts to single out specific events to record as important harbingers of change, the story becomes a multitude of petty details: the squabbles of governors and assemblies, the endless round of routine administration, the ambitions and hopes of inconsiderable individuals multiplied by the hundred thousand.

The changing colonial world

It is not possible to get a simple and direct approach to the period through the policy of the imperial government; for that government itself was tossed on the waves of faction. This was the period in which the Revolution of 1688, transferring the leadership of the nation from king to Parliament, was being worked out in practical details and was not as yet fully understood. The great landlords who in effect nominated the members of the House of Commons and thereby controlled the crown ministers as dependent on a majority in the House, did not fully comprehend the change: they still talked of the dangers of royal prerogative; and when the king's ministers applied to Parliament for permission to take into the king's hand the proprietary and charter colonies, Parliament refused it as a dangerous

Imperial inefficiency

extension of royal powers. Furthermore, throughout the whole machinery of government was to be seen the uncertainty as to the limits of jurisdiction of this committee or board and that. Between them all colonial business dragged in endless delay.

The one clear-cut purpose of the government appeared in its endeavor to improve the enforcement of the Navigation Acts, which, slack everywhere, was especially so in the nonroyal colonies whose governors were subordinate to the crown partially or not at all. To tighten up the system the Navigation Act of 1696 had been passed. A Board of Trade and Plantations had been constituted in London to supervise the colonies and formulate policies regarding them; the secretary of state for the Southern Department was given special jurisdiction over them; and in the colonies, to enforce trade regulations, new vice-admiralty courts were created.

Attempted enforcement of the Acts of Trade

If Parliament protected the charter colonies from absorption in the royal establishments, it did not fail to legislate itself on colonial matters, sometimes on most minute ones. To protect English manufactures it passed the Woolens Act of 1699 forbidding the transport of woolens from colony to colony, the Hat Act of 1732 limiting the number of apprentices a hatter could engage; in the Post Office act of 1710, the Coinage Act of 1707, the Debt Act of 1732 facilitating the collection from colonials of debts owed to Englishmen, in the act changing the calendar in 1751, and the act of the same year prohibiting the issuance of paper money, it exercised wide powers on its general claim to legislative supremacy. There were not wanting, however, judicial pronouncements in England to back the colonial theory that the colonial legislatures were essentially the American equivalents of Parliament endowed with all of its powers and duties that they could appropriately exercise.

Parliamentary legislation for the colonies

If it was to extend its power, the crown must secure by negotiation with colonial proprietors the surrender of their rights of government. East and West Jersey, where the proprietors had exercised but narrow authority, were so surrendered in 1702. In South Carolina, a popular revolution of 1719 against the pro-

prietors was caused by their failure to provide for defense, and by their veto of an act establishing election districts. It ended in the installation of a royal governor, and the surrender for both the Carolinas of all powers of government, and by all the proprietors save one, of claims to land ownership. The surrender was confirmed by Parliament in 1729, and thenceforth both northern and southern provinces were governed as royal colonies. Maryland returned to Lord Baltimore in 1715 on his adhesion to the Church of England; and it, with Penn's provinces of Delaware and Pennsylvania, remained proprietary till the Revolution, despite an attempt to turn Pennsylvania into a royal province in 1764. The power conferred on the crown by the act of 1696 of approving all provincial governors was rendered nugatory in Rhode Island and Connecticut by annual elections; but in the proprietary colonies it furnished a handle for the enforcement of imperial authority.

The Jerseys and the Carolinas become royal governments

In all the colonies, the drift of political habit had tended to the establishment of government under a governor, a council elected or appointed that served as an upper house, and an elected lower house. As a result, except in the charter colonies, politics tended to become a continual struggle on the part of the governor to maintain his independence of the elected branch of the legislature. Usually the hold sought by the assembly on the governor was the annual appropriation of his salary. In most colonies the persistence of local politicians triumphed in some moment when the home authorities were inattentive. In New York the Assembly, through the provincial treasurer, attained to a control of all expenditure. Governors who caused too much friction might find themselves recalled by ministers inclined to temporize with recalcitrant colonists. Indeed in Massachusetts a series of royal governors already denizens of the colony were chosen manifestly with conciliatory intent. Everywhere the king's representatives had to reconcile the will of the local aristocracy, generally dominant in council or assembly, with the will of the royal master.

The evolution of politics in the royal colonies

Nevertheless the crown maintained its control of legislation. Governors' instructions specifically forbade them to pass certain types of law at all, or certain others without clauses suspending their execution until the king's assent was given; the Privy Council with great vigor abrogated laws passed in royal colonies. This was always irritating; often as in the case of a North Carolina act allowing non-Anglican clergymen to perform the marriage ceremony, it was harshly oppressive. Through appeals from colonial courts to the home judicial authorities, even Rhode Island and Connecticut were brought under a measure of imperial power; but the success of the crown in maintaining control of its over-sea subjects under the old colonial system was but qualified.

Crown control of legislation

Only occasionally were the forces noticed that were working under the surface for fundamental change. In 1689 the colonies had a population of perhaps 200,000; by 1760 it had increased to a million and a half. New England from 80,000 grew to something less than half a million; her trade and shipbuilding increased her seaport towns. Boston became a well-built town of twenty thousand. Portsmouth, Salem, and Newport were her satellites. New England population, checked and driven back from the Maine frontier and the upper Connecticut through Indian raids, by 1760 was pushing into the upland back country with the founding of one tier of frontier towns after another. Emigrants from older New England towns, the natural increase of the seventeenth-century stock, these frontiersmen naturally perpetuated the older New England social life. Wringing a scanty living from the soil, they undertook in the long winter evenings to supply as many of their needs as possible through domestic manufacture. The women carded and even wove wool; the men fashioned rude woodenware, or at the forge hammered out nails or other simple ironwork. The frontier had extended to the central Massachusetts uplands and was about to extend in New Hampshire, Maine, and into Vermont.

New England

The middle colonies with perhaps 40,000 population in 1689 had by 1760 multiplied tenfold. New York's original 20,000 had

increased the least. The Iroquois, the powerful Indian confederacy which England had to conciliate, prevented much settlement in the Mohawk Valley. The great proprietary estates which supported the feudal families that ruled New York politics —Schuylers, Van Rensselaers, Livingstons, De Lanceys—did not tempt migration and settlement so long as lands could be had elsewhere on freer tenure. New York acquired a certain official importance as a center of royal authority in the north. Here had centered the diplomacy which appeased the Iroquois warriors and by them kept lesser Indian nations in awe; here was the natural field of battle against Canada in the trough of the Hudson and Lake Champlain. New York City, housing ancient corporations of vested right like Trinity Church, was primarily an official residence: it was only beginning the exploitation of its magnificent harbor and was smaller than Boston or Philadelphia. New Jersey, a farming, dissenting community economically dependent on New York and Philadelphia, had increased from 10,000 to 80,000. Pennsylvania and Delaware, with 12,000 in 1689, increased fastest of all, perhaps to 210,000. Philadelphia was the largest city of British America; by 1755 it had outstripped Boston; travelers commented on the regular streets of brick houses as contrasted with the tortuous lanes that served as thoroughfares in Boston. The religious policy of William Penn drew in migrating religious elements that sought freedom of concience; with or without the proprietary assent they pushed their settlements into the valleys that reached into the mountains, the Scotch-Irish obstinately refusing to pay quit rents in deference to proprietary ownership. Some of the German elements in the colony established themselves on the frontier; others in Lancaster County cultivated the best equipped farms on the continent.

The middle colonies

Territorially, Maryland had less opportunity for expansion; its population however increased from 20,000 to 108,000 whites and 56,000 negroes. Its capital, Annapolis, remained a sleepy southern village; its city of Baltimore grew as the market of the wheat farms, which in this colony interspersed the tobacco plantations. Maryland in her economic interests was half with the middle

colonies, half with the plantation provinces of the south. Virginia, whose charter claims embraced the Old Northwest, grew not quite so rapidly—from 58,000 to 165,000 whites and 150,000 negroes. As in Maryland the increase was largely negro and slave; but the whites were there, pushing into the upcountry where the land grants lavishly dealt each other by the Virginia tidewater planters of the governor's council seemed ever to precede the pioneers. An upland devoted to wheat, rather than tobacco, to free rather than slave labor, to farms rather than plantations, stretched down from Virginia through the Carolinas. In Virginia, towns did not thrive. Williamsburg, the Old Dominion's capital, was a village, stirred into social life when the Burgesses met. Norfolk had more the air of a town; but as we have seen, the conditions of Virginia life did not promote the growth of cities.

Maryland and Virginia

The Carolinas had grown from a frontier outpost of 5,000 to 230,000 souls. North Carolina, satirized by Virginia gentlemen as the land of the shiftless, supported a large population, 110,000 whites and 20,000 blacks, heterogenous as to race and religion, with but small reverence to spare for external authority. Wilmington, the colonial capital, was a smaller replica of Williamsburg. A few great gentlemen like Willie Jones could live in magnificence, and goad the royal governor to emulate them by building what was said to be the stateliest mansion in North America.

North Carolina

South Carolina had become a land of rice and indigo plantations with 70,000 negro slaves and an aristocratic society ruling a colony of 30,000 whites. At Charleston flourished the most sophisticated urban society in America; the city in that day was still on equal terms in population and trade with New York, Boston, and Philadelphia. Georgia was a backwoods outpost against the Spaniards of St. Augustine.

South Carolina and Georgia

Very significant was the increasing importance of non-English elements. The so-called Scotch-Irish—Presbyterian Scotchmen colonized in Ulster in 1611 to hold it in subjection to England, and forced out by English economic legislation hostile to Ireland a century later—migrated to America by tens of thousands. Generally

they settled in the eastern Piedmont and the Allegheny Valleys all the way from New York to Georgia. German elements, encouraged to migrate from the devastated Rhineland early in the eighteenth century for economic reasons, after an unfortunate experience of settlement in New York came to central Pennsylvania. There they were reënforced by German sects that had come seeking religious freedom, Moravians and Mennonites. German newspapers, presses, books, churches, and schools supplied them with instruction in their native language to the consternation of their English neighbors. The Dutch constituted another strong foreign-language group in New York. At Albany and elsewhere Dutch was still the dominant tongue. Scotch Highlanders, leaving Scotland after the failure of the rising of 1745 on behalf of the claim to the throne of the exiled house of Stuart, or as a result of the abandonment of the feudal system in the Highlands and the loss of the lands they had tilled under primitive tenures abrogated by their chiefs, furnished still another element. French Huguenots, driven from France by persecution, supplied colonists of influence from Newport to Charleston.

Non-English elements

These elements, Dutch, German, French, Scotch, were remote in language or at least in intellectual culture from England. Though no conscious elements of revolt appeared among them in the period, the instinctive ties of sympathy to bind them to the natives of Old England were distinctly lacking. In her literary tradition or religious tradition there was for them little or nothing, in her political tradition only what they might find it convenient to appropriate for their own advantage.

Foreign elements lack ties to England

It is significant also that three of those groups, German, Scotch-Irish, and Scotch, were essentially of the upcountry and frontier. Generation by generation the frontier has moved across the continent to the Rockies and to the Pacific, in a series of waves or phases of irregular length and uneven order; but in every age its unfolding has tended to follow a general economic sequence.

The frontier

Close after the first adventurous explorer comes the hunter or the fur trader, taking toll himself of the swarming wild life or hiring the Indian to do it. With the development of some faint degree of protection to property rights appears the grazier or herder, leaving his brand-mark or the name of his branding pens or corrals all the way across the continent; he suffers his herds to run at large, distinguished from his neighbor's only by earmarks and brand, and establishes property over calves by branding each with the mark borne by the mother. In case mineral wealth offers, the prospector or miner may appear now or earlier. The land speculator with money or influence to get tracts of land has inserted his prospectuses in the newspapers of old settled communities and thrown out his surveying parties, almost on the heels of the wilderness scout and pace by pace with the squatter. After the squatter comes the more solid farmer, the mechanic, the storekeeper, the lawyer, the judge, the minister-missionary; and thus the frontier is transmuted into civilization. In some such sequence each generation has seen the frontier pushed toward the sunset.

The influence of the frontier has been often described. The existence of free wild land is a challenge to the adventurous, to the independent of spirit, to the ambitious, speaking always of newer opportunity farther on. Hence the first squatters tend always after a few years to push west once more, selling rights or improvements to more permanent settlers. The typical pioneer is restless mentally and physically, shifting his religion as he shifts his station. The frontier obliterates old marks of social success and establishes others based on personal prowess. Fortunes can be easily made on the frontier and as easily lost. The aristocrat of the east, unless his position depends on superior physical and mental powers, is likely to lose to one fitter to survive in the economic conflict. The frontier itself grapples with the men who invade it, a cruel antagonist, punishing them with fever and ague from its swamps and forests, and gloom of mind. But the product of the struggle of men with raw nature is democracy, faith that the man is worth more than the dollar.

Influence of the frontier

The frontiersman in the various stages always tends to develop certain intellectual characteristics from his environment. Out-

The frontiersman

stripping on his way to the wilderness the economic conveniences of civilization, organized schools, churches, governments, and laws, he makes these things anew for himself. He uses primitive makeshifts of his own as substitutes for tools, nails, and ironwork; he makes his own church organizations and creeds, and frames rude governments and codes of law to be enforced by the better men of the community in armed might. He is quick to imagine and to resent an attempt to impose government, religion, or economic subserviency on him by the older settled communities he has left; self-reliance in him mounts to impatience of all external control.

The frontier type of 1750 stood fully developed. In Pennsylvania it was waging political war on the Quaker majority in the Assembly, which represented the wealth of the older settled

Frontier and tidewater

section, and clung to pacifist ideals in deprecation of vigorous measures against the frontiersman's Indian enemy. In Virginia, in North Carolina, in South Carolina, as in Massachusetts, the under-representation of the frontier was a grievance, and the back country chafed under provincial governments controlled by the eastern sections. From political opposition to the seaboard colonial assemblies to rebellion against the mother country for the frontiersman might be only a step.

By 1760 in the physical sense throughout the colonies the frontier had been pushed back from the coastal plain, across the Piedmont or upcountry marked by the fall line of the rivers, to the edge of the mountains and into their first interior valleys. Of the gateways to the continent beyond, the easiest, the Mohawk Valley, was blocked by the presence of the Iroquois. The passes to the southward in Pennsylvania, across the mountains by road,

Barriers to westward advance

or by portage from the headwaters of the Potomac to the waters of the Youghiogheny were difficult. So were those that led from the Virginia rivers across to the Kanawha. Yet by 1740 fur traders had passed there and penetrated into the present State of Ohio. Of the southern gateways, Cum-

berland Gap, the future great road to Kentucky, did not invite the fur trader, for Kentucky was a battle-ground, not a dwelling place; the routes farther to the south by the upper tributaries of the Tennessee—the French Broad and the Little Tennessee—traversed by generations of fur traders, led into the homes of powerful and warlike tribes who welcomed white men as traders but not as settlers. Indian warriors conspired with rugged mountain passes to dam up English settlement east of the mountains.

In the colonies generally, life in the older settled sections might be as comfortable and almost as sophisticated as in the mother country. There had always been the gentility of an upper class in the colonies; the trade of the eighteenth century, land speculation, the profits of the planter brought money to express social position in luxurious display. Fairly good houses, good furniture even if American copies and simplifications of English styles, liveried servants, were the background on which the colonial gentleman appeared, gorgeously appareled in satins, silks, and lace, drinking fine wines, enjoying as wide a range of food as the Englishman, reading good books, perhaps in the south even sending his sons to English universities or to the law schools of the Middle Temple in London. Public amusements such as the theater, of course he enjoyed more rarely. In New England too the Puritan had not forgotten his antipathy to the playhouse and the players. The upper class, mercantile in New England and Pennsylvania, landholding in New York, Maryland, Virginia, and the Carolinas, reënforced by men of more moderate means, was the material of council and assembly that waged war on royal governors or basked in the social prestige that emanated from them.

The upper class in the colonies

Below them in the seaport towns were the artisans or mechanics, shipwrights, riggers, caulkers, sailmakers, sailors, shoemakers, and the unskilled workmen, all dependent on the upper class for daily bread. The economic organization of society was still primitive. The master workman, generally doing work to order in his shop or home, worked side by side with the apprentices, bound to him to learn the trade, and the journeymen,

The lower classes

skilled workers to whom he paid wages. Uneducated and illiterate save in New England, living narrow lives in the poorer sections of the towns on small wages, this class was unrepresented because its members could not show the varying property qualification that from colony to colony admitted one to the franchise. Together with the under-represented frontiersmen they represented a class as yet inert politically that in a political contest with the mother country might be used and might get out of the control of the user.

American literature

In the arts and literature America could show but little. Competent craftsmen with a fine sense of form built her houses, made her furniture, even of the rustic type; but the skill of the portrait painter who recorded the face of the man of wealth was elementary. What literary effort there was that was not directly copied from English models was religious in tone; whatever abstract thinking America could point to was like that of Jonathan Edwards, the painful casuistry by which man seeks to know his relation to his Creator.

American education

In higher education, Harvard and William and Mary, foundations of the seventeenth century, were supplemented by Yale, established in 1701 as a protest of the Puritan against the growing doctrinal laxity of Harvard, and by Princeton, Brown, King's College or Columbia, Dartmouth, the University of Pennsylvania. These institutions with a few scores of students, usually either men of the upper colonial families or candidates for the ministry, were on about the same plane as the English institutions of their day in what they imparted—a round of the ancient languages, philosophy, divinity, a little mathematics. The students were comparatively young and the work correspondingly slight in quality. As to the lower grades of training, only in New England was anything like public education to be found. Yet probably in most of the colonies a person able to pay for instruction in any given subject from reading and writing to surveying and navigation would have found no difficulty in finding a schoolmaster able to teach him. Many boys of the poorer classes were apprenticed to masters whose duty it was to

give them rudimentary education. Because education was unorganized it eludes description, but it was not nonexistent.

Newspapers had begun to appear in 1704. They were small sheets of four pages, filled with commercial advertisements, shipping reports, official publications, and a little general information and news. Some of them, however, had essayed criticism of public officials; and in the trial of John Peter Zenger at New York in 1735, the venerable Andrew Hamilton of Philadelphia pleaded his defense, establishing in colonial jurisprudence the new principle of the freedom of the press to criticize public acts of officials so long as it criticizes truthfully. From the presses also came great quantities of books of all descriptions, religious works largely controversial, schoolbooks, histories.

American newspapers

In religious matters one significant fact has already been noted—non-English church organizations, Dutch Reformed, Mennonite, Moravian, Lutheran, Scotch and Irish Presbyterian, had been coming in; further, as Professor Greene has pointed out, their connection was with non-English organizations to the east of the Atlantic. With the multiplication of sects the men of the frontier frequently groped in the dark for the faith and confession they should espouse as their own. Often the creed of the first minister who passed their way and took their fancy determined the point for them. Great upheavals of religious excitement swept the colonies—in 1734, one in New England in response to the preaching of Jonathan Edwards, one in the next decade throughout the colonies inspired by the oratory of the Methodist clergyman of the Church of England, George Whitefield. Everywhere this period of religious excitement resulted in the partial disintegration of the older church orders such as the Congregationalist, and the establishment of "new light" churches that frequently became Baptist. The new emotional restlessness, the searching for creeds to satisfy it, foreshadowed the American religious tendency in the next century.

Religious life in the colonies

The Congregational Church of the New England Puritans during the period was thrown more and more on the defensive. At

the outset it was discredited by the Salem witchcraft delusion. The barbarous belief that certain persons sold their souls to the devil for supernatural powers, generally used to torment their neighbors, lingered among New England Puritans and was defended in print by conservatives like the Reverend Cotton Mather. When, in 1692, popular terror recognized the presence of witches at Salem, Mather and the orthodox led a crusade resulting in the judicial murder of a score of alleged witches. The inevitable reaction and the growing enlightenment that condemned such superstition shook the authority of the conservative Puritan clergy. More liberal and sophisticated town churches turned in the ways which were later to lead to Unitarianism and Universalism. The effect of Whitefield's preaching and the Great Awakening disintegrated the older Puritan churches still further. Those who clung to the seventeenth-century creeds of the Puritans saw the world drifting away from the faith of the fathers.

Puritanism on the defensive

On the side of order the important fact is the steady advance of Anglicanism. In various degrees it had become an official church not merely in Virginia, but also in the Carolinas, Maryland, New Jersey and parts of New York, though in North Carolina establishment was the emptiest of forms. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, founded in 1701, by means of missionaries and schoolmasters, undertook to advance the Anglican cause throughout the colonies. It labored for many years but not so effectively as it might have done. Royal governors had instructions to promote Anglicanism so far as possible. The crown indeed in 1704 had to interfere to secure the repeal of a South Carolina act which made only members of the Church of England eligible to the Assembly; but the argument had been advanced against it that in certain points it allowed powers to a board of lay commissioners that only a bishop should exercise. A colonial bishop was needed to ordain clergymen, to induct them into their parishes and to confirm children. To send candidates for the ministry across the Atlantic for ordination was difficult, even if more satisfactory than taking the

The advance of Anglicanism

ne'er-do-well Anglican priests who migrated often to shock their parishioners by their loose manner of life.

The proposal for the establishment of an American bishop was listed by John Adams as one of the causes of the Revolution. Certainly other Protestant sects that regarded Anglicanism as next door to Romanism looked on its advance with horror. In New England, where save in Rhode Island, Congregationalism was still the established church form to the maintenance of which all men were required to contribute, the English government forced the exemption of Anglicans. The spread of Anglican churches, the conversion in 1722 of the president and tutor of Yale to Anglicanism seemed to throw Congregationalism on the defensive against the old enemy. When New England took up arms in 1775, the ancestral example of war on the Church of England helped to steel her resolution. In New York a violent quarrel between Anglican and Presbyterian elements shifted in the end into the revolutionary struggle. In Virginia the attempt of the Anglicans to force the punishment of Baptist and Presbyterian clergymen of the upcountry for preaching without licenses broke down, leading about 1760 to a defeat of Anglican and tidewater elements that was to pave the way for the Revolution. Anglicanism was undoubtedly a strong bond of empire, and many Anglicans in the Revolution remained loyal to church and king; but the difficulty was that its advance under official and imperial fostering produced suspicion and irritation that at length transferred themselves to the government that sustained it.

Jealousy of Anglicanism

In the colonies were scattered also elements of skepticism rejecting all the miraculous in the Bible narrative—deists enthralled by the brilliant style of the English Bolingbroke. Of this type Benjamin Franklin is the ideal example. A skeptic in religious matters, quoting with approval a characterization of himself as "of no religion whatever but merely an honest man," he could compare the lives of men to the lives of the ephemeræ who live a day and perish. He taught a morality in *Poor Richard's Almanac* based on the fact that honesty pays. Born a poor boy

in a Boston Puritan household, coming to Philadelphia to seek his fortune and finding it as a printer, he assiduously pursued and attained wealth by the maxims of frugality and worldly wisdom which he preached to his countrymen. He was, however, foremost in devising and supporting organizations tending to public enlightenment, made one or two practical inventions such as the stove that bears his name, followed with intelligent curiosity the advances that the eighteenth century was making in the physical sciences. As a public official he approved himself to the English ministers as a shrewd, able, well-informed man. A self-made American, he might have typified to them a class of men who some day weighing the impatience of the frontier and the lower classes, might decide that greater opportunity for America lay outside the British Empire.

Deism: Benjamin Franklin

Franklin represented unconsciously the tuning-in of certain sections of American life with the thought of eighteenth-century Continental Europe. There the enlightened were abandoning the acceptance of ideas and methods because they had the sanction of higher authority. The French philosophers tried systems of thought by the touchstone of rationality, rejecting everything that did not bear the test of reason and logic; they fashioned ideal systems of religion, philosophy, and government, based on belief in man's innate goodness and sound sense, and in the perfectibility of human nature. The idea of progress, the habit of looking on man and human society as steadily improving, was the keynote of the age.

Eighteenth-century philosophy

Discussion of the colonial trade and economic organization in the old régime has been reserved to the last. In it centered the colonial economic life of the mid-eighteenth century; the attempt of the home government to interfere with it was a potent cause of the Revolution. First of all, manufacturing, save of the simplest sort, was rare. Acts of Parliament forbade the trade in woolens between colony and colony, the extension of the hatter's trade, or the foundation of new steel furnaces or slitting mills. Generally there was no interference with production for home consumption; but that produc-

Lack of colonial manufactures

tion was of the simplest—homespun and everyday clothing, simple smith-work in iron, ships for colonial trade. Pennsylvania, it was true, had developed manufactures of fine textiles, glass, and advanced metal working; but most of the comforts and all of the elegances of life came from the Old World. The Navigation Act of 1663 had with few exceptions required that all non-American imports should come through British ports; ordinarily the goods themselves came from British manufacturers or through British importers. Probably they would have so come for economic reasons in any case and in this trade there was but little smuggling. Colonial ships returning in ballast or with salt from South European ports found customs officers ready for a consideration to wink at unusually large amounts of ship's stores in the form of fruit and wine. But the long credits given by English merchants, twelve months free and five per cent thereafter, were sufficient cause for the tying of colonial import trade to British exporters.

Necessarily, therefore, the colonies had to find commodities to make up a means of payment to the mother country. The southern colonies had little difficulty. The indigo and rice of Georgia and South Carolina, except under certain conditions, were "enumerated articles" to be exported only to England. So were the naval stores, pitch, tar, and other products of the forests of North Carolina, and the tobacco of Virginia and Maryland. Here, however, the mother country by bounties, by monopoly of the home market or in other ways created a market for the product lucrative at least to the British importer.

Southern exports

In the plantation colonies merchant classes developed but slowly from native stock. In Maryland—midway between Virginia and Pennsylvania in agriculture as well as political life—there was one. But further to the south the export of the staple crops and the import of English goods was largely in the hands of factors of British firms, usually Scotchmen resident but a few years and far more English than colonial in sympathy and outlook. Generally the planter anticipated his year's crop in obtaining European goods of the factor, and naturally was his economic vassal, bound to take his goods

Mercantile classes in the South

at his own price. Even more was this the case with the great Virginia planters who exported directly to London or Bristol firms. As Jefferson put it, "these debts had become hereditary from father to son, for many generations, so that the planters were a species of property, annexed to certain mercantile houses in London." In these colonies there were few large towns—Charleston was almost the only one south of Baltimore—and little local trade. The factor in his economic and political outlook was turned to the east; the planter without any distinctly colonial mercantile influence to supplement him was narrowly provincial.

Commerce of the middle colonies

In the provinces farther north, in New York, the Jerseys, Pennsylvania, and Maryland the trade outlook was entirely different. The products of these colonies, grain, flour, live stock, horses, furs, save for the last item did not interest England. High English duties protected the English market in them for her own squire landowners. The middle colonies therefore found a market for their produce largely in the sugar islands of the West Indies, Spanish, French, Dutch, and English. These islands, utilizing all available space for the cultivation of tropical plants such as the sugar cane with its products of molasses, brown and white sugar, drew the foodstuffs for their slave populations from the North American colonies. In return for them the middle colonies took their products to be shipped directly or indirectly to European ports to accumulate trade balances to repay debts to British merchants. Philadelphia and New York thus became thriving trade centers with mercantile firms of pretensions.

Commerce of New England

New England solved her problem in another way. With little agricultural surplus to export, with the sources of her fur trade dried up long since, she relied on the products of her fisheries to furnish her with salted fish which in its poorer grades was exported for slave consumption in the West Indies, in its finer to South Europe. To the West Indies went also lumber from the New England forests, and horses. In return molasses was brought back to be distilled into rum in the distilleries of Rhode Island and Massachusetts. Much of this was used in

the coastwise trade. Some of it was exported to Africa and exchanged for slaves to be sold in the West Indies. By such devious traffic New England accumulated her trade balance. Her main commercial port was Boston, with Providence, Newport, and Portsmouth secondary to it. Connecticut, with ports locked by the Sound, was in economic subjection alternately to Boston and New York merchants. With her almost autonomous colonial charter, she was in some ways most remote of the colonies from outside influences.

The British government could not refrain from tampering in blundering fashion with the slender basis on which the economic life of New England rested. In 1733 the wealthy West India planters mustered their Parliamentary influence and secured the passage of the famous Molasses Act, laying a prohibitive import duty on products of the non-British West India Islands brought to American ports. This was to the last degree unjust and oppressive. At prices 25 to 40 per cent higher than those of the French Islands, the British sugar islands could supply but one-eighth the molasses used in the New England stills. The act was consistently evaded; by the collusion of corrupt customs officials it became everywhere a dead letter.

The Molasses Act

Do what the colonies might to find trade that would yield a surplus applicable to their debts to British merchants, those debts frequently threatened to drain the country of its little specie. This with the constant demand for new capital, in a new country constantly interpreted as a need for more money in circulation, led to the emission of paper money or bills of credit in one form or another. In New England where such issues were needed most and were most unreliable, the British Parliament prohibited paper money after 1751; this was not the least among the grievances that alienated the colonies from Great Britain.

Paper money

Much has been said in derogation of the opportunist policy of Great Britain toward her colonies in America before 1763. This much at least can be said for it, that under it the colonies and their relations with the mother country reached an equilibrium. If the colonies paid nothing directly toward imperial defense, they

contributed much indirectly to the profits from which British merchants paid their taxes. Colonial assemblies nagged royal governors unceasingly; but the classes that those assemblies represented were not very far removed in sentiments and interests from the middle classes of Britain. They held in control an unenfranchised population, restless, willful, much of it separated from the mother country by language and religion. A break in the equilibrium, additional burdens on colonial trade, an additional tax to drain the little store of specie in the colonies, and the ruling classes in them will be compelled to foment opposition not to royal governors, but to the royal government itself. In doing so, they will need to call to their aid the unenfranchised classes. Notions of liberty, either new ones or old ones long since out of fashion, will seize on the mind of these classes, and a storm will arise in the seaboard colonies that will finally sweep the world.

The equilibrium of the old colonial system

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

H. J. Ford, *The Scotch-Irish in America.* Princeton, 1915.
O. M. Dickerson, *American Colonial Government, 1696–1765.* Cleveland, 1912.
A. B. Faust, *The German Element in the United States.* 2 vols. Boston, 1909.
H. L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century.* 4 vols. New York, 1924.
E. B. Greene, *Provincial America* (*American Nation*, vol. VI). New York, 1905.
——, *The Provincial Governor in the English Colonies of North America.* New York, 1898.
C. M. Andrews, *Colonial Self Government, 1652–1689* (*American Nation*, vol. V). New York, 1904.
G. L. Beer, *The Old Colonial System, 1660–1754.* 2 vols. New York, 1912.
E. Channing, *A History of the United States*, vol. II. New York, 1908.

CHAPTER VIII

THE COLONIAL RIVALRY OF SPAIN, FRANCE, AND ENGLAND

In tracing the development of the United States, we naturally emphasize most the elements that have contributed most to its national tradition, life, and thought. Necessarily therefore we give most weight to the original thirteen colonies, considering as of secondary importance other and lesser cultural influences. In their place will be mentioned the migrations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the Spanish populations in the southwest taken over by the United States as a result of the Mexican War. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the English seaboard colonies were influenced profoundly by their participation in the imperial struggle between England, France, and Spain. Accordingly at this point it seems appropriate to sketch in the Spanish- and French-American Empires and England's contests with them.

The French, Spanish and British Empires

From 1525 to 1660 the greatest world power was the Spanish Empire. It was based on the union, in the persons of Ferdinand and Isabella, of Aragon, the strongest power in the Western Mediterranean, and Castile, the dominant state of Spain. Ruling in concert the two sovereigns were strong enough to complete the expulsion of the Moors from Spain and to hold in abeyance the privileges and liberties of the Spanish nobles and towns. Thanks to the marriage of their daughter to the heir of the Hapsburgs, their grandson Charles V ruled provinces now parts of France, such as Franche-Comté, as well as the Netherlands and Belgium, much of Italy, and the lands that formed the nucleus of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. In the New World his subjects were exploiting in his name most of South and all of Central America and the southern part of North America. Financed by the vast treasures of bullion that

Founding of the Spanish Empire

poured in from the mines of America, armed with the Spanish tercios, the best infantry units of their day, Charles V aspired to give law to Western Europe. Even after his abdication in 1555, when the Austrian dominions were set off under his brother Ferdinand, and after the revolt of the Netherlands in 1572, his son Philip II was still the most powerful Christian monarch. Moreover in 1580 Philip by inheritance and conquest acquired Portugal and its dominions in Brazil, in India, and in the Spice Islands of the East.

Spanish national policy

Historically, the Spanish monarchs—for after the accession of Philip II, Spain was the heart of this empire—were the champions of Catholic Christianity. They fought against the tremendous forces of the Turks, which in the sixteenth century were sweeping over Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean world and had established on its African coast the series of Barbary states that sent their piratical cruisers forth to prey on the commerce of the Mediterranean and the Eastern Atlantic; and they stood as the enemies of the Reformation, not merely stamping out mercilessly any gleam of Protestantism in their own domains, but also using their political and military influence to check it in Germany, France, and England. Spain was naturally hated in proportion to her power and to her aggressiveness in using it.

The Spanish conquest of America

With the conquest of her great empire in South and Central America and the Indies, we are concerned only as to method. In its earlier stages, using in the New World the restless energy of the nobles whom Ferdinand and Isabella were reducing to order at home, Spain employed the system of Adelantados—she allowed adventurers to conquer and colonize at their own expense, and to exploit the unhappy natives to the full, on condition of contributing a share of the gains to the Spanish revenue. By the seventeenth century, however, the conquests of the Adelantados were all unified under an administration responsible to the king, whose officers undertook future conquests for his sole benefit and at his expense. The Spanish dominions in America had been centralized in two vice-

royalties, Peru and New Spain; in the latter, with its capital at Mexico City, was included a portion of the present United States.

Before 1761, the contest between Spaniard and Englishman on the North American continent was an affair of outposts. The Spaniard, first on the ground in Florida, seeking to extend colony and mission along the South Atlantic and Gulf coasts, was steadily pushed back into the peninsula, his first and last stronghold east of the Mississippi. As early as 1513 Ponce de Leon had discovered Florida; by 1519 Pineda had skirted the Gulf shore as far as Mexico. In 1525 on the Atlantic seaboard expeditions had coasted from Nova Scotia to Florida. Between 1526 and 1529 a Spanish colony actually occupied Cape Fear. The gold-hunting expeditions of Narváez and De Soto of 1528 and 1539, which ranged the continent east and west of the Mississippi, were both originally designed for the colonization of Florida. In 1559 a colony was attempted on the Alabama River.

Spanish exploration of North America

The colonies of the French Huguenots in Florida, 1562–1564, stirred the Spaniard at last to effective rivalry against the men who were both of an enemy nation and an heretical faith. Under grant of exploitation from the King of Spain, Menendez in 1565 mercilessly wiped out the French settlements and at St. Augustine established a permanent Spanish colony. Its expansion at first was to the north. We hear of a colony at Santa Elena within the present limits of South Carolina and of the presidio of Guale in what is now northern Georgia. Missions spread into the North Carolina upcountry; in 1570 Jesuit missionaries appeared in Virginia, probably on the Rappahannock, only to be massacred by the Indians. Between 1593 and 1597 Franciscan friars had established themselves on the Georgia coast; by 1634 they had reached the Savannah. In short, while Raleigh was projecting his colonies on the Roanoke, and while the first English colonists were dying at Jamestown, the Spanish fingers were reaching for Virginia itself.

Florida: its extension northward

Then came the period of retrogression. The Spaniards eyed

the Jamestown colony, but for reasons of diplomatic expediency postponed an attack on it; soon it was too strong to be destroyed.

Recession of the Spaniards

Then, in the days of the Restoration, the colonies of Carolina were established to the south of Virginia as England's outpost against Florida. Virginia traders, passing the mountains to the headwaters of the Tennessee and the Cumberland, or around the flanking ranges in Georgia, began to establish trading relations and political influence with the Indians of the south, thrusting Spanish trader and missionary aside, even as in the next generation they were to thrust aside the Frenchman in the Mississippi Valley.

Desultory war alternated with trade. Between 1680 and 1685 there was intermittent border warfare between Carolina and Florida. In 1702, with the sanction of a European war between Spain and England, military expeditions sought decisive results; there was a raid on St. Augustine in 1702, an expedition against the Apalachee towns under Spanish influence in 1704. In 1706 a French and Spanish attack on Charleston by sea was beaten off. In 1715 Carolina was shaken by Indian raids inspired by the Spaniard. Eventually the Carolinians won, breaking the Spanish missions in Georgia whose Indian converts had counted tens of thousands. After 1732 the English colony of Georgia, recruited with debtors, Scotch Highlanders, and Germans, served as a bulwark for South Carolina as in the previous century South Carolina had served for Virginia.

The Spaniards lose Georgia

Farther to the south, the great system of Spanish colonies in Central and South America and the West Indies was a magnet for illicit trade. Spain framed strict regulations for her colonial trade, prescribing convoys, fleets that sailed at specified times of the year, fixed and regulated markets. Non-Spanish traders she barred in theory. By the Treaty of Utrecht, however, she was compelled to relax her regulations to permit the English to supply her plantations with slaves and to allow a limited yearly trade—concessions which opened the door for wholesale smuggling to the Spanish colonies from England and North America alike. The efforts of the Spanish to enforce their

Spanish trade regulations

regulations led in 1739 to the outbreak of a war with England into which France was later drawn.

The rich trade of the Spanish Main was also a lure for piracy. The Elizabethan sea dogs, like Drake, who had harried Spanish colonies and commerce in the sixteenth century, found their seventeenth-century counterpart in the buccaneers, lawless smugglers and freebooters drawn from every seafaring nation in Europe. They attacked Spanish treasure ships, and ventured under leaders like the English Harry Morgan to sack Spanish towns. As the century ended, the buccaneers came to be called pirates. Most picturesque among the freebooters who sailed under the black flag was Captain Teach, or Blackbeard, a ruffian who terrorized his crew by shooting off his pistols under the dinner table, and who tied with gay ribbons the long and plaited black beard that gave him his name. His refuges were the sounds of North Carolina until he was finally defeated and slain in combat with an English warship. Most famous of the pirates, however, was a certain Captain Kidd, a worthy man whom Governor Bellomont of New York and certain English Whig politicians sent out in command of the *Adventure* to capture and despoil the pirates. Missing their legitimate prey, his crew forced him to turn pirate himself; on his return to New York he was arrested, tried and convicted in England of piracy and hung, mainly to discredit his Whig employers. The legend that he buried treasure on some points of the American coast set generations of diggers to search for it and furnished American fiction with the subjects of some of its finest tales.

Buccaneers and pirates

The French Empire in the New World, its contact with the English colonies extending ultimately from Nova Scotia and the desolate reaches of Hudson Bay to the lower regions of the Mississippi, was a more dangerous rival. It was overthrown only after repeated trials of strength between the two imperial systems for almost a hundred years before 1763. As an antagonist who shaped her enemies by her contests with them New France now demands our attention.

The French Empire

With the French, as with the English, the period of effective

colonization was deferred to the seventeenth century. The France of the sixteenth century had still to reduce to order the last of her great feudal, semi-independent princes; she had still to recover an eastern tier of provinces from alien control; her kings had their eyes set on acquisitions in Italy; after the middle of the century war between Catholic and Protestant threatened to disrupt her. Her American achievements in the century were therefore not great. In 1524 the Florentine, Verrazano, under her auspices coasted the American continent as far as Nova Scotia; but in the north John Cabot and the Portuguese brothers Cortereal had preceded him, and the Spaniard Estevan Gómez followed him within a year. In 1534, 1535, and 1541 the Frenchman, Jacques Cartier, explored the St. Lawrence as far up as Montreal. Between 1541 and 1543 a settlement existed near Quebec. Except for the abortive Huguenot colonies wiped out in Florida by the Spaniard, that was the sum of France's official endeavor in the sixteenth century. Her fishermen, however, with those of a dozen other nations almost from the beginning of the century caught the cod of the Grand Banks to be salted and carried to a Europe which practiced religious fasts and periodic abstention from meat.

French inactivity of the sixteenth century

With the end of the sixteenth century, France achieved internal order. The accession to the throne of the Protestant King Henry IV, who later became Catholic, was the earnest of a truce between warring faiths on the basis of official security for Protestant freedom of worship. Under Henry and under Cardinal Richelieu, the minister of his son and successor Louis XIII, the centralization of France under the king's government began. The nation exerted a new weight in foreign policy against her old enemy, the house of Hapsburg, in Spain and Austria. American colonization followed. The first settlements, some of them Huguenot, were planted in the region of Nova Scotia. One private purse after another exhausted itself in the enterprise. Catholic missionaries were admitted for the task of Christianizing the Indians. At length in 1608 Samuel de Cham-

Beginnings of French colonization

plain founded at Quebec on the mighty rock that is the sentinel of the St. Lawrence, the first French settlement destined to permanence.

Champlain, pious, hard-working explorer of the wilderness and founder of settlements, modest as he was, established certain policies that were to control to the end the destiny of New France. As to the Indians, he naturally sought the friendship of those nearest at hand, the Hurons and certain Algonquian stocks. These led him into war with the redoubtable Iroquois or Five Nations. These tribes were famous not merely for insatiable lust for war and the cruelty and skill with which they waged it, but for the closely interlocking clan system that bound their tribes together in a close alliance quite different from the unstable pacts between tribe and tribe that were customary among Indians. The firearms of Champlain overawed them in his first expeditions. But soon, supplied with arms by the Dutch on Manhattan and at Albany, they proved more than a match for the little French colony. A savage war of extermination against the Indian allies of the French culminated by 1649 in the flight of the Hurons from the lake of their name to the distant shores of Lake Superior. Even earlier, the French, blocked from advance to the south by the Iroquois, lords of all western New York, had turned toward the west by the devious route of the Ottawa in search of furs and the fabled route to the western sea.

Champlain and the Iroquois

An outlet to the western sea, furs, Indians to convert to Christianity—those were the things sought by Champlain's little colony. The faith of explorers of that age that somewhere in the north of America was a navigable passage to the Pacific which would serve as an outlet for European trade to China and India was one which French and English had not wholly abandoned in the eighteenth century. Furs, in seemingly inexhaustible quantity, to give comfort and mark degrees of luxury and social distinction in Europe, were a merchandise of profit which could be drawn from North America. Frenchmen, Englishmen, Dutchmen, Spaniards joined in the

The western sea and the fur trade

traffic. All persuaded the Indians to abandon the simple crafts of their fathers and supply themselves with the white man's goods—guns, powder, iron kettles, hatchets, blankets, cloth, finery, rum, brandy, whisky—by trapping the fur-bearing animals and selling their pelts. Rivals for the trade, the whites set tribe at war with tribe. The Iroquois, to reap the profits of middlemen in the trade with the Dutch, compelled nations as far distant as the Illinois to abandon traffic with the French.

As to the conversion of the Indians, the task was shouldered by various religious orders, the most famous of them being the Jesuits.

The Jesuits

They pushed into the forest with their red children, enduring all the hardships of the canoe, the portage, and the winter camp, threatened, abused, often falling martyr to caprice or malice of savage friends or foes. Their aim was not only to convert the Indians to Catholic Christianity but also to organize them into civilized communities in which Jesuit fathers should direct the religious, economic, and military life to the greater glory of God. With the Hurons they had almost succeeded when the Iroquois drove the tribe far to the west for shelter; and on the heels of the fur traders the Jesuits followed to take up their work again.

Until 1660, the colony of New France hung by a thread over the abyss. It was captured by an English fleet in 1629, being

Weakness of New France

restored on conclusion of peace between England and France in 1632. The colony was made up of a few scattered settlements in Nova Scotia and a few on the St. Lawrence between Quebec and Montreal—an outpost against the Iroquois founded in 1642 by soldiers and nuns in the spirit of crusaders. Exploration had been carried on; Lakes Huron and Superior were known to the French; in 1634 Jean Nicolet in search of a route to China had visited Lake Michigan and Green Bay. Between 1654 and 1660 the traders Radisson and Groseilliers had explored beyond Lake Superior, possibly as far as the Mississippi, and had acquired some notions of the essential geography of the region that stretches up to Hudson Bay. In the next ten years, Jesuit missions sprang up on Lake Superior and Green Bay. Yet the ceaseless attacks of the Iroquois and the recurring interruptions

of the western fur trade made New France still count its existence year by year.

By 1660, France was at last ready to come to the rescue of her colony. Richelieu's policy of centralization, continued by his successor Cardinal Mazarin during the boyhood of Louis XIV, had borne fruit. In the Thirty Years' War, 1618–1648, France had come on the scene at the end to defeat Spain and Austria in Germany and to reap a share of the fruits of the earlier victories of Sweden. Between 1648 and 1659 her war with Spain continued; thanks to her centralized government, her strong army, her fertile soil, her teeming population, and her central position, she emerged from the Peace of the Pyrenees as the most powerful nation of Europe. Her great King Louis XIV, reigning baby and man from 1643 to 1715, through all but five years of his life played the part of the Grand Monarch. That the lesser kings of Europe might court his smile and dread his frown, every Frenchman must toil in his place and vocation to exalt Louis' majesty and power. For him, the nobility of France, once turbulent and independent on their remote estates, attended his court to bask in his favor and enhance his magnificence. For him, adventurers like La Salle penetrated the trackless wilderness that they might claim it in his name. For him, armies died in wars of ambition; and ministers like Colbert worked on the principles of the mercantile system to exalt France's economic strength and to make colonies such as Canada useful to her.

The Age of Louis XIV

It was comparatively simple to send a regiment of trained troops to Canada in 1665 to overawe the Iroquois and procure a temporary peace with them; but the whole system under which the colony had grown had now to be reconsidered. In a certain sense, the method had been that followed by England. In 1540 colonization had begun in a legal sense with the commissioning by the king of a lieutenant general to exercise royal functions in the colony, administering justice, making laws, and appointing officers. To the lieutenant general belonged a monopoly of all trade. Nobleman after nobleman ruined himself in seeking to found a colony under this system.

Earlier French colonial organizations

Then the monopoly of trade was used to attract the needed funds for the enterprise. The monopoly was granted to one group after another—in 1627 to the Hundred Associates, who in return for exclusive privileges undertook to convert the Indians, to send out settlers and to support the colony financially. In many respects this agreement established lasting principles of colonization. In its proviso that settlers must be good Catholics, it barred any possibility of New France's being to the Huguenots what New England was to the Puritans. France was not to build up an empire of elements not desired at home. She sifted the wheat for her colonial planting in the sieve of orthodox Catholicism.

Furthermore, the Hundred Associates' agreement had adopted the essentially feudal system of land tenures. At the time of English settlement, the feudal system in England was fast becoming obsolete. The tenure of free and common socage, in most respects comparable to ownership as we know it to-day, was the one generally established in her colonies. But in seventeenth-century France feudalism still thrived. The peasant still held land of his seigneur on the condition of tilling his lord's land, paying his lord a share of his crop, grinding his corn at the lord's mill, and so on. The Associates established lordships or seignories in New France. True, the feudal system thus introduced was not burdensome. In 1637 the Coutume de Paris was indicated as its rule of regulation. If seigneurs offered their lands on too hard terms the land reverted to the crown. Only three to six days a year of corvée or labor for the lord was customary. In theory many of the seigneurs had power of life and death; none ever used it. They were not necessarily noble, were not as in France exempt from taxation, were not degraded by work. Often they were no better off than their tenants. The land grants held of them, usually long strips reaching back from the river, were divided among the children in each generation till the long ribbon-like farms one sees along the St. Lawrence to-day were the result.

Feudal land tenures of New France

When in 1663 the power of the Hundred Associates ended, Colbert, the French minister, had to consider what should take

its place. In the West India Company of 1664, which under the king was allowed to name the governor and enjoy feudal and trading rights, he found a substitute which endured till 1674 when the king took over the colony to be governed in his name. The council of the colony consisted ordinarily of the governor, the bishop, the intendant or financial agent, and various others. In the intendant and the governor were established two rival officials to be played off against each other lest either get out of hand. To the very end the curse of New France was thenceforth divided authority in the colony and the necessity of constant reference to the king at Versailles on the most trivial points.

New France under Louis XIV

The French government had decided opinions to enforce as to colonial development. With the small population it deemed concentration essential, and legislated savagely against the *coureurs de bois*, the young men who slipped away from the little settlements to live the free life of the forest trader among the Indians. The merchants of Montreal added their protest against trading in such fashion with remote Indian tribes, fearing that furs would not come to their city. Repeatedly they harassed the exploiters of the western trade, and opposed every new post until assured that it would traffic only with Indians who would not in any case come to Montreal.

Attempts to limit settlements

In spite of itself, the French government was compelled to acquiesce in regulated western expansion, which developed under the guidance of Jean Talon, the intendant, and Frontenac, governor after 1672. In 1671, De St. Lusson in a great ceremony at Sault Ste. Marie, graced by Jesuits and soldiers, had taken possession of the west in the name of Louis XIV. In 1673 Jolliet and the Jesuit Father Marquette made their way to the Mississippi and voyaged far enough down it to assure themselves that it emptied into the Gulf and not the Pacific. In 1669 the first thorough exploration of Lake Erie had taken place.

Exploitation of the west

Then Robert Cavelier, Sieur de la Salle, greatest of the French masters of the forest, with the support of Frontenac set about the

organization of the west for France. His trading posts in the region south of the Great Lakes would collect fur to be forwarded to European markets either by the lakes and St. Lawrence or by the Mississippi. One disaster after another befell him; his property was attached by creditors at home, destroyed in the wilderness by shipwreck or by mutineers; his Indian friends in the west were attacked and massacred by the Iroquois; his steps were blocked by his enemies among the Jesuits and in New France. Only occasionally was his path lightened by a gleam of success, such as the discovery of the mouth of the Mississippi in 1682, and the organization of the western tribes in confederacy to make head against the Iroquois. In 1687, having led an expedition from France to colonize in Louisiana which had landed by error four hundred miles westward at Matagorda Bay, he fell, murdered by mutineers, on a desperate march overland from Texas to find help in the Illinois. Yet at his death his posts in the Illinois country were so firmly established that they survived in the hands of his assistants, and grew to little settlements. They were exempted from the operation of a royal edict of 1696 recalling all traders from the west.

La Salle

But in spite of the French government's general prohibitions, exploration and settlement continued. Men like Du Lhut in 1678 had begun the exploration of the farther northwest beyond Lake Superior. In 1701 Cadillac secured permission to found a post at Detroit, the strategic point for control of the upper Lakes. Three years earlier, Iberville, sprung of a Canadian family prolific in men of action, had established at Biloxi a colony on the Gulf of Mexico.

Extension of French culture

In the years that followed, the French holdings were consolidated. By 1717 they were firmly established at Mackinac, Green Bay, St. Joseph, Detroit, and at Kaskaskia and Cahokia on the Illinois side of the Mississippi opposite the mouth of the Missouri. From New Orleans, French outposts began to creep up the Mississippi although it was but a tenuous line of communication always liable to be broken by hostile Indians. John Law's Mississippi Company, a great French speculation, was based on the

Courtesy of the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michig

AN EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY MAP OF LOUISIANA

Notice the insets of Niagara Falls, of beavers at work, and of the buffalo.

supposed riches of the west and served to draw to it attention and additional colonists. In what is now Indiana, Ouiatenon in 1720 and Vincennes in 1731 were added to the list of French settlements. The indefinite line that separated Canada from Louisiana usually was drawn between the two posts. Louisiana in 1721 was divided for government into nine military districts: New Orleans, Biloxi, Mobile, Alabama, Natchitoches, Natchez, Yazoo, Arkansas, Illinois. The names indicate the extent of French organized settlement. Explorers and fur traders pushed farther and farther to the west; in 1720 they defeated a Spanish force on the Platte. The Missouri River became their route to the fur trade of the farther west; Vérendrye in 1732 reached Winnipeg. January 1, 1743, his sons saw farther to the south what possibly were the Rocky Mountains. Yet the French population was widely scattered. At the end of the French régime, from the St. Lawrence to New Orleans were 80,000 Frenchmen—a weak garrison against the hundreds of thousands of the English.

Development of Louisiana and New France

The contest of Frenchmen and Englishmen in North America was but a phase of a greater contest between England and France that—barring thirty years of peace, 1713–1743—lasted almost continuously from 1689 to 1763. In Europe, England and her allies fought against the predominant power of France. In India, in the West Indies, where both had acquired numerous island colonies in the seventeenth century, on the African slave coast, on the high seas, and in North America the contest resolved itself more and more into one between two great empires, based on colonies and trade, to determine which should, as world empire, replace the inert, decaying mass that once had been imperial Spain. There were times when Englishmen envied the autocratic centralized government of France, potent to administer and regulate colonies and trade without question, and feared that their own loose organization of autonomous colonies and unenforced trade regulations was a fatal handicap. We now believe that the vigor which England's policy of "hands-off" infused into the outposts of her empire was

Imperial rivalry of France and England

her salvation. Naturally our immediate concern is only with the struggle as it relates to the American continent.

The story of the contest is the establishment of hostile contact between French and English at point after point of a vast battlefield stretching from Hudson Bay to the warm lands of the Gulf Coast. At Hudson Bay the first actual conflict had come. In 1610 Henry Hudson, on a voyage under English auspices that ended in his tragic death from mutineers, had discovered the bay that bears his name; but no use came for it until 1665. Then Radisson and Groseilliers, the French explorers of the west, who had become disgusted with the treatment they had received from the French authorities and had begun trading under English auspices, mentioned its possibilities as an English base for the fur trade. In 1668–1669 a voyage resulted in a rich cargo of furs, and in 1670 in the chartering of the Hudson's Bay Company with sole rights of trade and ownership in all territory drained by Hudson Bay and not possessed by other powers. The trade advantage was great. In the season of open water, ships could easily navigate the Bay, tie up at its shores, and at prices the French traders could not meet, trade for furs brought by Indians who had descended the rivers that flow into it. The French met commercial competition with the sword. In 1685 began an intermittent war between the French and the Hudson's Bay Company waged with varying fortunes. In 1697 the Company was left with but a single post; but in 1713 the Treaty of Utrecht returned it all its former possessions; it began to establish posts well up the rivers that drained into the Bay.

The Hudson's Bay Company

Long since, clashes between traders of the rival powers had occurred elsewhere. Traders from Albany under the protection of the Iroquois even ventured as far as Mackinac on the Great Lakes. Traders from Virginia and the Carolinas followed the passes of the Alleghenies that led by the French Broad and the Little Tennessee to the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers or followed trails around the lower end of the mountains. By 1700 they had reached the mouth of the Tennessee and appeared in the region of Arkansas. Their

Advance of English traders in the west

influence with the great tribes of the south was enough to set the French at nought, to defeat French expeditions like that of Dartaguiette in 1736. By 1740 the traders had passed the Pennsylvania mountains and had set up posts in what is now Ohio. They were assisted by wise men who understood the Indians and were trusted by them, such as Conrad Weiser and George Croghan, and above all the famous William Johnson, whose influence with the Iroquois tribes of New York was unbounded.

The intercolonial wars, 1689–1763

Before the moment of the final struggle arrived, a series of wars between French and English in America had paralleled the wars of the two powers in Europe. The English colonists had names of their own for them—King William's War for the War of 1689–1697, Queen Anne's War for the War of the Spanish Succession, 1701–1713, King George's War for the War of the Austrian Succession, 1744–1748, the French and Indian War for the Seven Years' War, 1754 or 1756–1763.

King William's war: Queen Anne's war

The first two of these wars in the colonies saw no decisive results and few attempts to achieve them. A French and Indian raid on Schenectady, New York, in 1690, a similar raid on Deerfield, Massachusetts, in 1704, stand out among a long series of similar attempts on the towns of the New England-New York frontier. The development of northeast New England was retarded by them two full generations. Expeditions by sea against Quebec in 1690 and 1711 were fruitless and the only gain for either side out of the two wars in America was the recognition by France in the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 of the Hudson's Bay Company's rights in the far north, and her cession to England of Acadia with a French population and indefinite boundaries, both pregnant with future trouble.

Louisbourg, its capture

Compelled to abandon Acadia, the French projected a great fortress at Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island to protect the fisheries, to serve as a trade center for New England and the West Indies, and to form a naval base. In 1745, garrisoned by a force unaccustomed to war, it was taken by an English fleet and an expedition of New England militia. At the

peace of 1748, much to New England's wrath, it was given back to France to be re-fortified against the final struggle now clearly foreseen.

At the end of King George's War, the French fully realized that the stakes for which they were contending in America were empire or ruin and they hastened to prepare for a future conflict. Louisbourg was strengthened; and in an attempt to protect the Illinois from Indians influenced by English traders in the upper Ohio Valley, the French in 1753 began the establishment of a series of posts from Lake Erie to the forks of the Ohio, where Pittsburgh now stands, to block the English up behind the mountains. Here they clashed with the Ohio Company, a group of Virginia speculators who in 1748 had secured a grant of lands at the forks of the Ohio. At last the French Empire felt the onrushing tide of backwoodsmen that swarmed out of the English colonies.

French occupation of the Ohio Valley

The first advantages were with the French. In 1754 they expelled the Ohio Company from a post at the forks and built in its place Fort Duquesne, later forcing the capitulation of a supporting party led by a twenty-two year old Virginia officer, George Washington. The English ministry considered the affair an encroachment on their territorial rights at a place where the international boundary remained undefined, and, without seeking war with France in Europe, they prepared with British troops to attack her in America. France on her side hurried reënforcements to New France. The final struggle for empire, broadened next year into a general European war, had begun.

Outbreak of hostilities, 1754

In the contest England was handicapped by the necessity of seeking harmonious action from thirteen distinct governments with various provincial outlooks, governments which often found it difficult to understand the necessity of assisting in concerted action far from their borders. An Albany Congress of 1754 projected a scheme of federation among the colonies to promote efficiency; the colonies objected because it was too centralized, and the home government because it was not centralized enough.

The Albany Plan of Union



OUTPOSTS OF COLONIAL RIVALRY

Much unjust condemnation has been visited on the colonies for slacking and for failure to perform their full share in the war. When tactfully approached by a war minister such as William Pitt, they incurred heavy debts, paid heavy taxes and raised large military contingents for the war on New France. It is not fair, either, to assume that the reduction of New France should have been their exclusive task. In the contest between the empires, the detachment of heavy military and naval forces to the New World as a theater of war by one power necessitated similar action by the other. Had the colonies, unsupported, been left to deal with the 80,000 Frenchmen in America, unsupported also, the result could not have been doubtful.

Participation of the colonies in the Seven Years' War

In the campaign of 1755, the British in Nova Scotia captured Fort Beauséjour, and deported as from a dangerous frontier the Acadians—certain French settlers transferred under English rule by the Treaty of Utrecht, who persisted in remaining loyal to France. William Johnson gained a success at the future site of Fort William Henry on the Lake Champlain route to Canada. Governor Shirley of Massachusetts failed at Niagara. General Braddock, leading a force of British and colonials through the wilderness to capture Fort Duquesne was defeated in an ambush, the success of which surprised the French themselves. In Virginia and Pennsylvania the frontier swayed back across the mountains under the terror of raids by Indians in the French interest.

The campaigns of 1755

The French policy of dividing authority was now to do its fatal work. France sent to America a soldier of first-rate ability, the Marquis de Montcalm, but he actually commanded only the force of French regulars. In using colonial troops, he had to consult the governor, Marquis de Vaudreuil, an incompetent who seemed to take pleasure in thwarting him; and the morale of the colony was broken by the peculations of the intendant, Bigot. Montcalm, however, had the advantage of an interior line of communication and for four years baffled the English. In the campaign of 1756 his skill and energy captured

Montcalm

Oswego while an English expedition against Louisbourg was abandoned.

The campaign of 1758 was to be executed by the greatest of British war ministers, William Pitt. A master of oratory, a man of overwhelming personality, contemptuously honest in a day of political peculation, he inspired the enthusiasm of England and America and justified it by magnificent success. In Europe he supported Frederick the Great of Prussia in unequal war against Russia and Austria, the allies of France; on the sea he organized the British naval power for the overthrow of the French; in America he prepared with elaborate detail a series of expeditions in which he enlisted the hearty coöperation of the colonies. He had planned the campaigns of 1757 during a short term in office but was deprived of power before he could execute them. From 1757 to 1761 he organized the triumph of the British Empire over the French.

William Pitt

Pitt's American campaigns in 1758 were marked with but one English reverse, Montcalm's repulse of Abercrombie at Ticonderoga. But Louisbourg fell to a naval and military expedition, Fort Frontenac at the outlet of Lake Ontario was captured, and Forbes, with Washington in command of the Virginia contingent, forced his way through the Pennsylvania wilderness to Fort Duquesne, to find it a heap of smoking ruins, from which the garrison had fled down the Ohio.

Pitt's campaigns of 1758

In 1759, the French were pushed to the wall; they had necessarily to evacuate the posts that had connected Duquesne with Lake Erie; they gave up Ticonderoga and Crown Point. Montcalm concentrated his force at Quebec, assaulted there by a great naval and military expedition under James Wolfe. All through the summer Wolfe vainly tried to break through the guard of Montcalm. Assaults on the lines of intrenchments along the heights eastward from Quebec to the Montmorency River failed. Assault on the rock itself was impossible. At the end Wolfe resolved to attempt scaling the cliffs above the town by surprise to cut off supplies to the garrison from the interior. With all Wolfe's skill in feinting,

Montcalm and Wolfe: the fall of Quebec

Montcalm divined the intention; but Vaudreuil would not let him reënforce the point of danger. On September 13, 1759, Wolfe eluded the vigilance of the French outpost, carried his army up the cliff and placed it on the Plains of Abraham above Quebec. Montcalm drew out the forces to meet him; but his French colonials were no match for the British regulars, and his French regiments of the line were overpowered by superior mass. Wolfe fell in the moment of victory; Montcalm mortally wounded survived his defeat but a few hours. The British were defeated outside the town by forces from Montreal and shut up in it over winter; but the opening of the St. Lawrence in the spring of 1760 brought a British fleet and reënforcements, and Montreal fell without a struggle.

France's resistance in America was broken; accounting for the remnants of her power in Illinois and Louisiana was an affair of detail. Before the final triumph, Pitt had left office. Convinced that Spain was about to join France, he resigned in 1761 when refused permission to strike the first blow. But the impetus of victory on which England moved could not be checked. Spain lost Manila in the Philippines and Habana. Hopelessly beaten, the two Bourbon powers sought terms of peace. As far as America was concerned, English statesmen had hesitated whether to exact from France the cold coasts of Canada or the tropical sugar island of Guadeloupe. Eventually they took Canada, requiring from Spain the cession of Florida, which seemed to invite settlement. As a consolation to Spain for her loss, France ceded her Louisiana west of the Mississippi River with New Orleans on its eastern bank. She withdrew from the North American continent leaving to England Canada and everything east of the Mississippi; to Spain everything west of it. In India also England's successes had secured her ascendancy. In 1763 at the definitive treaty of peace, she stood forth as the first of world powers. Her retention of the position Pitt had won for her was conditioned on her success in the organization into a new empire of her possessions, old and new.

The Treaty of 1763

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

R. G. Thwaites, *France in America* (*American Nation*, vol. VII). New York, 1905.
H. E. Bolton and T. M. Marshall, *The Colonization of North America, 1492–1783*. New York, 1920.
E. G. Bourne, *Spain in America* (*American Nation*, vol. III). New York, 1904.
I. B. Richman, *The Spanish Conquerors* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. II). New Haven, 1919.
J. Winsor, *Cartier to Frontenac*. Boston, 1894.
——, *The Mississippi Basin*. Boston, 1895.
F. Parkman, *Works*. 17 vols. Boston, 1910. (Frontenac edition.)

CHAPTER IX

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

I. IMPERIAL EXTENSION AND COLONIAL PROTEST

From the Peace of 1763 to the time when the American Revolution was an accomplished fact, the English governing class struggled blindly with a problem of imperial organization. Since American colonization had begun, the subjects of the little Kingdom of England had wandered afar, establishing their settlements and authority in India, in Africa, in the West India Islands, on the Eastern American seaboard. In the latter place communities largely English had grown up, numbering by 1774 about one-third of the population of England itself. After the triumph of 1763 an imperial problem in varying phases confronted England on every side: in Ireland, restive under the economic domination of the British Empire; in the vast territories about to be exploited by the East India Company; in the organization of Canada, the eastern Mississippi Valley, and Florida, spoils of France and Spain; and lastly in the reassessing of imperial burdens on the American seaboard colonies. Successive English ministries labored at these problems, rarely seeing them as a whole, and always hampered by the exigencies of factional party politics in England.

The problem of imperial order

Criticism of the British government's measures arose from the colonies year by year. As it developed, colonial students searched deeper and deeper into the constitutional history of England, seeking to prove that it did not warrant the new measures of imperial control. At length a democratic uprising in the colonies swept them into union, into armed resistance, into republicanism, into independence. In the state constitutions, in the Ordinance of 1787 and the Constitution of the United States they finally evolved an imperial system of their own designed for the American continent alone.

America and imperial organization, 1763–1789

Such are the larger outlines of the American Revolution. Let us now examine the elements in more detail, considering first the shortcomings of England's eighteenth-century government. In the first forty years of the seventeenth century, as we have seen, English Parliaments had been content to oppose to the king's claims of absolute discretionary power the doctrine of the supremacy of law, the idea that constitutional principles bound both king and Parliament. That theory was abandoned after 1642; the theory of Parliamentary supremacy which replaced it struggled with royal absolutism until the Revolution of 1688 turned the scale, leaving the king unable to govern save by ministers acceptable to the Parliament. How far the Revolution of 1688 made Parliament the residuary legatee of authority which the king had formerly exercised independently is a hard question to answer. Certainly after 1689 control of the government fell more and more completely into the hands of Parliament. Its legislative authority numerous writers pronounced unlimited alike in England and over Englishmen beyond the seas.

Parliamentary sovereignty

Meanwhile Parliament was in the hands of a small ruling class. The House of Commons was made up of a few members representing the counties, and many more representing the boroughs or towns of the kingdom. Little change had been made in the apportionment since the sixteenth century. Many a thriving industrial city of the modern age went unrepresented; many a medieval town, decayed to a little village, turned to a sheep pasture or sunk beneath the North Sea, sent its members to Westminster. The ownership of the land on which a borough stood, or of houses in it, the control of a little self-perpetuating town corporation gave a lord in many cases the right to name two members in Parliament. Great nobles and landholders themselves sitting in the House of Lords numbered the Commons' seats they controlled by tens and twenties. They formed political alliances supported by their blocks of votes. Politics degenerated into factional contests in which the making and breaking of alliances made and unmade ministry after ministry. Settled policy, even a policy free from personal interests, was not

The unreformed House of Commons


A GENERALL MAP
OF THE COAST &
ISLES OF
EUROPE,
AFRICA and
AMERICA
Hudsons Bay
NEW BRITAIN
NEW FRANCE
NEWFOUND LAND
PENN SYLVANIA
NEW ENGLAND
MARYLAND
VIRGINIA
CAROLINA
FLORIDA
JARSEY
THE NORTH SEA
THE ATLANTICK OCEAN
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
AZORES
AFRICA
PARS
Senega R.
ISLANDS OF CA. VERDE
BAY OF MEXICO
CUBA
LUCAIES IS.
HISPANIOLA
ANTILLES IS.
CARIBY ISLANDS
TROPICK OF CANCER
WESTERN OCEAN
SOUTH SEA
TERRA FIRMA
GUIANA
60
50
40
30
20
10
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10

to be expected from such a system. Yet, to a Parliament so made up fell the task of taking the initiative in the solution of the problem of imperial unity.

A sympathetic approach to the problem as far as it concerned the colonies was not to be hoped for. Three thousand miles of ocean separated them physically from the mother country; and the dweller in great English city, staid town, or trim countryside had not the imagination to appreciate the problems of the men who dwelt on the edge of the mighty American wilderness. A feeling of proprietorship in the colonies and the colonists pervaded high and low alike; and in too many cases men were in power who were morally rotten in politics and private life, like the Earl of Sandwich with his sixteen illegitimate children, and his political sinecures as a member of the Bedford faction, the "Bloomsbury Gang"; in such men any appreciation of the colonial viewpoint would be sought in vain. The problem of imperial order, difficult of solution in any case, in their hands became absolutely impossible.

Lack of sympathy with America

The necessity of a greater exercise of central authority pressed strongly on the minds of English statesmen from various angles as the final struggle with France developed. To win that struggle in America, the coöperation of the Indians was essential; and until the confidence of the Indians could be restored by checking the lawless activity of colonial traders and backwoodsmen as well as the equally lawless purchases of Indian lands by individual colonies, that coöperation could hardly be assured. The trade of the continental colonies in foodstuffs with the enemy provinces in Canada and the West Indies had imperiled the success of British military operations against them. And when England finally emerged victor, with new provinces and a crushing debt incurred in winning them, it seemed just to English statesmen that the colonies should contribute their share to the upkeep of the military organization for the common defense. That, in seeking to bring these things to pass, British statesmen attempted to use the authority of the British Parliament, without endeavoring to find a way of enlist-

The need of imperial organization

ing colonial coöperation or allowing the colonies a voice in the policy, was a fatal mistake. Inevitably would communities dominated by Anglo-Saxon ideas, founded in the seventeenth-century atmosphere of questioning constituted authority, challenge not merely the new imperial organization but Parliamentary authority on which it was based.

It was from the angle of the western wilderness that Great Britain made her first approach to her problem. The principle of imperial control of relations with Indians, established in the creation of two Indian superintendencies, northern and southern, in the heat of the Seven Years' War, was enlarged by the order of Colonel Bouquet in 1761 prohibiting settlement beyond the mountains in the Ohio Valley. Once it became apparent that the whole French domain east of the Mississippi would fall to England, she projected a force of twenty battalions to keep order among Indians, French *habitants*, and British traders. Before the British could take possession of the farther west and raise their flag above Fort Chartres on the Mississippi, the rapacity of the traders and the fears which the Indians entertained of white settlement on their hunting grounds prompted the rising of Pontiac which swept all the Indians of the north save a part of the Iroquois, lost all the British posts in the west save Detroit and Pittsburgh, and threatened to involve the British in a long and costly Indian war.

The west: Pontiac's insurrection

To quiet the Indians, the royal proclamation of 1763 was issued. To reassure them as to the safety of their hunting grounds, it set a line beyond which settlement on the west was not for a time to go. Originally it was intended to run this boundary so as to include certain tracts beyond the mountains; but the need of a graphic and easily described line caused the ministry to set it at the crest of the Alleghenies. The framers of the Proclamation probably intended that, once the Indians were quieted, settlements should be extended by orderly purchases. But, as the years passed by, the impression developed in high circles that it was advisable to set the "Proclamation Line" as a permanent barrier to western expansion. This phase

The Proclamation of 1763

of the ministerial policy, emphasized in the Quebec Act of 1774, drove the defiant frontiersmen into the Revolution.

The ministers who had just come into office when the Proclamation had passed the seals were imperialists. One of their sponsors, the Duke of Bedford, had had a share in the Treaty of 1763, and was bound to defend the expediency of the new acquisitions of Canada and the west. The so-called Grenville-Bedford ministry therefore projected a strong imperial organization for the west: Indian superintendencies with ramifications that reached into all the tribes, strictly licensed traders bonded to trade only within fixed limits, and strong imperial garrisons. Before the scheme could yield returns, much money was necessary. To make the colonies pay their part seemed natural.

The Grenville-Bedford western policy

The Bedfords favored strengthening imperial authority over the seaboard colonies; and in 1764 George Grenville, the prime minister, proposed to extend to them the English stamp tax on pamphlets, newspapers, legal and commercial documents, and other items. The agents of the colonies in England protested mildly; but Grenville politely assured them that the colonies must contribute directly to imperial expenses, that the older system of requisitions had failed, and that in some way or other a colonial revenue must be provided. The agents acquiesced, so little forecasting the gathering storm as to seek positions for themselves and their friends as distributors of stamps. The principle of a direct Parliamentary tax on the American colonies was combated in Parliament by a small and eloquent minority. Colonel Barré applied to the Americans the term "Sons of Liberty," which they were later to adopt for themselves; but with little opposition the act passed, February-March, 1765. "Nothing of note in Parliament, but one slight day on the American taxes" was Horace Walpole's comment. The Stamp Act was a grievance which touched the whole continent; but to the commercial colonies of the north it came only as a fitting climax of disaster to a series of measures that had recently forced a complete shifting of the colonial commerce and threatened its very ruin.

The Stamp Act

To begin with, outraged by the colonial traffic in foodstuffs with the French West Indies during the Seven Years' War—a traffic marked by forged passes, collusion, and fraud in all concerned, from colonial governors down—the British ministry had begun a stringent enforcement of the Acts of Trade. Absentee customs officers were directed to repair to their posts; the navy was used; above all, customs officers took to using search warrants which, couched in general terms, allowed them to search any place where they might suspect the presence of smuggled goods. In Boston the merchants found a defender in James Otis, a lawyer of powerful but undisciplined mind who, arguing before the superior court in 1761 the illegality of the "writs of assistance," based his defense on their violation of the liberty of English subjects to be free in their houses from unwarranted intrusions. In a not too worthy cause the first constitutional note of the Revolution was struck.

Great Britain enforces the Acts of Trade

The writs of assistance had been only one phase of the new colonial policy of Great Britain. The Sugar Act of 1764 revised her system to its very basis. A new admiralty court for all America was established to assist in enforcing the Acts of Trade. Higher duties were put on foreign goods reshipped from England to the colonies. Import duties were levied on wines from the Azores and Madeira; the number of enumerated articles was increased. A duty, somewhat lower but still prohibitive, and manifestly intended to be enforced, was put upon molasses imported into the colonies from the non-English West India Islands.

The Sugar Act

Four-fifths of the West India trade was gone. The Sugar Act, combined with the inevitable commercial setback of the end of a war, brought economic distress to almost every class of the northern colonies. Not merely was the merchant affected. The sea captain and his crew beating down to the West Indies in a little snow or schooner, the ship carpenters who built her on some New England river, the riggers, sailmakers, ropemakers who helped rig her at the wharves, sail lofts and ropewalks of some commercial town, the fishermen,

Distress of the northern colonies

farmers and lumbermen who had wrung from nature by toil and peril the produce that loaded her, all alike faced unemployment and ruin. That duties and fines under both Sugar Act and Stamp Act were payable in specie, that paper money was now everywhere prohibited, threatened the ruin of the currency.

The merchants thought that their best weapons for redress were the nonconsumption and nonimportation of British commodities. Such measures would make British merchants feel in their pockets the distress of their American correspondents, and would provoke their best efforts to secure the repeal or modification of the obnoxious acts. To draw in the aid of the plantation colonies they laid the main emphasis of their protest upon the Stamp Act. Agreements to buy no European goods till Stamp Act and trade regulations were repealed began in New York and spread from colony to colony. The merchants favored orderly resistance and a mere avoidance of the necessity for using stamps. However, the lower elements of the population felt the sting as quickly as the upper classes and by violent measures in New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and elsewhere coerced the collectors under the Stamp Act into resigning. The term "Sons of Liberty" was quickly attached to their organization. Sometimes with the tacit support of the merchants as in Boston, sometimes checked by them as in New York, they made resistance by open violence. In Connecticut for two years the Sons of Liberty overawed the governor and assembly and controlled the colony. In Virginia the eloquence of Patrick Henry, a backwoods lawyer, member of the House of Burgesses, swept through resolutions of protest far too radical for the tidewater planters.

American resistance

To a congress called by Massachusetts to meet at New York on October 7, 1765, came delegates from Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina. It drew up a declaration of grievance, and petitions to king, lords, and commons. Claiming the rights of English subjects, its resolutions argued from these rights the illegality of Parliamentary taxation of the colonies; for only a freeman's representa-

The Stamp Act Congress

tives could tax him, and represented in Parliament the colonies could not be. The resolutions also touched on the inequity of the new restrictions on American commerce; but of course the congress could not pronounce them unconstitutional like the Stamp Act.

Meanwhile commercial distress in England and the impression made by the testimony of Benjamin Franklin before the House of Commons, together with the fall of the Grenville-Bedford ministry, assured the repeal of the Stamp Act. The Rockingham or Old Whig faction succeeded to power as a stop-gap. Conservative and timid, they were easily led to retrace the bold steps of the Grenvilles in colonial policy. The Stamp Act was repealed with the proviso that Parliament had the right to "bind the colonies . . . in all cases whatsoever." The Acts of Trade were modified; the three-penny duty on molasses was reduced to a penny, but it was now applied to all imported molasses and thereby became not a commercial regulation, but an external tax. All colonial commodities were hereafter to be landed in Great Britain before going to any European port north of Spain. With this the colonists had to rest content. Their situation was not so good as it had been before 1761, but the worst effects of the legislation of 1764–1765 had been removed.

The British reverse their policy

Unfortunately for the British Empire, the British government waited until agitation had died down, but not until it had been forgotten, to try a new experiment on American submissiveness to imperial control. The ministry of the Old Whig faction was succeeded by one headed by William Pitt, now Earl of Chatham—a ministry based on several groups, which it was hoped would finally unite all factions for the common good of the Empire, and enable a genuine solution in terms of the public good of the questions that had confronted it. By a fatal chance Chatham was stricken with illness, physical and mental, which prevented him from giving any attention to government; he left no second in command able to make himself obeyed, and with a narrow majority the ministry drifted danger-

The Chatham ministry

ously near destruction, its only safety lying in the divisions among its enemies.

Charles Townshend, the chancellor of the exchequer, a man of brilliance, spoiled by popular adulation, profited by the weakness of the ministry to force upon it an American policy of his own. Premising as an absurdity the distinction which the Americans drew between external and internal taxation, he proposed to take advantage of it by imposing a new schedule of duties on paints, paper, glass, and tea imported into America. These duties, if coupled with measures to increase the efficiency of the customs service, would, he thought, raise a revenue. The disintegrating ministry disapproved, but could not replace him and the Townshend Acts were passed. They included an act suspending the legislature of New York because it had refused to pay for the expenses of British troops billeted in the province—an imperial charge which fell with undue weight on those colonies in which strategic considerations dictated the concentration of forces. The Townshend legislation further expressly recognized writs of assistance and provided for the payment of colonial judges and governors out of the new revenue, thus freeing them from local control. A board of customs at Boston and three new vice-admiralty courts at Boston, Philadelphia, and Charleston were designed to secure the due enforcement of the system.

The Townshend Acts

The Massachusetts merchants regarded the Townshend duties, and perhaps even more the way of enforcing them, as a fresh blow at America's trade and prosperity. They hoped to ward it off, like the Sugar and Stamp Acts, by bringing economic pressure to bear on the English merchants through nonimportation and nonconsumption agreements. They wished at the same time to keep in leash the lower classes, with their tendency to direct action; for, like propertied men everywhere, they dreaded violence from below.

Resistance by economic pressure

Nonimportation agreements, covering first the articles affected by the Townshend Acts and then all British imports that were not essential, spread from city to city. Boston began; New York followed; the influence of both places led the Philadelphia mer-

chants who at first hung back. In the provinces to the south, the agreements were enforced by the planters on the factors and foreign residents, who generally held aloof from the movement. Georgia and North Carolina mercantile interests were forced in or led in by the predominant weight of South Carolina, and lived up to the agreements but poorly. Newport and Providence came in only under the menace of boycotts from Boston and New York. Portsmouth came in only in 1770. Boston, most radical in opposition, in vain tried to bind the other cities to hold out not merely for repeal of the Townshend duties but for a complete return to the system of 1761.

Nonimportation

The agreements were enforced by publishing the names of those who refused to sign, and by bringing economic and social pressure to bear upon them. For a time a group of merchants in Boston, connected in one way or another with Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson, defied nonimportation. The opponents of the agreement tried to sow dissension in the enemy ranks by publishing proofs that signers of the agreement were violating it. John Mein did so in Boston. In South Carolina W. H. Drayton, whose whole-souled conversion to the Revolution came only in 1774, maintained the cause of the importers against Christopher Gadsden, who was the representative of resistance among the merchants. Attempts were made to alienate public opinion by alleging that the merchants who urged nonimportation were merely clearing their shelves of shopworn goods at an advance; but in the most important commercial centers of the colonies nonimportation was strictly enforced.

Resistance to nonimportation

Mob violence, however much the merchants might deprecate it, was just around the corner. In 1769 and 1770 it appeared in New York and Boston to force defiant importers into line. Smuggling goods from Continental Europe, especially "Holland tea," began to be regarded not merely as profitable but also as patriotic. The greater efficiency of the customs service under the Townshend Acts led to deeds of increasing violence against customs officials. In 1768 riots in Boston,

Violence: The Boston massacre

rescuing John Hancock's sloop *Liberty* from customs officials, prompted the dispatch of two regiments to the town. Bad feeling between townspeople and soldiers led to a series of street brawls culminating in the Boston Massacre of March 5, 1770, when a British guard fired on a mob attacking it, wounding and killing several persons. The incident, coupled with discreet threats of violence from the Boston town meeting and the countryside, was used by Sam Adams to force the removal of the British regiments to Castle William in the harbor.

Soon after, in April, 1770, the British ministry repealed the Townshend duties except that on tea, although, because of increased European demand, the pressure of colonial nonimportation had not been felt. The merchants now generally wished to abandon nonimportation, the lower classes to adhere to it. One by one the mercantile centers dropped off, New York first, on July 9, 1770, Philadelphia next, finally Boston; the places dependent on them, and the southern provinces followed suit. The merchants had shown themselves willing to base all on expediency; and they parted company with radical leaders of the lower classes who stood out for the principle of no Parliamentary taxation. Until 1775 the rift between the two classes was sharply marked.

Abandonment of nonimportation

II. THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH ARGUMENTS

During this period when the radical leaders were fighting against acquiescence in the principle of Parliamentary control over the colonies, they put the finishing touches to the theories of government and of the English constitution upon which their argument was based. As these theories link up the present political world of the United States with the political thinking of seventeenth-century England and America and are the basis of our constitutional system, they deserve careful attention.

The American argument

The heart of the theory is that there are limits to the power of Parliament—things that Parliament cannot do without violating the English constitution or certain rules of right on which that

constitution is based. This argument had changed a good deal in its scope. In 1765 when confronted with the internal taxation of the Stamp Act, the colonial champions had conceded to Parliament the right of legislation, the right of regulating trade, even the right of levying customs duties. They had rejected merely Parliament's claim to lay internal taxes, arguing that as the colonies were not represented in Parliament, Parliament could not grant their money in direct taxes to the king's government.

Limited power of Parliament

Confronted with the Townshend Acts the colonists were compelled to change their position, and, while allotting to Parliament powers of legislation and imperial regulation, they proceeded to deny it any right of taxing for a colonial revenue. Finally between 1770 and 1774 they came to deny the authority of Parliament over them in any particular, alleging themselves bound to the king alone. In the Declaration of Independence the colonists reproach the king for tyrannical government over them, only alluding to the Parliament as a body whose usurped authority George III had turned against the colonies for his own wicked ends.

Progress of the colonial argument

This inconsistency in the colonial argument in its various stages has been attacked by British and American critics of the Revolution. The question, too, has been decided against the Americans by a recent school of American historians who have in general indorsed the British constitutional argument as the only correct one. This argument therefore may be briefly stated.

The British argument

According to the champions of Parliamentary power, by the progress of events in the seventeenth century culminating in the Revolution of 1688, the discretionary authority hitherto lodged in the king over his dominions in the British Isles, America and elsewhere, had been gradually transferred to the British Parliament. That body had become the supreme authority of the British Empire and over all the Empire. The constitution of Britain was fixed by Parliament's legislation and changed in accordance with its will. No constitutional practice, no individual

privilege was so sacred that Parliament could not set it aside if it deemed best. For England or for the colonies it could legislate or tax as it saw fit. The argument that the colonies were not represented in Parliament was idle. The colonies were virtually represented; for members of the House of Commons, though elected by boroughs in Great Britain, did not represent those boroughs; in theory rather they were representatives of the whole class of commons in England; in practice they did represent the landed gentry, the merchants, the great vested interests of the British nation. The interests of these classes in the British colonies were justly represented by them. For the rest, Boston and New York must rest content with the fact that they elected no representatives to Parliament, and neither did great British trading cities like Birmingham, Leeds, and Manchester. To the physical difficulty of sending members over 3,000 miles of dangerous seas was to be added the argument that precedent decreed the composition of the House of Commons as it then was; and that must suffice.

Parliamentary sovereignty: virtual representation

As one examines critically the British argument it seems less conclusive. The theory of the representation of classes or estates and not localities was the theory of the constitution, true enough; but it had led to an absurdity by which a hundred and fifty persons could name three hundred and seven members of the House of Commons. Such a situation called for reform sooner or later, along the line of the practice which in America had given rise to the popular conviction that a man's representatives must be the men he elected from his own community to voice the interests of himself and his neighbors. Of two conflicting theories of representation, the American was certainly the one closer to the facts of life.

Defects of the British argument

As for the argument of the absolute power of Parliament, the more one studies the constitutional history of England the less convincing does it seem. Until 1642 at least, the Stuart Parliaments were proclaiming not the supremacy of Parliament but the supremacy of law. Nor could it be argued that more recent constitutional practice had

The uncertain basis of Parliamentary sovereignty

fixed past alteration the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty. For three centuries the practice of the constitution had varied, now warranting the belief that the king or the Parliament was supreme, now seeming to point to the supremacy of the law. Moreover there was nothing in the letter of the constitutional documents which recorded the Revolution of 1688, that was explicit proof of Parliament's achievement of supremacy. The English historian of that Revolution has celebrated the fact that in outward form very little was expressly changed. At all events, was it certain that Parliament, even if it had acquired absolute authority over England, had acquired it at the same time over all other portions of the king's dominions?

This question is most puzzling. Medieval kings of England had also been dukes of Normandy, lords of Ireland, counts of Anjou, and various other things. Because the authority of the king over England had, as the centuries passed, been subordinated to that of a political assemblage of his English subjects, did it necessarily follow that his subjects beyond seas had likewise been subordinated to it? The Channel Islands, which he held as relics of the Duchy of Normandy, were not subject to the English Parliament in the days of the Stamp Act and are not subject to it to this day. The rightful subordination of Ireland to the legislation of a British Parliament has been challenged intermittently for the last five hundred years; it was challenged with effect in the days of the American Revolution. The very fact that strained theories like virtual representation were necessary to justify Parliament's assumed power over the colonies was an argument that it was functioning to ends for which its historical structure completely unfitted it.

Had Parliament become sovereign over the colonies?

The Americans based their protests against British encroachments sometimes on the fact that they were Englishmen with all the rights of Englishmen including that of trial by jury of their neighbors and that of being taxed only by their representatives. Sometimes they based arguments on the charters of their colonies, alleging that those charters were

Basis of the American argument

compacts between the kings who had granted them and the colonists, irrevocably guaranteeing to the latter certain rights. But more than either of these as time went on they used arguments based on the laws of nature and the rights of the natural man. Such arguments would unite both the Anglo-Saxon and the foreign elements in the colonies, and all the provinces, chartered or unchartered.

The compact argument was essentially that men in a state of nature before the formation of governments possess certain natural rights; that just and lawful governments can originate only in a compact or agreement, by which such natural rights are expressly preserved to men against possible future encroachments of their rulers. Therefore the right to live both safe and free, without danger of being crushed by unjust taxes or legislation, was a right which the colonists retained. Repeated attempts on the part of king and Parliament to infringe it would automatically destroy the basis of their just authority by annulling the compact from which it arose. The colonists might then justly disregard it, and by compact create for themselves new governments better fitted to insure justice.

The law of nature

The compact theory of government has long since been discarded as artificial, not corresponding to the circumstances under which the British nation arose. But the theory had a strong argument from past colonial practice. Colony after colony in New England, and town after town settled under New England auspices, could point to its town or plantation covenant by which the first settlers had established just governments over themselves by consent or agreement. To argue from the known to the unknown—to assume that because the governments of Connecticut, New Haven, and Rhode Island originated in compacts of the seventeenth century, the liberties of Englishmen at large were based on compacts far more ancient was a natural thing for Americans to do.

The Compact Theory

The criticism of the American argument as shifting and changing ground is perfectly justifiable; but all revolutionary arguments are subject to that criticism. It was natural that, in the face of

repeated interference by the British Parliament with the privileges formerly enjoyed by the colonies, the colonists should go deeper to find constitutional security against it, and that toward the end they should seek arguments to refuse to Parliament certain powers the abuse of which they had not at first foreseen. The American argument was worked out by a series of penmen: James Otis, who in the case of the writs of assistance first restated the old theory that an act of Parliament contrary to the constitution is null and void; Daniel Dulany of Maryland, a royalist after 1765, who argued the illegality of a direct tax; John Dickinson of Pennsylvania, author of the *Farmer's Letters* of 1767–1768, arguing the illegality of all external taxation; Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson, who were the spokesmen of frontier radicalism in Virginia; and greatest of all, Samuel Adams of Massachusetts, draftsman of most of the Massachusetts expositions of American rights.

Development of the American argument

Samuel Adams in 1765, in 1768, and in 1772 had preached the doctrine that because of its foundation in compact, the English constitution was fixed, and that a Parliament overstepping its constitutional bounds passed only null and void legislation. In 1772, in controversy with Thomas Hutchinson, governor of Massachusetts, he admitted the full consequences of the argument. Hutchinson had argued that two supreme legislatures, Parliament and the General Court of Massachusetts Bay, could not exist in the same state. Adams insinuated that if bound by the law both might. Hutchinson had further said that no line could be drawn between absolute subjection to Parliament and absolute independence. Samuel Adams hinted in reply that the dilemma was one which the colonists must settle in concert; but, if forced to choose, their decision might be independence. To that end the sturdy agitator, ruler of the Boston town meeting, later averred he had been working for years before the Sugar Act or Stamp Act were dreamed of.

Samuel Adams

From the vantage point of time one is tempted to shift the argument from right and precedent to expediency. For the British ministers it could be urged that a British Empire had

grown up, of profit and value to colonists and Englishmen alike, and that the colonists must learn to support its burdens not merely in taxation but also in acquiescence and loyal obedience to measures necessary for the welfare of the whole. Yet the colonies had spent two and a half million pounds on the Seven Years' War and in 1766 had yet six hundred thousand to pay by taxation. There was truth too in their allegation that the British merchant paid his heavy taxes with the help of the profits he reaped from his privileged position in colonial trade. Probably, however, the colonist bore something less than his share of the burden of taxation, and was far less obedient than he should have been to imperial trade regulations. So far he was culpable.

Equities of the question

But the British ministers were no less blind and foolish in coming with strained constitutional precedents—"the statute book doubled down in dogs ears," to use the impatient phrase of William Pitt—to stretch in absolute control over the Empire the authority of an English Parliament which was representative only of an English oligarchy. To expect acquiescence by Americans in the absolute authority of such a body composed of men morally and politically corrupt was to expect the sons of the Puritans to worship the Golden Calf. If British statesmen wished to enlarge the imperial authority of the central government, they should have devised a central government that would have been a proper receptacle for power, and not have been content with heaping new duties on an English Parliament that was essentially a legislature only less local than those of the colonies themselves. To the intellectually lazy, however, it was easier to devise arguments based on wrested precedents for the imperial sway of Parliament, than to devise a new government really imperial in scope. The British oligarchy did not even seriously consider colonial representation in Parliament.

The British mistake

Imperially-minded men there were on both sides of the water, but they worked in vain. Thomas Pownall, sometime governor of Massachusetts Bay, Joseph Galloway of Pennsylvania, Ben-

jamin Franklin, William H. Drayton, all worked out specimen schemes of imperial control which did not involve the subjection of the colonies to a legislature they had not chosen. Galloway's Plan, once defeated by a single vote, was expunged from the journals of the Continental Congress by the radicals, simply because by 1774 the radicals were convinced that there must be a solution of the problem of empire in terms of American liberty. Behind them stood the, as yet, unenfranchised masses of Americans dreaming of better things, on a new continent given by God to man for economic and political liberty. The minds of such men were in the future, not on the past, on principles of liberty, not precedents of subjection. If Manchester and Sheffield—so Otis crushed the British argument from analogy—"are not represented, they ought to be." "The decree has gone forth, and cannot now be recalled," said John Adams, "that a more equal liberty than has prevailed in other parts of the earth, must be established in America."

American imperialists and radicals

Such men after 1770 believed that the struggle with the advocates of privilege in England was one in which the political life or death of the colonies was at stake. The words of Hutchinson, ominous in themselves, however innocent their context, "abridgment of what are called English liberties," were a sinister commentary on the policies of the Grenville-Bedfords and Townshend. Colonial merchants, anxious only for their own pockets, were doubtful allies to have in a fight for political liberty. The Adamses, the Gadsdens, and the other leaders of the radical parties throughout the colonies did not trust the schemes for imperial reorganization of Americans like Galloway because such devices seemed fetters on those who were ready to defend even to blood the newly discovered American ideals of liberty. On the thinking of seventeenth-century England, on the practice of seventeenth-century New England as foundations, the radicals were about to build the American national system of the future. By comparison, the schemes of the imperialists, however high-minded, were but mazes to entrap the colonies in

The radicals

subjection to an English oligarchy, reaching out for imperial authority to be exploited for its own gain.

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

E. Channing, *History of the United States*, vol. III. New York, 1912.
J. T. Adams, *Revolutionary New England*. Boston, 1923.
G. E. Howard, *Preliminaries of the Revolution, 1763–1775* (*American Nation*, vol. VIII). New York, 1905.
C. H. Van Tyne, *The Causes of the War of Independence*. Boston, 1922.
M. C. Tyler, *Literary History of the American Revolution, 1763–1783*. 2 vols. New York, 1897.
C. H. McIlwain, *The American Revolution: A Constitutional Interpretation*. New York, 1923.
H. E. Egerton, *The Causes and Character of the American Revolution*. Oxford, 1923.
J. K. Hosmer, *Samuel Adams*. Boston, 1885.
A. M. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution, 1763–1776*. New York, 1917.
C. W. Alvord, *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics*. 2 vols. Cleveland, 1917.
A. C. McLaughlin, *The Confederation and the Constitution* (*American Nation*, vol. X). New York, 1905.
S. E. Morison, *Sources and Documents Illustrating the American Revolution*. Oxford, 1923.
G. O. Trevelyan, *The American Revolution*. 4 vols. London, 1905–1907.

CHAPTER X

THE EVOLUTION OF INDEPENDENCE

I. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF COLONIAL UNION

The peculiar fatality about English politics in the decade immediately preceding the Revolution was that the unstable ministries, based on hastily cemented factional alliances, changed too fast to permit an imperial system to be set in operation even if ministers could have been found with sufficient breadth to frame one. Bute's ministry had barely sketched the outline of a western policy when, in 1763, it was succeeded by a loose coalition, that within the year yielded to the Grenville-Bedford imperialists of the Stamp Act. These imperialists, driven from office as the colonial outcry arose, and cherishing a grudge against the colonies, were succeeded by the aristocratic, little-Englander, Rockingham Whigs. That group would have probably endeavored to return to the old colonial system. It was soon succeeded by a coalition ministry headed by William Pitt, made up of the most disinterested men in several factions, enthusiastic for a solution of all the problems of empire in terms of the common good.

The shifting British ministries

The best hope for keeping America fell here. Pitt's illness paved the way for the Townshend Acts with the results we have already seen. Further support for the ministry was needed, and the Bedfords began to filter in. The only terms they made were that colonial affairs be taken from the hands of the liberal Earl of Shelburne. "I suspect," wrote an observer, "some appearance of resentment against the Americans is to be the first fruits and cement of the new alliance, but I much doubt whether it will be such a one as you would have suggested or I approved." As the years passed more and more of the Bedfords came in, drawing after them their former associates from Grenville's following. The friends of Pitt one by one resigned, and

The North ministry

his ministry of high hopes changed to a coalition of Grenvilles, Bedfords, and followers of the king, led by the fat, easy-going Lord North, whose good nature forbade his saying no to schemes his better judgment condemned. By 1772 the transmutation was complete.

The shifts in the ministry are most sharply mirrored in its policy towards the west. In a former chapter was sketched the Grenville-Bedford scheme with strong garrisons, trade at western posts by licensed traders, a strong Indian department. It had gone down for want of money to support it on the repeal of the Stamp Act. Promoters in the various colonies and in England itself were now pushing schemes for land grants and land companies and colonies in the west, arguing that they would supply the garrisons with cheap food, keep the Indians in order, and secure the fur trade, which threatened to cross the Mississippi to the French and Spanish. On the other side it was objected that the proposed colonies would stir up the Indians and damage the fur trade; the west—so argued fur traders placed influentially at home, and persons owning land elsewhere in America or in Ireland—had better be left alone.

Western problems

Shelburne, who had taken up the problem in 1766 as secretary of state, approached it with an understanding, possessed by few Englishmen of his day, of the westward drive of settlement. Recognizing the impossibility of checking it, he prepared to regulate it. Returning the fur trade to the colonies for supervision, he planned the establishment of royal colonies almost self-governing in the wilderness. The man with such vision might possibly have produced an imperial scheme that would have gained colonial support. The Bedfords drove him from control of colonial affairs and finally from office. The imperial government rejected the idea of new western settlement, though it played for some years with the notion of a colony, Vandalia, on the upper Ohio.

Shelburne's policy

While ministries were reversing each other's policies, frontier Americans were executing a western policy all their own. By various means they were obtaining grants from the Indians be-

yond the proclamation line of 1763. In the Treaty of Fort Stanwix negotiated by Sir William Johnson in 1768, colonial agents induced the Iroquois to cede all their claims south of the Ohio.

Americans exploit the west

The complacency of Stuart, the Southern Indian superintendent, and strange mistakes of colonial surveyors pushed the boundary, agreed to in treaty with the Southern Indians, as far west as the Kentucky River. Close to the time at which the British government was planning to demolish Fort Chartres on the Mississippi and garrison only the easily accessible posts on the Great Lakes, shifty colonials were buying great tracts of land from the Indians in Illinois and Indiana, land surveyors employed by Virginia speculators like George Washington were plastering surveys far down the Ohio, Virginia and Pennsylvania backwoodsmen were swarming over the upper Ohio Valley, and Richard Henderson of North Carolina was projecting a colony in the heart of the present Kentucky.

Against squatter and speculator, Parliament in 1774 made a final attempt to assert its authority. Under the influence of Scotch members in league with the Scotch fur merchants of Montreal, and in the hope of shutting off Englishmen from the west altogether it passed the Quebec Act of 1774. The act at-

The Quebec Act

tached the whole region beyond the mountains to the province of Quebec, establishing autocratic nonrepresentative government, and French civil law. The English ministry in their last legislation respecting the Ohio Valley sought to close its gates in the face of their own race. The Revolution in the west necessarily took the form of the overthrow of their policy.

It is quite probable that the western policy of the British government contributed more than the Acts of Trade to bring about the Revolution in Virginia. There, the commercial situation was dominated by the Scotch factors, who were generally

The Revolution in Virginia

loyalist. The attempt of the Episcopal clergy to unleash persecution on the back-country dissenting ministers, and the peculations of the colonial treasurer had ultimately enabled the men of the frontier about 1760 to break the grip of Anglican and tidewater planter on the colonial govern-

ment. Patrick Henry, the upcountry lawyer and orator, had helped the movement. His eloquence in the "Parson's Cause" of 1763 had checkmated the clergy who had secured the disallowance of a colonial act commuting their tobacco tithes for a money equivalent when tobacco was dear; it had forced through the radical resolutions of 1765, and at one crisis after another of the prerevolutionary period it was to rouse the upcountry farmers like a battle cry.

The Virginia land speculations

Besides the upcountry, however, many of the greatest men in the colony, such as Andrew Lewis and George Washington, were interested in western land speculations. They had bestirred themselves to defeat the Vandalia land project of the Pennsylvania speculators; on the eve of the Revolution their surveyors were already marking choice tracts far down the Ohio and its tributaries; and upcountry farmer and speculating planter found common cause in resisting the ministerial determination to keep the west a fur preserve.

The Intolerable Acts

The Quebec Act had been originally designed to restore to the French Roman Catholics of Canada the rights under the Treaty of Paris, of which the Proclamation of 1763 had despoiled them. It was intended to regulate rather than to punish the men of the frontier, but by the time it was passed, Americans listed it among a series of acts provoking the colonies to desperate resistance—the five "intolerable acts." How they came, bringing the Revolution directly after them, we must now see.

The committees of correspondence

After the collapse of nonimportation in 1770 the merchants held carefully aloof from the more radical elements in New York, Boston, and elsewhere that had figured as Sons of Liberty. Samuel Adams in Massachusetts tried with no great success to keep up the flames of radical opposition by denouncing such measures as the payment of governor and judges by the royal authority, and by discussions of abstract right. From such discussions, however, there arose after 1772 a system of so-called "committees of correspondence." With increasingly elaborate ramifications, they extended from

town to town and at length from colony to colony. Essentially they were a party organization led by the more radical elements, based largely on the lower classes still excluded from colonial or town franchise. How this organization could be made to function when the opportunity came, no one as yet imagined.

A ministerial measure of 1773 forced the merchants once more into resistance in which they were unable to check the radicals. The East India Company, plundered by her officials as they had plundered her hapless subjects in India, was near bankruptcy.

The tea issue

In 1769 she had raised the scale of "upset" or minimum wholesale prices on which tea was auctioned off at London. Smuggling from Holland thenceforth became profitable and in the colonies patriotic as well: the Company was left with vast stores of unsold tea. To save it, duties were revised or drawbacks given for all save the threepenny duty payable in the colonies under the Townshend Act; tea could now be legitimately imported into America cheaper than it could be smuggled. Moreover the Company was no longer required to sell by auction in London; it could consign its tea to American merchants or even create a selling organization of its own. In other words, special privilege was given a monopoly to establish itself in colonial business; silks, china, and other articles of commerce might easily follow tea.

The merchants and radicals alike resisted the changes, but they based their opposition mainly on the tea tax. Cargoes were consigned by the East India Company to Charleston, to Philadelphia, to New York, and to Boston.

Reception of the tea in America

At Philadelphia and New York the merchants and radicals forced the consignees to refuse to accept the consignments, and the ships were turned back. At Charleston the tea was landed and stored, ultimately to be auctioned off during the Revolution. But at Boston the crisis came. The Boston consignees were the sons of Thomas Hutchinson and could not be forced to resign. While the merchants sought to bring pressure on them, the days passed and it was at length technically too late to do anything but land the tea and pay duty. The radicals now took a hand,

and a mob, disguised as Indians, dumped the tea in Boston Harbor.

Undoubtedly this was a reprehensible act of violence, although the annals of eighteenth-century customs' enforcement and evasion in England would probably have matched it. The merchants of Boston and the more conservative colonials elsewhere deprecated the act. Given the opportunity they would have probably repaid the Company for its money loss. The British ministry gave no time for penitence. It launched on Boston and Massachusetts a series of repressive acts—changing the charter of Massachusetts to make the Council thenceforth appointed by royal authority, prohibiting town meetings save by special permission, providing for the trial in England of offenders in the colony, and closing the port of Boston till the town should make good the Company's loss. General Gage, commander of the forces in America, replaced Hutchinson as governor to carry out the policy of repression.

The policy of repression

The violence of the British government in its policy of vengeance in the long run disarmed the moderates in the colonies, and left the radicals to dictate the policy of opposition. Boston called on the continent for support, in food for the starving people thrown out of employment by closing the port, in stringent measures to bring the ministry to terms. She advocated complete nonintercourse with Great Britain and the West Indies. In colony after colony radicals and moderates fought for control to determine the policy to be followed. In many places arose simultaneously demands for a Continental Congress of all the colonies. Sometimes, as in New York and Pennsylvania, the moderates welcomed the proposal, hoping to dominate the Congress and limit Continental measures to moderate protest and petition. In various ways the delegates were chosen. In Massachusetts this was the last act of the old provincial General Court before Gage adjourned it. With its adjournment, royal government in Massachusetts Bay, outside the reach of the bayonets of Gage's sentries in the outskirts of Boston, went out like a puff of smoke. A provisional government based on the

The First Continental Congress

committees of correspondence or safety and on public assent arose in its place.

The Continental Congress that met in Philadelphia in September, 1774, was a momentous affair. Leaders, radical and conservative, acting at opposite ends of the seaboard, here stood face to face for the first time. A politician like Samuel Adams could lay aside his Puritanism for an ingratiating manner, and even invite an Anglican divine to open a session of Congress with prayer. Even his stiffer cousin John Adams could feel the seductiveness of the more genial social atmosphere of Philadelphia. The moderate men in the colonial delegations were adroitly silenced by the proposal that the colonies vote as units; and the formal record of proceedings thus displayed an appearance of unanimity quite at variance with the facts. Joseph Galloway proposed a scheme of imperial order based on two legislatures, American and British. It found support, even came within one vote of adoption; but all reference to it was finally expunged from the journals by the radicals. In formulating the American constitutional position the colonies represented in Congress were equally divided on the question of admitting Parliament's right to regulate external commerce; finally they conceded the principle of imperial trade regulation.

The Congress and its work

The Congress embodied its position in addresses and petitions to the king, to Canada, and to the people of Great Britain and the British colonies. More important still, it adopted an association for a stringent régime of nonimportation of British goods and after a given date nonexportation of American. Thus it was thought the West Indies could be starved into bringing their powerful influence to redress the wrongs of the continent. Before agreeing to nonexportation South Carolina demanded special terms for rice. The discouragement of consumption for luxury and display, the fostering of home manufactures, and the protection of the wool supply by discouraging the slaughtering of sheep were enjoined. The Association was left to the enforcement of local authorities. As far south as Georgia a system of extralegal governments developed side by

The Association

side with the legal ones, and were infinitely better obeyed. Governor Dunmore admitted that the dictates of the Congress were received in Virginia with "marks of reverence which they never bestowed on their legal government, or the laws proceeding from it."

II. THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

The outcome of the first Continental Congress was a great victory for the radical party. The moderates were bound by the injunction of secrecy against revealing the transactions at Philadelphia and stood committed by the seeming unanimity of the Congress to full acquiescence in its acts. The adoption of the Association had given radicalism the stamp of a semi-official program. The Association was in effect a law, the radical committees that enforced it a government, and further moderate resistance would seem resistance to a law and a government which America had adopted for herself. Fearing persecution the moderates feared also that all extralegal associations might be regarded as acts of treason against the king, and therefore hesitated to form organizations to combat the radicals. No royal governor had the genius to rally the moderates about him; and ultimately they made their choice between loyalism and acquiescence in the Revolution soon to be sponsored by the new radical governments, sprung from the committees of correspondence, the Association, and the Continental Congress.

The radicals gain control

There was some local opposition. The Episcopal clergymen of New York were headed by Samuel Seabury, later a bishop, in a savage pamphlet-attack on the Congress and its works. The rift in New York between Episcopalism and Presbyterianism was soon to divide Toryism and Whiggism. Except in the south the extreme Anglican elements headed by the clergy were likely in the end to be found on the loyalist side. From New York to Georgia certain groups such as the Scotch Highland emigrants generally adhered to the cause of the king. But such action was more and more coming to be regarded as opposition to American authority.

The loyalist opposition

The Association was enforced with deadly effectiveness. Yearly imports from Great Britain sank from £2,500,000 to £83,000. The outcry of British merchants arose to Parliament for propitiatory measures to America. It was not so loud as it might have been but for the opening up of new European markets; but it fell on deaf ears. George III and the "Bloomsbury Gang," in complete control of the Parliament, were resolved to yield not an inch to the Americans, to meet organized resistance with new repressive legislation, backed if necessary by armed force. On March 30, 1775, an act of Parliament cut off New England from commerce with any part of the world save the British Isles and the British West Indies. On April 13, the act was extended to New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina. The Association was being but sluggishly enforced in North Carolina and Georgia, and the ministry believed the loyalist forces might control New York.

The British ministry defiant

Meanwhile both sides were preparing for armed conflict. The radicals were drilling men and procuring what supplies they could of arms and munitions. In New England the countryside was in a posture of defense against the British in Boston. With companies of minutemen drilled in every town under the direction of the provisional governments, with arms collected, Gage was confronted by a territorial army. Officers going out to reconnoiter encountered almost the danger of spies in an enemy camp.

Preparation for war

Finally in April Gage acted. He detached a strong force on the night of April 18 to seize the supplies accumulated by the Massachusetts government at Concord. The countryside rose to the alarm. The British force marching through Lexington early on the 19th encountered the local company of sixty or seventy men forming on the village green. Perhaps the militia fired; a volley dispersed them, leaving seven dead on the ground. The British pressed on to Concord, and destroyed what stores were left; their picket at the bridge was driven in by the gathering patriot minutemen. Returning from Concord the British force found itself assailed at every turn by the local mus-

Lexington and Concord

ters. Exhausted by the night march, without food, harried and decimated by bands who adopted the methods of Indian warfare and fired from cover, the British were saved from destruction only by a strong supporting force at Lexington. As the retreat continued, the local musters continually increased in numbers and boldness, until finally the British passed Charlestown Neck just in time to escape being cut off altogether; they had suffered two hundred and fifty casualties. The pursuing militia, made an army by one day's work, began the investment of Boston.

No news ever before had traveled so fast through the colonies as the news of Lexington; no news ever had more momentous effects wherever it was told. From New Hampshire in response to it the militia marched fifty-five miles in twenty hours to take part in the siege; in Connecticut, Israel Putnam riding the same horse traveled one hundred miles in eighteen hours. In Rhode Island the Quaker blacksmith Nathanael Greene, an assiduous student of military books, commanded the levies that marched to Boston. Everywhere beyond the Hudson the story of New England townsmen shot down by the king's troops before their homes confirmed in radical, moderate, and Tory the belief that armed conflict with the crown was inevitable. It reached the wilderness of Kentucky, and the settlers on the Elkhorn sensed its import for the west and named their settlement Lexington.

The news of Lexington

The Second Continental Congress, summoned by the first to meet May 10, 1775, in case the British ministry had not yielded, convened in the heat of the excitement. The moderates, backed by all the influence of the Quaker society of Philadelphia, were strong enough under John Dickinson's leadership to frame a last petition to the king, the "Olive Branch Petition," for redress of grievances. But the Congress also adopted the Massachusetts army besieging Boston as its own, at Adams' motion, appointing to the command of it George Washington of Virginia.

The Second Continental Congress

George Washington was born of one of the smaller planting families of Virginia, and as a young man sought a career first

as a surveyor of western lands for his friend Lord Fairfax and then in the service of the colony. Military experience gained on the frontier in the French and Indian War made him at twenty-six the most trusted officer in Virginia. Through a fortunate marriage, wise attention to his estate, and judicious speculation in western lands he became one of the richest planters in Virginia. Less conspicuous in the Revolutionary movement while it still expressed itself in speeches and manifestoes, events pushed him to the front when action became necessary. Physically, the tall, stately, stern-faced man with iron self-possession seemed made to inspire confidence in his followers. The years of the Revolution impressed on his countrymen throughout the States the deepest respect and reverence for the personality revealed by his career. Always master of himself and others, he neither gave way to despair in the deepest disaster, nor ever seemed to consider his private interests in his public duties. His countrymen's confidence in his military ability they unhesitatingly transferred to his judgment in the problems of federal organization and public policy that arose after the war. Twice unanimously elected president, he saw toward the end of his service the confidence of a part of his countrymen shaken by his espousal of the Federalist pro-British foreign policy; but in a few years after his death in 1799 criticism was forgotten, in the universal worship of the Father of his Country.

George Washington

Before Washington could take command, a second action had shown that New England and her army were making war in earnest. The peninsula on which old Boston stood was commanded to north and south by two others, each five hundred yards away, or within the range of the eighteenth-century cannon—Charlestown on the north, Dorchester on the south. To force the British evacuation on June 16, the New England army occupied and fortified Breed's Hill on the Charlestown peninsula, selecting it as better situated for commanding Boston than the famous Bunker Hill that has given its name to the action. Gage and Sir William Howe saw the danger and planned to expel the enemy. The simplest way to do it was to take ad-

Bunker Hill

vantage of the guns of their fleet to cover a landing on Charlestown Neck to cut off the Americans; but the loss of British prestige on the 19th of April seemed to demand a spectacular frontal attack on the American works. The British infantry that advanced to the assault was met by aimed fire that twice swept it back in disorder; the third time the American powder had given out, and British cannonading had prevented the advance of supporting troops; but the raw Americans driven from their redoubts retreated doggedly fighting as few regulars have ever done. The British casualties were 1,040, three in seven of the troops engaged. The Americans who sold their lives dearly on the crest of Breed's Hill did not end their services to their country there; they inspired in Sir William Howe a fear of intrenched American troops that saved the American army from destruction in future defeats, and they convinced the rest of America that New England was in deadly earnest.

Washington took command of the siege of Boston on July 3. Reënforced by three thousand men from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, he began the arduous task of making an army out of the militia, equipping them, forming organizations for command and for supply, training officers and men alike in subordination and in the duties of various ranks. Meanwhile a New England expedition had seized Fort Ticonderoga and with it much-needed heavy artillery. Sporadically, military operations and preparations were going on from Maine to Georgia. Loyalist uprisings in North Carolina failed for want of military support; for a time opposition to the Revolution was crushed.

Hostilities become general

The British answer to the "Olive Branch Petition" and Bunker Hill was merely more military preparation. In October of 1775 Falmouth in Maine was burned by a British squadron. Most of the British army was in America already, and recruits were hard to get. Therefore the government negotiated with German princes, notably the ruler of Hesse-Cassel, for the use of troops recruited by them or from their armies. The use of mercenary foreign troops to destroy the liberties

British preparation

America claimed aroused the deep anger of Americans against their king, and disappointed the moderates who still hoped for reconciliation.

For a year before the 2d of July, 1776, the Continental Congress had made one step after another in the direction of independence. Radicals like Samuel Adams and his cousin John were pressing on, conservatives like Dickinson holding back. On June 9, 1775, Congress advised Massachusetts to establish a provisional government based on her charter; in November it advised South Carolina and New Hampshire to form provisional governments anew. Throughout the colonies, during 1775, royal governors were betaking themselves to the shelter of British warships, or like Governor William Franklin of New Jersey falling prisoner to their subjects. Tryon in New York and Wentworth in New Hampshire effected their exit with dignity. Dunmore in Virginia, failing in attempts to stir up a negro insurrection, was less impressive in his flight. The transition from royal authority came by peculiar steps. The last assembly to meet Governor Martin in North Carolina was also a revolutionary provincial convention and met in the one or the other capacity as the moment required. British warships lingered in New York Harbor in intimate touch with the governor and the Tories; the provincial congress did not dare cut off supplies of food to them until admonished by Washington in 1776.

The breach widens

While the moderates in Congress still fought the word independence they were compelled to acquiesce in one measure after another that implied its substance. The army of Washington, using guns dragged in sleds from Ticonderoga, fortified Dorchester Heights in March and compelled the precipitate evacuation of Boston by the British. In the same months Congress advised the disarming of loyalists, authorized privateering, and defied all British trade regulations by throwing open the ports of America to the world. On May 10, 1776, it advised the colonies thereafter to carry on government in the name of the people. "As to declarations of independency," wrote John Adams, "be patient. Read our priva-

The approach of independence

teering laws and our commercial laws. What signifies a word?"

Sooner or later the word must be spoken. On June 7, 1776, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia introduced resolutions for independence, a plan of confederation, and foreign alliances. At the time but four state delegations were authorized to vote for independence. In succeeding weeks the other colonies defined their position. When Lee's Resolutions came up for vote in Congress on July 1, South Carolina and Pennsylvania opposed them, Delaware was divided, New York refused to vote. The South Carolina delegates acted without authorization from their colony on hearing that Clinton's fleet had been beaten off at Charleston. In Philadelphia, the Assembly, in which the older settled sections dominated by the Quakers were over-represented, and which had refused to instruct its delegates for independence, had been overawed by a mass meeting of seven thousand, and had surrendered its place to a provincial convention; on July 2 the delegates who opposed independence absented themselves, and Pennsylvania's vote was secured. The arrival of Cæsar Rodney changed the vote of Delaware. Only New York held out; but the resolution passed finally on July 2, 1776.

Lee's Resolutions

A committee had been set on June 11 to draw up the document which would announce the resolution, and to Thomas Jefferson of Virginia was intrusted the task of penning it. His Declaration of Independence, couched in a style that makes it a masterpiece among state papers in an age when America excelled in them, sets forth the political philosophy of the American Revolution in its classic form. Beneficent nature has framed the universe for the safety and happiness of man, and by her laws provided political government to help attain these ends. Therefore when government no longer promotes the welfare of those governed, the law of reason teaches them to fashion it anew. In the Declaration of Independence the British Parliament, save for indirect allusions, does not appear; the colonists have long since regarded the king as the sole bond with the mother country, and denouncing him in surging

The Declaration of Independence

sentences of condemnation for the policy by which he has provoked resistance, and the measures he has taken to crush it, they finally cast him off. America is at length embarked on her own course in the world's history.

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

E. Channing, *A History of the United States*, vol. III. New York, 1912.
J. T. Adams, *Revolutionary New England*. Boston, 1923.
G. E. Howard, *Preliminaries of the Revolution, 1763–1775* (*American Nation*, vol. VIII). New York, 1905.
C. H. Van Tyne, *The Causes of the War of Independence*. Boston, 1922.
M. C. Tyler, *Literary History of the American Revolution, 1763–1783*. 2 vols. New York, 1897.
C. H. McIlwain, *The American Revolution: A Constitutional Interpretation*. New York, 1923.
H. E. Egerton, *The Causes and Character of the American Revolution*. Oxford, 1923.
J. K. Hosmer, *Samuel Adams*. Boston, 1885.
A. M. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution, 1763–1776*. New York, 1917.
C. W. Alvord, *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics*. 2 vols. Cleveland, 1917.
A. C. McLaughlin, *The Confederation and the Constitution* (*American Nation*, vol. X). New York, 1905.
S. E. Morison, *Sources and Documents Illustrating the American Revolution*. Oxford, 1923.
G. O. Trevelyan, *The American Revolution*. 4 vols. London, 1905–1907.
J. Winsor, *The Westward Movement*. Boston, 1897.
C. L. Becker, *The Declaration of Independence*. New York, 1922.

CHAPTER XI

THE WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE

The Declaration of Independence did not make a nation; it only announced the determination of men with their eyes on the future to make one. Yet some historians who have fully recognized this fact have failed to see what modification it requires in their strictures on the military shortcomings of the Americans in the Revolution. They have criticized the failure to provide armies, supplies and money precisely as if the habits of obedience to the complex social and political organism of 1918 were to be found in the scattered little communities of 1776.

A nation in the making

To begin with, the Revolution was the work of an active and determined minority; only in the New England colonies and Virginia did the mass of the people support it. Elsewhere a Whig minority contended with a Tory minority for the allegiance of masses of people who would have liked best to stay neutral. In New York, in Pennsylvania, and in New Jersey until after the visit of the Hessians, Washington's army was almost in hostile territory. Besides 8,000 loyalist militia, New York alone furnished 15,000 recruits to the British army and navy. Even the patriot group had learned in former days the habit of opposing taxes and government acts, and found it hard to unlearn. Distrust of a standing army and trust in militia had been an English commonplace of liberty for a hundred years. Colony distrusted colony and all of them distrusted the central government; individual communities were interested in protecting themselves against British and Tory raids and with reluctance saw militia and recruits depart for distant Continental service. Habits of allegiance to the British crown were but slowly transferred to the Continental Congress or even to the new state governments. The aristocratic element of

Weakness of the Revolutionary party

leadership, prominent in earlier revolutions, was lacking in great measure. The Revolution in short was not the uprising of three million people keenly conscious as a nation, acutely sensitive to governmental direction. It was the work of a minority determined to see a new and better order of things established on the American continent. The wonder is that they accomplished even half of what they did.

The British government until 1778, and in a measure afterwards, had control of the sea; their navy could assail the fifteen hundred mile coast line at dozens of places; at almost any of them save in New England or Virginia they could count on some popular support. This encouraged them to attempt with an inadequate force a military conquest, instead of the blockade their wiser strategists advised. They had at first seemingly unlimited money and supplies, seemingly unlimited German mercenaries, and good English troops and officers, though some of the best of the latter, like Amherst and Admiral Keppel, declined to serve against the Americans. In 1776 they hoped by seizing and holding the Hudson to cut off New England from the rest of the continent and to reduce it at leisure. The campaigns of 1776 and 1777 turn on the lines of the Hudson and the Delaware. After 1778 with the Franco-American alliance a fact, and Burgoyne's disaster to teach them that the Hudson was dangerously within reach of the swarming New England militias, they contented themselves with the occupation of New York City and set about a systematic conquest of the southern colonies. Thus they would have something that could be traded on at the peace, or retained to render the new nation as feeble as possible. This involved essentially the use of one force to operate alternately on two widely distant points. So long as control of the sea enabled use to be made of interior lines, the policy succeeded; when even for a few weeks control of the sea passed to the enemy, the result was the irretrievable disaster of Yorktown.

The British plan of campaign

The British campaign of 1776 turned on seizing the Hudson by a concerted attack from north and south. In the north Montgomery and Benedict Arnold in 1775 had led an expedition to win


LAKE
ONTARIO
Oswego
Oneyda Lake
Ft. Stanwix
Oriskany
43°
42°
Susquehanna River
Mohawk
Branch of Delaware R.
Schoharie R.
Hudson's River
Ticonderoga
Lake George
Ft. Edward
Saratoga
Stillwater
Schenectady
Albany
Bennington
Connecticut River
MASSACHUSETTS



THE PROVINCES of
NEW YORK
and
NEW JERSEY
with part of
PENSILVANIA
1776

Canada to the Revolution; but the French Canadians were reconciled to English government by the Quebec Act and the wise rule of Governor Carleton. They failed to rise on behalf of their old enemies the "Bostonnais"; and the Americans, successful at Montreal, failed at Quebec, where Montgomery was killed, blockaded the city during the winter, and finally, decimated by disease, withdrew in the spring. Carleton followed; but Arnold contested every step of his advance and finally checked him at Ticonderoga in the fall of 1776. Half the British plan had thus failed at the start.

The campaign of 1776

The other part succeeded. The defense of New York against an enemy controlling the sea was a desperate enterprise—how desperate Washington scarcely realized. He drew his army there after the evacuation of Boston, while General Sir William Howe brought the former garrison of Boston to combine with forces sent him directly to Staten Island. His brother, Lord Howe, commanded the fleet. Lord Howe sympathized with the Americans; he was the bearer of terms of pardon for them that he sincerely regretted were too slight for their consideration; but he was a keen sailor and used his naval advantage to the utmost. New York was assailable by ocean-going ships from either the Hudson or Long Island Sound, and forces could be landed on the upper part of Manhattan Island to cut off the defenders unless at all points they maintained a superiority of numbers that Washington did not possess. He attempted the defense of New York City against his better military judgment because of the blow its loss would deal to American morale; in doing so he sacrificed a considerable part of his forces in mistakes he learned never to repeat.

Washington attempts to defend New York

The fact that the heights of Brooklyn commanded New York made it necessary for Washington to hold western Long Island. Here the British threw their forces in a first attack, defeating the two American divisions in the first line. August 24, Washington skillfully withdrew his remaining forces in the face of the enemy to Manhattan Island. Howe's next maneuver was to land forces from the East River; they almost cut off the American troops

remaining in the city. Washington now concentrated his army at Harlem Heights. Attempts on his flanks from both the Hudson and the Sound left his army disposed along an eighteen-mile line north-eastward from Harlem to White Plains. The possibility of British attacks toward either Philadelphia or the upper Hudson caused Washington to divide his forces; he shifted to the west bank, leaving on the east a garrison of 2,600 in Fort Washington and General Charles Lee, a former British officer, vainglorious, boastful and treacherous, with 7,000 men. November 16, the garrison left exposed in Fort Washington was captured.

The New York campaign

Washington was now confronted by Howe with superior numbers and compelled to retreat posthaste to the southward, taking refuge behind the Delaware at Trenton. Lee had disregarded Washington's repeated orders to join him, and his troops remained near the Hudson until Lee himself was taken prisoner by a raiding party, and Sullivan marched the relics of the force to Washington's aid. The cause of the Americans seemed desperate. Washington commanded a few thousands of ill-equipped, dispirited men, with enlistments rapidly expiring. Congress had fled from Philadelphia to Baltimore. For the time, New Jersey generally went over to the British side. Howe left a chain of garrisoned posts along the Delaware and retired to New York for the winter.

The retreat through the Jerseys

On those garrisons Washington planned a desperate surprise attack to revive American morale. On Christmas of 1776 the Delaware was full of floating ice, and of three attacking forces only one column of 2,500 desperate men gained the east bank. Marching nine miles they threw themselves on three Hessian battalions at Trenton. Their countersign "Victory or Death" told the desperate stakes they played for and won. Colonel Rall took no warning from patrol or picket; and by the time the long-roll called the Hessians to fall in, Knox's artillery was sweeping the village street of Trenton, and Sullivan's flanking detachment had cut off escape. A thousand German captives grounded their arms after inflicting but four casualties, one of them

Trenton

on Lieutenant James Monroe, who survived to be president of the United States.

The British caught the challenge of Trenton, and Lord Cornwallis, sharpest of British infantry leaders, dashed back to the Delaware to overwhelm Washington's little force. He confronted it at Trenton on the night of January 2, 1777, secure that it could not recross the Delaware; but Washington slipped out of Trenton by a road the British had not covered, to pass behind Cornwallis' rear. The fact that the British were advancing with brigades out of supporting distance left three regiments in Washington's way at Princeton to be disposed of in a workmanlike manner; and Washington, abandoning his dash at the British stores in Brunswick, placed his forces at Morristown on the heights between the Delaware and the Hudson. His position was unassailable in winter, and from it his raiding parties fell on the British communications, compelling ultimately their evacuation of New Jersey. Learning as fast from his mistakes as man could, Washington with completely inferior forces had achieved a great strategic success. Thenceforth as a military leader he had the implicit confidence of the masses of his countrymen.

Princeton

The British campaign of 1777, planned on the same lines as that of 1776, was hazy in conception. General Burgoyne, soldier, playwright, man-about-town, humane in spite of the bloodcurdling rhetoric of his proclamations, was to lead from Canada 8,000 men, mainly British and German. Whether his object in so doing was to seize the line of the Hudson or merely to reënforce the army at New York by the most direct line, was left uncertain. Actually Burgoyne weighed the possibilities of going by sea or marching across New England to Newport. Finally his orders directed him to advance to Albany and place himself at Howe's disposal. Colonel St. Leger was to land from Lake Ontario at Oswego and to descend the Mohawk Valley to join Burgoyne on the Hudson.

Burgoyne's campaign

The device was too fine-spun. St. Leger besieged Fort Stanwix on the Mohawk; in an attempt to ambuscade an American relieving force he lost the bloody combat of Oriskany; the ubiquitous

Arnold coming up to raise the siege by a strategem such as Greek writers on war would have cited as a golden example—sending a half-witted loyalist to terrify the Indians by accounts of the American numbers—turned St. Leger's force in headlong retreat.

St. Leger's defeat

Burgoyne had initial success. Ticonderoga, indefensible by the troops at the disposal of General St. Clair, was evacuated, the garrison escaping to join General Philip Schuyler at Fort Edward. Schuyler slowly retreated, delaying Burgoyne's advance; his indiscreet contempt for plebeian New England officers and his defense of New York's claims to Vermont made him unpopular with the Adamses and they secured his retirement in favor of General Horatio Gates, a professional soldier like Lee except that he was more honest.

The Northern campaign opens

Burgoyne had fallen into difficulties from which no incompetence in his opponent could relieve him; his advance was slow, his communication with Canada tenuous. His march was through a region supposedly loyalist, but New England militia swarmed like hornets on his flank and threatened his line of supply. At Bennington under Colonel John Stark they cut to pieces a strong German raiding force. Burgoyne's orders to advance were imperative. On September 19, 1777, he attempted to outflank the Americans on Bemis Heights. Again Arnold was on hand to thwart the movement. October 7, Burgoyne attacked again and again; Arnold repulsed him, this time forcing him to retreat to Saratoga. From New York Clinton was at last moving toward Albany, but too late to prevent Burgoyne's surrender of his army as prisoners of war, October 17, 1777.

Surrender of Burgoyne

The lack of support accorded Burgoyne from the south is an interesting commentary on British ministerial efficiency. Howe had been informed of Burgoyne's enterprise, but was merely instructed to support it if he conveniently could; he therefore proceeded with an attack on Philadelphia by sea which the ministry had already authorized. The attack took longer than he planned. His pilots pronounced a landing on the Delaware impossible, and he sailed

Howe's Philadelphia campaign

around to the Chesapeake. It was the 25th of August before he landed, the 11th of September before he forced the passage of the Brandywine from Washington's army, and the 25th before he entered Philadelphia. On the 4th of October Washington assailed a part of his forces at Germantown in a surprise attack that failed only for lack of military experience in the American troops. It was then impossible for Howe to return to the Hudson, and Burgoyne's fate was sealed.

Burgoyne's surrender was far more of a disaster than the numbers involved would indicate; it determined France to enter the war against Great Britain. France's policy ever since the Peace of 1763 had been the recovery of her diplomatic prestige in Europe by the humiliation of her successful antagonist. Fearing they were too weak even with the Spanish alliance, the French were conscious of inferiority to their conquerors; and through their secret agents they had eagerly watched the growth of American disaffection in the hope it might turn the balance of power in their favor.

Effect of Burgoyne's defeat on France

With great anxiety they watched the first stages of the Revolution. They did not wish to interfere openly on behalf of the colonies until their success was assured or at any rate until their resolution to pursue independence seemed irrevocable. On the other hand, they feared that if the quarrel ended in a reconciliation, Great Britain would employ her fleets and armies and give Washington and other American soldiers a chance to satisfy their ambitions in a descent on the French West Indies. For a time they contented themselves with secretly supplying the Americans with money and munitions in liberal amount, although they tolerated American agents, Arthur Lee, Silas Deane, and later Benjamin Franklin, at the French Court. They seem to have been at the point of proffering open aid when the defeat of Long Island occurred. Then the new Spanish minister, Count Florida Blanca, took up an independent rôle of diplomacy, and France, loath to engage in war without Spain, held off still longer to win Spain to her aid.

French policy, 1765–1776

Franklin in France had the shrewdness to attract French inter-

est to his personality and hold it for the American cause. Homely and simple in dress and manner, he became the fashion of the French upper classes who saw in him the republican, the man of nature, the philosopher, emblematic of all the virtues ascribed to his country. The Marquis de Lafayette, a French soldier with the enthusiasm of youth, made his way to America as a volunteer in the cause of liberty. The French nation was won over, and the news of Burgoyne's defeat impelled the French government to action. Certainly the British ministry would now offer America its utmost concessions, and France must forestall them. Lord North in December, 1777, gave notice in Parliament of a move for reconciliation and brought in his measures on February 17—everything the Americans asked but independence; but the Franco-American alliance was then an accomplished fact. It pledged France to the cause of American independence, bound both parties against concluding a separate peace, and provided for a guarantee by the United States of the French West Indies in case of war. France, trusting that Spain would follow her example, announced her treaty March 13, 1778. It was an automatic declaration of war with England.

The French alliance

The winter of 1778 had been a bad one for the American armies. Washington's troops were cantoned at Valley Forge where they could watch the British in Philadelphia; the hardships of a winter in temporary log huts were made worse by the complete breakdown of the service of supply. In an agricultural country where hides and homespun abounded, the troops suffered for want of food, shoes, and clothing. But on the British, passing the winter in Philadelphia amid all the comforts and gayeties that Tory merchants and madeira could afford, the wasted American army maintained its watch.

Valley Forge

The winter saw the remaking of the Continental army. A plot in which certain members of Congress were leagued with disgruntled officers to give General Horatio Gates supreme command broke down before the general confidence of the rank and file in Washington's character and ability. Baron von Steuben, a Prussian officer sent by the French government, taught the naturally

Courtesy of the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan

A PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

From the Clinton Headquarters Papers. The corrections on the map are in Sir Henry Clinton's handwriting.

brave officers and men the manifold technical duties and observances that create discipline and obedience. He left his imprint deep on the United States army. A generation later, his description of the duties of officers in the various grades was still the established text; and the close attention of the commissioned officer to the training of his men the American service learned through Steuben, from Prussia, not from England. While Steuben was remaking the infantry, Knox was reorganizing the artillery, Henry Lee making a light cavalry detachment, and Nathanael Greene reorganizing the quartermaster service. Out of the hardships and dissatisfaction of Valley Forge emerged in the spring a disciplined, tempered army.

The making of the Continental army

The campaign began with the evacuation of Philadelphia by the British. The Continental army threatened their supplies from the interior and from the Delaware, and the French fleet might soon imperil their communications by sea. They shipped munitions and loyalist refugees for New York, while their army marched across New Jersey. Washington pursued it, and brought it to a general engagement at Monmouth. The treachery of General Lee, who had returned as an exchanged prisoner, left the result indecisive, and by night the British drew off; when they had finally taken refuge in New York City, the war in the middle colonies was at an end. Save for engagements on the Hudson, and occasional raids on seaport towns, British active operations were thenceforth confined to the country south of the Potomac.

The British evacuate Philadelphia

The hostility of the second naval power should have sufficiently threatened British control of American waters to jeopardize their future campaigns by land; but not until 1781 did this occur. Immediately after the declaration of war Comte d'Estaing with a French military and naval armament reached the American coast. He considered with Washington the chances of success in an attack on Newport. The attempt failed, leaving French and Americans with a mutual distrust.

Franco-American coöperation

The British transferred their attention to the south; the rice and indigo colonies were the ones they valued most, and the large number of Tories, the lack of efficient local militias and the menace of negro revolts rendered them an easier prey. Sir Henry Clinton, Howe's successor in command, was emphatic in condemning the division of the small British forces in this fashion. The ministry persisted, later turning over the southern campaign to Cornwallis, who, to obtain an independent command, was willing to execute a strategy he knew to be fundamentally unsound. Beginning at the southern extreme, British forces from Florida seized Savannah on December 29, 1778; the little backwoods settlements that were Georgia fell with it. D'Estaing planned with General Lincoln at Charleston to recover Savannah; but again coöperation failed. The British, withdrawing their garrison from Newport, the best naval base on the North American coast, used it to back a second blow at Charleston where General Lincoln surrendered the only American army in the south. For the time the Revolution was dead in South Carolina. Even some of the American leaders of the more conservative cast made advances to the British. The Whigs of the back country took up the defense of the American cause when the low country laid it down; Pickens, Marion, Sumter, organized their bands for guerilla warfare on the British. The stage was set for the savage struggle between Whig and Tory that left a deep mark on the Carolina frontier.

The British in the south

As the nucleus of a new American army in the South, Washington sent a detachment of Continental regulars commanded by Gates. At Camden August 16, 1780, when Cornwallis fell on them, Gates and the militia saved themselves by flight, and the Continentals were cut to pieces. A second time the south seemed lost; but two months later the British suffered a most significant reverse. A strong loyalist force under Ferguson had penetrated deep into the upcountry to stamp out the last sparks of Whiggism. Over the mountains came the frontier colonels Sevier, Campbell, and Shelby leading their militia, the backwoods riflemen who had sought new homes on the western

Camden and King's Mountain

waters. Ferguson fell back to King's Mountain, a solitary crest in North Carolina and, October 7, on its summit awaited the attack. In charge after charge his bayonets swept back the encircling line of riflemen; but as it gave on one side it advanced on the other. Ever nearer the crest crept the circle, till finally as it crowned the summit Ferguson dropped from a rifle shot, his men surrendered, and his work in the upcountry was undone.

Long before this the west had had its influence on the Revolution. The press of land surveyors and speculators down the Ohio had outraged the Indians and led them to a revolt in 1774, which was crushed under the command of Lord Dunmore, governor of Virginia and leader of its land speculators, at the battle of Point Pleasant. At the time appointed the Indians to receive their final terms of peace from Dunmore at Pittsburgh, he was a fugitive, and emissaries of the Continental Congress negotiated a treaty that kept the Indians quiet a year or two.

Dunmore's War, 1774

Meanwhile Dunmore's emissaries planned a great expedition from Detroit; French, British, and Indians were to cross the western wilderness, strike eastern Pennsylvania, and coöperate with the British fleet in cutting America in two. The American invasion of Canada in 1775 prevented the British from trying it; but the lieutenant governor at Detroit, Henry Hamilton, sent out Indians, often led by renegades like the Girtys, who swept the Pennsylvania and Kentucky frontier. But already the western Continentals had found the opportunity of obtaining supplies from New Orleans by the Mississippi and Ohio rivers, thanks to the benevolent neutrality of Spain; and to the young major of the Virginia county of Kentucky, George Rogers Clark, occurred the idea of seizing the Illinois country as the base for an attack on Detroit that would stop the Indian raids at their source.

The Revolution on the Ohio, 1775–1778

Everything favored his plan. The French in the Illinois villages for years had been restive, seeking in vain of the British the right of self-government. The Americans among them had inspired their interest in the new nation; the British had withdrawn their garrisons to save Canada; and only the shadow of imperial author-

ity remained at Vincennes and in the Illinois. Clark therefore with a Virginia force easily took possession in July of 1778. Hamilton launched an expedition that retook Vincennes in the autumn and was intended to retake Illinois in the spring. Clark forestalled him in a desperate winter march across the Illinois wilderness and captured him at Vincennes. Virginia had previously established the county of Illinois; and Clark, maintaining an uncertain grip on the region, managed generally to the end of the war to keep the British out of it. He failed year after year to muster the necessary force to take Detroit; but in 1780 he beat off a British attack on the Illinois villages, and also saw it repulsed by the Spaniards at St. Louis. His was really an outpost, imperfectly defending the new settlements in Kentucky from Indian raids. The settlers further to the south, in eastern Tennessee, had their troubles with the Cherokee, but, as at King's Mountain, they could interpose decisively to change the military balance in the east.

Clark conquers the Illinois for Virginia

The west tangled itself alike in the domestic and foreign policies of the Confederation. It has been supposed that France was unenthusiastic over an American conquest of the west because she wished to revive her own imperial schemes there. More probably she was influenced by the exigencies of her Spanish alliance. Under the dominating leadership of Florida Blanca, Spain did not join France in war on England until April 12, 1779. Then she did it under pledge of France to recover Gibraltar and other former Spanish possessions in Europe. From Louisiana as a base her vigorous governor Galvez reconquered Florida from Great Britain; and she aspired to other territorial gains east of the Mississippi. If she was at war with England she was not allied with England's revolting colonists. She withheld official recognition of them for she thought their example a bad one for her own colonies. She wished to see the United States feeble, with territories closely clipped to the south and west, her lawless backwoodsmen either checked afar from Spanish colonies or else tamed by Spanish rule. France, trying at once to satisfy the ambitions of the United States for territory

Spanish policy

west of the mountains, and to reassure her Spanish allies, played by necessity a game of equivocation.

There was dissension among the new States too. Some like Massachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia under the terms of old charters laid claims to belts of territory cutting the west from sea to sea. New York, too, could put forward vaguer claims based on the former overlordship of her vassals, the Iroquois; but while these claims conflicted, the claimants demanded that the west should be the prize of individual States. Virginia especially, claiming the greater part of the northwest by right of charter, conquest, and organization, was the greediest of the "landed States."

Western land claims

The smaller colonies with no western claims protested against allowing some States to swell to such huge size as to overbalance the Confederation by their future weight. Maryland generally led the "landless States" in opposition. When a clause allowing Congress to fix the western limits of States claiming to the Pacific was dropped from the Articles of Confederation, Maryland refused to ratify them. She ratified only in 1781 under informal assurance that all western claims would be pooled for the common benefit. Meanwhile the various land companies to whose claims Virginia was hostile clustered around the Maryland delegation. Spanish and French influence was exerted to induce her to oppose Congress's urging American claims to the west as a condition of peace. As the southern States were conquered in 1779–1780, their delegations to Congress often were discouraged enough to take the same position. There was a group in Congress in 1780–1781 willing almost to make terms with England on the basis of military possession, leaving New York City, Charleston, and most of the south in her hands. That was the peace that Spain desired. To satisfy her in 1781 Congress voted even to yield the west and the navigation of the Mississippi, but John Jay, envoy to Spain, suppressed the terms.

Opposition to western claims in Congress

The Confederation indeed in 1780 seemed in danger of disintegrating even before the Articles of Confederation were form-

ally ratified. The assistance of the French had led to no decisive results. The country was flooded with depreciated paper currency; Continental bills had sunk in value so far as to be exchanged forty for one in 1780 for new paper issue, only less depreciated than the old. The States had issued paper money, the northern ones in moderation, the southern ones lavishly. Virginia was swamped in issues of fabulous amount, fabulously depreciated. Congress was full of second-rate men who could not lead. Even the patriot party was tired of taxation and requisitions. Washington and the army seemed the only effective center of resistance that was left; and in 1780 one of the ablest of American generals, Benedict Arnold, treacherously attempted to surrender West Point and Washington with it to the British. The British agent of corruption, Major John André, was detected by guerillas; the mistake of a colonel to whom André's papers were brought gave Arnold enough notice to make his escape, leaving André to hang as a spy. Perhaps Arnold had hoped to play the part of a reconciler of the British Empire, not believing that an American nation had come into being.

The crisis of 1780

England was in difficulties of her own. She was at war with America, France, Spain, and after 1780 with Holland. Her maritime interference with neutral trade had provoked against her the armed neutrality of the northern nations, Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Prussia and the Empire. They announced the then new principle of international law that "free ships make free goods"; the neutral flag protected goods belonging to a citizen of the country at war. Among the European powers England had neither friend nor ally. Her American campaigns were a steady drain of money and men, and American privateers by the thousand harassed her trade. The little American navy had performed a few surprising feats of arms such as Paul Jones's capture of the frigate *Serapis* with the old hulk *Bonhomme Richard.* The English ministry, built up for political reasons on factional groupings, was corrupt and weak, wasting men and money with no commensurate returns. Even stout Tories like Dr. Samuel Johnson growled at its shortcomings, or whispered that the

Courtesy of the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan

SKETCH MAP OF THE HUDSON AS FAR AS WEST POINT, POSSIBLY BY MAJOR JOHN ANDRÉ

From the Clinton Headquarters Papers

king was isolated among his people. The opposition in the House of Commons, made up of the younger Rockingham Whigs, assailed the arbitrary measures that had goaded the colonies into arms and the foolish ones that had arrayed most of Europe on their side. Even Parliamentary majorities bought and paid for were a weak shield against the eloquence of Charles James Fox.

In the fall of 1780 Washington, in a last attempt to recover the south, sent Nathanael Greene, ablest of his infantry leaders. Greene's success and the skill by which it was achieved were worthy of Washington himself. Against an able antagonist he waged a campaign in which all the battles but one were tactical defeats, and won a complete strategic victory.

Greene in the South

The contest began January 17, 1781, with the complete rout of Tarleton and his Loyalist Legion by the left wing of Greene's force under Morgan at the battle of the Cowpens. Cornwallis at once marched after Greene, who with his main force was hurrying to unite with Morgan. Across North Carolina Cornwallis pressed on Greene's heels, until the latter finally escaped across the Dan on the Virginia border. Greene now turned back and offered Cornwallis battle at Guildford Court House, March 15. Cornwallis was the tactical victor in a desperate battle, but suffered such losses that he retreated to Wilmington on the coast to reorganize. Greene passed into South Carolina, accepted another tactical defeat from Lord Rawdon at Hobkirk's Hill on April 25, and saw him in his turn retire to his base at Charleston. In a campaign of five months Greene had pushed the British back from the provinces of the south that lay at their feet to the protection of the guns of their ships of the line.

Greene's success

A peculiar move on the part of Cornwallis, it must be said, was partially responsible for his success. That gentleman had long believed for some reason that a campaign in Virginia would crush the Revolution. Therefore instead of returning to South Carolina to oppose Greene he moved in May, 1781, to Virginia. Lafayette, who commanded there until he was reënforced by Virginia levies and the Pennsylvania Continental Line, could do little except shadow Cornwallis, who swept into the upcountry, surprised the

legislature at Charlottesville, almost captured Governor Jefferson, and barely missed the stores at Albemarle. Finally he took post at Yorktown, mainly because it put him in touch with the ocean, and with the transport to new fields of activity which the British fleet seemed to promise. Unwittingly he prepared the final triumph of the American cause.

Cornwallis in Virginia

Since early in the year Washington had been hoping, with French assistance, to strike a decisive blow. In July of 1780 eight French ships of the line had brought to Newport a French division commanded by Rochambeau; but the fleet was promptly blockaded by the British, and to the anger of amateur American soldiers Rochambeau dared not move his troops out of supporting distance. In May of 1781, however, he met Washington to concert plans for joint action. Since 1778 French and English fleets had maneuvered in the West Indies, attacking and defending their respective island colonies. There De Grasse was expected in the early summer of 1781 with a large French fleet, and it was hoped he would operate on some continental point with the allied armies. As yet Cornwallis' departure from the Carolinas was not known and a summer campaign there seemed inadvisable. An attack on New York was therefore projected, and Rochambeau drew his troops to the Hudson. Meanwhile word came of Cornwallis' Virginia campaign, and by August 14, 1781, news that De Grasse would try to make the Chesapeake in late summer, but must be gone again by the middle of October.

The campaign of 1781

The sweep of a strategic conception that took in the whole North Atlantic Ocean now centered at Yorktown. British incompetence in the Admiralty enabled the French to exercise momentary superiority of naval forces on the Atlantic seaboard, and Cornwallis' army at Yorktown was the prize. For De Grasse had evaded British blockading squadrons and got to sea from France; in the West Indies he had evaded Hood and Rodney until he could unite with other French units and gain a superiority of force. When on the eve of the hurricane season in the West Indies he sailed northward, Rodney sent too few ships under Hood to reënforce the northern station.

The battle of the Chesapeake

De Barras' eight ships from Newport, no longer fearing the British fleet at New York, slipped out to join De Grasse; and when Graves and Hood combined encountered him in the Chesapeake on September 5, they could muster but nineteen sail of the line against twenty-four. They were worsted in an indecisive action, and drew off to refit.

The strategy of the allied armies timed with the navies like clockwork. No sooner had Washington heard of De Grasse's intentions, than his plans were secretly changed. In the last days of August with an army of 2,000 Americans and 4,000 French he crossed the Hudson and marched into New Jersey, feinting an attack on Staten Island. Then he threw off the mask, and dashed for the Delaware, crossing it before the British could prepare a force to fight a holding action. His army embarked at the Head of Elk on the Chesapeake and in the last days of September joined Lafayette and 3,000 more French brought by De Grasse. With the French fleet holding control of the water, they besieged Cornwallis in Yorktown. Overwhelmed by the enemy fire, his outpost redoubts stormed by French and Americans, he surrendered his whole army October 19 as prisoners of war. Sir Henry Clinton, with a larger fleet and reënforcements for Cornwallis, left New York too late.

Yorktown

Yorktown decided the war. George III, German by blood, was sufficiently a Briton not to know when he was beaten, and wished to go on. But the hopelessness of the contest was now apparent to his most slavish supporters. His majority in the House of Commons dropped away; and Rockingham came into office to be succeeded at short intervals by Shelburne and Fox, by Shelburne alone, and by Fox and North. Peace negotiations were begun at Paris through informal conversations between Richard Oswald and Franklin.

Peace negotiations

The American negotiators, Jay, Franklin, and finally John Adams, were brilliantly successful in the terms they secured. They had instructions not to negotiate without France; but America's treaty obligations to her were modified by her subsequent engagement to Spain to fight

The Americans negotiate separately

until the recovery of Gibraltar, and Spain had never condescended to conclude a treaty with the upstart United States. Jay feared that France in deference to Spain would hinder American acquisition of the west. He therefore prevailed on Franklin to break their instructions and negotiate directly.

In the West Indies Great Britain had been close to disaster, and the prizes obtained by the American peace commissioners were great; for Shelburne's policy was at any price to get the British garrisons out of America and to detach the United States from dependence on France and Spain. In the west the bounds of the United States were set at the mid-channel of the Great Lakes and at the Mississippi River. On the south, a secret article provided that if Spain obtained Florida, the boundary should be at 31°; and if England retained it, it should be the parallel of the mouth of the Yazoo. On the details of boundary the treaty was most inexact, and not for sixty years were all its complications removed. The Americans agreed that no difficulties should be thrown in the way of British creditors recovering their debts from American debtors, that the loyalists suffer no further confiscations or persecutions, and that Congress should recommend the restoration of their property. The British agreed to evacuate, carrying off no American property. The fisheries were to remain open to Americans. Indefinite as was America's inheritance from the former British Empire, it offered brilliant future possibilities, could she develop the strength and astuteness to make use of them.

The Treaty of Paris

Thus the American Revolution was consummated. In moments of expansive good-will Englishmen and Americans are prone to regard it as a rift between brothers made by an headstrong king of German race, who in losing the Revolution lost also his play for autocratic control of Parliament and the British nation. The conclusion is a little hard on George III. As king he had attempted to be more than a figurehead, by building up a personal following of members of Parliament through the use of places and money. Entering the game of politics with his faction, by force of character he had

The Revolution inevitable

dominated the other factional leaders who combined with him to support the North ministry. The power he wielded was neither more nor less than that of any political boss. The fault lay not with him but with the system of factional politics that had given him his opportunity. Whether the wisdom lay in any man, save perhaps Pitt or Shelburne, to solve the imperial problem of 1763 is doubtful. The old bonds of empire were too weak to hold; and to devise new ones in which both the eastern and western wings of the empire would acquiesce was the task of a genius, such as eighteenth-century British politics rarely called to the seats of the mighty.

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

E. Channing, *A History of the United States*, vol. III. New York, 1912.
G. O. Trevelyan, *The American Revolution*. 4 vols. London, 1905–1907.
J. T. Adams, *Revolutionary New England*. Boston, 1923.
M. C. Tyler, *Literary History of the American Revolution, 1763–1783*. 2 vols. New York, 1897.
C. H. Van Tyne, *The American Revolution, 1776–1783* (*American Nation*, vol. IX). New York, 1905.
P. C. Phillips, *The West in the Diplomacy of the American Revolution*. Champaign, Ill., 1913.
E. S. Corwin, *French Policy and the American Alliance of 1778*. Princeton, 1916.
A. T. Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783*. Boston, 1890.
J. W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, vol. III. London, 1902.

CHAPTER XII

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

The American Revolution involved not only the breaking down of old constituted authorities, but also the establishment of new ones in their place. In the individual colonies, state governments had either to be created, or evolved out of the older colonial authorities. More difficult still, a central government had to be constructed to take the place of the rejected British crown. To succeed in the problem of imperial organization where British statesmanship had failed was not easy. Fifteen years elapsed from the time when the First Continental Congress reached out for the reins of central authority, to the definite establishment of federal government under the Constitution of the United States.

Problems of the new nation

Much of the intervening period was marked by lawlessness, disorder, and inefficiency under a Continental government unable to fulfill its obligations or to exercise its proper functions at home or abroad. Accordingly it has often been regarded as a period of disgrace and dishonor. Rather it was one of experiment and growth. The Revolution had come about through a distrust of imperial government on the part of the colonies, a distrust that had proved strong enough to draw them together to strive for their independence. It was only slowly that they perceived that a central government was necessary, and that imperial organization was something not to be altogether condemned, but to be regulated more wisely and more wisely adapted in functions and powers to its true end than had been the case with the experiments of Grenville, the Bedfords, and George III.

A period of experiment

The first task of the Revolution constitutionally was the adaptation or construction of state governments conformable to Revolutionary ideals. Certain important problems at once presented

themselves. What was to be the form of the new governments? How should executive, legislature, and judiciary be organized and chosen? What powers should they enjoy? How widely should the franchise be extended? Should it include the nonpropertied classes? Should the over-representation of the older settled tidewater region and the under-representation of the rapidly growing frontier be preserved to give the older settlements a check on the radicalism of the new, or should the American theory of representation be carried to its logical extreme? Should support of churches or any particular church be enjoined on the people? How far should the ideas of the new order, the rights of man, equality, and so on, be enshrined in the new structures? Last, but not least, how should the new constitutions and governments be framed? Was popular assent to them a necessary form? Were the existing Revolutionary congresses in the various States competent to frame them, or must special conventions be elected by the people? All these questions demanded solution.

Problems of state constitutions

In some cases it was possible to postpone the issue to the next generation. Rhode Island and Connecticut under their colonial charters had been practically self-governing. With British admiralty and customs abolished, and appeals to British courts no longer taken, all former manifestations of imperial authority in the two colonies were gone. Thus Connecticut to the year 1818 retained her charter, and under it a government of restricted suffrage, with public maintenance of divine worship. Rhode Island retained her charter until 1842 when its glaring unfitness for the America of the nineteenth century at length compelled its revision.

Rhode Island and Connecticut

New Hampshire and South Carolina were the first to improvise constitutions. In each case, acting by advice of the Continental Congress, in the winter of 1776, a provincial congress formed a provisional government, and, without referring the matter to popular vote, assumed the place of a lower house of assembly in the new régime. But these first essays in state government came before the

New Hampshire and South Carolina

idea of reconciliation with Great Britain had definitely passed, and hence were only tentative. New Hampshire retained this form of government until 1784, when she replaced it by one modeled on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. In 1778 South Carolina adopted a definitive constitution; by permanent overrepresentation of the lower parishes, it riveted tidewater control upon the State for almost a century, and by high property qualifications for the franchise and for office holding it created the aristocratic government that survived to the Civil War.

John Adams on state constitutions

In the formative days of 1775–1776 John Adams of Massachusetts, from his place in the Continental Congress, expressed most clearly the theories and ideals of the new constitutions. In a series of writings he outlined what he considered the ideal form of state government, not too dissimilar from what we have to-day. A governor with appointive power and veto was to be elected by the Assembly, the lower house of Assembly was to be elected by the people, and an upper house appointed by the lower. This of course was in part an adaptation of old local experience; such experience of course had its influence in State after State. But the formulation was new. New also was the proposition that such frames of government must be drawn by specially elected conventions and submitted for popular approval in order that the document might have a higher sanction than that of ordinary acts of the legislature.

In their entirety Adams' ideas were not carried out until the framing and adoption of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, his own handiwork. But his writings had their influence in the spring and summer of 1776. On May 10 Congress passed his resolution that States without a permanent constitution should frame one. State after State, as it instructed its delegates in Congress to vote for independence, set about framing a new fundamental law for its government. Most typical of these essays, embodying the classic formulation of the principles of civil liberty involved in the Revolution, is the Virginia Constitution of 1776.

Congress directs the states to establish constitutions

The Congress of Virginia began to frame her constitution on

May 15, and adopted it on June 29 without a prior reference to the people. The men actively concerned were Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee, R. C. Nicholas, James Madison, and above all George Mason, the actual draftsman of the document. Adams was in close touch with the Virginians but the constitution did not altogether follow his ideas. The governor, possessed of but narrow powers, was annually elected by joint ballot of the legislature, both houses of which were elected by the people under a fifty-acre suffrage qualification. By apportioning representatives equally among the counties, the small, thinly settled tidewater counties were given an undue weight in affairs which they retained until the Civil War.

Virginia

The great contribution of the Virginia Constitution was its long Bill of Rights. The name was borrowed from the document in which the English Convention Parliament of 1689 had vindicated the national rights infringed by James II; the Virginia Bill is a statement of the rights of individual liberty dear to the Anglo-Saxon. Trial by jury, prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments and of general search warrants, freedom of the press, subjection of the military to the civil power, the origin of authority in the people, and their inherent right at all times to reform their government, the separation of judicial, legislative, and executive power, full religious freedom: these were the outstanding securities in a document which served as a model from end to end of the nation.

Virginia's Bill of Rights

Jefferson returned to Virginia in 1776 to push legislation through the Assembly to put in practice the principles of George Mason's Bill of Rights. Supported by Mason, Wythe, and Madison, he secured an act abolishing the entail of landed estates to the oldest son, and began the disestablishment of the Anglican Church, a process which was not fully accomplished until the close of the Revolution. He would have been glad to attack negro slavery also, but that offered too little prospect of success and too great danger of overturning the radical program altogether. Jefferson here stands out sharply as the radical democrat, intent on schemes of far-

Jefferson and constructive legislation in Virginia

reaching social amelioration. Henry, the old doctrinaire advocate of liberty, stood neutral, while the aristocratic landholders and Anglicans opposed, as Jefferson and his lieutenants set about the translation of the Revolutionary ideals into practical measures of democracy and social betterment. In framing the Declaration of Independence Jefferson had been but the pen in the hand of the American party; in Virginia he stepped forward to lead the more liberal elements in that party in the path of democratic liberty.

Between democracy and aristocracy, between radicalism and conservatism the new constitutions swung back and forth. In Pennsylvania the calling of a convention, as well as the indorsement of independence, were stubbornly opposed until June, 1776, by a conservative Quaker, Anglican, and proprietary majority in the colonial legislature that clung obstinately to the old charter and the old order. Its leaders were men later prominent, Mifflin, Morris, James Wilson, and Dickinson. Franklin and McKean preached the need of change; when the people of Philadelphia openly demanded a congress, the Assembly gave way. When it adjourned on June 14, 1776, never to meet again, the old order ended. The convention which succeeded, elected by a small popular vote, was in the hands of the radicals. Its constitution partially followed certain theories of Franklin's with disastrous results. A plural executive, consisting of an elective council chosen every three years and a president annually elected by it, a legislature of one house, and a council of censors to inquire at seven-year intervals into defects in the constitution and violations of it, recall the doctrinaire tang of some of Penn's essays in government. They were atoned for by manhood suffrage, and a due representation of the frontier. The conservatives bitterly opposed the constitution, and did not submit to it for a year after its adoption. It was changed to a more conventional form in 1790. Delaware, and New Jersey, Pennsylvania's neighbors, also framed their constitutions in the summer of 1776.

Pennsylvania

In North Carolina the result was similar to that in Pennsylvania. There too in colonial days the west had been under-

represented. Its discontent had borne fruit in the Regulator outbreak of 1771 which the lower country assisted Governor Tryon in suppressing. The incident left bitterness behind it, and the sectional dispute cut across both the patriot and British parties. In 1776 the radicals in the North Carolina congress at first proposed to frame a constitution themselves. Finally they decided to call a special congress apportioned to represent fairly the upcountry. The congress and its constitution were radical. The governor, to be elected for one year and eligible for but three years in six, was shorn of authority. His power was described by an indignant member of the convention as power to sign a receipt for his salary. The judges held office during good behavior, the legislature was all powerful; the Anglican church was disestablished, and manhood or freehold suffrage was ordained.

North Carolina

In other States the balance inclined to the conservative side. Maryland under its proprietary government felt the harmful effects of British rule only in the Acts of Trade; she temporized with her proprietary governor to the very end. Her new constitution included a property qualification for the suffrage, and a senate, indirectly elected, with £1000 property qualification; her governor must possess £5000.

Maryland

As might have been predicted, the forces of conservatism in New York kept their grasp on the province when it passed into a State. The fact that it was for years a battleground, and that its chief city remained in British hands until the end of the war made its governor, George Clinton, almost a military leader, and delayed the constitution's completion until 1777. The New York constitution was drawn by John Jay, Gouverneur Morris, and R. R. Livingston. It established property qualifications for the franchise, £20 freehold for a vote for assemblyman, and £100 freehold for a vote for governor or senator. In 1790 it was estimated that of 13,000 adult males in New York City only one in ten could vote for governor. For election of senators the State was divided into four districts. Appointments, state and local, were in the hands of a council of appointment con-

New York

sisting of the governor and four senators chosen by the legislature; the veto power was intrusted to a Council of Revision consisting of the governor, chancellor, and judges of the Supreme Court. As in but few other States, the judiciary was left independent. Jay had drawn a landholder's constitution. It perpetuated the feuds of the great families of the provincial period by providing in the Council of Appointment the machinery by which they might ensconce their adherents in office. Before the constitution was changed in 1821–1823 it had nurtured a régime of political party management through spoils that was destined to extend into national politics.

Massachusetts essays at constitution-making

As has already been said, the period of constitution making reaches its climax in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. In 1775 the province had elected to go on under its charter, without a governor, and with a council elected by the lower house. In 1777 the General Court set itself to draw up a constitution, in spite of the popular feeling that a convention especially elected should do the work. The resulting instrument was beaten by an overwhelming popular majority. In 1779 a constitutional convention was elected which adopted a constitution largely of John Adams' authorship. It was referred back to the town meetings, and voted on by them clause by clause; the convention tabulated the result of the votes, standing ready to alter the document where a majority disapproved it.

The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780

As finally adopted the governor had the veto and appointing power and was popularly elected. The lower house contained one or more members from each town; the upper house was apportioned according to the assessment of taxes; the judges were appointed by the executive to hold during good behavior. "The Constitution of 1780 was a lawyers' and merchants' constitution, directed toward something like quarter-deck efficiency in government, and the protection of property against democratic pirates."

In such manner was the problem of local government solved in the course of the Revolution, partly on the basis of past ex-



A
NEW
and
CORRECT MAP
of
NORTH AMERICA

1777

perience, partly on distaste for the old colonial system, partly by the employment of those principles of liberty which the discussion of the years before 1776 had emphasized. Yet this was but the easiest part of the problem. Vigorous criticism of the British rulers had engendered a dislike of central government. With some persons government and liberty had come to be contradictory terms. Things were sure to go ill, until men generally could realize that the thirteen States must have a federal government that could deal with foreign affairs, trade regulation, defense, and Indian agency, as the British ministry and Parliament had previously done, and that such a government must have powers similar to those which the British had claimed, only exercising them more wisely and with definite constitutional restraints.

Problems of central government

The first Continental Congresses had exercised, it is true, very wide powers; they had raised armies, levied taxes and borrowed funds for their support, printed money, entered into treaties with foreign nations, and, considering that they had no charter of authority, they had done all these things with amazing vigor and success. They had accomplished what they did because their members were the leaders of the American party in the various colonies. When they transmitted orders to the provinces, the controlling element in each province heard the voice of its chief and obeyed. Of course some weakness existed. In a moment of indignation Jay once declared, "In the Congress of Confederation there was as much intrigue as in the Vatican and as much privacy as in a girl's boarding school."

Early authority of the Continental Congress

The central government, however, grew weaker and weaker. The leaders left it to undertake commands in the army, foreign missions, or work in their own States. Second-rate men succeeded them who could not command their parties. Petty cliques and jealousies both in Congress and the States hindered efficiency. The people grew weary of obeying requisitions for men and money when they could see no need for them near at hand. The rise of Washington's per-

Decline of Congress' prestige

sonal influence could not replace the decline of the authority of Congress.

The first attempt to supplement personal by institutional authority made no improvement. On June 11, 1776, Congress had resolved to draw up the form of a confederation between the colonies. A plan drawn up by Dickinson was reported on July 12, and finally adopted, November 15, 1777. The Articles of Confederation were ratified by eleven States in 1778, by Delaware in 1779, and by Maryland in 1781.

The Articles of Confederation

The Articles especially reserved to each State its sovereignty and all powers not expressly delegated to Congress. They provided for state delegations in Congress, no man to sit more than three years in six; each state delegation to cast one vote. They forbade diplomatic relations between the States or between States and foreign powers, or state armaments, save with the consent of Congress. Requisitions were to be levied by the United States on the States on the basis of their land values, to be raised by the state legislatures as they saw fit. Congress was to establish courts out of its own body for settling controversies between the States. Congress could maintain foreign relations, strike coin, fix weights and measures, establish post offices, and appoint military officers above the grade of colonel. In time of war it could apportion to the States the quotas of men they were to raise and to equip at the expense of the federal treasury. Questions of war and peace, alliances, taxation, levy of forces, and so on, were to be decided only on the assent of the delegations of nine States. With the consent of less than a majority of the States Congress could only adjourn from day to day. When Congress was not sitting it could delegate executive authority to a committee composed of one member from each State, called a committee of the States.

Provisions of the Articles

Perhaps as far as powers allotted to Congress were concerned, the Articles were not at fault. Could Congress have exercised the powers assigned to it, could Congress even have maintained a quorum to exercise them, the instrument might have worked.

But States found the pay of their members in Congress expensive, members found attendance burdensome, and for long periods state delegations were incomplete and no quorum of States in Congress could be convened for business. Further the States very often ignored the requisitions of Congress for men and money. Local jealousy, distrust of other States and of their influence in Congress, fear of outraging local opinion by unpopular levies, all were sufficient reasons for ignoring the demands of Congress.

Shortcomings of the Articles

So from 1780 to 1787 Congress drifted along, borrowing money abroad when it could not raise it at home, and unable even to pay the interest. No foreign nation thought treaties worth while with a power that could not enforce them on its citizens. Congress failed to enforce the provisions of the Treaty of 1783 on the States, and Great Britain seized the pretext to refuse to fulfill its obligations by the surrender of the western posts, north of the Ohio. In 1781 and 1783 Congress appealed to the States for power to levy imposts on imports. A single State, Rhode Island, defeated the first proposal; four States vetoed the second. The weakness of Congress before the army disbanded was apparent in its inability to pay the troops. When it promised the officers half pay for life, the States rejected as an outrage this dole to the men who fought the Revolution. The army, disgusted with the feeble Congress, in 1783 almost reached the point of a coup d'état to erect a stronger government. Only Washington's influence checked it.

Weakness of the Confederation

The west and the frontier more than the east demanded regulation. There were outlying settlements, a small one west of the mountains in Tennessee, a larger one in the Virginia county that is the present State of Kentucky. In the present State of Vermont were New Englanders who claimed independence of both New York and New Hampshire, and coquetted with Canada for the sake of a trade egress from Lake Champlain by the St. Lawrence. These settlements were bound to the other States by ties of blood, language, and ideals, rather than by the closer bonds of law. Vermont and Kentucky were

The frontier communities

scenes of British intrigue, Tennessee and Kentucky of Spanish. The Spaniards, dreading the westward push of the lawless frontier element, hoped to bring it under Spanish rule, to teach it docility, and to prevent it from corrupting Spanish subjects in Florida and Louisiana.

Spanish intrigue

The western territory's economic life depended for the free disposal of its goods on an outlet by the Mississippi to New Orleans; but Spain obstinately refused to accord the United States by treaty a free navigation of the river. This she hoped to use as a bait to lure the Kentucky and Tennessee frontiersmen under her influence. For other arguments, she used bribes to influential westerners like James Wilkinson, and intermittently turned on the southern settlements the lash of the great Indian tribes of the southwest. Both Kentucky and Tennessee were restive under their formal connection with Virginia and North Carolina, and were ready to consider a change.

British activity in the west

Beyond the lakes in Canada the British spun their webs of intrigue over American territory. Determined to hold the fur trade of the region, and with it the control of the Indian tribes as a shield of defense against the United States in time of war, Great Britain seized the pretext that the States had thrown obstacles in the way of recovery of British debts, and retained the western posts, keys of all the territory on the Great Lakes. The push of settlements by frontiersmen northwest of the Ohio, and ill-advised cession treaties negotiated with tribal minorities threw the Indians into the arms of the British. As additional advantages, the British counted on support in Kentucky or Vermont in case of difficulty with Spain or the United States.

The western problem and Congress

And yet the problem of the west had been tossed into the lap of Congress simply because it was one on which the States could not trust each other. Jealousy of the vast western territorial claims of States like Virginia, had led Maryland to refuse ratification of the Articles of Confederation until she felt assured that all claims to the west would be pooled for the benefit of the States as a whole. Virginia had excepted Kentucky from her deed of cession; but by 1784 the sur-


DENSITY of POPULATION
in 1790
87°
82°
77°
72°
67°
45°
40°
35°
30°
25°
Under 2 inhabitants per square mile
2 to 6 " " " "
6 to 18 " " " "
18 to 45 " " " "
45 to 90 " " " "
Over 90 " " " "

render of state titles to the territory northwest of the Ohio had imposed on Congress the task of devising an organization for it. The very nature of things was forcing new powers upon the central authority.

Essentially, the problem was to allow free government in the new settlements in the northwest, and at the same time to retain a general control over them. Already the point was settled that the territory was ultimately to be made into States equal with the original thirteen. In 1784 Jefferson reported to Congress an ordinance by which such States could organize themselves in the western country and seek admission to the Union. His draft excluded slavery south as well as north of the Ohio after 1800. Repeatedly revised and amended, the ordinance came up for a final reconsideration in 1787 when a little group of New England ex-soldiers, the Ohio Company, proposed to buy land of Congress and to found a colony in the northwest. Such a settlement with New England ideas of government, order, and social subordination, promised to be a fulcrum for the exertion of authority over the lawless elements already moving north of the Ohio in defiance of regulations. Congress therefore hastily adopted an amended Northwest Ordinance on July 13, 1787, which was the basis of the system by which the United States was to expand its political organization across the continent.

Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787

By the Ordinance, the territory in its first stage was to be governed by a governor and judges appointed by Congress, who legislated by adopting laws from the codes of the original thirteen States. Once it had 5,000 inhabitants, it might elect a lower house which in coöperation with Congress and the governor chose a council or upper house. It also was entitled to a delegate in Congress who could speak but not vote. When there were 60,000 inhabitants in any one of five State divisions laid out in the territory, the State in question was to be admitted to the Union. Certain guarantees of liberty were added to the Ordinance, with a declaration in favor of religion and education, and a prohibition of the further introduction of slavery. No

Provisions of the Ordinance

better organization of the west could have been devised; but before it could be put into effect Congress must have real power.

By 1787, from every channel forces were flowing together to bring about an increase of the powers of the central government.

Need of a stronger government

There were not only the needs of trade regulation and of the west, not only the need of creating a body that could speak with authority in dealing with foreign nations. So long as New Jersey and Connecticut were dependent on the harbor of Manhattan, a certain federal control of it was essential if these States were not also to become politically dependent on New York. The need of establishing roads and canals as channels of trade to the west and between the colonies pointed to the need of a central authority. The foreign and domestic debts of the United States, if they were not to be repudiated, must be funded.

Moreover, to the conservative classes there seemed danger lest the lower orders engulf the governments of individual States and endanger property. During the Revolution, thanks to the feverish effect of war, there had been a specious prosperity. The conclusion of peace had seen an influx of British goods, lavish buying, lavish incurring of debt, and lavish mortgaging of farms and businesses. Then came a period of reaction as after every war, with hard times, contraction of credit, foreclosure of mortgages, distress and imprisonment of debtors. New England especially suffered because the treaty of peace cut off her trade with the British West Indies in foodstuffs and lumber; and for a time the French withdrew the special trade privileges accorded America during the war. As in the days of 1765, the distress of the shipping interest was the distress of all New England. Remembering the easy days of the war when debts could be paid in the omnipresent paper money, in State after State the poorer classes called with effect for an issue of legal tender currency. In Rhode Island the legislature issued it, and passed laws requiring creditors to accept it. In Massachusetts the General Court resisted the demand; in 1786 an insurrection known as Shays's Rebellion broke out in the western part of the State. Governor Bowdoin suppressed it with a strong hand and at the

Paper money

next election saw himself replaced by the supple John Hancock. The conservatives among the men who had fought the Revolution had reached the point of striking hands with elements, loyalist or neutral, whose pecuniary interests prompted the establishment of a check on radicalism.

Under such circumstances it is not strange that an attempt at coöperation between Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania for improvement of a route to the west led to a convention called at Annapolis for September, 1786, to consider a uniform system of commercial regulations among the States; and that meeting led to the call of a convention at Philadelphia, for May, 1787, to propose alterations in the federal government. The Congress sanctioned a convention for the time and place to revise the Articles of Confederation by reporting necessary alterations to render them adequate. All the States save Rhode Island sent delegates.

Evolution of the Philadelphia Convention

At the Convention of 1787, Washington, who served as president, and Franklin were the chief representatives of the older political generation. Both were active in moderating and composing disagreements rather than in the actual framing of the Constitution. The early work of the Convention centered around the Virginia delegation, which beside Washington included Edmund Randolph, George Mason, and James Madison. They speedily drew in to their group Gouverneur Morris, and James Wilson of Pennsylvania and Rufus King of Massachusetts. At the first organization of the Convention they were ready with a plan of constitutional reform known variously as the "Large State," "Virginia," or "Randolph Plan."

The Virginia delegation

This proposal swept aside any attempt to remold the Articles of Confederation, and traced the outlines of a strong national government beside which the hitherto autonomous States would shrink to minor proportions. It provided for a national legislature, the upper house elected by the lower, the lower house elected by the States in proportion to population or to federal taxation. It created a national executive and a national judiciary competent to enforce by judicial means the

The Virginia Plan

due powers of the federal government. It prescribed an oath to support the national Constitution to be taken by state officials, and empowered the national legislature to negative all state laws contravening the Constitution, and even to call out the militia of the Union against a delinquent State. A set of resolutions was pushed through the convention embodying the salient points of the Virginia Plan.

So long as the principle of nationalism was emphasized no strong opposition was encountered. But once the question of representative apportionment arose a powerful Small-State party took form. The States large in territory or population, Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, looked with complacence on a strong government in which they were represented according to weight. In any other they feared the small States "would put their hands into the pockets of the large States." But the weaker and smaller States feared the mass of the great States would crush them. Over the question of representation the storm broke. The smaller States yielded proportional representation in the lower house seven to three, Connecticut here voting with the majority; but on proportional representation in the upper house she changed sides and the measure was carried six to five.

The Small-State party in the Convention

At this point Paterson of New Jersey introduced the so-called "Small State" or "New Jersey Plan" which avowedly comprised what the Convention had been called to frame, an amendment to the Articles of Confederation. Undoubtedly the amendments would have given the Articles new life. They allowed Congress to regulate trade and levy duties, to lay requisitions on the States, and if necessary collect them itself; if need be it could call forth the force of the States against a State opposing the execution of federal acts or treaties. More significant still, the New Jersey Plan made the acts of Congress the supreme law of the States, thereby imposing on state judiciaries the duty of its enforcement. Between the Paterson Plan and the Randolph Plan lay the question as to whether state

The Paterson Plan

sovereignty was to survive unchecked, though guided by an efficient confederate assembly, or whether a part of the state sovereignty should be vested in a national government. The Paterson Plan was dropped by a vote of seven to three, Connecticut again voting with the majority. The Large-State men here acquiesced in the striking of the word "national" from their plan. The word did not matter if they had the thing.

A new federal system adopted by a vote of six States to five would be worth little; the minority must be measurably satisfied and reconciled to the scheme. At this point the Connecticut delegation, Roger Sherman, William S. Johnson and Oliver Ellsworth, the ablest of the Small-State leaders, brought about a compromise between the Large- and Small-State groups. Essentially it was that representation in the lower house should be by population, and in the upper should be by States. On July 5 this was proposed by a committee. The nationalist group protested against the limitation of the national idea and the introduction of the state entities, but on July 16 the small States had their way.

The Connecticut Compromise

From this point details and not general principles had to be considered. The election of two senators from each State was intrusted to the state legislatures. In spite of misgivings of men who profoundly distrusted the people, the lower branch of the legislature was to be elected in each State by persons competent to vote for the lower house of its state legislature; this for most States in 1787 was far, indeed, from universal manhood suffrage. As to the choice of the executive or president, the Convention changed its mind again and again. At first it was supposed that he would be elected by the national legislature; but if he were not made ineligible for re-election, and his experience thus lost to the public, how could he be prevented from being the creature of the legislature? Did the people have wisdom to choose their executive by popular vote? Would not their vote be divided among a number of men, the voters of each State voting for their most popular fellow citizen, and the largest State or States thus carrying their candidate?

Choice of Congress and the President

Finally it was decided that the president should be chosen by electors proportional to state representation in Congress; that the electors in each State should vote for two men, not specifying which should be president and which vice president; in case no man had a majority, the House of Representatives, each state delegation casting one vote, should choose. The dual vote of each elector, tending to scatter the votes, and the provision for election in the House were concessions to the small States. The Convention seemed to think that in most cases the election would go to the House, and that, in effect, the large States would nominate five candidates, and the small States choose one of them.

The Electoral College

One group of compromises was framed between north and south. In calculating federal ratios of representation the southern States were allowed to count three-fifths of their slaves; the slave trade could not be abolished by Congress before the year 1808. Fugitive slaves escaping from one State to another could be reclaimed.

Compromises between north and south

There remained the question of the enforcement of the lawful acts of the government. Various schemes had been proposed, a negative by Congress on all state acts contravening the constitution, the use of military force against recalcitrant States; both were abandoned because they seemed to bring the federal government into collision with state governments. A truer solution was found in the theory that the newly created government, being national, could act on individual citizens; thus each citizen would owe a personal allegiance to his state government and to his national government as well; thus the new government must, like any government, enforce its lawful decrees on individual citizens. To this end state officials and legislatures were required to take an oath supporting the federal Constitution. Above all, the Constitution and all laws and treaties made in accord with it were declared to be the supreme law of the land, and as such enforcible by state courts against state acts or constitutions contravening them.

The law of the land

Here at length stood fully revealed the Puritan principle of

the supremacy of law,—the idea dimly hovering in Anglo-Saxon minds, still new in the seventeenth century, that a government should enforce its decrees on its citizens by the same courts by which its citizens enforce their rights on each other. It was an English judge servile to royal authority who had said that there was "a Rule of Law and a Rule of Government, and that many things that might not be done by the Rule of Law, might be done by the Rule of Government." That idea was definitely discarded from American political thought when the rule of law was made the rule of government.

Supremacy of law

Implicit in this is the corollary that the government of the United States must walk according to the law; that it must be content with powers expressly or impliedly bestowed on it, and must, eschewing all other powers, accomplish its ends with them. It was to be, to borrow the words of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, "a government of laws and not of men." The makers of the American Revolution had risen against the imperial government of Great Britain because it disregarded what they thought constitutional limitations on its powers; in framing their own national government they set above it the law of the land as a supreme constitution.

The Constitution a rule to the government

In this connection the federal judiciary may be considered. It was sketched briefly; a Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress should establish, the judges holding office by good behavior. Their jurisdiction reached cases arising under the Constitution or federal laws and treaties, controversies between States, and cases between citizens of different States or citizens and aliens. Except in a few cases the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was appellate only. The right it later assumed of declaring null and void acts of Congress contrary to the Constitution was not expressly foreseen. Clear-thinking men might very well have expected that in a question of conflict of laws, it, as well as the state courts, would accept the dictum that the Constitution was the supreme law of the land, and accordingly throw out any lesser enactment that contravened it.

The federal judiciary

The question as to the exact relations in which the framers of the Constitution had left the States, the state governments and the federal government, was later to be so clouded as to be cleared only by the arbitrament of arms. In case one holds with the political scientists of the nineteenth century that sovereignty—the right to recognize no superior who can bind one's will save by force—is indivisible, one must admit that the States were sovereign under the Articles of Confederation and remained sovereign under the Constitution until a civil war subdued a part of them to a national government. But the eighteenth century did not think of sovereignty as an indivisible thing. Admitting it could be divided, the federal Constitution sanctioned a division of it between State and nation, a division of the exercise of its powers between state and federal governments. Both State and nation were sovereign each in its sphere; each for certain purposes of government exercised certain powers without conflict on each individual citizen. The system was as Madison admitted, neither federal nor national; it partook of the characteristics of both. Fifteen years before, the Massachusetts General Court had asked of Governor Hutchinson why two supreme legislatures could not exist in the same empire if they did not clash. One of the ablest of the members of the Philadelphia Convention believed the Massachusetts proposition was the essence of the Constitution.

The central government and the states

It is interesting to contrast the almost sacred character we ascribe to the Constitution to-day, with the opinions its framers had of it; for a knowledge of their attitude we are mainly indebted to the full notes of the Convention's debates kept by James Madison. Speaking under the pledge of secrecy in the Convention men of ability spoke their minds freely. Many of them feared the final establishment of monarchical government in the United States, and regarded the Constitution only as the best stop-gap that could be agreed to. Several members of the Convention left in disgust before its work was done or refused to sign. Some like Yates and Lansing of New York, or Luther Martin of Maryland, disliked it because they

What the framers thought of their work

thought it swallowed up the sovereignty of the States in a consolidated government. Some like Alexander Hamilton disapproved because it was too weak. It perfectly satisfied only a few.

Once completed the Constitution was submitted to Congress which referred it to conventions in the States; on ratification by three-fourths of the States it was to go into effect among the States ratifying it. By January 9, 1788, Delaware, New Jersey, Georgia, and Connecticut had all ratified without serious opposition. But elsewhere a hard battle had to be waged for it. In the first place, the creation of so strong a national government aroused in men like Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee, and Samuel Adams, a dread lest local self-direction be swallowed up in central control. Western interests disliked the strength of the federal government and feared that the treaty-making power vested in the president and two-thirds of the Senate might admit the closure of the Mississippi by Spain. The debtor class objected to the prohibition on state emissions of paper money. Men imbued with the revolutionary philosophy objected to the absence of a bill of rights. Furthermore it must be admitted that except for Wilson and Madison the framers of the Constitution had but a qualified trust in democracy, and had built a strong edifice of government, only one branch in four of which depended on popular election.

Opposition to the Constitution

On these grounds in State after State a fight was made. In Pennsylvania the "Federalists" had a majority and carried ratification in December, 1787. In Massachusetts a majority of the delegates opposed it, and had to be won over by argument, while Hancock's powerful influence was secured by appeals to his vanity and ambition. In New Hampshire too a majority opposed it, only as in other things to follow Massachusetts' example in the end. Maryland and South Carolina had previously ratified without difficulty in April and May of 1788.

Massachusetts and New Hampshire

In Virginia and New York occurred the fiercest battles. Virginia's opposition included Henry, R. H. Lee, and George Mason; yet Madison and the young John Marshall won ratification

June 25, 1788, by 89 to 79 votes. In New York the Clinton faction opposed for a long time the strong Federalist group in New York City. Hamilton, Madison, and Jay prepared for the newspapers a series of articles defending the Constitution. Among the floods of similar writings pro and con, these, under the name of *The Federalist*, have survived as the classic exposition of the intentions of the framers. In the New York Convention Hamilton finally won his fight 30 to 27, partly because nine States had already ratified. North Carolina postponed ratification and Rhode Island defeated it; they finally acceded to the union in 1789 and 1790, respectively. Among the eleven States that first ratified, the Constitution went into effect.

Virginia and New York

In several of the Conventions the anti-Federalist group offered amendments in the form of a Bill of Rights. A selection of twelve of these was afterward offered by the Congress to the States; ten were accepted and form the first ten Amendments. Meanwhile the new Constitution was about to go into effect with the choice of electors to vote for president, and of senators and representatives to sit in Congress. On the interpretation these men put on the Constitution, on the molds in which they formed the government, depended the settlement of many questions only less important than those the Philadelphia Convention had already answered.

The Constitution in operation

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

J. B. McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States*, vol. I. New York, 1883.
A. Nevins, *The American States During and After the Revolution.* New York, 1924.
B. A. Hinsdale, *The Old Northwest.* New York, 1899. (Revised edition.)
J. Winsor, *The Westward Movement.* Boston, 1897.
J. T. Adams, *New England in the Republic, 1776–1850.* Boston, 1926.
A. J. Beveridge, *The Life of John Marshall*, vol. I. Boston, 1916.
C. A. Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States.* New York, 1913.
S. E. Morison, *Maritime History of Massachusetts, 1783–1860.* New York, 1921.
E. Channing, *A History of the United States*, vol. III. New York, 1912.
A. C. McLaughlin, *The Confederation and the Constitution* (*American Nation*, vol. X). New York, 1905.

CHAPTER XIII

THE FEDERALIST ADMINISTRATIONS

On July 2, 1788, the president of the Congress of the Confederation announced that the Constitution had at length been accepted by the required number of States and hence went into operation between the States so ratifying. Congress, accordingly, prescribed the choice of presidential electors, the election of the Senate and House of Representatives of the new Congress to meet at New York the first Wednesday of March, 1789; and then it faded out of existence. Members absented themselves until a quorum of States could no longer be kept up. The rudimentary government under Congress functioned, but that was all.

The Confederation fades out

As had been foreseen, every presidential elector cast one of his votes for George Washington; the second votes were scattered among many candidates, but John Adams of Massachusetts was second to Washington in number of votes and became vice president. Wretched roads, swollen rivers, and cross winds made travel by land or sea uncertain and excused unpunctuality; it was April 6 before a majority of both houses had convened at New York and could go through the prescribed formality of counting the electoral votes, and notifying president and vice president of their election. On April 30, Washington was inaugurated.

The new government

To organize the new government under the Constitution, the enactment of laws and the establishment of administrative procedures were necessary. The Congress passed an act levying customs duties to raise a revenue; mercantile interests in House and Senate delayed enactment until ships in which they were interested could reach port and land their cargoes without paying duty. Further, Congress created by a series of acts the departments of Foreign Affairs or State, War, and Treas-

Basic legislation

ury, each with a secretary. It passed a Judiciary Act creating a Supreme Court consisting of a chief justice and five associate justices, who were to hold four circuit courts in combination with thirteen federal judges of district courts. The act created also the office of Attorney-General.

The various parts of government had to find their true functions, and their relations to other parts as well. The twenty-two senators aspired now to be a sort of council to the president, now to be an upper house of the legislature, exhibiting to the lower house the superiority of position which in England the House of Lords bears to the House of Commons. Until 1794 the Senate's sessions were secret and its debates not reported. A system of having the secretaries report directly to the houses of Congress failed to develop. The president, by taking them for his advisers and seeking their opinions jointly and severally, created the cabinet as we know it to-day.

Relations of the parts of government to each other

Questions of form assumed high importance. One of the first senators, William Maclay of Pennsylvania, has recorded in his diary with acid humor the perturbations of the Senate as to titles of honor and outward forms of ceremony and precedence. Washington would perhaps have liked, and some would have liked him to have, such titles and outward dignities as ornamented a hereditary stadtholder. Actually he copied the forms of the British kingship so far as he could. In delivering his messages to Congress he couched them in the form of a British monarch's speech from the throne. In his levees, where ladies and gentlemen approached him to make their bows, and then ranged themselves around the hall while he made the circuit saying a gracious word to each and finally taking a formal leave, he followed the ceremony observed at the Court of St. James. Here the resemblance stopped, but even the modest ceremonies of the Republican court had for many a "squinting to monarchy," a regal tendency which they feared would ultimately be imitated by political institutions.

Titles and ceremonies

The most important work of the first years of the federal Constitution was the regeneration of the finances. Alexander Hamilton,

secretary of the treasury, worked out his financial proposals in a series of reports to Congress. Most important were his decisions as to the debt. Of this there was in face value almost twelve millions owed abroad, and forty-two millions owed at home, depreciated for default of interest to twenty or twenty-five cents on the dollar. A cautious financier would have tried to buy it in, or refund it at the depreciated figure; but Hamilton proposed to refund it at par, two-thirds to bear six per cent interest at once, and the remainder after 1800—the deferred interest itself bearing interest at three per cent. He planned to retire no more than two per cent a year, thereby making United States stock at a single stroke a gilt-edged investment worth par and higher. Further, he planned to assume and fund similarly some twenty-two millions of debts incurred by the States in the cause of independence.

Hamilton's financial policy

Congress adopted these proposals. James Madison, who had hitherto been the administration's spokesman in the House of Representatives, was impressed with the injustice of paying the domestic debt in full to such present holders as had bought it at a discount from men who had received it for services or supplies to the Revolution and had been compelled to let it go for a portion of its face value in cash. He proposed to pay to the original holders the difference between the market value of the securities at the time Hamilton's scheme was announced, and their par value. This proposal did honor to the heart of the man who offered it; but financial experts showed that original holders could not be traced, and that the provision would throw the whole scheme into confusion. The speculators were left with the full rewards of their foresight.

The funding system adopted

On assumption of state debts there was a harder struggle. That assumption would diminish the importance of the States and increase that of the federal government was an argument against the measure for those who favored states' rights, as with Hamilton it was a reason for it. Generally the northern States which had heavy debts favored assumption, and the southern ones, Virginia especially,

Assumption of state debts: The federal capital

which had financed the war with floods of paper currency long since invested in state lands or depreciated to zero, opposed it. The southerners at first defeated the proposal in the House. Hamilton finally secured its passage by a bargain with Jefferson as to the location of the federal capital. Sectional interests had contended over this, being generally divided between a location somewhere in Pennsylvania, and one on the Potomac. Jefferson agreed to find enough southern votes to pass the assumption measure; and an act was passed locating the national capital for ten years at Philadelphia, and then in a tract ten miles square on the Potomac River.

The sinking fund and the excise

Several other features developed in Hamilton's scheme. For the reduction of the debt he used a device known as a sinking fund. Certain sums of money were to be used to buy up parts of the outstanding obligations; the interest on them was to be credited to the fund and used from time to time to buy more. On paper the scheme affords a way of ultimately paying a large debt with a very small sum; in practice, as in this case, it generally fails to work. To find additional revenue for his schemes, Hamilton proposed December 13, 1790, the levy by Congress of an excise tax on the distilling of liquors. This bore heavily on the men of the frontier who found their only means of getting crops over bad roads to eastern markets was in the condensed form of whisky and brandy. The tax produced an uprising in western Pennsylvania which Hamilton welcomed because its suppression by eastern militia offered the opportunity of showing that the new government meant to enforce its decrees. Hamilton further outlined a plan for the sale of public lands to raise a revenue; but it bore no immediate fruit. To give dignity to the national authority, he proposed the establishment of a mint to strike a national currency, for the circulating medium was made up of the coins of a dozen different nations.

A more important essay toward the establishment of a currency was Hamilton's proposal for the establishment of a National Bank, made in December, 1790. As finally established, the Bank

had a capital of ten millions, one-fifth held by the United States government. It was the sole depository of United States funds; its notes were to be receivable for government dues. It was welcomed with enthusiasm by the moneyed classes, its stock was quickly subscribed, and during its existence of twenty years its dividends averaged eight and one-half per cent. The establishment of the Bank was bitterly contested in Congress. Out of the struggle emerged two great political parties, stretching from end to end of the nation, and representing fundamentally different economic interests, foreign policies and interpretations of the Constitution. The essence of each deserves consideration.

The Bank of the United States

Hamilton had frankly avowed as a very important end in his financial measures the attaching of the moneyed and conservative classes to the federal government. The investor in United States stock had seen his investment increase fourfold in value from Hamilton's policy; the Bank afforded him an additional safe and lucrative investment for his funds. Naturally he gave the Secretary and the government that thus increased his wealth his hearty support. He looked with complacence on the broadening and deepening of the powers of a national government that was so peculiarly responsive to the moneyed interests. He carried with him naturally the shopkeepers, tradesmen, and workmen dependent on him.

The government and the moneyed interests

Moreover, Hamilton's financial policy made him pro-British in foreign affairs. The greatest part of our foreign trade was with England; were it diminished the revenue to support the financial program would fail. Hence at all costs Hamilton advocated peace and good relations with Great Britain. After the outbreak of the French Revolution and the sweeping away of organized Christianity in France, the influential churches of New England looked on Hamilton and England as bulwarks of religion, and redoubled their support of the Federalist party.

Hamilton's foreign policy

Of this party Hamilton was the most prominent figure, though not always the undisputed leader. Only thirty-two years old in

1789, his career had been meteoric. He was born in Nevis in the West Indies; his abilities were early recognized, and he was sent to King's College, later Columbia, in New York. There he took the side of the Revolution, entered the Continental army, and successively gained Washington's notice, friendship, and admiration. After the war, as lawyer and statesman he had been the firm advocate of vested interests and of a strong government. In the Philadelphia Convention he frankly avowed his preference for the British form of government, and his enemies professed to believe that his policy under the Constitution was directed to the establishment of a monarchy. Personally small in stature, quick, vivacious, he turned all the forces of his being on the end he had in view. A genius in finance, he saw most problems in their financial bearing. He was imperious and self-willed, could dominate all but the strongest men in personal contact with him, but never could touch or win popular imagination or respect. It was not surprising that in a moment of heat he called the people a "great beast." Government, though it might have a popular basis, he believed should be vested in an aristocracy of money and brains.

Alexander Hamilton the man

His critics, in the period when they were founding the Republican party, based their opposition on his financial policy. That it was intended to attract the moneyed classes to the support of a strong government appeared to them a sinister omen. Speculators had filled their pockets from Hamilton's financial schemes by dispatching swift vessels to remote parts of the country to buy up evidences of public indebtedness before the news of his policy should arrive. Many of the men who backed his schemes in Congress were financially interested in the debt and filled their pockets by their votes. The funding and assumption schemes had sent up to par the financial holdings of the north and its commercial and capitalist classes. The agricultural classes, especially in the south and west, would have to pay the bill in heavier taxes.

Criticism of Hamilton's financial policy

The new Republican party in its policy looked to the desires of the farmer and small landowner. Almost self-sufficing in that

day, he demanded that government do but few things for him, and resented elaborate political machinery and the taxation necessary for its support. The farmer could see no need for a strong, central government that could levy high taxes, establish great fiscal institutions and negotiate trade treaties with foreign powers, all for the benefit of merchants and townsmen. He adopted the point of view of the Republicans, who argued that the Constitution was a strict grant of power to the federal government, and was to be strictly construed.

The Republican party

Two theories of the Constitution had come into contrast in papers prepared for Washington, when considering the Bank bill, by Hamilton and Jefferson and Madison. The Virginians argued that the Bank was unconstitutional, because in the Constitution could be found no specific grant of authority to Congress to establish one. Hamilton argued that certain clauses in the Constitution, notably one authorizing Congress to use all means "necessary and proper" to carry out its duties of raising revenue and administering public funds, amply justified the exercise of power. More boldly he argued that by virtue of being a government, the government of the United States enjoyed certain powers beyond and above the letter of the Constitution. Here, on strict and loose construction, was a sharp line between Republican and Federalist.

Strict and loose construction

The Republican party gathered around the striking figure of Thomas Jefferson. Fourteen years older than Hamilton, he was in every way his opposite, tall and angular in frame, awkward in posture, sometimes, like Virginia gentlemen of his day, studiously careless in dress and unconventional in manner. Charming in personality, he won men rather than dominated them. No man in America had such wide interests, literary, scientific, and political; and he gained many a new political adherent by approaching him through tastes enjoyed in common. As a man of action, as governor of Virginia at the time of the British invasions, he had been a failure. But otherwise his career had been brilliant and useful. Spokesman of the Virginia upcountry on the eve of the Revolution, he had gone to Congress,

Thomas Jefferson

had drafted the Declaration of Independence, and had then returned to Virginia to translate the principles of the Revolution into social reforms. With an incurable optimism and faith in the capacity of mankind to perfect itself, he was the apostle of theories of democracy in government and social order. That virtue rested in the farming classes because of their independence of economic control, and that government should therefore rest on them; that government should be as near the governed as possible, strictly limited by the letter of the Constitution and subject to frequent revision and alteration by them; that appeals to the economic interests of foreign states by discriminating trade regulations are more potent than wars—such were the ideals that Jefferson pursued, with an opportunism that occasionally laid him open to the charge of shiftiness; but on them he ultimately united the farmers from the Savannah to the Merrimac.

The two parties, thus taking form on questions of domestic politics, took sides in foreign affairs. The Federalists espoused the side of England, the Republicans that of France. The French Revolution that had begun in 1789 had swept away all special privileges of the noblesse and the church; it had first limited the royal power, then abolished the monarchy and guillotined the monarch, in pursuance of the revolutionary formulas of liberty, fraternity, equality, and the rights of man. The monarchical powers of Continental Europe had leagued to suppress the French Republic. The outbreak of war between England and France in 1793 rendered supremely difficult the problem of American foreign relations, a problem which touched the affairs of tidewater and frontier alike.

The Republicans favor France

The presidential election of 1792 offered the two groups but a partial opportunity for a trial of strength. Both Hamilton and Jefferson had subsidized newspapers at Philadelphia in support of their parties. Washington, though not a Federalist, leaned generally to the side of Hamilton; his stately carriage offered a target to attack; and he came in for some sharp criticism from Jefferson's editor, Philip Freneau. The Republicans, however, were not likely to commit the mistake

The election of 1792

of running a candidate against Washington, who finally consented to serve a second term. Again his election was unanimous; but for the vice presidency George Clinton was put forward as Republican candidate and polled 50 votes to Adams' 77.

Before Washington was inaugurated for the second time, questions of foreign relations had become acute enough to bring to the fore the partisanship of Federalists and Republicans for England and France. England's restrictions on our trade with her, English aggressions on our commerce with France and her colonies, and English disregard of our rights in the northwest were bringing us close to a rupture with Great Britain; they were partly counteracted by the ill-advised efforts of Genêt, the French minister, to involve us in war on the side of France.

Foreign problems

First as to the northwest. There England had retained the frontier posts of Mackinac, Detroit, Fort Erie, Niagara, Oswego, Oswegatchie, Pointe-au-Fer, and Dutchman's Point, the two latter on Lake Champlain. Her pretext had been that the United States had not fulfilled the clauses of the treaty of 1783 that no obstacle should be put in the way of recovery of debts by English creditors and that proceedings against loyalists should cease. The Americans claimed that the treaty had first been violated by the removal of negro slaves who had fled to the British; and that the establishment of impartial federal courts had obviated all difficulties regarding the collection of just debts. But England's real motive in holding the posts was to keep control of the fur trade and the Indians of the northwest; for she feared that in American influence they might be used against Canada in a subsequent war. In a way the United States had played into her hands. Ill-advised cession treaties, covering all Ohio save the northern part, concluded in 1784, 1785, and 1789 with a part of the tribes concerned, had alarmed the Indians; the presence of white settlers beyond the Ohio where the Northwest Territory had been organized in 1788 provoked war parties and raids.

Great Britain retains the western posts

Great Britain and her Canadian governors hoped that difficulty with the Indians might compel the United States to submit to the

establishment of a permanent Indian buffer state in the northwest, a perpetual barrier to an attack on Canada. For a time they counted on disaffection in the outlying settlements of Vermont, Ohio, and Kentucky, frontiers that could make trouble for the federal government, or at least serve as the bases of a British attack on Spanish territory should England's demands on Spain lead to war. But by 1792 North Carolina and Rhode Island had acceded to the Union, and Kentucky and Vermont, freed from the galling claims of Virginia and New York, had become full-fledged States. Disaffection on the northern frontier was thenceforth a negligible factor.

British western policy

The Indians, however, remained; warlike, well led, supplied with arms and ammunition by British traders, they were a match for their own number of white troops. The American policy of raids on their villages had had no success. A campaign by General Harmar in 1790 resulted in a reverse. In 1791 General Arthur St. Clair led a force of ill-disciplined, ill-equipped troops and militia on an expedition to the headwaters of the Wabash, Maumee, and Miami Rivers in northwest Ohio. Its camp was stormed by the Indians, November 4, 1791, and complete disaster followed. Not fifty out of 1,400 escaped unwounded.

Indian reverses of the United States

The United States now set General Anthony Wayne to organizing and drilling a new army. Meanwhile it opened negotiations with the Indians for peace. The British agents artfully manipulated the tribes so as to make themselves mediators. In 1793 they prevented the American commissioners from meeting directly the tribes assembled near the present site of Toledo, themselves transmitting the proposals of either side. The Americans offered a large sum for a cession to cover their settlements in the northwest; but the Indians insisted that the whites should retire behind the Ohio. The negotiations broke off. Lord Dorchester, governor of Canada, in a speech made in February, 1794, told the Indians that war between the United States and Great Britain was likely, and in that event a new boundary line would be drawn by the warriors. In so doing

Negotiations with the Indians, 1793


THE UNITED STATES
1782 - 1792
Disputed Boundaries
CANADA
Grand Portage
Lake Superior
Lake Michigan
Lake Huron
Lake Erie
L. Ontario
CEDED BY VIRGINIA 1784
CLAIMED BY VA. AND MASS.
CEDED BY VIRGINIA 1784,
BY MASSACHUSETTS 1785
CLAIMED BY VA., CONN. & N.Y.
CEDED BY
N.Y. 1782; VA. 1784; CONN. 1786.
CEDED BY CONN. 1800
CLAIMED BY VIRGINIA AND NEW YORK
CEDED BY NEW YORK 1782,
VIRGINIA 1784
Ft. Niagara
DISPUTED BY
N.Y. AND MASS.
SETTLED 1786
CONFLICTING
CHARTER CLAIMS
BY PA. AND CONN.
NEW YORK
MASSACHUSETTS
NEW HAMP.
CONN.
PENNSYLVANIA
NEW JERSEY
MARYLAND
DEL.
St. Clair's defeat
Greenville
Ft. Harmar
Marietta
Pt. Pleasant
St. Louis
Vincennes
Kaskaskia
St. Chatres
VIRGINIA
KENTUCKY ADMITTED 1792
CEDED BY
NORTH CAROLINA 1790
NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTH CAROLINA
CEDED BY GEORGIA 1802
GEORGIA
DISPUTED BY
SPAIN AND GEORGIA
ADJUSTED 1795
CEDED BY GEORGIA 1802
Mississippi R.
Missouri R.
Ohio R.
Kentucky R.
Cumberland R.
Tennessee R.
Cumberland Gap
French Br.
Roanoke R.
James R.
St. Croix R.
ATLANTIC OCEAN
GULF OF MEXICO
95°
90°
85°
80°
75°
70°
50°
45°
40°
35°
30°
25°

he overstepped the policy of the British government, which had no desire for open war with the United States.

Wayne began the campaign of 1794 by a cautious march into the Indian country. He offered the tribes the choice of peace or war and then devastated their villages and cornfields in the Maumee Valley; a little above a British fort, newly erected there in 1794, he defeated a part of their force at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. The Indians were refused refuge in the fort and saw the houses and magazines of the British traders around it put to the torch by the Americans. The event dashed the British prestige among the Indians; the news of Jay's Treaty, and the sense of desertion by the British government, enabled Wayne in 1795 at a great tribal council at Greenville to extort a cession of southeastern Ohio and of tracts at the strategic portages throughout the northwest. The surrender of the posts in 1796 in accord with Jay's Treaty ended for a time the project of an Indian buffer state. Yet by the treaty British traders still came freely to the region, to monopolize the fur trade and to retain a consequent influence over the Indians despite the presence of American garrisons.

Wayne and the Treaty of Greenville

Long since the question of neutral trade had reached a temporary adjustment. After the Revolution England had treated the young republic in a cavalier fashion; she had neglected to accredit a minister to her or to make a treaty of commerce. Despite this, English goods and merchants, as before the Revolution, monopolized our markets. People were accustomed to English goods, and English merchants granted long credits. France was thus disappointed in her expectation of a market based on American gratitude for her assistance. In 1790 England took but one-half of America's exports and sent her nine-tenths of her imports. The American trade with England, too, was the most important single item of England's commerce.

America's English trade

Under these circumstances the British accorded the Americans such trade privileges as they saw fit. They permitted the export to England in American ships of such unmanufactured goods as English merchants could sell to the Continent as middlemen;

but they laid heavy discriminating port duties on American shipping. They allowed American foodstuffs to go to the British West Indies, but only in British vessels. An important employment for shipping of colonial days was thus cut off; and until Boston shipowners developed new and bolder trades to the Pacific Ocean, New England clamored for the recovery of the West India trade. Retaliatory legislation on British shipping before 1789 had failed to work because the States were not unanimous in it. In 1789 Madison had proposed discriminating tonnage duties against nations having no commercial treaties with the United States; but the Senate had stricken out the discriminatory provisions.

English commercial policy toward America

The proposal, however, caused the dispatch to New York from Canada of an informal agent of the British government, a certain Major Beckwith, who was admitted to terms of the greatest intimacy with Hamilton and others of his group; he was soon able to transmit reports of its pro-English sympathies. Hamilton indeed was afraid that any interference with the English trade would impair the customs revenue on which his financial schemes depended. Accordingly he continued in a confidential relation to Beckwith and to Hammond, British minister after 1791, letting them see that his policy was peace at any price, and discounting the bolder tone towards England taken by Madison, and by Jefferson as secretary of state.

English agents

Under the circumstances English statesmen might have gone on the supposition that their commercial policy and their policy in the northwest were not likely to bring the United States to extreme measures, had it not been for the outbreak of war with France in 1793. The French treaty with the United States of 1778 included a guarantee of the French West Indies; but this clause France did not invoke. The treaty also gave French privateers special privileges in case of war, and refused them to the nation with whom she was at war; and these clauses France, through her minister Genêt, planned to use. Hamilton tried to have the treaty disavowed on the ground that it was with the overthrown French monarchy and

The European war and America

not with the French people, but Washington's good sense rejected his proposal and framed a general proclamation of neutrality.

Meanwhile on April 8, 1793, the Citizen Edmond Genêt, French minister to the United States, had landed at Charleston, and had begun a triumphal progress northward amid the applause of the people who welcomed the birth of the French Republic and the formulas on which it was based. Genêt was the emissary of the Girondins, the most sentimental and least practical of all the groups who from time to time controlled the policy of the French Revolution; and he believed the popular enthusiasm would enable him to employ the United States as a base for war on England and Spain, sweeping Washington aside if he ventured to interfere. He commissioned privateers in American ports and permitted them to send back British prizes. With adventurers in the west like George Rogers Clark he planned expeditions against Florida and Louisiana.

Genêt

Washington speedily fathomed Genêt and concluded to give him rope enough to hang himself. He forbade the admission to American ports of British prizes taken by French privateers. When Genêt deceitfully armed one of them and sent her to sea, Washington took the opportunity to demand his recall; a threat to appeal from the president to the people completed the minister's downfall. The Girondins had fallen in France and their Jacobin opponents and successors were ready both to recall and guillotine him. Only Washington's refusal to allow his extradition saved him. He had accomplished little save temporarily to weaken Republican prestige and to assist the pro-British policy of the Federalists.

Recall of Genêt

Already the war had brought the United States into difficulties with the sea power of Great Britain. France, finding her navy inferior to that of her old rival, promptly threw open to neutral vessels the trade with the French West India islands and from them to Europe, although in time of peace she had reserved it for her own ships. England in June, 1793, therefore put in force the so-called Rule of War of 1756, that a neutral could not lawfully enjoy in war

English interference with American trade

a trade closed to it in peace. American vessels were seized in the West Indies, the crews stripped of their possessions, and the ships and cargoes condemned. On November 6, 1793, a supplementary order in council, aimed directly at the doctrine "free ships make free goods," written into American commercial policy, declared all neutral ships loaded with goods the property of Frenchmen to be good prize. American protests led to its modification on January 8, 1794, to embrace only American ships carrying French produce to Europe.

Danger of war with England, 1794

In spite of the Federalists and of Hamilton's influence everything seemed to threaten war with England in 1794—the failure of the Indian negotiations on the frontier, Dorchester's defiant speech, the assaults on American commerce. In January, before the full story of English aggression was known, Madison renewed his proposals for retaliatory regulations on British shipping. Hamilton bestirred himself to prevent any interference with his precious commerce, and succeeded in defeating Madison's policy. Yet when England's arbitrary course became fully apparent, in March, 1794, war seemed inevitable.

Jay's mission

As a last resort John Jay was dispatched to England to settle all outstanding difficulties between the two nations by treaty. His mission was doomed to failure from the first because of the confidential insight that the British, through Hamilton, enjoyed into the purpose of the administration. In protest against the British orders in council the northern European nations were proposing an armed neutrality. The fear that the United States might accede to it would have made the British ready to offer concessions; but Hamilton felt it his duty to assure Hammond that in no case would the United States concur; and England therefore accorded Jay as little as she chose.

Jay's Treaty

By the final treaty she agreed to surrender the western posts, which actually was done in 1796; but she secured for her subjects freedom of trade in the northwest, while excluding Americans from the Hudson Bay region. Both spoliations on American commerce and British debts were referred to

commissions, despite the fact that British creditors were receiving justice in United States courts. The question of the negroes was dropped. No enemy of England was to fit out privateers in American waters. Article XII allowed American ships of 70 tons or less to engage in the trade between the United States and the British West Indies, provided that no American ships carried molasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa, or cotton from the United States or the islands anywhere except to the United States itself. British trade and shipping alike were to be on the most-favored-nation basis in our ports.

In the treaty that bears his name, Jay could not have yielded more to Great Britain than he did. It was a tribute to the fears of Hamilton and the Federalists, and their willingness on any terms to keep the British trade. Indignation ran from end to end of the United States. Washington himself was disgusted, and cast his influence for the treaty only because he thought it better than war; his personal prestige carried it, but the confidence of his countrymen in him was shaken. The Senate ratified the treaty without the twelfth article, but with difficulty was the House induced to vote supplies for carrying the treaty into effect in 1796. In the European conflict the Federalists had played the United States into the hands of Great Britain; naturally they had to reckon with the hostility of France.

Unpopularity of the treaty

As an offset to the doubtful achievement of Jay's Treaty the year 1795 saw the temporary settlement of the problems of the southwest. Spain had refused to recognize the validity of the English retrocession of Florida with its more southern boundary, and had refused to accord the Americans the free navigation of the Mississippi River. Georgia had complicated the situation by her claims to the whole territory west of her boundaries, and by sales of it to land companies in 1789, which came to nothing. But at Spanish instigation the Indian tribes of the south harried the frontiers, notably under McGillivray, one of the Creek chiefs, whom the federal government tried to buy to its support with a military title. Spanish intrigue was still busy in Tennessee, even after its cession by North Carolina

Spain and the southwest

in 1790 and its establishment as a territorial government. By 1794 the settlers had, however, decisively defeated the most hostile of the Indians.

The Spanish treaty, 1795

In 1795 Spain had separated from the English alliance and made peace with France under the ministry of Count Manuel Godoy, an able statesman who owed to the queen's favor his rise to power. To conciliate the United States and to counteract her sensitiveness to English influence as revealed in Jay's Treaty, he concluded with Thomas Pinckney a negotiation that had dragged for years, conceding the navigation of the Mississippi River and the right of transshipment at New Orleans. The treaty ceded Spain's claim to the territory between 32° 28′ and 31°; but possession was not surrendered until 1798. For the time being at least Spain had abandoned the key to the Mississippi gateway and the power, by locking and unlocking it as she saw fit, to play on the loyalty of the pioneers of the southwest.

The election of 1796

The election of 1796 was frankly a party contest. Washington, now openly maligned by the Republican press in savage epithets, was in no mood to seek a third term. He issued to the people of the United States a Farewell Address, in which he deprecated partisan attachment to the great foreign powers. Jefferson had left the cabinet in 1793 and Hamilton in 1795. They had been replaced by second-rate men, Edmund Randolph and Oliver Wolcott. To succeed Washington the Federalists put forward John Adams, though Hamilton and his group had misgivings about him. Their vice presidential candidate was Thomas Pinckney of South Carolina; for, in deference to the needs of party, the electoral system was already being twisted to enable a distinction to be drawn between party candidates for president and vice president. As it happened, however, Adams had 71 electoral votes and Jefferson, the Republican candidate, 68. Intrigues on the part of Hamilton to throw enough votes from Adams to elect Pinckney president had provoked retaliation on Pinckney by New England electors; and accordingly the country had for its vice president the presidential candidate of the defeated party.

Almost immediately American relations with France reached a

crisis which had been threatening since Jay's Treaty. James Monroe, minister to France since 1794, had made no secret of his sympathy with that nation, and in 1796 was replaced by Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. Edmund Randolph had been pushed out of the cabinet because he was suspected of collusion with the French minister Fauchet, certainly much milder than that of Hamilton with Hammond. The French Directory, now embarked on an aggressive European policy, hoped by a threatening attitude to assist the Republican friends of France in the United States; accordingly in 1796 they suspended the functions of their minister at Philadelphia. French privateers were now seizing our vessels on the ground that France could enforce the same rule on neutrals that they suffered England to enforce on them. When Pinckney reached France the Directory refused to receive him.

Disputes with France

On the news of this rebuff Adams called Congress in special session, to put the country in a state of defense while continuing negotiations. C. C. Pinckney of South Carolina, John Marshall of Virginia, and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts were sent to France. Talleyrand, the French minister for foreign affairs, refused to receive them openly, but hinted to them through informal channels that it would be necessary for them to make a round loan to the French treasury, and to cross the hands of the Directory with a bribe. Such was the current fashion of French diplomacy to lesser states. Two of the American envoys sensed the insult and left; Gerry was induced to remain as a private citizen to continue conversations with Talleyrand.

The XYZ affair

Up to this time Adams had acted with the support both of Hamilton's group and of the moderate Federalists represented by John Marshall, though the former were anxious for war. The publication in 1798 of the so-called XYZ correspondence, in which the names of the French agents who had sought bribes for France and Talleyrand were concealed behind the last three letters of the alphabet, completely silenced the Republicans. Active preparations for defense were pushed. Three frigates begun some years earlier on a threat of war with Algiers were completed; others were begun. Twenty ships were

Hostilities with France

soon at sea and captures of French privateers and warships began —notably that of *L'Insurgente* by the *Constellation* and of the *Berceau* by the *Boston*. An army was raised. Washington accepted the command, insisting on nominating Hamilton as ranking major general, to command until hostilities began. Without Adams' knowledge Hamilton controlled in his cabinet Wolcott, secretary of the treasury, Pickering, the secretary of state, and McHenry, the secretary of war, using their influence to force his schemes on the President. He already visioned a project of wide conquest and was impatient of delays in recruiting.

Adams, while not suspecting its full extent, was jealous of Hamilton's influence. He had received private assurances that France was repentant and would receive an American envoy. In February, 1799, therefore, much to the dismay of Hamilton's group, Adams nominated a minister to France. In 1800 a treaty was concluded which settled all outstanding difficulties, and superseded the old treaty of 1778. The wrath of the extreme Federalists, thus cheated of their war, knew no bounds.

Peace with France

The Federalists had already taken fateful advantage of the war fever that had given them a majority in Congress. They had long looked with fear and contempt on Republicanism, and its supposed catering to the mob; now they planned to take advantage of their opportunity to scotch it by legislation, and to establish really strong government in the hands of the upper classes. A part of Hamilton's scheme had contemplated the creation of a strong army and navy and the commitment of the nation to a career of conquest in Spanish possessions in the south, with the assistance of Miranda, the revolutionary adventurer, and with the connivance of Great Britain.

The extreme Federalist policy

At home the Federalists planned to cut off the reënforcement of the electorate by foreign elements that generally turned Republican, to get rid of certain foreign Republican agitators obnoxious to them, and to stifle all criticism of the government. In 1798 they passed an act requiring fourteen years' residence for naturalization. Then followed acts allowing the president to expel from the country any alien he thought dangerous to the

public peace, or to imprison him in time of war. The Sedition Act punished any criticism of the government made with the intent of stirring up hatred of it or its members, saving only the truth of the charge. The Sedition Act was put into execution in some ten cases against Republican critics of the government, sometimes for the mildest criticisms imaginable. In hearing such cases some of the judges, especially Samuel Chase of the Supreme Court, showed the most rabid partisanship.

The Alien and Sedition Acts

The Republicans cannot be blamed for believing that the Federalists were on the point of disregarding constitutional restrictions altogether. Certainly the Sedition Act conflicted with the spirit of the amendment guaranteeing freedom of speech. The Federalists seemed to be interpreting the Constitution so broadly as to sweep away all its guarantees. A counter-revolution seemed impending that might lose the ideals of liberty and so far undo the work of the Revolution by planting firmly in power a privileged class. In Virginia some of the hotter-headed Republicans were on the verge of armed resistance.

Alarm of the Republicans

Madison and Jefferson, though Jefferson's authorship of the Kentucky Resolutions was not known till long after, framed for passage by the Virginia and Kentucky legislatures resolves of protests at the course of the federal government. They laid down the doctrine that the federal government was a government of limited powers, originating in the Constitution, which was essentially a compact between the States; and that in the event of a palpable violation of the Constitution by the government that it created, the States might interpose to check the abuse of power, each State having, as the Kentucky Resolutions put it, the right to determine as well infractions as the mode and measure of redress. In a draft Jefferson went even further in attributing to each State the right to nullify assumptions of power by Congress that were not warranted by the Constitution. A second set of resolutions passed in Kentucky in 1799 frankly used the word nullification.

The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions

There can be no question that the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions seem to foreshadow the later idea of nullification. But it is absurd to try to read into two or three phrases of 1798 the elaborate procedure called for by the theories of Calhoun and Hayne in 1832. Jefferson and Madison were confronted by an immediate political emergency. They were convinced, perhaps not so wrongly, that the results of the Revolution of 1776 were in danger of being overturned by a counter-revolution in 1798. They had distrusted the Constitution of 1787 because it seemed to encroach on liberty. They had acquiesced in it on the understanding that it was to be the strict limit of the powers of government. And when everything seemed to point to the establishment of an arbitrary government, with a strong army and navy, with Hamilton the ablest advocate of strong government in both civil and military control, they might well have considered how to check the process. The Resolutions in reply from northern States assumed that the United States Supreme Court was the interpreter of the constitutionality of acts of Congress. Yet save in one dubious case it had so far shown no sign of exercising that power. Where else could an agency be found to voice a protest save in the States? That the process was intended to be that of 1832 or to be used save in an emergency just short of civil war is unlikely.

Meaning of the resolutions

The Federalists had a majority of moderate men in the Congress that met in the fall of 1799; but the pendulum was swinging back. The charges of the Republicans were having their popular effect. Washington, whose personal prestige was still the mainstay of Federalism, died on December 14, 1799. A riot in Pennsylvania against the levy of a direct federal tax was foolishly magnified to treason, and an ignorant rioter, John Fries, convicted and pardoned by the President. The pro-English attitude of the Federalists laid them open to criticism. The hanging by the British on a charge of murder of Jonathan Robbins, surrendered to the British government in spite of his claim to be an American citizen, was more ammunition for their enemies. In spite of their majority in the new Congress they steadily lost ground in it.

The Federalists lose ground

On the eve of the election the split between Hamilton's group and Adams' group of more moderate Federalists such as Marshall became open. The President, at last scenting treachery in his cabinet, got rid of McHenry and Pickering but still did not suspect Wolcott. Adams and C. C. Pinckney were the Federalist candidates for president and vice president. The Republicans put forward Jefferson, and Aaron Burr, the leader of a New York political group that with George Clinton's following made up the Republican strength in that State. The Federalists tried desperately to hold New York and Pennsylvania for their party by having electors chosen by the old legislatures that they controlled. In Pennsylvania they thus got seven electors out of fifteen, but they lost New York altogether. Hamilton endeavored to play the game of 1796 and get votes thrown away from Adams to put Pinckney in as president. A pamphlet attacking Adams, which Hamilton prepared for the leaders of his party, fell into the hands of Burr and was given wide publicity.

The election of 1800

In the end the Federalists carried New England, New Jersey, Delaware, and divided the electors of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and North Carolina, 65 votes in all. One vote was thrown from Pinckney leaving him but 64. Both Burr and Jefferson got 73 votes and the House of Representatives had to decide between them. The Federalists controlled a majority of the States there, and were at first disposed to put in Burr as president. Hamilton, who regarded Burr as a dangerous adventurer and Jefferson as an opportunist dreamer, threw his influence to Jefferson as a safer man. Finally on the thirty-sixth ballot a deadlock was broken and Jefferson elected.

Burr vs. Jefferson

In the last weeks of the session the Federalists passed an act enlarging the judiciary and creating new circuit courts, all places being duly filled with Federalist judges as a bulwark against the anarchy which they felt was impending. Marshall, secretary of state for the last months of Adams' term, was made chief justice; he was to be the first holder of the office to leave an impress on it.

The Judiciary Act

The election of 1800 was far more decisive than it appeared. So

strongly did the change impress Jefferson that he afterwards called it the Revolution of 1800. The undemocratic elements of the electoral system had allowed the Federalists to obtain many votes contrary to the expressed will of the masses. The tide of reaction against the strong government that the Federalists had hoped to set up was just beginning to run, and was not to turn until their party had disappeared. Absorbed in the Republican party they gradually modified its composition and neutralized the strong anticommercial and strict-constructionist elements that had given it its tone in 1798. In later years Republicans of the old school used that year as the touchstone of true Republican principles. In very truth a reaction from the looseness of Revolutionary days and in favor of strong government had begun in 1787. It had produced in the United States a strong federal organization. Under the control of the Federalist party that organization's sphere of action had been extended to the limits warranted by the Constitution. In 1798 extreme Federalists had taken advantage of the foreign situation to go even beyond the Constitution in establishing a powerful government based on the higher elements of society. Defeated in 1800, they were to see the current run for some time in favor of weaker government and strict construction, and then reverse itself once more; but even to the present day the democratic participation of the masses of the people in their government has steadily increased.

Significance of the election of 1800

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

J. S. Bassett, *The Federalist System* (*American Nation*, vol. XI). New York, 1906.
S. F. Bemis, *Jay's Treaty*. New York, 1923.
——, *Pinckney's Treaty*. Baltimore, 1926.
C. G. Bowers, *Jefferson and Hamilton*. New York, 1926.
C. A. Beard, *Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy*. New York, 1915.
E. Channing, *A History of the United States*, vol. IV. New York, 1917.
J. B. McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States*, vol. II. New York, 1885.
J. Winsor, *The Westward Movement*. Boston, 1897.
J. T. Adams, *New England in the Republic, 1776–1850*. Boston, 1926.
A. J. Beveridge, *The Life of John Marshall*, vols. I and II. Boston, 1916.

CHAPTER XIV

THE DAYS OF JEFFERSONIAN SIMPLICITY

On the fourth of March, 1801, Thomas Jefferson walked from his boarding house in the little village of Washington to take the oath of office before the Congress of the United States. The previous year the government had moved from the aristocratic and luxurious surroundings of Philadelphia society to the site on the Potomac chosen by Washington as the permanent seat of government. The president's house and the Capitol, placed on the grand scheme for the development of the future city that to this day recalls the genius of Major L'Enfant, its designer, loomed out of a sea of wilderness and mud in which a few boarding houses and homes had arisen. No better setting could have been devised for the ideals of Republican simplicity that were to be the vogue of the new era, or for Jefferson's generous and hazy ideas of the amelioration of the human race through its own exertions—ideas as optimistically designed for a rosy future as were the farflung squares and avenues of the French engineer.

The inauguration of Jefferson

The inaugural was the explanation of its author's policy—studious moderation in word and deed that would convince the more moderate Federalists that Republicanism did not mean anarchy, would draw them into support of the new government and policy, and finally would leave the irreconcilables, Hamilton, Cabot, and Sedgwick, isolated, without followers and powerless for ill. Bank and funding system were left untouched under the charge of Albert Gallatin, as able a financier as Hamilton himself. By rigid economy he devoted seven out of the ten and a half millions revenue to the payment of the debt, and by 1810, despite the payment of a dozen millions for Louisiana, had reduced it by $27,500,000. Of course this meant curtailment of the expenditures of the Federalist régime. The army was reduced, but not abolished. The navy, not farther in-

Jefferson's policy of moderation

creased, was not destroyed, and was actually used in spirited fashion to force the Barbary States of the Mediterranean to cease their depredations on American commerce. Jefferson planned to increase it by the creation of fleets of small gunboats, each with a single gun, for use in shallow water; they were to play a ludicrous part in the War of 1812.

Under the circumstances Federalist criticism sank to mere rhetoric. True the Judiciary Act of 1801 was promptly repealed.

Repeal of the Judiciary Act

In frantic language Federalists like Gouverneur Morris foretold anarchy and the destruction of the Constitution, if to evade the provision that judges held office for life judgeships were abolished from under the judges. But the Judiciary Act of 1801 had done the same thing, and the appointments made under it were so manifestly a job that the Federalists did not come into court with clean hands. In the debate the question was raised repeatedly whether the disallowing of unconstitutional acts of Congress was work for the judiciary or the States.

Marshall, as chief justice, took up the challenge. A case had arisen of a justice of the peace for the District of Columbia whose

Marbury vs. Madison

commission, signed, sealed, and on the desk of the secretary of state at Madison's coming into office, Madison had refused to deliver. Marbury sued for his commission by a writ of mandamus. The issue of such writs by the Supreme Court in original jurisdiction was authorized by the Judiciary Act of 1789 and had been customary for some years. On the ground, however, that the Act of 1789 conflicted with the Constitution in this particular, Marshall declared in his decision that while Marbury was entitled to his commission, and should have a remedy for its withholding, the remedy was not a writ of mandamus from the United States Supreme Court. For the Constitution was of higher authority than an act of Congress, and as the Constitution did not extend the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to the issue of writs of mandamus, the clause of the Act of 1789 allowing their issue, was unconstitutional, null, and void.

Toward this end judicial practice in the States as well as in the United States had been tending for some time. State judiciaries had repeatedly declared state acts contrary to state constitutions null and void; but the principle was now definitely laid down for the federal Constitution by Marshall. Against the Republican doctrine that the States could decide questions of constitutionality he announced the right of the federal judiciary to do so. Really his decision was only an extension of a very ancient English legal principle, that in deciding cases brought before it, a court must find the rule of law appropriate and in case two rules conflict, select the proper one to have weight. Similarly, in a conflict between Constitution and act of Congress, a court must have regard to the character of the Constitution as supreme law, and pronounce the conflicting act null and void.

Judicial review of legislation

Criticism has long since assailed the court's assumption of power to decide questions of constitutionality in last resort. In 1803 Jefferson and the Republicans were encouraged to proceed in an attack on the personnel of the judiciary. That personnel was largely Federalist; and the judges had not always acted impartially in partisan cases; they had delivered political harangues from the bench attacking the Republicans, and in political trials under the Sedition Act some of them like Chase had, to say the least, indicated clearly their personal bias. The Republicans now moved forward to evict their political opponents from the branch of the government they still retained. In Pennsylvania, Judge Addison of the state courts was impeached by the state legislature and removed. A certain Judge Pickering, a district judge of the United States, was impeached by the House of Representatives to the Senate of the United States. It was submitted to the Senate that the acts complained of were manifestly the result of insanity, and that impeachment could not be used against an insane person who was not responsible for his acts; but the Senate refused to entertain the question of insanity, and removed him. Indeed, they had some excuse since, in Constitution or law, there was as yet no means of ridding the bench of an insane judge.

The Republicans attack the judiciary

The House of Representatives, led by John Randolph of Roanoke, next impeached Judge Samuel Chase of the Supreme Court for alleged acts of outrageous bias in the trial of Republicans charged under the Sedition Act, and in other ways. The impeachment was tried in the Senate in 1805, Aaron Burr presiding as vice president, the managers of the House prosecuting, and some of the ablest lawyers of the United States defending Chase.

The impeachment of Justice Chase

The question at issue was really the nature of impeachment under the Constitution. Was it merely a process of removal for general unfitness or misconduct in office, or was it a trial for an offense otherwise indictable, and hence to follow all the rules of laws as to procedure, evidence, and so forth? Chase's counsel insisted generally that no man could be impeached save for an indictable offense. The managers for the House were not consistent. Some of them asserted impeachment to be a process of removal; others, in deference to the supposed opinion of some of the Republican senators, admitted it to be a form of trial. Finally Chase was cleared on all counts.

The nature of impeachment

The attack on the judiciary died away. Intermittently proposals were made for a constitutional amendment providing for removal of judges on address of two-thirds of both houses of Congress; Jefferson, angered by Marshall's conduct in the trial of Burr for treason, was to think once again of impeaching a judge; but in the end the judiciary stood intact in the position taken by Marshall as final arbiter of questions of constitutionality.

The Republican attack on the judiciary abandoned

By 1804, some of the more extreme New England Federalists were aroused by Jefferson's sapping of the Federalist strength in their section to plan the secession of New England from the corruptions of the Republican United States. They were opposed by the saner men of the party such as John Adams and especially Alexander Hamilton. As the adhesion of New York was vital to a New England confederation, the advocates of secession planned to throw the Federalist strength there to assist Burr's malcontent Republicans in electing him

The separation plot of 1804

governor. Jefferson was punishing Burr for casting his eyes on the presidency in 1800 by a judicious manipulation of New York patronage in favor of the Clinton group, and when Burr tried for the governorship it was the last throw of a political gambler. Hamilton tried to hold the Federalists back by attacks on Burr's personal character, which was deservedly more notorious than Hamilton's. After his defeat had checked for the time being the New England plot, Burr challenged Hamilton to a duel. The fall of the great Federalist before Burr's pistol, and the outlawing of Burr by the New England conscience, were the sole fruits of the attempt to stem the tide of Republican success. In 1804 Jefferson was triumphantly reëlected over C. C. Pinckney by 162 votes to 14. Even Massachusetts cast her vote for the Virginian.

Jefferson's policy of moderation alienated in the end some of the stricter theorists of his following, such as John Randolph of Roanoke. To Randolph the last straw was the "Yazoo business,"—the administration's support of a measure to compensate innocent purchasers from the fraudulent Yazoo land companies that had bribed the Georgia legislature into sales in 1795, only to have it revoke the sales in the next session as fraudulent. In the case of Fletcher *vs.* Peck in 1810 Marshall decided for the validity of the claims, laying down the principle that the contract arising from the act of the Georgia legislature, however tainted, was not to be impaired by its later revocation. Randolph, however, successfully fought the measure, even when exiled from his party, until he failed of reëlection to Congress during the War of 1812.

John Randolph of Roanoke

In domestic policy the Jeffersonian era was not widely different from the Federalist; but from 1801 to 1815, in the field of foreign affairs, the Republicans won their greatest triumphs and suffered their most humiliating defeats. Europe in those years was convulsed with the Napoleonic wars; the great nations of Europe in constant change of policy were now fully subject to the control of France, now galvanized by English subsidies into coalitions against her. On the continent the fascinat-

The Napoleonic wars

ing, incomprehensible figure of Napoleon towered up, dealing in deceit and violence, a man whose purposes for good or evil few could fathom. Beside him crafty diplomats like Talleyrand shrank to the size of pygmies. Against him fought a series of British statesmen, often stubborn, insular, and narrow after the British fashion. Between them neutrals like the United States were ground as between the greater and the lesser millstones. When the motives of the two contending forces are sought, they will generally be found to be the supposed commercial interests of England and France. Napoleon, however, less capable than his English antagonists of accumulating great supplies of money, was compelled to descend to actual plunder for sums of a few millions, even though his grasp after them vitiated his more authentic and dignified policies of trade regulation.

Against these antagonists the Republicans had to oppose the ideas of Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson and Madison were not soldiers, they feared war, and they disliked the kind of leaders war brings to the surface and the strong centralized governments by which war is carried on. Their ideal of civilization was an agricultural community where there is little trade. But as foreign trade existed for the United States, and foreign trade might and did threaten to involve the nation in situations where war was likely, they had to consider escape from them, first by diplomacy, second by measures of trade retaliation. In the first they became expert. In the second they failed, partly because measures of commercial restriction failed to strike at classes which had a voice in the governments of England and France, partly because a government too strong to suit their theory was necessary to enforce them. However Jefferson blithely reached out for extreme powers for the federal government in the enforcement of commercial restriction. With the amelioration of the human race as the end in view, he could cheerfully sacrifice his lesser principles, to attain it by the employment of means which he had formerly condemned.

Jefferson and war by commercial restrictions

Jefferson's first triumph was the acquisition of Louisiana for the United States. After 1798 the United States had enjoyed the

free navigation of the Mississippi River and the right of deposit of goods at New Orleans for transshipment to ocean-going vessels. The cutting off of this right, in November, 1802, by a local Spanish official created a furor in the western country. The government was still more alarmed, for it strongly suspected a part of what was the truth, that in 1800 by a secret treaty the First Consul Napoleon had extorted from Spain the cession of Louisiana, intending to fit it into a great colonial system along with the island of San Domingo now ruled by its revolted negro slaves. A vigorous French colony was not a desirable neighbor in the Mississippi Valley; Jefferson thought it would necessitate a close alliance between England and the United States.

Spain cedes Louisiana to France, 1800

Time worked for him. The able Spanish minister Godoy returned to power and delayed the execution of the secret treaty. Napoleon, who planned as a first step the subjugation of the blacks of San Domingo, saw his armies there swept away by the fever. England, alarmed at French aggressions, moved reluctantly to renewed war; and Napoleon, wearying of peace, believed the novelty of war necessary to keep himself the fashion with his fickle Frenchmen. Louisiana could not be held against the maritime power of England, and a few millions of money would help in a continental campaign; he turned to the United States as a likely purchaser.

Napoleon decides to sell Louisiana

Meanwhile in January, 1803, Jefferson had secretly asked of Congress an appropriation to deal with the question and dispatched James Monroe to Paris to assist Robert R. Livingston, the American minister, in endeavoring to purchase the island of Orleans and West Florida. A few days before Monroe arrived Talleyrand demanded of Livingston what the United States would give for all Louisiana. Livingston haggled, but at length the purchase was effected for twelve million dollars plus four millions more in American claims for damages on account of French spoliations of commerce.

Purchase of Louisiana, 1803

The bargain was a huge one. More important than the complete acquisition of control of the mouth of the Mississippi was

the vast stretch of territory beyond the river, a reservoir of national wealth and a home for future millions to add to the national greatness. Jefferson, as few men of the time did, caught the fascination of that vast expanse. Even before he knew of its acquisition he had planned to send Meriwether Lewis and William Clark overland to explore it. Their journal of a two-year journey to the coast at the mouth of the Columbia River is a classic of exploration. In the same years Lieutenant Zebulon Pike had explored the region of the lower Rockies. A dim notion of the possibilities of the region, hitherto known only to the most adventurous of fur traders, began to penetrate the popular mind.

Interest in the Far West

The questions that seemed troublesome for the moment were of constitutional consistency. For a time Jefferson himself thought a constitutional amendment necessary to authorize the purchase. The power to acquire territory could, it was true, be deduced from the right of the United States to make war, or from the fact that the United States was a government as other governments, but both were examples of reasoning from implied powers that the Republicans had formerly condemned. The Federalists singled out for attack the clause of the treaty requiring the admission of the territory, as States, to the Union. Such a clause might assure the swamping of the older States by those based on newly acquired territory. But without constitutional amendment the cession was approved.

Constitutional questions

Just how much territory it conveyed was a question to perplex the future generation. France had no right to sell Louisiana, for she had covenanted with Spain not to alienate it. The terms of the treaty, "Louisiana, with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it; and such as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other states," were a self-contradiction, which had been deliberately left in by the French. Napoleon had instructed his agent to take possession of Texas to the Rio Grande, and to consider the Iberville as the eastern boundary. But to southern statesmen, Florida, which con-

What did Louisiana include?

trolled the mouths of southern rivers, was desirable; and Monroe and Livingston were speedily committed to a theory that the purchase included Florida as far as the Perdido River. Congress adopted this interpretation in an act extending customs jurisdiction over Mobile.

The acquisition of Louisiana as a result of Napoleon's seeming caprice gave the Republicans an appetite for territorial expansion which next they sought to gratify by the Floridas. Monroe, Livingston, and Charles Pinckney labored at Paris and Madrid either to extract from Napoleon the admission that he had intended to include Florida in the sale, or to buy it from Spain. Spain had sunk into a client state of France, and the American envoys hoped that in some fresh mood of generosity Napoleon might present them with Florida also. Spain herself, outraged by the sale of Louisiana contrary to the stipulation on which she ceded it to France, was diplomatically defiant; if the United States wished to take Florida by war it might do so.

Jefferson seeks to get Florida

Napoleon and Talleyrand at times sharply rebuked the importunity of Monroe and Livingston. Then, in the summer of 1805, Talleyrand dropped a hint that the emperor might act as a go-between in an adjustment by which, for a sum paid to France and to Talleyrand, Spain would make the desired cession. Armstrong, now United States minister at Paris, urged instead that the nation settle the boundary question by seizing Texas to the Rio Grande and thus forcing Spain to come to terms. The cabinet in November, 1805, concluded it wiser to adopt the scheme of purchase through France.

Proposed purchase of Florida 1805

The policy of 1802 was followed. Jefferson sent Congress a warlike public message, and followed it with a secret one recommending that Congress supply the means for negotiation. The erratic Republican house leader, John Randolph of Roanoke, refused to do as he was expected—move an appropriation of two millions to buy Florida—and revolted against Jefferson. It was some weeks before the Republican majority could be rallied under a new leader, and the

Randolph revolts on the Florida question

proposal for purchase was not dispatched until March, 1806. The time had passed when it could be used; Napoleon had new projects.

The so-called Burr conspiracy is the natural sequel to the failure of the Florida projects of Jefferson. Aaron Burr's scandalous private life helped to give him a reputation as an unscrupulous politician which perhaps he did not deserve more than many others of his day. After the election of 1801 Jefferson, by the use of the New York patronage to exalt the Clintons, set deliberately about breaking down Burr's following as a punishment for his having sought to take the presidency. Burr's failure to be elected governor in 1804, and his duel with Hamilton, left him politically and financially bankrupt and under indictment for murder.

Aaron Burr's conspiracy

To repair his fortunes, with his eye perhaps on Napoleon, the beau ideal of adventurers of that generation, Burr began to enlist support in various quarters for an enterprise in the west. It took different forms according to the persons whom he approached. To Merry, the British minister, on bad terms with the Republicans and complacent to Federalist plots, it was represented as a separation of the west from the Union; to others Burr talked of a forcible seizure of Washington by a coup d'état, and a speculation in the lands of the Bastrop Grant in Louisiana, and an expedition to conquer Mexico from Spain. The last is probably nearest the truth.

Burr's plans

But no sooner had Burr started west in 1806 than rumors began to spread that his object was to separate the lands west of the mountains from the United States. For this he was unsuccessfully prosecuted in the Kentucky courts. The preparations of his agent Blennerhassett, at Blennerhassett's Island below Marietta, were broken up by zealous Ohio militia. Finally Burr made his way down the Mississippi with but a portion of his strength, expecting the assistance of his accomplice, General James Wilkinson, then commanding at New Orleans; for the United States and Spain were on the verge of hostilities in that region. But Wilkinson, twenty years a Spanish pensionary, was

Arrest of Burr: his trial

not disposed to injure his paymaster, and denounced Burr's enterprise as a treasonable plot against the Union. Burr fled, but was caught and taken to Richmond, Virginia, to be put on trial for treason; for an alleged overt treasonable act committed at Blennerhassett's Island was within the jurisdiction of the Virginia district court. Jefferson elected to countenance Wilkinson's theory that Burr had intended treason, and he was arraigned with Wilkinson as the chief witness against him.

In the event, Chief Justice John Marshall as presiding judge took the opportunity to save Burr from Jefferson's vengeance by a legal interpretation of the definition of treason in the United States Constitution. As Marshall decided that an overt treasonable act on the part of the person accused was necessary, and as Burr had not been present at the treasonable act alleged at Blennerhassett's Island, even though it was done in accord with his plans, he was not guilty of treason. The definition was a narrow one; but the United States has been none the worse off for it.

Marshall defines treason

The fortunate part of Jefferson's dealings with foreign powers had been written in the Louisiana purchase. By the time he had to admit that he had failed to secure Florida as he had secured Louisiana, a series of questions involving neutral rights on the seas had involved him in difficulties with Great Britain, which in the administration of his successor were to end in war.

Belligerents and neutral rights

At Jefferson's inauguration, the mercantile classes were generally content with the terms on which England, mistress of the seas, allowed their use. True, British warships, on the duty of blockading French ones in American ports, were guilty of occasional acts of arbitrary disregard for neutral rights. Further, the English navy from time immemorial had allowed its officers to impress British seamen to serve on board their ships, either taking them in raids on the sailors' taverns in British port towns, or removing them from British or other merchant vessels on the high seas. In making such impressments British officers disregarded altogether proofs of American citizen-

Neutral trade, 1800–1805

ship or of the naturalization of British-born seamen. Through inability to distinguish American from British sailors they occasionally impressed native-born Americans as well; but these last were generally freed in the leisurely course of diplomatic representations.

The seamen naturally objected to this procedure on the part of the British. But the mercantile classes gladly suffered it for the sake of the flourishing West India trade which the complaisance of British admiralty judges allowed to reach a point where it gave employment in American ships to thousands of British seamen. For, while Great Britain held in theory to the application of the Rule of 1756—that no neutral could carry on in time of war trade between France and her colonies reserved for French ships in time of peace—in practice, she allowed Americans to do it by the doctrine of broken voyage. If an American ship—as Sir William Scott decided in the case of the *Polly* in 1800—carried French West India produce to an American port, unloaded it and paid American duties, she was at liberty to reload it for any part of the world.

America enjoys the West India trade

Favorable as the situation was in 1803, America tried to improve it. Secure in the seeming friendship of France, Madison demanded of England that she abandon the right of impressment, limit the right of visit of neutral ships at sea, and open to American ships the direct trade between France and her colonies. This represented the ambitious program of the administration; but the situation was destined to alter not for the better but very much for the worse.

Jefferson demands additional concessions

British shipowners and West India planters looked with displeasure on the thriving American colonial trade. If trade with France were to be permitted at all, why should not English ships under some disguise be allowed to carry it on, and why should French West Indian produce compete in the world markets with British? In 1805 a movement against the American carrying trade was begun by James Stephen's pamphlet, *War in Disguise; or, the Frauds of the Neutral Flags.* It was given official weight by the previous de-

The British cut off the West India trade, 1805

cision of Sir William Scott in the case of the *Essex* in which he reversed his decision in the case of the *Polly*, and practically made the indirect trade via the United States impossible.

Jefferson at once reached for his favorite weapons, diplomacy and commercial retaliation. The latter was represented by the Nicholson Act passed by Congress in 1806, prohibiting the importation of certain manufactured goods, mainly English luxuries. It was not to go into effect at once —a dose of chicken broth to be taken nine months hence, was John Randolph's comment—and, actually, it did not operate till December, 1807.

The Nicholson Act

As to negotiation the British ministers with whom America had to deal were for the moment well disposed. Charles James Fox and Charles Grey were Whigs with the hard task of conciliating a Parliamentary following that was largely Tory. They could not be as liberal as they would. Apparently as a means of retreating from the decision in the *Essex*, Fox decreed a blockade of the European coast from the Elbe to Brest, but only to be effective between Ostend and Havre. He might tell his followers that this could take the place of the rigid enforcement of the Rule of 1756. Unfortunately it raised the question of what constituted an effective blockade. The American doctrine was that a port could not be blockaded lawfully unless a sufficient squadron were cruising off it to render hazardous an attempt to enter. Such a blockade no nation could enforce over a long stretch of coast studded with ports. But if, as England held, such a guard was not necessary to blockade, English warships and privateers could on the ocean highways of travel, even off American ports, make prize of any ship whose papers showed it was bound to the blockaded coast. The well-meant Fox's blockade was later to be a cause of war.

Fox's blockade

Jefferson in 1806 sent William Pinkney, an able Maryland lawyer, to England to join Monroe in negotiating a treaty to end all differences. Their instructions required them to insist on the abandonment of impressment and the restoration of the West India trade to the status of 1800. Both were impossible, and the envoys,

disregarding instructions, admitted terms which barred any American discrimination against British commerce; the draft treaty did not expressly mention impressment, although the British informally engaged to be reasonable in it. At the time the treaty was signed, Napoleon's Berlin Decree was just issued, and the British negotiators gave notice that the British government would not be bound by the treaty unless the United States resisted enforcement of the decree. When, in March, 1807, the treaty reached the United States, Jefferson refused to submit it to the Senate and Monroe was recalled in something like disgrace.

Futile negotiation, 1806–1807

Into the turmoil of British-American affairs was now tossed the greatest act of insolence ever recorded of a British naval officer. A deserter from a British warship, by name Jenkin Ratford, had been unknowingly enlisted by the officers of the United States frigate *Chesapeake*, then preparing at Washington for a voyage to the Mediterranean. Outside the Chesapeake capes, on June 22 she was hailed by the British frigate *Leopard* bearing an order from Admiral Berkeley, in command of the British naval forces on the Atlantic station, that the *Chesapeake* should be halted by a British warship, and searched for deserters. Commodore Barron of the *Chesapeake* had slackly neglected to call his crew to quarters on the *Leopard's* approach. He tried to gain time; but the *Leopard* fired three broadsides into the *Chesapeake* at point-blank range. So great was the disorder of men and things on board the American frigate, newly gotten ready for sea, that not until the end could a single gun be fired from her. Barron struck her colors and permitted British officers to muster the crew and remove four alleged deserters, three of whom were native Americans and the fourth Jenkin Ratford. Declining to accept the *Chesapeake* as a prize the *Leopard* then permitted her to make her way back to port.

The "Chesapeake" outrage

For the moment public opinion was stirred throughout the Union to the point of war. Jefferson, in issuing a proclamation ordering all British warships out of American waters and forbidding the sale of supplies to them, merely indorsed action that

Norfolk had already taken. He called a session of Congress for the fall, hoping that meanwhile diplomacy might take the place of war. Meantime, Erskine, the British minister to the United States, made the wise forecast that if the British government avoided war over the *Chesapeake* by apology it might do what it pleased to American neutral rights with impunity thereafter. He was almost right.

American indignation

The ministry in England that was to deal with the American situation was thoroughgoing Tory, headed by Spencer Perceval, a narrow lawyer, with George Canning, foreign secretary, noted for a slashing sarcastic style in diplomacy and oratory alike. If peace were to be maintained with this group, concession would have to come from the American side.

The Tory ministry, 1807

Meantime a new assault on neutral trade had begun, coming alternately from France and England. In retaliation for Fox's blockade, Napoleon, in November, 1806, on the morrow of his complete overthrow of the Prussian army, issued the Berlin Decree, laying the British Isles under blockade. January 10, 1807, the British government then still Whig, had responded with an order in council which prohibited the coasting trade along the shores of Europe dominated by France. This was in spite of the fact that the Berlin Decree was not enforced till the summer of 1807.

The Berlin Decree: the Orders in Council

The Tory ministry showed a more headstrong disregard of neutral rights than did the Whigs. Its answer to the accord of Napoleon and the Czar of Russia, at the Peace of Tilsit, to dominate the Baltic had been to bombard Copenhagen until the neutral Danish government surrendered its fleet to English keeping. On November 11, 1807, a new order in council was issued which treated any port from which the British flag was excluded as a blockaded port. Napoleon retorted with the Milan Decree of December, 1807, which made any ship submitting to English search, or touching at an English port, or paying any English tax, good prize for French privateers.

Attacks on neutrals, 1807

On their face these successive fulminations stopped any neutral

ship from sailing to or from any port in the British Isles or on the long coast from the Baltic to the Adriatic dominated by France. In practice they could be enforced with some effectiveness by the British navy, but with very little effectiveness by the privateers that slipped out of French ports. With warship and privateer, American shipowners were generally willing to take their chances. Their worse luck probably lay in the regulations, ever likely to be enforced against them in French ports, in answer to the capricious shifting of Napoleon's trade policy. In the larger sense the English orders in council were designed by their makers on the English side to divert neutral trade with the enemy to English shipping; the French decrees were used more than once to fill Napoleon's coffers by confiscations of American ships in French ports.

Effect of the Orders and Decrees

As it happened, due to contrary winds a considerable number of ships sailed from England just before the Orders in Council of November 11 were issued, and none for several weeks thereafter. The information in the hands of the American government December 16, 1807, foreshadowed the Orders in Council of November 11, and included an outrageous impressment order, issued in October, together with news that Napoleon had at last enforced the Berlin Decree. With these could be put the aggression of England on Denmark, and of France on Portugal, among the last of the neutral states on the continent. Jefferson thereupon recommended to Congress an embargo to prohibit all movements of ships out of American ports, except foreign merchantmen in ballast or with cargoes already loaded, and coastwise traders ready to give bond to double the value of the vessel and cargo that it would be unloaded in an American port. The embargo became law December 22, 1807. In later years the Federalists alleged that Jefferson, not knowing of the Orders of November 11 when he proposed embargo, had been guilty of subservience to France.

The embargo

The embargo was such an experiment in strong government as even the Federalists had never ventured. Under it the Jeffersonian Republican government established a license system de-

signed to prevent States from importing breadstuffs in excess of their normal consumption! Jefferson even looked askance at the exportation from State to State of qualities of flour regarded as luxuries. All this was necessary to keep foodstuffs from being exported to the West Indies or to England under cover of the coastwise trade. In defiance of government officials food was openly shipped over the northern frontier. In the session of 1808–1809 an enforcement act demanded by Jefferson was passed. It increased bonds for the coastwise trade to sixfold the value of vessel and cargo, and gave collectors discretionary power to check shipments altogether.

Legislation to enforce the embargo

There was no question that the embargo caused suffering among the negroes of the West Indies and the laboring classes in England, but neither could bring political pressure to bear on the English Tory majority. Of that majority the landholders saw the English price of wheat rise to high levels, and the shipowners saw American maritime competition cut off by the American government itself. As to effects on America, the result of evasion must be considered. Many shipowners kept their vessels away from American ports; others slipped them out under pretext of coastwise voyages. But, even so, shipping was tied up, seamen, shipwrights, sailmakers, and riggers went unemployed, and faced starvation; the farmers of the north found their wheat, pigs, and cattle, the Virginia planters their tobacco and wheat, the South Carolinians their rice and cotton, a drug on their hands.

Failure of the embargo

In the north, where the farmers were long since accustomed to simple home manufactures, manufacturing increased; a simple form of factory production sprang up to supply the planting States of the south that had hitherto bought of England. Cotton spinning, domestic weaving, hatting, nail-making, and soap-making flourished. The effect of the nonintercourse of the next year accentuated the process and increased the dependence of the southern planter on northern manufactures. The lost crop profits of two years has-

The embargo fosters northern manufacture

tened the economic decay that slavery and exhausted soils had been working in Virginia for generations.

The Federalists of the north attacked the embargo in the press and the courts. A fair case could be made against its constitutionality; it was not a war measure, and certainly a constitutional grant of power to regulate commerce did not convey power to destroy it. Once more a Jeffersonian measure could be defended only on the Hamiltonian doctrine of implied powers. Distress and hatred of the embargo reversed a political revolution in the New England States. By 1809 the Massachusetts and Connecticut legislatures were concerting a New England confederation, and a governor of Connecticut used the language of the Kentucky Resolutions. The New England towns passed strong resolves against the policy. "I felt the foundations of the government shaken under my feet by the New England townships," wrote Jefferson.

Federalist attacks on the embargo

In the midst of the excitement the presidential election came on. The south, true to its Republican ideals of peaceful coercion, cast its votes for James Madison; Monroe as a minority candidate did not seriously affect his strength even in Virginia. The Republican stronghold, Pennsylvania, and the choice of electors by the old legislatures in New York and Vermont insured Madison's election. The Federalists elected to hold to C. C. Pinckney and Rufus King, which rendered useless the attempt of the malcontent Clintonians to run George Clinton for president instead of vice president. In the end Madison was elected by 122 votes to 53.

The election of 1808

In the Congress of 1808–1809 the Republicans of New England insisted that repeal was necessary to save the Union. Most men believed the embargo could no longer be enforced without violence and must go—"The excitements in the east," said D. R. Williams of South Carolina, "render it necessary that we should enforce the embargo with the bayonet or repeal it. I will repeal it—and I could weep over it more than over a lost child."

Repeal of the embargo

Jefferson outwardly abdicated any policy. His term expired

March 4, 1809, and he would let his successor decide. Madison, with Gallatin's support, worked out a clean-cut policy of continuing the embargo until June, 1809, and then declaring war. But a factional group made up of William Giles of Virginia and Samuel and Robert Smith of Maryland, from personal hostility to Madison and Gallatin, joined with the Federalists to defeat the policy of the president-elect. They secured the repeal of the embargo and the substitution for it of an act forbidding any commercial intercourse with France, Great Britain, or their possessions. To put a climax on their mischief, they compelled Madison to abandon his intention of making Gallatin secretary of state and to appoint in his stead the impossible Robert Smith.

Madison's policy frustrated

Here in effect ended the Republican policy of economic pressure as a substitute for war. Jefferson had advocated it because he distrusted the strong government war necessitates; he had found an even stronger one necessary to make commercial war effective. By seeking for redress by the means of restriction and diplomacy instead of by the sword he had damped for a time the sensitiveness and pride of the American people and made them willing to acquiesce in wrong done them by one more powerful than they. A lesser evil was that commercial restriction, by reducing revenue, rendered the United States so much the less able to make war. The failure of Jefferson's system weighed on him as he left office.

Failure of Jefferson's policy

Those same months saw the publication of Washington Irving's *Knickerbocker's History of New York*, in its fresh native humor the forerunner of a distinctively American type of literature. In its pages, more imaginative than historical, the Sage of Monticello appears in the guise of Wilhelmus Kieft, governor of New Netherland. His installation of windmills as the defenses of New Amsterdam, his futile attempts to withstand aggressors by proclamations, his dispatch of his trumpeter Antony van Corlear on futile errands with them, his death in an attempt to catch birds by sprinkling salt on their tails, these are an exquisite satirization of the gunboat defense

Washington Irving satirizes Jefferson

policy, the commercial warfare, the missions of James Monroe, and the genuine scientific interests of the master of the Jeffersonian régime.

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

E. Channing, *The Jeffersonian System* (*American Nation*, vol. XII). New York, 1906.

H. Adams, *History of the United States of America during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison.* 9 vols. New York, 1889–1901.

——, *John Randolph.* Boston, 1882.

W. F. McCaleb, *The Aaron Burr Conspiracy.* New York, 1903.

E. Channing, *A History of the United States*, vol. IV. New York, 1917.

J. B. McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States*, vols. II and III. New York, 1885–1891.

A. J. Beveridge, *The Life of John Marshall*, vols. II and III. Boston, 1916–1919.

CHAPTER XV

BLUNDERING INTO WAR

In the days when American policy seemed a tame surrender to aggressive and warlike nations, the American people serenely went about their business. They had a continent to develop and exploit, and every day's work in the opening of farms, in the expansion of civilization, was so much more accomplished. A few westerners and the upper classes generally might understand the code of honor of the international duellist; the mass of the people had rejected it. Anxious to disregard Europe altogether while they did the work next to hand, they believed the leaders who told them that entrance into the European war was unnecessary. But in no sense did they lack courage individually. In the frontiersman, ready generation after generation to pitch his cabin, clear his cornfield and settle his family on the outskirts of civilization at the mercy of the first Indian raid, in the recklessness of the western land speculator, in the willingness of the Yankee seaman to trust to his wit and skill to steer in safety a light craft overmasted and oversailed, in the general willingness of individual Americans to take a chance, lay the promise of a more daring foreign policy in the future.

American courage

Cautious diplomacy had been busy during the embargo. In the summer of 1807 an attempt of England to offer reparation for the *Chesapeake* outrage had come to nothing because Madison insisted on linking with it the whole question of impressment. George Rose was then sent as a special envoy to the United States, reaching it late in December. His instructions were at least partially suggested by the fact that Tory public opinion inclined to approve the high-handed action of Admiral Berkeley. Rose was instructed to demand the recall of Jefferson's proclamation of July 2, 1807, before offering reparation; further he was to demand a disavowal of Barron's act in harboring

Rose's mission

British deserters. The mission ended in failure. The *Chesapeake* remained unredressed.

Negotiations were now pressed in England; there, William Pinkney offered the repeal of the embargo for the repeal of the orders in council. In answer Canning permitted himself the cheap sarcasm that the British government would be glad to help the United States disburden itself of the embargo, but not because England was hurt by it. Napoleon, on his part, failed to take advantage of the embargo, a far greater blow to England than to himself, to relax his commercial "system." Instead, with his instinct to snap up a few easy millions he issued the Bayonne Decree of April 17, 1808, seizing all American vessels in his ports on the ground that the embargo had forbidden them to go to sea. The place of issue, where he trapped the relics of Bourbon Spanish royalty before setting his brother Joseph on the Spanish throne, was significant of another act of international aggression. Once more he dangled the lure of Florida before the United States.

Negotiations in Europe

George Canning early in 1809 made a fresh attempt at a settlement with the United States. On January 23, 1809, Erskine was instructed that if the *Chesapeake* proclamation were tacitly withdrawn, and the United States engaged to exclude foreign seamen from her ships, it would be sufficient to warrant a complete disavowal of the *Leopard's* act. As to the rest, if the United States recognized the Rule of 1756 and prescribed nonintercourse with France, the orders in council might be recalled. Erskine in his anxiety to reach a settlement exceeded his instructions. He accepted the fact that certain conditions existed, as an avowal by the United States of the principles they implied. On April 19, 1809, therefore, he announced the withdrawal of the orders in council as regards the United States to take effect June 10, 1809.

Erskine's negotiation

The joy of the Republicans was short-lived. On May 24 Canning disavowed Erskine's settlement of the *Chesapeake* question and of the orders in council, alleging that the required prerequisites had not been fulfilled. Madison once more put noninter-

course in effect against England. In the fall, there appeared Francis Jackson, the British emissary in the Copenhagen outrage of 1807. Madison resolved to get rid of him in short order. He decoyed Jackson into the repeated statement that the American government had been aware of Erskine's violation of instructions, and then intimated that the government could have no further communication with him. The Federalists of the north fêted him; long since they had professed to believe the Republican government was but the tool of France for the ruin of England. They made no secret of their sympathy with the land they regarded as the bulwark of law, religion, and order.

Erskine disavowed: Jackson

The Congress that met in the fall of 1809 was elected on the issue of the embargo. It was not disposed to fight either France or England, and it did not continue the nonintercourse act. Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina reported the so-called Macon's Bill, closing American ports to British and French ships but otherwise leaving commerce free—really a navigation act for encouragement of American shipping. The malcontents in the Senate amended it to death. Next an act, usually known as Macon's Bill Number Two, opened intercourse with the world; it provided that if either France or England before March 3, 1811 should revoke its "system," nonintercourse should go into effect against the other.

Macon's Bill No. 2

The student of the diplomatic mazes of 1803–1812 may be pardoned for doubting occasionally whether Napoleon ever had broader aims with respect to American commerce than to decoy it into his ports to be confiscated for his treasury. Certainly both in France and England, in 1810, commercial measures were directed rather to favoring French and English merchants respectively than to the crushing by commercial force of a hostile power. Trade was carried on by ships of both nations under a system of licenses and fraudulent neutral flags. That Napoleon was able to manipulate the policy of Macon's Bill Number Two in such a fashion as to force the United States into war with England in defense of the false assertion that the French decrees were

Napoleon's real policy

repealed was his luck rather than his skill. Napoleon persisted to the end in outraging American opinion by blundering attacks on commerce, so that when Madison was at last forced into war with France's mortal enemy the President had but half the United States behind him.

Before hearing of Macon's Bill Number Two, Napoleon on March 23, 1810, issued the Decree of Rambouillet, seizing all American ships in Holland, Spain, France, or Italy on the ostensible pretext of the Nonintercourse Act. This decree was not published until May 14, 1810. Afterward, his policy made one of its sudden changes. He planned to substitute for his decrees a system of customs regulations, prohibitory duties, a series of licenses to American ships for certain specific trades, and requirements as to the composition of return cargoes. His new system classified all ships as unlicensed and English or licensed and French. To the United States he proposed specifically that the Berlin and Milan Decrees be recalled as of November 1, 1810, provided that Great Britain should revoke her orders or that the United States, conformably to Macon's Bill Number Two, should cause England to respect American rights. His French designedly left a doubt as to whether his conditions were precedent or subsequent. In a letter dated August 5, his foreign minister, Duc de Cadore, announced the policy to the United States. It reached Madison in unofficial form on September 25.

Napoleon pretends to repeal his Decrees

Madison jumped at the opportunity. On November 2, 1810, he proclaimed nonintercourse with England after February 2, 1811. Then, having thus committed himself to acceptance of the French repeal, he spent months of weary waiting for it, varied by attempts to convince the English representative of what the cabinet privately doubted, that the decrees were really abandoned. For no formal decree of repeal was published. French ministers, when pressed, pointed to evidence that the decrees were no longer enforced at least against American ships; but other evidence, in most disconcerting fashion, indicated the contrary.

Madison believes Napoleon

In London, events justified Pinkney in a bolder tone. England was in severe commercial distress; American foodstuffs were badly needed, both there and as a supply to the commissariat of the English armies in Spain. The final lapse of George III into insanity in October, 1810, brought in his son to rule as Prince Regent; for a time it was hoped he would replace the Tories with a Whig ministry. On November 3, 1810, Pinkney, on the ground of the reported repeal of the French decrees, demanded the repeal of the orders in council. Marquis Wellesley, now in charge of foreign affairs, listened to him with more respect than Canning had done; but Spencer Perceval's obstinacy was still in the way. In the winter of 1811, Pinkney took formal leave, under his instructions, on the ground that no English minister had been sent to replace Jackson. The British government hurried out Augustus J. Foster with specific instructions for settling the *Chesapeake* affair. He found it forgotten in a new situation.

Pinkney's inamicable leave

In May of 1811 the frigate *President*, passing out through the Chesapeake Capes to check the impressment of American seamen off the port of New York, gave chase to a British warship whose conduct was suspicious. The *President* overtook the chase at dusk, and when she hailed was answered with a cannon shot that lodged in the *President's* mainmast. The shot was instantly answered; three more shots came from the stranger, and then, after fifteen minutes firing, she was silenced. The *President's* commander had suspected his antagonist to be the King's frigate *Guerrière*, notorious for her attacks on American commerce, and was disappointed to find her the sloop of war, *Little Belt*, of but half the *President's* force. The American navy believed that another British ship had tried to repeat the *Leopard's* insolence, and had been almost blown out of the water for her pains. Reparation for the *Chesapeake* was now a matter that could rest; and Foster's settlement of the incident in 1811 excited little attention.

The "President" and the "Little Belt"

The international situation at large was slowly changing. John Quincy Adams, son of John Adams, had been sent as minis-

ter to Russia and had found the Czar anxious to encourage American trade to his ports, and to protect it in the Baltic against the operation of the French system. The alliance between France and Russia that had depended largely on Russian support of Napoleon's continental system was breaking down under economic necessity. Russia and Sweden were ready to welcome tropical produce in American ships even at the risk of war with France. At the same time Monroe, now secretary of state, was sorely "tried by assuring Foster in the morning that the decrees were repealed, and rating Serurier [the French minister] in the afternoon because they were in force." The diplomatists had reached an impasse; and the Congress that met for the first time in 1811 had to find the way out.

Russian friendship

In that Congress the leadership of the Senate still lay with men like Giles who put the political embarrassment of Gallatin and Madison above the needs of the country. But in the House was a group of young men, destined to exhibit qualities of statesmanship and leadership such as it had not seen since Randolph had gone into opposition—John C. Calhoun, William Lowndes, and Langdon Cheves of South Carolina, Henry Clay and Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky, Felix Grundy of Tennessee, Peter B. Porter of western New York. Southerners and westerners alike, they typified a new spirit of impatience with compromise and surrender, a new determination to wipe out the disgraces of the past in a fight. To these men England was the natural opponent. They believed she had fostered the spirit of resistance in the Indians of the northwest, and had supported Tecumseh's confederacy to stay the advance of white settlement in Indiana. To her account they placed the heavy bloodshed of the indecisive battle of Tippecanoe, fought by Governor Harrison of Indiana against Tecumseh's brother, the Shawnee Prophet, November 7, 1811.

The Congress of 1811

The whole situation in the west inspired action. Supple American policy had been slowly loosing the grasp of Canadian comships; on the fur trade. The days when Mackinac, in theory an the con an army post, was actually the base of a Canadian fur

trade that spanned the continent were passing. On the acquisition of Louisiana, the United States had barred British traders from the trans-Mississippi regions which they had roamed freely in the days of Spanish rule. Judicious enforcement of the embargo on British goods passing through American territory had ruined the trade of the great Michillimackinac Company. American fur traders had embarked in the trade of the Missouri region. Between 1808 and 1811 John Jacob Astor of New York had planned an American fur company with trade lines spanning the continent from New York to Mackinac and Mackinac to Oregon. In Oregon, where Captain Gray's ship *Columbia*, embarked on the fur trade between the Pacific coast and China, in 1792 had discovered the Columbia River, and with it an American claim to Oregon, Astor projected the post of Astoria. The contest of a generation between Canadian and American for control of the fur trade and dominion of the Indian tribes seemed to have reached a crisis. The westerners were eager to decide it by the sword.

The British influence wanes in the west

They were confronted, however, with the larger question as to whether they and the country were ready to pay the price for war. Had the United States fought in 1807, 1808, or 1809 there would have been surplus customs duties and a warlike spirit. Now heavy loans and internal taxes would be necessary, contrary to older Republican principles. The spirit of the country could not produce a heavy enlistment. To embarrass the administration, Giles proposed increasing the increment to the regular army from 10,000 to 25,000, a number impossible to be raised. The old Republican prejudices against a navy operated to defeat a proposal to build new frigates and ships of the line. The Federalists weakened the nation's morale by insisting on what was obvious, that the Decrees were not revoked, and by drawing the less valid conclusion that the Republicans were sold to Napoleon. A war loan early in the spring produced but six millions out of eleven asked; Federalist New England, the richest section of the country, held off. Napoleon's falseness with the Decrees was taking its toll of the efficiency of his new associate.

Misgivings as to war

But the United States had gone too far to recede from the position that the decrees were repealed. Even with the news that French frigates were burning American ships at sea she must go on.

War declared

Dispatches to Foster from the British Foreign Office, dated January 28 and April 10, received on March 21 and May 22, reiterated the English refusal to recede from the orders in council until France repealed her decrees for all nations. Madison gave up all hope for peace. Through "Count Edward de Crillon," proved later to be a French spy, Madison bought the letters of John Henry, a Canadian agent who had sounded the loyalty of the New England Federalists in 1808–1809; on these letters, on England's interference with American trade, and on impressment he based his war message to Congress of June 1. The House voted for war 79 to 49 on June 4, and the Senate 19 to 13 on June 18. Both votes were below the normal administration majority; but even the western "war hawks" had had their enthusiasm against England damped by the action of France.

Just too late the English government gave way. Foster's association with the New England Federalists had led him to ad-

England gives way too late

vise his government that the United States would not go to the point of war; his mistake was at last apparent. The outcry of the manufacturers at the loss of the American market, the sufferings of the lower classes were at last impressing even the Tory majority. Henry Brougham began a savage attack on the whole system; little by little he gained ground, as even the Tories believed the orders were not worth an American war. When Spencer Perceval fell before an assassin's bullet May 11, the last obstacle was down. On June 16, Castlereagh announced to the House of Commons the suspension of the orders.

Had an Atlantic cable existed in 1812 the war might have been fought against France; for in May of 1812 a French minister had the supreme effrontery to exhibit to the American envoy a pre-

Napoleonic mendacity

tended decree of April 28, 1811, purporting to revoke the Berlin and Milan Decrees as of November 1, 1810, and the further effrontery to insist it had been transmitted to the American government. The very date of the false decree

offered apparent proof to Madison's Federalist assailants that, as the tool of Napoleon, he had forced war with England by insisting to her that the Decrees were repealed long before they were, even on paper. The insolent blundering of English Tories and the shameless lying of French diplomats had driven the United States into a war in which the only benefit was to be the recovery of national self-respect.

The principles of Jeffersonian Republicanism and the national leaders who had exemplified them were not calculated to produce success in war. Jefferson, Madison, and Gallatin were men of peace; Monroe very much overestimated his military acquisitions during his career in the Revolution. The doctrine of these men had deprecated strong armies and navies. Madison had been content to leave William Eustis and Paul Hamilton, hopeless incompetents, as secretaries of war and navy. The navy had been neglected; the army, never too good, had been allowed to deteriorate under command of the traitorous intriguer, General James Wilkinson. The Revolutionary War lay thirty years in the past. The youngest men who had served in it as field officers were in the neighborhood of sixty. Under generals selected from them, Dearborn, Hull, Wilkinson, Winchester, the army met its worst reverses in the first stages of the war.

Unpreparedness

The first operation dictated by the war party was naturally the conquest of Canada. But on every route of invasion save that through the trough of Lake Champlain—by the outlet of Lake Ontario, by Niagara, and by Detroit—naval control of the Lakes was essential to success. Without it, transportation was everywhere difficult; in places, as in the expanse of marsh and river bottom around the west end of Lake Erie, it was impossible. Yet the government had made no steps to secure naval supremacy, and both Lakes Ontario and Erie were under British control at the outset. To add to the difficulty, Mackinac, not reënforced before the close of navigation in 1811, fell into the hands of the British, July 17, 1812; and hordes of savages from the northwest were set free for operations against Detroit.

British control of the Lakes: its results

There General William Hull had essayed a feeble invasion of Canada. His baggage and orders, sent trustingly by the lake to Detroit, fell into enemy hands. The failure of General Dearborn to organize offensives further east left the vigorous English General Isaac Brock to turn all his force on Hull. Hull, his communications threatened by the Indians in his rear, fell back to Detroit on August 8; on the approach of Brock he let himself be influenced by threats of Indian massacres in case of resistance, and surrendered on August 16. Farther east, at Niagara, Generals Van Rensselaer and Smyth attempted invasions of Canada, and literally accomplished no more than making American armies ridiculous. With completely inferior forces the British had succeeded in holding Canada intact.

Hull's surrender

The administration now showed the belated wisdom of dispatching naval officers, Elliot and Chauncey, to build fleets on Erie and Ontario to secure control of them for future operations. William Henry Harrison, governor of Indiana Territory, a man whose writing teemed with allusions to the civil and military exploits of the ancients, had got himself successively appointed major general of Kentucky volunteers and federal commander in the northwest; he was wasting the energy and fighting qualities of Kentucky frontiersmen in a futile campaign in northwest Ohio. Difficulties of transportation in that land of marsh and interlocking river tributaries prevented him from doing anything but establishing advance supply depots, which he could hardly defend against enemy raids. In this position he frittered away the enthusiasm of ten thousand men. In January of 1813, a body of frontiersmen who had advanced under General Winchester to the River Raisin were overcome and massacred by the Indians. Fighting doggedly with insufficient supplies and wretched leadership, they proved at least what the despised militia might have been worth if properly led and equipped. As might have been expected thenceforth the militia let Harrison use his regulars. He was saved by the supineness of Proctor, the British general at Malden, whose attacks on Fort Meigs and Fort Stephenson, delayed until the garrisons were prepared, were beaten off.

Harrison's campaigns

Meanwhile Commander O. H. Perry of the navy, who had been engaged in mustering the naval resources of the government on Lake Erie, had built and concentrated a fleet superior



to the British. For the sake of supplying their troops on Lake Erie, they had to offer battle at Put-in Bay September 10. What should have been a decisive victory for the American fleet was

endangered by the bad conduct of the *Niagara*, Perry's second ship. After his flagship, the *Lawrence*, had been disabled by the enemy fire, Perry made his way to the *Niagara* to bring her into the fight, and to clinch the destruction of the whole British fleet. As a result, Proctor abandoned Detroit in headlong haste, retreating across the river into Canada. Harrison pursued with 4,500 infantry and Colonel Johnson's mounted regiment, and cut the retreating British force to pieces at the Battle of the Thames. Here Tecumseh met his death, supposedly at the hands of Johnson.

Perry's victory

Perry's victory and the Battle of the Thames should have decided the war in the west. But an attempt to seize Mackinac in 1814 was foiled, and the schooners in which it was made were later captured by the garrison. The British there were able later to detach a force to drive the Americans from Prairie du Chien on the Mississippi and to hold the place, a center of the western fur trade, against two American attacks. There was no other military activity in the north beyond the New York frontier.

End of the war in the west

In 1813 the War Department under General Armstrong, a new and more able secretary, was able to concentrate a decidedly superior force on Lake Ontario to be wasted by General Dearborn. A campaign against the British at the west end of the lake around Niagara bore no other fruit than the capture of Fort George and York on the Canadian side and the burning of the public buildings at York. An attack by the British General Prevost on Sacketts Harbor was beaten off by a local Quaker militia officer named Jacob Brown. Later in the summer a concerted attack on Canada, Wilkinson descending the St. Lawrence and Hampton advancing from Lake Champlain, was a complete fiasco. A part of Wilkinson's force, all regulars, was defeated at Chrystler's Farm. At the close of the campaign the British compelled the evacuation of Fort George, seized Fort Niagara, and burned Black Rock and Buffalo. The only American advantage from the year was the final retirement of Wilkinson and Dearborn, and the rise to notice of one or two

Campaigns of 1813 in the east

hard-hitting officers of a younger generation, such as Brown and Winfield Scott.

However, the complete and contemptible failure of the administration, and its generals in Canada was not the outstanding feature of the first two years of the war. Perhaps not even the American naval officers, certainly least of all the United States government, had suspected that American naval draftsmen had designed a 44-gun frigate that could outsail, outmaneuver, outweather, and far outfight the typical British 38; that American naval officers in handling these frigates, and American gun crews in fighting them, were as good as or better than the very best the British navy could show. True the American navy could hardly count one ship for fifty of Great Britain's. Still the swarming American privateers that preyed on British merchantmen and evaded British cruisers alarmed British statesmen with the reflection that in quality America had the raw material for a sea power equal to Great Britain's and possibly one day might have it in quantity also.

The American frigates

In the first weeks of the war Commodore Rodgers put to sea with a little American squadron for an extended cruise to protect American merchantmen on their way to home ports. The presence of his force made it unsafe for British frigates to cruise singly to pick up American vessels and insured the complete success of his mission. Isaac Hull with the *Constitution*, sailing from Chesapeake Bay, by sheer skill in handling his ship escaped from a British squadron to Boston. Sailing again, on the 19th of August he encountered, south of Cape Race, the British 38-gun frigate *Guerrière*. Confident of the superior quality of his ship, the Briton accepted battle at close range, to find at once that he was in the grip of a superior force and skill. In less than thirty minutes his vessel was a sinking wreck; with a force of 10 to 7, the relative damage inflicted was 10 to 2.

"Constitution" and "Guerriére"

This was no chance happening. On October 25 Decatur with the *United States*, in a two-hour action off the Azores captured the British 38-gun *Macedonian*, and brought her into port to be added

to the American navy, a trophy most galling to British pride. Late in the year, off Brazil, the *Constitution* captured the 38-gun *Java*, in little more than an hour's fighting. Here the odds were about 10 to 9 in favor of the American. It might be alleged that the British had yielded to a superior force; but that could not account for the United States 20-gun sloop *Wasp* in forty-three minutes capturing the *Frolic*, her superior by a few pounds of broadside. Canning in Parliament voiced the dismay of all Englishmen when he pronounced broken "the sacred spell of the invincibility of the British navy."

Other ship duels

The privateers added significant ciphers to the digits of accomplishment by the frigates. Hardly had war broken out than swift sailing vessels numbered in hundreds sallied out to pick up unarmed British merchantmen. More effective than the naval vessels as commerce destroyers, their greater mobility and greater numbers emphasized to the British shipowner the new claim of the United States to international respect. The British government on its side could point to the fact that its cruisers had practically driven unarmed American merchantmen off the sea.

The privateers

The British admiralty took precautionary measures as best it could. It no longer sent out its 38-gun frigates singly to fall prey to the American forty-fours. With its vastly superior naval force it penned up American ships in port wherever it could and instituted a rigorous blockade of the coast as far north as New England. Aware of the attitude of New England Federalists toward England and the war, the British government afforded their commerce this profitable mark of its approbation.

The British blockade

England indeed went into the war reluctantly. In 1812, with Napoleon's vast invasion of Russia seemingly successful, she sought an armistice to give an opportunity for peace on the basis of the repeal of the orders in council. Madison's administration thought the game in its own hands and held out for higher terms. Napoleon's complete overthrow in the retreat from Moscow changed the situation; and Madison was glad to accept an offer of media-

tion made by Russia in September, 1812, and to dispatch Gallatin and Bayard to join John Quincy Adams in the negotiation. England declined the mediation but was ready to treat separately. The campaign of 1813 in Europe, promising well for Napoleon at the beginning, ended in his crushing defeat at Leipzig, his headlong flight to France, and the crossing of the Pyrenees by Wellington's army from Spain. The winter of 1814 saw the collapse of Napoleon. England, planning to use her advantage against the United States to extort a peace with victory, dispatched veteran regiments from Wellington's army to inflict a decisive defeat on the Americans in the summer of 1814.

The war in Europe

Fortunately, the United States had at last found competent soldiers to command its army. In a series of savagely fought little actions around Niagara without decisive strategic result, Chippewa, Lundy's Lane, and the defense of Fort Erie, regulars and militia led by Jacob Brown and Winfield Scott obtained tactical successes over superior forces of British regulars. An invasion on water and land by way of Lake Champlain was checked by McDonough in a brilliant naval action on the lake; and at Plattsburg, Macomb with a decidedly inferior force compelled the retreat of a large invading force of Wellington's best. The campaign of 1814 closed in the north with the American defense successful, and both sides building for naval control of Erie and Ontario in the spring.

Campaigns of 1814

Next after the skill and steadiness of American commanders and troops in 1814, New York was saved by the loyal support which its Governor Daniel D. Tompkins gave the war. The election of 1813, in which he was barely successful over the Federalist candidate, was a crucial one. In New England things went worse. It was true that in enlistment and in the activity of her privateers New England compared favorably with the southern States that had sponsored the war. But the attitude of New England governments and majorities walked close to disloyalty and treason. In the belief that Madison had plotted with Napoleon an unjust war on England, Massachusetts society ostracized those who subscribed to war loans. By the

New England and the war

purchase of British treasury notes indeed New England probably lent Great Britain more money than she did the United States. The British armies in Canada could not have been provisioned without food smuggled across the border. The Massachusetts Senate pronounced that it did not become a moral and religious people to rejoice for victories gained in an unjust war. In 1814 Massachusetts formally refused any support to the central government.

Even after 1814 saw the blockade extended to the New England coast, and the British forces conquering Maine as a permanent acquisition, New England failed to learn her lesson. Old Federalist intriguers like Pickering tried to draw their section out of the Union into independence. The famous Hartford Convention of 1814–1815 was actually under the control of moderate elements, and voiced a moderate program when it proposed the interposition of state laws to protect the individual citizen from the war powers of the federal government, and the employment of the militia and federal taxes of New England for her own defense. Were these demands not accorded by the federal government, the convention held in reserve a more extreme course of action.

The Hartford Convention

The federal government had been declining in authority and in ability to make war ever since 1812. At the outset the reëlection of Madison to the presidency over De Witt Clinton by but 128 votes to 89 was significant; for Clinton's votes, cast by Federalists and malcontent Republicans, showed how strong was opposition to the war. The votes of Vermont, Pennsylvania, and part of Maryland were all Madison received north of the Potomac. Even the ambitions of Monroe to play a part that would qualify him for the presidency in 1816 were a source of weakness, especially as his rivals for the nomination would naturally come from the crucial State of New York.

Reëlection of Madison, 1812

Not much could be done by Congress to strengthen the government. Additional frigates and ships of the line were authorized in 1813, but with the British blockade growing stricter they could do no good. The Federalists forced the retention of the Nonimpor-

tation Act to protect New England manufactures, and this cut down the customs revenue. To finance the war, loans and treasury notes were the only resources. Philadelphia and New York bankers were the only recourse for loans, and at heavier and heavier discounts. Specie had drained into New England and thence Republicans had no charms to draw it.

Weakness of the government

A military disaster on the doorstep of the federal government in 1814 completed its ruin. Ever since the outbreak of the war the British had controlled Chesapeake Bay with their fleet, occasionally making shore raids. On one of them at Hampton the raiding forces got out of hand and committed savage outrages on noncombatants. Reënforced in 1814 with additional troops, the British planned a more important blow. Armstrong had insisted that Washington was safe because the British had nothing to gain by attacking it. When the attack came, on August 24, 1814, a combination of hopeless blundering and meddling by Armstrong, Monroe, and Winder, the general immediately in command, led to the entirely unnecessary defeat of Bladensburg, and the still more unnecessary evacuation of Washington, which the British held just long enough to burn the public buildings. The panic-stricken flight of Madison and his government added a dramatic touch to make Bladensburg prick like a thorn in American consciousness for a generation to come. The repulse of a subsequent attack on Baltimore offered a sentimental relief that has made Francis Scott Key's song in commemoration of the victory, *The Star Spangled Banner*, the national anthem of the United States.

Bladensburg

After Bladensburg, the United States hardly had an operating central government. Bankruptcy came in August-September, 1814, when specie payments were suspended and funds could no longer be transferred from section to section save in irredeemable bank paper. Taxation was useless, for it would merely bring in paper money. Monroe had to pledge his personal credit for small loans by local banks. Treasury notes had depreciated hopelessly. In discussing a stringent draft

The government bankrupt

law in 1814–1815 to fill the federal armies Congress was discussing a measure which probably it could not have enforced.

Though federal authority had disintegrated, the United States was very far indeed from military and naval collapse. The Jeffersonian government was too simple a structure to bear the weight of war. But the political and individual organisms that made up the disintegrating federal body were still able to function. In naval actions, since 1813, the balance of British and American successes had been nearly even. In 1813 and 1814 the privateers were deadlier than ever. As British merchant ships armed for self-defense, the privateers had grown fewer in number, but larger and more heavily manned and gunned. Rakish overrigged vessels, they could outmaneuver and outsail a pursuing warship in any but the heaviest weather. Their reckless design and still more reckless handling earned the tribute of unwilling British admiration. Occasionally a privateer could record the repulse of a British cutting-out party, or some daring checkmate of an overwhelming military force. The damage they did to British commerce was terrific. They cut ships out of convoys, and picked up single vessels until the ministry admitted that ships unescorted could not safely cross the Irish Channel. Insurance rates of 13 per cent for the voyage gave a bitter point to the proclamation of blockade of the British Isles that Captain Boyle of the privateer *Chasseur* sent into Lloyds. It was small consolation to British shipowners that American commerce was in even worse plight. The harassing of British commerce by the privateers was a strong influence on the ministry for according America reasonable terms of peace.

Privateering

In 1814, the British government had launched a large military and naval expedition against New Orleans and the mouth of the Mississippi. The commander of the Gulf region was Andrew Jackson of Tennessee, who owed his command to the extraordinary qualities of leadership and discipline he had shown in using the Tennessee militia to put down a dangerous Creek Indian uprising in 1813–1814. In his defense against the British expedition Jackson has been blamed for

The British expedition to the Gulf

slowness by amateur critics, because he did not concentrate at New Orleans until he was sure it was the British point of attack. However, his concentration when made was effective.

To the east of New Orleans, by Lake Borgne, the British landed a force of 8,000 veterans for the attack. Jackson, disposing an inferior force of regulars, Tennessee and Kentucky militia and volunteers, had to cover three possible routes of attack through the swamps that surrounded the city. On the 23d of December he drove in the British advance along the levee of the east bank of the Mississippi below the city, and gained time to fortify a line of defense. On the first of January the British began a cannonade at the American line, only to be silenced by the American guns.

The British attack at New Orleans

A week later the British undertook, with a flanking division west of the river, to drive straight on the American works the columns of veteran regiments that had gone over the walls of Spanish fortresses in the face of the best infantry of France. They had the right to suppose that raw militia would lose its nerve before the steadiness of their onset; but they had not learned that the value of American citizen soldiery depends on its leadership. That 8th of January saw a hopeless slaughter of British battalions, by American artillery and rifle, that ended any hopes of a capture of New Orleans. The last act of the war on land had once more demonstrated to American self-respect the potential fighting qualities of American troops.

Battle of New Orleans, Jan. 8, 1815

Before the battle of New Orleans was fought, peace had been made. The American delegation, Adams, Bayard, Jonathan Russell, Gallatin, and Clay, were the best brains America could produce, matched against second-rate British diplomats, Lord Gambier, Henry Goulburn, and William Adams. The Americans, in face of an England triumphant on the Continent, had to give up all hope of settlement of the issues of neutral trade and impressment on which the war had begun. They had to meet demands on the part of the British envoys for boundary rectifications, the abandonment of fishing rights, the continued

The Treaty of Peace

navigation of the Mississippi, and a permanent Indian buffer state in the northwest on American territory. By threatening to break off negotiations on such extreme demands, they put the unskillful British negotiators in the wrong with a British public anxious for peace on fair terms. At last both fisheries and navigation of the Mississippi were excluded from the treaty. Settling nothing but peace with the old boundaries, it gave the United States everything it needed. Generations were to elapse before neutral trade or impressment could ever again be issues. With territorial integrity secured, the American people had acquired the time they needed to occupy their imperial domain in peace, to people and to exploit it, and to fashion for themselves at leisure a government better suited to their needs.

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

K. C. Babcock, *The Rise of American Nationality* (*American Nation*, vol. XIII). New York, 1906.
A. T. Mahan, *Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812*. 2 vols. Boston, 1905.
T. Roosevelt, *The Naval War of 1812*. New York, 1882.
E. Channing, *A History of the United States*, vol. IV. New York, 1917.
J. B. McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States*, vol. III. New York, 1891.
A. J. Beveridge, *The Life of John Marshall*, vol. III. Boston, 1919.
S. E. Morison, *Maritime History of Massachusetts, 1783–1860*. New York, 1921.
H. Adams, *John Randolph*. Boston, 1882.
——, *History of the United States of America during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison*. 9 vols. New York, 1889–1901.
J. T. Adams, *New England in the Republic, 1776–1850*. Boston, 1926.

CHAPTER XVI

THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONALISM

As the student of American history passes the year 1815 he becomes sharply conscious that a fundamental change has been taking place in the life of the American people, since in 1776 it had set about achieving its independence. In very truth economic, social, political, and religious forces had been transmuting the very essence of the Republic, making it more and more what the term American means to us to-day. In government the problem of the generation of 1815–1840 was essentially the readjustment of political forms and laws to the newer national life.

The changing American nation

In 1815 the change was not as yet apparent in the outward things of life. The tight trousers of light shade, the ruffled shirt, the long-tailed bright-colored coat, the huge shaggy high hat of the dandy of the "era of good feeling" is farther from the raiment of our day than from the scarlet coat, laced waistcoat, satin smallclothes, silk hose, lace, and cocked hat of the beau of 1776. Life had few more conveniences to offer the wealthy man at the end of the period than at the beginning. The wax or tallow candle, and the sperm-oil lamp had not yet been eclipsed by the gasolier. Only in Pennsylvania was coal, as a substitute for wood, beginning to travel far from the mines. The steamboat, first made practicable by Robert Fulton on the Hudson in 1807, was just giving new speed and pleasure to river travel; but the coach and the horseman still lumbered and floundered along roads that were usually seas of mud. Perils of storms, wreckers, and pirates still attended the coastwise sailing vessels that remained the main means of travel among the Atlantic seaboard States. The gentleman of 1815 drank no better wines, ate no wider range of food, lived in no more comfortable a home than his father had done. In the lot of the upland farmer,

The world of 1815

or the town mechanic in his mean house or tenement, could be noted no improvement at all.

In the finer things of culture the nineteenth century was witnessing a development distinctively American. In the service of the men who acquired wealth in trade or speculation arose designers of fine private houses and public buildings like Charles Bulfinch, whose work stands the test of artistic criticism. The movement for the revival of the classic in public architecture originated in the first years of the nineteenth century not in Europe but in America. In the furnishing of American houses of wealth, furniture makers like Duncan Phyfe achieved genuine distinction and grace in the lines of older colonial styles. The other arts followed more slowly. Painting was developed out of portraiture by such men as Stuart, Allston, and Vanderlyn, the protégé of Aaron Burr. German landscape painting influenced a group of men who finally in the Hudson River School achieved a real expression of the American atmosphere and countryside.

The fine arts in America

Until the beginning of the nineteenth century American literature was, save for state papers, nonexistent. No better written state documents than the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States can be found in the archives of any nation. Worse poetry than Joel Barlow's *Columbiad* has rarely been printed. No one would think to-day of turning to the "Hartford Wits" for anything but an exercise in literary history. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, Brackenridge struck a new note in fiction by delineating the peculiarities of American character on the frontier. In 1809 Washington Irving produced one of the first genuinely American books in the convulsingly funny *Knickerbocker's History of New York.* James Fenimore Cooper, after experiments in fiction of the current English fashion, was to exploit American scenes and characters in the *Spy* and the *Leatherstocking Tales.* William Cullen Bryant's *Thanatopsis* and *To a Water Fowl* were the first genuine American poetry. The released liberalism of Massachusetts produced Emerson and Henry Thoreau, heads of a school

American literature

of essayists who commented on the deeper meaning of life. The 'thirties saw Edgar Allan Poe, perhaps the greatest of American poets, certainly among the greatest masters of the short story. The copyist of European models still existed; sometimes as in the case of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow he even acquired a tremendous vogue; but at last native craftsmanship had appeared to rebuke the copyist by example.

The theatre developed more slowly. Small urban populations, and religious prejudices were serious hindrances. In 1792, stage plays in Boston masqueraded under the title of "moral lectures." The theatrical promoter as a purveyor of public amusement shaded off into the exhibitor of wax-works and wild animals, forerunner of the circus. As the century went on, English actors made their way over to excite the jealousies of American rivals. But in theatrical ventures the purveyance of amusement was first and artistic expression secondary.

The theatre

In the quality of education the early nineteenth century generally saw little improvement. College standards were no higher, even though colleges multiplied; generally they were denominational and were designed to train ministers for various creeds. In a few cases however—in New York, in Indiana, and in Michigan Territory—universities were projected as the keystones of state systems of schools; the full realization of the ideal lay far in the future. A more promising enterprise was the foundation under Jefferson's auspices of the University of Virginia, avowedly nonsectarian and secular, manned by the ablest professors that could be obtained in America or Europe. In professional education, medical training was still rudimentary. Certain famous law schools such as the one at Litchfield, Connecticut, attended by southerners like John C. Calhoun and Judge A. B. Longstreet, replaced, for the few, the casual instruction of "reading law" in a lawyer's office.

The colleges

More important than any advance in higher education was a movement to extend the opportunities of primary and secondary schools to classes hitherto debarred by their poverty. New York in 1795 and 1805 established state school funds to be distributed

among local schools. By 1821 the State had 300,000 public school children. Connecticut established a school fund in 1795. Pennsylvania based education of the poor on the poor rates. Maryland in 1812 seriously attempted the establishment of free primary schools. In the south the movement was diverted to the establishment of endowed academies which in the end benefited the rich and not the poor. Of the western States in 1824 only Ohio had a system of schools based on taxation. The new States of the west had received liberal grants of public land for education—one section in each township for local schools. As yet they had made no use of their endowment. But the broadening of the basis of popular education was nevertheless sufficiently general to be of vital importance; it was the fit accompaniment of the extension of the suffrage.

Public schools

Religious self-expression by the poorer classes is another marked symptom of the period. Of the older creeds, Anglicanism, discredited by its support of the losing side in the Revolution, disestablished everywhere, maintained its hold on the upper orders. Congregationalism, the state church of the triumphant Revolution in New England, at first spread but slowly outside it. To check a Presbyterian invasion of New England the Congregationalists, by the Plan of Union of 1800, virtually surrendered the newer west to Presbyterianism. It was a generation before Congregational churches began to spring up there in the wake of the New England migration. Presbyterianism pushed vigorously into the west, hampered only in occupying the field by its insistence on a college-trained ministry.

Religion in the new era

The churches that flourished most in the west as elsewhere were the branches of the Baptists and the Methodists. Baptist churches, essentially self-governing congregations with all manner of strange variations of creed, sprang up everywhere from the seed of former church members or lay preachers often strangely ignorant. The Methodist church with its close organization of circuit riders and local class meetings pushed its way into the new country in orderly fashion, organizing and occupying circuit after circuit. Various hybrid denominations

Religious creeds in the west

sprang from the union of those already mentioned—the Cumberland Presbyterian, and the Campbellite. A great religious frenzy swept the west about 1800. Gathering by the thousand in camp meetings—thenceforth a familiar feature of frontier religion—men, women, and children listened for days to the exhortations of the preachers, until they were swept with tides of emotional excitement that expressed itself in such uncouth physical manifestations of conversion as the "jerks."

In material things the United States was developing rapidly. In 1776 Mexico could show a population much greater, far larger cities, and older universities than the Republic of the North. By 1815 the United States, with multiplying and growing cities, had passed Mexico in population. In 1825 the City of New York with a population of 150,000 had supplanted the City of Mexico as the largest on the North American Continent. Boston, since the first part of the eighteenth century, had remained nearly stationary in population at about 20,000, except when the Revolutionary siege had reduced it; she was passed by Philadelphia about 1755 and by New York a generation later. In 1820 she numbered 43,000. In the same year, Philadelphia had some 63,000, only a little more than Baltimore, which since 1790 had increased more than fivefold. Charleston, the commercial metropolis of the lower south, had reached her zenith; New Orleans at the base of the Mississippi Valley had 27,000 citizens in 1820; she already aspired to be the greatest city in America. In 1840 she was neck and neck with Baltimore for second place; thereafter in relative standing she slowly declined. In 1820, everywhere towns were beginning the race to cities. Richmond, Louisville, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Albany were giving promise of their future.

Growth of cities

The forces thus outwardly expressing themselves must be studied section by section. New England, never particularly inviting to agriculture, save in the Connecticut Valley and one or two other favored spots, had always turned to trade and the sea for a livelihood. In the vessels built along the forested reaches of the Merrimac and the shores of Massachusetts Bay, she had not merely a vehicle of trade, but an easily trans-

New England

ported merchandise; on the products of the northern fisheries, on the forest products of lumber, masts, spars, and potash, on the nails and wooden manufactures, fruit of the long winter nights on her snowbound farms, the Boston merchants depended for the first step in a series of profitable barters in every quarter of the globe. The loss of the West India trade after the Revolution had driven the upland farmers in desperation to revolt. The opening up of the East India, China, and Levant trades had restored the situation. True, the period saw an extension of agriculture by the pushing of grazing up the hill slopes. But the surplus of population could not be taken care of in the fisheries, or even on the Maine frontier; and New England became a source of population supply to western New York, to Ohio, and ultimately to the whole west.

The embargo and the War of 1812 accentuated the movement; but they promoted manufacturing and thereby created new employment at home. In farm boys and farm girls, handy at all tasks, was the labor supply, in the falls of the streams the motive power, and in the carefully hoarded fruits of twenty years' neutral trade, the capital for the New England factory system. Factories vied with privateers as investments during the war, and at its end the political voice of New England was divided; the commercial interests urged free trade, the factory owners a tariff on manufactures, the upland farmer protection for raw wool. By 1828 the protectionist interests prevailed.

Rise of New England manufacture

The change was reflected in other ways in Massachusetts. The Jeffersonian policy of moderation by 1807–1808 had seemingly broken the power of the Federalist Brahmins in their New England strongholds; but the policy of commercial restriction and war renewed their strength, and enabled them to adopt the suicidal policy of disloyalty in 1812. After the war their party rotted away or was absorbed by its old rival.

New England Federalism decays

With New England Federalism declined the whole social and religious system that had fostered it. Except perhaps on the New England frontier, the New England village or town was an elabo-

rate social unit directed by conservatism as represented by men of wealth and by the Congregational clergy. In Connecticut, for instance, under the old charter the method of choosing representatives by public vote gave every opportunity for social coercion, direct and indirect. The freemen of the State thus controlled and directed were themselves an upper class, above the great body of the unenfranchised. The Congregationalist ministers of the State, meeting at Yale commencements, in informal caucus settled nominations for public office and other political matters. In Connecticut and Massachusetts alike Congregationalism was accorded special favor in compulsory public support. Not until 1818 in Connecticut did the conservative Episcopalians combine with the Baptists and Methodists to amend the charter to do away with compulsory church rates. Not until 1819 and 1833 did similar action come in New Hampshire and Massachusetts. Congregationalism, no longer accorded compulsory public support in places where no other churches existed, was left to contend with other creeds on a parity.

The changing New England order

In the New England States generally the period saw the riveting of a rotten borough system which awarded a seat in the legislature to each town no matter how small; here was the beginning of the strife in American politics between city and country. Yet in a larger sense, in New England as in the nation at large, the period was one of steady democratic advance. Marked by the extension of the suffrage to a manhood or poll-tax basis, it was marked also by the decline of the influence of the upper classes. The way was being prepared for the conquest of New England by Jacksonian Democracy.

New England: representation and franchise

New York State, rising steadily toward a commanding position in the Union, owed her growth to two assets,—her Genesee wheatfields, and her harbor, so wonderful that Boston merchants were to desert their own reef- and shoal-dotted Bay to place their investments in New York shipping. The Erie Canal, after 1825 connecting the waters of Lake Erie with the Hudson, was undertaken in 1817 through the vision of De Witt Clinton and by his energy was completed at what was then the

New York

staggering cost of seven millions. But the canal exceeded even the predictions of its supporters. It not only opened up western New York to settlement, and developed a cluster of thriving towns; it made New York City the eastern terminus of the most expeditious route to the west. After 1825 emigrants passed westward by the canal and the Great Lakes, and their produce returned the same way to the Manhattan markets. Against such advantages as harbor and canal other cities could not compete. Long before the day of the railroad, New York had outstripped Boston and Philadelphia in commerce and population. As the natural receiving point for the majority of the millions of immigrants she kept her share of them and by the middle of the century was exhibiting on a large scale the cosmopolitan population and life that had distinguished her ever since she was a Dutch trading post.

Politically New York was governed not like New England by a church but by factions based on her landed families. In her centralized government the Council of Appointment could dispose of offices, state, municipal, and local, by the thousand, and was therefore the main prize of political contest. Beside the more or less meaningless designations of Federalist and Republican appear factions centering sometimes around men like De Witt Clinton, sometimes around groups like the "Bucktails." In the school of New York politics, leaders like Van Buren learned an astuteness in management that was the dread of the Virginians from Jefferson down. Not until 1821 did New York close her school by revising her constitution to extend the narrow property limits of suffrage and to abolish the Council of Appointment. The New York political method had then been learned too well to be forgotten.

New York politics

New Jersey can be dismissed as an essentially rural State, whose politics were naturally secondary, like her commerce, to the two cities on her borders, New York and Philadelphia. Prevailingly Republican, she exhibited distinctive traces of the strong Puritan and Quaker elements that had first settled within her bounds.

New Jersey

Pennsylvania, from its size and steadfast democracy, was the northern bulwark of Republicanism. Despite the moneyed aristocracy that clustered around the United States Bank and the commercial center of Philadelphia, the State, with widely extended suffrage, elected to office and sent to Congress men of a lowly type, a following for the Virginia leaders. The strong Quaker element, the German and Welsh emotional religious groups woven into her being, colored intensely her people's attitude toward life and politics. She has never had a state church.

Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania, though prevailingly rural, had naturally been led to simple manufactures by the coal and iron ore in her uplands, where abandoned forges still dot the landscape. Her water power in this period was inviting her to the establishment of little woolen mills as well, and her manufacturing elements by 1816 dictated her policy on the tariff. Her projects for roads and canals to develop her vast extent of territory were helping to maintain the importance of Philadelphia in the western trade and of Pittsburgh as the industrial warehouse of the new west.

Pennsylvania manufactures

Maryland was a neutral zone between the cultures of Pennsylvania and Virginia, between the middle States and the south. She was at once a tobacco and a wheat State. Her port of Baltimore was as aggressive in its search for western trade as any of its neighbors; in 1827 she was projecting the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad as a rival to trade routes terminating at Philadelphia and Norfolk. For some reason, perhaps her conservative state constitution, Maryland was one of the last strongholds of Federalism in the south; so was her neighbor Delaware.

Maryland

By 1815 the decline of Virginia had begun. Her population, her great extent of territory even when curtailed of the old Northwest and Kentucky, the leaders, like Washington, Patrick Henry, and Jefferson whom she had contributed to the infant Republic, and her unity in the cause of the Revolution had given her a commanding prestige in the Union. It is a

Virginia

commonplace to point out that, for all but four of the first thirty-six years of the Constitution, the president had been a Virginian. Virginia's leadership in the Revolution had been succeeded by her leadership in Jeffersonian Republicanism. Save an occasional New Yorker like Burr or Clinton, the Democratic party of the north was content to take both leaders and principles molded by the peculiar Virginia society. Her population, migrating to the west, carried with it reverence and affection for the old State, but sentiment could only delay her declining importance.

The economic basis of Virginia society that had dictated the principles of Jeffersonian democracy was fast decaying in 1815. For almost two centuries wasteful tobacco culture had been stripping her soils. The negro labor of later years could not, it seemed, be taught to put back what was taken out. The remedy in earlier generations had been to seek new soils for old; but after the Revolution new soils could no longer be found within the political limits of the Old Dominion. Those who remained, the greater planters and the lesser farmers, pursued alike by the years of commercial restriction and war which had prevented them from marketing their tobacco and wheat crops, were on the edge of ruin. The estate of one great Virginia leader after another became involved in debt; negroes could not make their keep and public opinion forbade their sale. As John Randolph put it, slaves must soon advertise for their runaway masters. The remedies—scientific restoration of the soil, the reopening of the West India market for wheat, and the sale of slaves to southern markets for the cotton crop—were in the future. Now, with her relative importance in the Union fast declining, Virginia saw her leadership pass elsewhere. The Virginia Constitution of 1830 that deliberately riveted slavery on the State, thus destroying the last hope of emancipation, and also riveted control of the Assembly in the small and depopulated tidewater counties, is essentially the conservative abnegation of her earlier idealism.

Decay of Virginia

Politically and economically North Carolina was always more or less an appanage of Virginia, as in the Roanoke Valley the stolid Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina was the trusting fol-

lower of the brilliant and erratic Virginian, John Randolph. More democratic in representation, she had the advantage of economic diversification from her pine forests with their produce of pitch, tar, and lumber, and from her cotton fields. North Carolina

South Carolina held in the Union a position and attributes all her own. Her rich indigo, cotton, and rice planters had formed at Charleston a society more exclusive and aristocratic, more rigidly based on birth, than existed anywhere else in British North America. South Carolina had little grievance in the British colonial system; why she espoused the cause of the Revolution is not easy to explain. In the years that followed the war the seaboard planters were concerned in consolidating their power in the state legislature by securing a balance of representation against the small farmers of the upland, until in the nineteenth century the plantation system pushed the small farmers out. The invention of the cotton gin made cotton a staple South Carolina crop; and her planters flourished on it until they met the competition of the newer Gulf States where an increase in production ultimately lowered the price to a point that was dangerously near the costs on poorer soils. In the early nineteenth century the leaders of South Carolina, Calhoun, William Lowndes, Langdon Cheves, were distinctly nationalist. It seemed for a time that a South Carolina dynasty might succeed Virginia's. But South Carolina, a staple State, was necessarily taxed by the tariff on her manufactured goods, whether imported from New or Old England. That and fear of northern aggression against slavery, drove her leaders finally to add to the Virginia doctrine new refinements that left the federal government but the creature and tool of each of the sovereign States; the profession of this creed left South Carolina in a critical and dissenting minority of one among the States. South Carolina

There remains the west, the section whose creation altered completely the political balance and theories of the older region. In so far as its influence is calculated in terms of the frontier it must be remembered that the frontier included much more than the Old Northwest and Southwest. In 1790 most of Maine, Ver-

mont, central New York and Pennsylvania were essentially frontier regions; so were the Shenandoah in Virginia and the North Carolina and South Carolina hill-country. Georgia was a wild little frontier settlement in which the planter had not yet begun to push out the frontier farmer; it was a community in which farmers still sat down to table with their negro slaves, and strange uncouth types presented themselves to the pen of Judge Longstreet. Central Massachusetts itself was then hardly past pioneer development. In all these places the frontier ruled human life.

The west

Thus within their own borders the tidewater States felt the touch of the frontier. But the development of the newer west politically begins with the admission of Kentucky and Tennessee to the Union in 1792 and 1796. They were formed by the push westward of Virginia and North Carolina population. Both had the peculiarity that the United States never administered their public lands, a fact which divided them in interest from the rest of the west.

Kentucky and Tennessee

Northwest of the Ohio was the territory created in 1787 and organized in 1788 on the nucleus of order afforded by the little settlement of Marietta. Population developed very slowly until the end of the Indian difficulties in 1795–1796 and the cession of the northwestern posts. Then it came from New England to the Western Reserve on Lake Erie, from Virginia and Kentucky in the south. In 1800 the territory was divided, and Indiana Territory was set off, the Northwest Territory, with somewhat reduced bounds, being admitted to the Union as the State of Ohio in 1802. The Federalists attempted to block its admission, for they rightly foresaw that it would be vigorously Republican. In 1805 Michigan Territory, consisting of the Southern Peninsula, was set off from Indiana; in 1809 Illinois Territory, including Wisconsin, was also set off. In 1816 and 1818 Indiana and Illinois respectively were admitted to the Union. Their population came in numbers from every State from North Carolina to New York. Except in Ohio, New England did not contribute much emigration until the

The Old Northwest

'thirties and 'forties, when it came in by the Erie Canal and the Great Lakes. Socially the population ranged from the "lone-wolf" hunter, the poor white squatter and the solid farmer, to the speculator or office holder, usually a gentleman and often college-bred.

In a similar fashion was the settlement of the south proceeding. Louisiana, with a long established French community that chafed under territorial government, was admitted as a State in 1812, with laws and customs drawn from Latin origins and from the civil law. Mississippi was admitted in 1817 and Alabama in 1819, obviously balancing Indiana and Illinois. However, the four States were much alike in pioneer character and early population; their problems were the same and they naturally coöperated politically. Their fundamental difference was of course that the States of the southwest were by law open to slavery, and that their climate was adapted to cotton. These two things caused ultimate divergence between northwest and southwest; but in the pioneer period they were less important. The settlers of the two regions came from the same States, and the type of their early squatters and farmers was the same. True, in the southwest the planter was on the ground quite early, migrating with a caravan of slaves, steadily buying up the small cleared farms which he could not easily teach his slaves to duplicate, establishing large-scale production and pushing the small farmer to less desirable land. But in the problems of Indians, internal improvements, public lands, and banks, the two sections had much in common.

The Southwest

As to the Indians, the pioneer naturally desired to get rid of them and their claims to the land as soon as possible. The process of extorting cessions from them begun by Wayne at Greenville, was pushed vigorously by Governor Harrison of Indiana Territory, whose policy led in a sense to the Indian war of 1812. After that war the extortion of cessions continued. By 1825 the policy had assumed the form of pushing the Indian so far as possible across the Missouri, where in the Great American Desert he might be left in peace on lands which the white man

Indian policy

did not covet. By 1835 Indiana and Illinois were cleared of Indians, and great tracts were open to settlement in Missouri, Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin.

In the south the situation was complicated by the presence of stronger organized nations, the Choctaw, Creek, and Cherokee, holding a great part of the soil from Georgia to the Mississippi River. Jackson had extorted great concessions at the end of the Creek war in 1814; and in 1825 Georgia began the process of forcing the Indian states under her control. Marshall, in 1831, had laid down the doctrine that the Indian states were nations in alliance with the United States and hence not subject to Georgian jurisdiction; but Georgia had defied Marshall as she had previously defied President Adams. New England humanitarianism toward the Indian passed out with Adams in 1829; and under Jackson, a western president, the southern tribes were removed to the present Oklahoma.

The Indian nations of the south

On the issue of the public lands northwest and southwest saw alike. The federal government had based its land policy on the theory that the public lands of the United States were a fund intended to relieve the older States of the burden of the Revolutionary debt; thus it took the financial rather than the social viewpoint. If sales in tracts of millions of acres to speculators would be more convenient than sales of a few acres to actual settlers, the actual settlers must put up with the terms which the speculators imposed on them.

Public lands

Not until 1796 was a general land act passed. It provided for sales on a year's credit in sections of 640 acres—a tract far too great for the average farmer—at a minimum of two dollars an acre. Four years later Harrison as delegate from the Northwest Territory secured an act for sales in 320-acre tracts at a minimum of two dollars an acre, with a four-year credit. Lands thus to be held on an option of fifty cents an acre were bought on speculation. The hard days of 1807–1815 caused almost universal defaults on payment. There was no way of evicting settlers by thousands and nothing was done until 1820 when, despite the protests of speculators who had loaded

Public land policy, 1796–1820

up on options at the two-dollar rate, the price was set at a minimum of $1.25 an acre, cash only.

For ten years sales under the act were inconsiderable. It was the best the west could get from an east jealous of a development which depreciated eastern lands and drained off factory labor. The west, through Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri, was demanding the classification of unsold lands in price according to the period they remained unsold, the special right of actual settlers to purchase their lands at the minimum price, and even donation to the States of lands within their borders unsold after a term of years. The question was indeed vital to the western States; for as population pushed on, seeking the best lands at the lowest price, the government's land policy might divert it from State to State at pleasure.

The western land policy

The economic situation of the west tended to dictate its opinions on various topics. The lack of sufficiently cheap transportation to markets east of the mountains forced bulky agricultural products down the rivers to New Orleans to pile high on its wharves. Eastern goods brought over the mountains had high transportation costs added to their price. Hence the west was enthusiastic for internal improvements at federal expense. Like every new country it was short of money; for lands and manufactured goods had to be paid for, and the cash for both traveled east. The exchange system of the country was too rudimentary to balance western credits at New Orleans with debits at Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New York. Accordingly the west was drained of good money and compelled to use local bank issues that were shakier than elsewhere even in the United States. The unwary lost money continually by accepting counterfeit notes and notes of insolvent banks. State banks and even the Second Bank of the United States at times deliberately involved their debtors in difficulty in order to foreclose on their real estate securities; and such practices laid the foundation of a hatred of the United States Bank and of all banks. The northwest was generally in favor of a protective tariff, in the hope that it would create for produce an eastern market in new manufacturing cen-

The west: currency and banks

In his first annual message Monroe took issue against the constitutionality of internal improvements, urging a constitutional amendment to authorize them. The majority necessary to overrule a veto was not in sight during his two terms. In 1822 he vetoed an act for the establishment of toll-gates on the Cumberland Road. But in 1824 a bill, appropriating funds for a survey of projected internal improvements, passed the House 115 to 86. The west was unanimous for it, the middle States for it 37 to 26, the south and New England generally against it.

Monroe and internal improvement

Henry Clay of Kentucky united the issues of internal improvement and tariff under the name of the American System. The tariff would provide a surplus revenue to be used for internal improvements; by developing manufacturing communities and sections the tariff would increase the demand for foodstuffs, which could travel cheaply to market over the new internal improvements. In 1824 Clay secured the passage of a tariff by a vote of 107 to 102. The vote was frankly sectional. Kentucky and Missouri were unanimous for the bill; Tennessee cast two votes for it; but it gained only a single vote from below the Potomac. New England too voted against it 23 votes to 15. The northwest favored protection, believing that the tariff would create a market for foodstuffs. The south opposed protection because her staple crops had to be marketed abroad, and she feared her markets might be lost if she took no manufactures in return; besides she feared dependence on northern manufacture.

Clay and the American system

The ominous sectionalism, revealed on the tariff question, and challenging the new nationalism, had already appeared on the question of the admission of Missouri to the Union as a slave State. In 1776 slavery was lawful in every State of the Union; but beginning with Massachusetts, whose courts decided in 1783 that the bill of rights of the Constitution of 1780 had abolished slavery, State after State of the north had put the institution in the way of extinction. As far south as Maryland and Delaware the process went, and there stopped; for

Slavery disappears in the north

it was in the staple sections that slavery could best be used. Its abandonment in the north generally involved little more than a change in domestic service.

It was true also that the States, as they stood in 1812 after the admission of Louisiana, were equally divided between slave and free. For the sake of the balance of votes in the Senate this ratio was more or less consciously observed by balancing the admission of Indiana and Illinois against that of Mississippi and Alabama. In the northwest ever since the formation of Indiana Territory in 1800 there had been a steady fight to overturn the antislavery clause of the Ordinance of 1787 and admit slavery. When this could not be done, an indenture system was introduced in both Indiana and Illinois Territories which introduced negro slavery in the form of long indentures. It was only after a contest that Indiana came in as a free State. In Illinois the constitution was formed by men favorable to slavery, but afraid of being barred from the Union, were slavery specifically allowed. The same group in 1822–1824 endeavored to revise the state constitution to admit slavery.

Slavery in the west

In 1818–1819 the question of the admission of Missouri, where slavery had always existed, came before Congress. The northern men led by Tallmadge of New York, who had already challenged the equivocal phrases of the Illinois Constitution, offered amendments of the enabling act to the effect that further introduction of slavery should be prohibited and that the children of slaves born after admission should be free at twenty-five years of age. The amendments in spite of furious southern opposition passed the House 87 to 76 and 82 to 78. The Senate rejected the amendments 31 to 7 and 22 to 16, the Illinois senators voting with the majority.

The Missouri question

The constitutional question was a nice one. Undoubtedly Congress could and had made stipulations in the admission of new States to the Union. Whether such stipulations as slavery prohibitions were binding on the States once they had obtained full statehood was doubtful. If they were, then a distinction was made between the original thirteen States and those since ad-

mitted; Massachusetts if she wished could reintroduce slavery, and Missouri could not. The south of course took alarm at the alleged right of Congress to interfere with the institution of slavery in a State. The arguments urged for it were more or less fallacious—that slavery as it spread out tended to become milder and that to exclude slaveholders from the territories was essentially unjust.

Power of Congress over new states

In the session of 1819–1820 the matter was finally settled for the time being by a compromise, based on the fact that Maine, hitherto a part of Massachusetts, was applying for statehood. The setting off of Maine against Missouri, a free against a slave State, was the natural, moderate course. The essence of the Missouri Compromise was the amendment offered by Senator Jesse B. Thomas of Illinois which, admitting Missouri as a slave State, barred slavery in the Louisiana purchase north of 36° 30′, her southern boundary. In a cabinet including Monroe, Crawford, Calhoun, and Wirt of Virginia, no one questioned the right of Congress to exclude slavery from the territories; but even then some southern men challenged it. An additional flurry over a clause in the Missouri Constitution barring free negroes in the State was settled by requiring the legislature to promise that the section should never authorize the exclusion of citizens of the United States from any privileges.

The Missouri compromise

The period of the War of 1812 marks the climax of the exploitation of Spanish domain in North America that the United States had been engaged on intermittently since 1782. From the first, the United States had insisted that the Louisiana Purchase included West Florida, but not till Napoleon's policy disintegrated the Spanish empire did she dare reach out her hand for it. In 1810, taking advantage of a revolt largely engineered by American citizens against the Spanish government, Madison, in the right of the previous American claim, issued a proclamation annexing Florida as far as the Perdido River to Orleans Territory. Ultimately by the Act of 1812 part was annexed to Louisiana and part to Mississippi Territory. By a secret act of January 15, 1811, the President was authorized

The occupation of Florida


100°
95°
90°
85°
80°
75°
Missouri R.
Mississippi R.
35°
32°28′
31°
30°
25°
WEST FLORIDA
EAST FLORIDA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Perdido R.
Rio Bravo or Rio Grande
DISPUTED BOUNDARIES of
FLORIDA, LOUISIANA, and TEXAS
Unofficial Boundary of French Louisiana and Spanish Texas and Florida before 1763
Boundaries of British East and West Florida 1763-1767
Boundary of British West Florida after 1767
Boundaries of Louisiana Claimed by France 1803
Annexed and Occupied by Madison 1810
Annexed 1810, Occupied 1813
Ceded by Spain 1819

to occupy East Florida rather than see it fall to other powers; under this law the United States actually held Amelia Island for a year.

In the course of the War of 1812 the neutrality of Florida was violated by both British and Americans. Jackson occupied Pensacola in 1814 and the British built a fort on the Appalachicola that, after the war, became the nucleus of a refuge for runaway slaves and Indians. The United States intervened once more to scatter this nest of disorder. In December of 1817 Jackson was authorized to pursue Indians into Florida, since the Spanish did not check them; he believed he had private authority from the President to seize the province. He captured the post of St. Marks, executed two British subjects, Arbuthnot and Ambrister, whom he suspected of stirring up the Indians, and actually occupied the whole territory by military force.

American aggression in Florida

This was a long step. Clay in Congress, and Calhoun in the cabinet believed that Spain's protests should be heeded, and Jackson reprimanded. On the other side were men who admired Jackson's deeds as those of a man of action, and the secretary of state, John Quincy Adams, who wished to yield no points to Spain in the diplomatic struggle to obtain the Floridas. Though American troops were withdrawn, Adams insisted that Spain's weakness and inability to maintain order in the territory had justified Jackson's action for the protection of the frontier and would justify similar action again. Spain must, in short, maintain order or cede the territory.

Adams and the Florida question

Finally by treaty of February 22, 1819, Spain recognized the acquisition of the Floridas by the United States, on our agreeing to discharge the claims of American citizens for Spanish commercial spoliations up to five millions. Further the treaty delineated the American-Spanish boundary on the west. Adams finally surrendered our claim to Texas and was criticized for so doing; the boundary from the Rockies to the sea was set at the 42d parallel, Spain definitely surrendering her claims north of it to the United States. It was almost her last act in the enjoyment of her continental empire.

The treaty of 1819

In the same years by the convention of 1818 the United States cleared up its position on the continent with respect to the British possessions. The United States retained rights in the fisheries in Labrador and Newfoundland, and to those three miles out from any other Canadian coasts. Her northern boundary was adjusted in general as it is to-day from Lake Superior to the Rockies. There the rival claims to Oregon of Great Britain, based on the voyages of Cook, Mackenzie, and Vancouver and on the Nootka Sound affair with Spain, and those of the United States, based on Gray's discovery of the Columbia in 1792 and Astor's fur trading post, were left unsettled. The territory was left to joint occupancy for a ten-year period subject to renewal.

Boundary settlements with Great Britain

The diplomatic attention of the United States was turning to the far northwest because traders in the track of Lewis and Clark were already there. Spain's rights the United States had acquired; with Great Britain she compromised. With Russia, who had extended her domain across from Siberia to Alaska, she took a more decided tone. An ukase of the czar, placing his authority at the parallel of 51° and forbidding approach to it within a hundred Italian miles, was met in 1823 by Adams' notification that the United States would contest Russia's right to any territorial establishment in America, and that the American continents were no longer open to the colonial enterprises of European powers. On April 17, 1824, Russia accepted 54° 40′ as the delimiting line between her colonies and those of the United States.

The United States checks Russia on the Pacific coast

The Russian question fits in with the whole question of the Monroe Doctrine; and that in turn goes back to the revolt of the Spanish colonies in South and Central America. The earlier uprisings at the time of Napoleon's invasion of Spain had generally failed. But in 1816–1824 successful revolutions under Iturbide, San Martin, and Bolivar swept away Spanish rule from Mexico to Cape Horn. In recognizing the new states, which from their trade relations with England had had her moral support from the first,

The United States and South American independence

Monroe and Adams moved slowly. They feared to lose the Florida cession if they provoked Spain by recognizing her revolted colonies. Clay in Congress seized on the opportunity to embarrass the administration and to push for recognition as a means of securing the commercial and international leadership of the new states. He steadily gained ground in his propaganda and March 8, 1822, Monroe announced a policy of recognition.

In Europe the age was one of reaction against the French Revolution and its doctrines, and in favor of the authority of hereditary monarchs over their subjects. The powers of the Continent—Russia, Prussia, Austria, and France—were preparing to maintain the rights of legitimate sovereigns against popular demands for constitutions to limit the royal power. In Naples, in Piedmont, and in Spain the forces of the allied sovereigns restored absolutism. It seemed possible that France's ambition might lead her to reconquer for Spain or herself the Spanish dominions in America. George Canning, the English foreign minister, took the alarm and proposed with the assistance of the United States to forestall such a movement by a joint declaration.

The Holy Alliance

But assured that England's policy must be the same in any case, Adams persuaded Monroe to take a bolder stand independently. In his message of 1823 the President laid down the principle that America would tolerate no European interference in American affairs; that admitting the principle of Old World government was authority, that of the New World was liberty. America would not interfere with the despotisms of the Old World, and would resent as an unfriendly act any interference of Europe with the Republics of the Western hemisphere.

The Monroe Doctrine

Secure of English support in maintaining South American independence, the United States thus laid down the principle of the independence of the American continent from further European colonization or from European aggression on colonies that had achieved independence. The fitting climax to the period that saw American nationality developed was the measure by which the United States put herself forward as the guardian of a system

of republics in the New World based on her principles and modeled on her example. In a sense it was only a gesture, dependent for its force on the coincidence of British interests with those of the United States, and not regarded with great enthusiasm by some of the South American leaders. It was almost a generation before the Monroe Doctrine assumed real importance in American policy. It has been developed on lines that its origin would scarcely have suggested; its discussion therefore is postponed to a later period.

Significance of the doctrine in 1823

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

F. J. Turner, *Rise of the New West* (*American Nation*, vol. XIV). New York, 1906.
F. L. Paxson, *History of the American Frontier, 1763–1893*. Boston, 1924.
E. S. Corwin, *John Marshall and the Constitution* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. XVI). New Haven, 1919.
E. Channing, *A History of the United States*, vol. IV. New York, 1917.
J. B. McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States*, vols. III and IV. New York, 1891–1895.
A. J. Beveridge, *The Life of John Marshall*, vols. III and IV. Boston, 1919.
S. E. Morison, *Maritime History of Massachusetts, 1783–1860*. New York, 1921.
K. C. Babcock, *The Rise of American Nationality* (*American Nation*, vol. XIII). New York, 1906.

CHAPTER XVII

JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY AND NATIONALISM

For a decade after the War of 1812 the current of nationalism was pulsing through the United States. True, the decaying Federalism of New England forgot its old ideals and turned sectional; the elder statesmen of the Virginia Dynasty clung to a few of the Republican principles of 1798; dimly apparent beneath the surface were the sectional changes wrought by slavery. But in the Union at large men were thinking in terms of the national; tradition was gilding the fine and obscuring the sordid in the Revolutionary past. The sense of the common danger so narrowly escaped in the War of 1812, the sense of the now undisturbed destiny of America on her continent were accustoming men's minds to a more exalted idea of their country and her future. Hard roads, canals, and steamboats were linking up remote sections, making travel easy, no longer the perquisite of the rich; the extremities of the nation were becoming better acquainted with each other.

The newer nationalism

And as the United States was becoming national it was becoming also democratic. The western States had generally entered the Union without property qualifications for suffrage; one by one in the first quarter of the nineteenth century the older States revised their constitutions to match; New England stripped the Congregational Church of its special privileges. New York abandoned the elaborate system that had fostered her aristocratic political cliques. The people of the United States, blindly unconscious, were groping for control of the federal government in its policies, and in the choice of men to high office. For the achievement of the ideal that the government should be administered in the interests of the masses they found in Andrew Jackson a leader to put their aspirations into words and deeds.

Growth of democracy

Ever since the making of the federal Constitution the voice of the people had been limited, as its framers designed, to the choice of the members of the House of Representatives. Direct popular participation in the selection of the president was barred first through the choice in most cases of presidential electors by state legislatures, and second by the system of caucus nominations. For as the party system developed in the United States, politicians grasped the importance of uniting the party electoral vote on single candidates for president and vice president. In that day of difficult and expensive travel the members of the Republican party in Congress, sitting in what was called a party caucus, had assumed the right to name the party candidate.

Choice of the president

From 1800 to 1820 the nomination of the Republican caucus had been the equivalent of election. The caucus system had extended to state legislatures, had there excited popular disfavor, and had gone into disuse; but in 1820 it still flourished in national politics. Its effect on the presidency was to make the president dependent on his party in Congress for a renomination; it caused stories to circulate of the appointment of congressmen to lucrative public offices as rewards for their caucus support; joined with the personal weakness of the presidents it caused the power and prestige of the presidency to decline. Congressmen were found to avow the belief that the president must virtually be elected by Congress in any case. Either the caucus must unite the electoral votes on one man, or they would be scattered among a number of candidates, between whom the House of Representatives, voting by States, would have to choose.

The caucus

The caucus system was sure to be strained, once Monroe had served his two terms. For in 1817 there gathered in Washington a group of ambitious men, each eager for the succession. In Congress was Henry Clay of Kentucky—"Harry of the West"—brilliant orator, magnetic popular idol, advocate of great causes like the recognition of the republics of South America, and his own American System, but repeatedly led astray from his avowed principles by his

Presidential aspirants, 1817–1824

ambitions. In the president's cabinet sat John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts, profound and learned, a skilled diplomat, albeit a man of most absolute, dogged, Adams-like personality. William H. Crawford of Georgia was one of the ablest of American secretaries of the treasury; as he was inclining to strict construction of the Constitution, he became the collateral heir of the Virginia Dynasty. He was feared by his antagonists as an unscrupulous politician. John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, secretary of war, was as yet an extreme nationalist, but a man whose thought even then played with abstractions rather than concrete facts. Outside the circle of Washington aspirants was De Witt Clinton, leader of free lances in New York politics and not on good terms with Martin Van Buren and the regular Albany Regency. However, as maker of the Erie Canal, Clinton could count on great popular support in the newer western communities which it served in New York and Ohio. Still farther outside the circle was Andrew Jackson of Tennessee.

Jackson was born in the upcountry of the Carolinas; child though he was, he participated in the savage partisan warfare of Whig and Tory that was the Revolution in the south, and saw his whole family perish in battle or prison sickness. After a fling in Charleston had dissipated the lad's little patrimony, he set off for the outpost of civilization that was to be Nashville, Tennessee. Here he gained an important place as lawyer, storekeeper, planter, congressman in 1796, United States senator in 1797, judge, and general of militia. In his early life Jackson was the ideal type for a frontier, rife with bad men and Indians. Cockfighter, horse racer, brawler, duelist, fierce and vindictive even for Tennessee, he was perhaps becoming out of place in the community which his strong arm had helped to civilize, when a new opportunity opened before him in the War of 1812. As a commander in the campaigns against the Creeks, and in the defense of the Gulf Coast against the British he showed new qualities. His campaigns have been assailed by critics; but uniform success, following on hard fighting, is their best answer. More than a vigorous, aggressive, and successful general, he was a leader of the lawless frontier

Andrew Jackson

militias which understood not obedience to orders against their own wishes. Using volunteers to quell a mutiny in his militia one day, and his militia to quell one in his volunteers the next, overawing mutinous troops with a rifle held across his pommel by his one undisabled arm, when from sickness he could barely sit his horse, enforcing discipline by the death sentence, he held his lawless fellow citizens in subordination to a will greater than their own. He was the idol of the west for his victory at New Orleans, for his seizure of Spanish Florida and for his upstanding fight at Washington against the men who sought to censure him. Against the peaceful statesmen of the Jeffersonian school and the orators and intriguers of Congress who had floundered through the War of 1812, men instinctively contrasted this man of action, good friend or fierce enemy, whose spirit burned as fire and was not consumed. After 1819 in the mind of the frontier he was a candidate for the presidency.

From 1817 to 1824 the canvass went on. Adams tried to remove his chief rivals by proffers of diplomatic posts. Clay and his friends tried to discredit Adams' attitude and achievements in the Treaty of Ghent and the Florida Treaty. Scandals in the War Department were raked up against Calhoun. Crawford's management of Treasury relations with banks were attacked by Calhoun's partisans, such as Senator Ninian Edwards of Illinois, to Edwards' ultimate discomfiture. By 1823 it was apparent that Clinton had little chance, that Calhoun, out of the race for the presidency, was content with the vice presidency, which he could have for the asking, and that Crawford, representing the strict-constructionist tendency of the Virginia school, would get the caucus nomination. His rivals now opened a hot attack on the caucus system, alleging that it was undemocratic for the House of Representatives thus to force a presidential candidate on the party. Clay and Adams stood distinctly for a liberal national policy on tariffs and internal improvements, and Jackson was supposed to lean in the same direction. All three were put in nomination by state legislatures and a furious campaign began.

The presidential canvass, 1817–1824

So far had the system become democratized by 1824, that eighteen States out of twenty-four now chose their electors either on a general ticket or by districts. For the first time the popular vote was important enough to tabulate. No candidate had a majority of the electoral votes. Jackson had 99, Adams 84, Crawford 41, Clay 37. Jackson had obtained in popular votes 153,554. Adams carried the electoral votes of New England, most of New York's, and scattering votes in the middle States, Illinois, and Louisiana. Crawford had Virginia and Georgia; Clay carried Kentucky, Missouri, and Ohio; and Jackson, Pennsylvania and the remainder of the south and west. With no candidate having a majority of electoral votes, the House of Representatives, voting by States, had to choose among the three highest, Jackson, Adams, and Crawford. Clay's interest was naturally courted by all three, but he decided to support Adams who was accordingly elected by a vote of 13 States out of 24.

The election of 1824

The way in which this result was achieved is significant. Adams had the votes of two States, Missouri and Illinois, cast for him by single congressmen. In either case the vote corresponded to the member's liking rather than to that of his constituents. The democratic spirit of the age felt that something was wrong with a system that could thus overrule the will of the constituency, and began to cast about for something better. Before the election in the House the rumor spread that, if elected, Adams would reward Clay for his support with the appointment of secretary of state. After his election, conscious of rectitude, Adams persisted in making the nomination, and the charge was openly made at once that his election in the House was a corrupt bargain. The person immediately responsible was an eccentric Pennsylvania congressman socially beneath the notice of the duelling pistol of the chivalrous Clay. But John Randolph of Roanoke, commenting on the alliance between the "Puritan and the blackleg," provoked a bloodless duel, ending in embraces and reconciliation on the ground.

The "Corrupt Bargain"

The popular indignation, though fanned by artificial means, was deep and genuine. That the Old Hero who had risked his life for

his country should be cheated, by the intriguing cowards of Bladensburg, out of the presidency which the people had bestowed on him was too much. Jackson's own evident belief in it gave weight to the scandal. It was manipulated wisely by a group preparing Jackson for the presidential race of 1828. Crawford, stricken with paralysis, was out of politics; his supporters in most States, like Van Buren in New York and Forsyth in Georgia, came over to Jackson, whose rudimentary political theories began to take a strict-constructionist hue from his new associates. Calhoun, ambitious for the presidency in 1832, consented to run for vice president on Jackson's ticket. In the seclusion of the vice presidential office to which he had been elected in 1824 his own views, in deference to the exigencies of South Carolina, were changing to the extreme of state sovereignty which usually is associated with his name.

Popular wrath; realignment of factions

That Jackson should become strict constructionist in one sense was inevitable, because the policy of Clay and Adams was necessarily loose construction. Adams, indeed, carried it so far as to play into the hands of his opponents. In his first message, urging Congress not to be "palsied by the will of our constituents," he recommended a most extensive system of internal improvements, a national university, an astronomical observatory, and promotion of the arts and sciences. The anti-Adams presses made fun of the "lighthouses of the skies," as Adams grandiloquently named the proposed observatories. Southerners listened with alarm to the forecast that if Congress could consistently do those things it could also interfere with slavery. Other happenings showed that much of the north was still aggressively opposed to the "institution"; that Taylor, one of the chief opponents of slavery in the Missouri struggle, was the choice for speaker of the administration, served to mark it as anti-slavery. A proposal that the United States be represented at a Pan-American Congress introduced the issue, since United States delegates might there sit with representatives of negro republics, and debate the freeing of the slaves in Cuba, should the South American states wrest it from Spain.

Adams' administration

While thus alienating the south, Adams failed to gain the west through his internal improvement projects, because on two more essential issues his policy seemed to threaten its interests. Rush, his secretary of the treasury, pointed out that the supposedly low price of public lands acted as a bounty to agriculture, and drew off to the west the hands needed by eastern manufacturers. The west, convinced the government price was far too high, listened in anger. Here was no promise of a more western land policy; and the population of the western States would increase or remain stationary according as the land policy of the federal government was eastern or western.

Adams and public land policy

To the west, the administration also seemed on record against a white man's Indian policy, when it withstood Georgia's attempt to rid herself of the autonomous Indian states within her borders. New England, not having heard the war whoop for a hundred years, apparently was to insist on regarding the Indian from a philanthropic viewpoint, not as a hindrance to white settlement. Georgia had been promised in 1802, when she ceded to the federal government her claim to Alabama and Mississippi, that Indian titles within her bounds would be extinguished; with increasing displeasure the State had noted the government's delay in removing the tribes from her midst. A treaty made in 1825, ceding the Creek lands in Georgia, was repudiated by the Indians; Adams therefore refused to allow Georgia to survey the ceded lands. Governor Troup flatly defied the federal government, even after cession treaties of 1826 had yielded nearly all the Creek holdings in the State; he insisted that the first treaty made the sovereign rights of Georgia effective. The opposition in the Senate adopted Georgia's view and thus prevented any resistance by the federal government. The Georgia Cherokee in 1827 had adopted a constitution as a sovereign nation, which Georgia met by subjecting whites and Indians in the Cherokee bounds to her jurisdiction in 1829 and 1830 respectively. Georgia not only defied the administration but branded its attitude as pro-Indian and anti-western.

Indians and state rights

The tariff was the main hindrance to the unity of the Jackson

forces, dividing the protectionists of Pennsylvania and the west from the free traders in the south. Woolen manufacturers and raisers of raw wool who demanded protection saw the tariff of 1827 beaten by Calhoun's casting vote in the Senate. The next year the raw material sections brought forward a measure protecting the producers of wool, hemp, flax, and iron, without giving the additional protection to woven woolens, which New England alleged was necessary to keep out British goods; as a further blow, they proposed a duty on the New England raw material, molasses. The Senate increased the duty on woolens, and the measure passed, with the wool regions of New England, most of the middle States, and the northwest voting for it. Save for a few votes from Delaware, Kentucky, and western Virginia and Maryland, not a slave State representative voted for the bill. The southern interests had amended it to make it as intolerable to the north as possible, and to insure its defeat. When it passed, South Carolina threatened extreme measures; but that story is better deferred to Jackson's administration.

The tariff issue, 1827–1828

In 1828 the Adams' forces were on the verge of defeat. The outcry against the corrupt bargain had not died down; Adams' policies offered many handles against him; and his postmaster-general, John McLean, a holdover from Monroe's cabinet, was active in behalf of Jackson. Jackson had been enraged and the canvass embittered by personal attacks from the pro-Adams presses, representing Jackson as a murderer, bully, swindler, slave trader, and playing up a technical flaw in his marriage as an aspersion on Mrs. Jackson. Beneath all was the issue of the disregard of the popular will in 1824. By 1828 state legislatures still chose electors only in Delaware and South Carolina; and the popular vote became fully significant. Adams had all New England save one vote, Delaware, New Jersey, and part of Maryland and New York—83 votes to Jackson's 178. The popular vote was 647,276 to 508,064.

The campaign of 1828

Jackson's inauguration was such as the United States had not

seen before. While Adams took no part in the elevation of a rival who had become a personal enemy, people poured into the little village of Washington by the thousand, to seek office it is true, but also to see the inauguration of a president whom the people had chosen for themselves. The mobs that invaded the White House reception, seized on eatables and drinkables and climbed on satin settees in muddy boots were consciously expressing for the American people a new-found sense of proprietorship in their government.

Jackson's inauguration

Immediately after inauguration came removals from office *en masse*. Removals for political activity on the losing side or for opinion were nothing new. In some of the States, New York especially, they had been a commonplace of politics. Crawford, when secretary of the treasury, had secured a law for four years' tenure of office; but in 1829 for the first time immediate and wholesale removals took place. They were not as extensive as is sometimes supposed: Jackson's supporters insisted that they left a majority of those hostile to him in office, that only an eleventh of the office holders were removed, 800 postmasters out of 8,600. Some changes could be justified because of inefficiency and corruption; some, the most pitiful ones, were of men hopelessly superannuated. The idea that office was a public service, and not a life sinecure, was the one defense of the system of so-called rotation in office; to say the least, efficiency in public service was not increased by it. Jackson undoubtedly entered on the policy largely from his sense of the need of a loyal and unified administration under him.

Removals from office

For his cabinet, Jackson selected William H. Eaton of Tennessee, a close personal friend, as secretary of war; Martin Van Buren, as secretary of state, represented the Crawford elements that had supported Jackson; Ingham of Pennsylvania, secretary of the treasury, J. P. Branch of North Carolina, secretary of the navy, and perhaps Berrien of Georgia, attorney-general, supposedly represented Calhoun. Jackson regarded the cabinet members as department heads subordinate to himself, and not according to his earlier idea as a

Jackson: his cabinet and advisers

"council consultative." Van Buren he made a close confidant; otherwise he sought such advice as he wanted from other sources, such as his friend and neighbor Major W. B. Lewis. Amos Kendall, a New Englander by birth and education, a Kentucky editor, informed the administration on public opinion, drafted documents and even outlined policies. After 1830 Duff Green's *Telegraph*, a Calhoun organ, lost its position as the administration mouth-piece, and Francis P. Blair was brought in as editor of the *Globe*, a paper that took the lead of the party press and gave the tone to the democratic newspapers of the country as no previous journal had done. Isaac Hill of New Hampshire, a Republican editor in a Federalist community, despised by his social betters but meeting abuse with hard blows, was still another informal adviser. To this group was soon applied the name of "Kitchen Cabinet."

Jackson's first cabinet was broken up in about two years, partly over a serio-comic social squabble. Secretary Eaton had married the extremely beautiful daughter of a Washington tavern keeper, her reputation justly or unjustly being not above reproach. The wives and daughters of Branch, Berrien, and Ingham, and of some of the foreign ministers, refused to accept her as a social associate. Jackson, aided by Van Buren, undertook a vain struggle to force her social acceptance by Calhoun's friends. Then early in 1830, Jackson learned that Calhoun, whom he had thought his consistent friend, had as secretary of war in 1818 proposed to censure him for exceeding orders in the Florida business; to Jackson this was a sign of duplicity and bad faith that made Calhoun a personal enemy. Calhoun had expected with Jackson's good will to succeed him in the presidency in 1832. His hopes were now destroyed. Van Buren was wily enough to see that if he remained in the cabinet he would seem to have elbowed the South Carolinian out of the succession. He therefore resigned as secretary of state; and Jackson took the opportunity to get rid of his whole cabinet. Van Buren was nominated minister to England in the recess; and Calhoun, desirous of crushing his rival, defeated his confirmation in the Senate, only to find that he had thereby assured him the vice presidency in 1832, and the presidency in 1836.

Break up of the cabinet

The question of nullification had completed the severance of Calhoun from his old associates; and the way in which that issue arose and was met by Jackson has now to be told. The South Carolina of 1816, led by Calhoun, Lowndes, Cheves, and McDuffie, was vigorously national in the policies she advocated in Congress—bank, tariff, internal improvements. But the competition of the newer cotton-growing areas of the lower south reduced the price of her staple in the world markets, while the tariff compelled her to buy the goods she needed at a higher rate from northern manufacturers. Accordingly a states' rights group arose, determined to check the United States in her career of nationalism. Each successive tariff increase added to its strength until finally Calhoun and McDuffie had to throw in their lot with it or lose their State. By 1827–1828 South Carolina was at the boiling point on the tariff and ready for any measure that promised relief. Calhoun, restating certain of the older tenets of the Virginia school in the light of newer theories of political science, evolved the doctrines of nullification and state sovereignty associated with his name.

South Carolina and the tariff

In the years that had followed the War of 1812 a distinctly nationalist interpretation of the Constitution had been embodied by Chief Justice John Marshall of the Supreme Court in a series of far-reaching decisions. By Cohens *vs.* Virginia in 1821 he had announced the right of the Supreme Court to review on appeal any decision of a state court involving the Constitution or laws of the United States. By Gibbons *vs.* Ogden in 1824 he had declared the New York State act granting Fulton and his associates a monopoly of the steam navigation of the waters of the State to be an unconstitutional restraint of commerce. By McCulloch *vs.* Maryland in 1819, he had affirmed the constitutional power of Congress to charter a bank on reasoning that would warrant the loose Hamiltonian theory as to the extent of the powers of the central government, and had denied the right of a State to tax an agency of the federal government. In the Dartmouth College Case in 1819, he had decided that a state legislature could not alter or revoke a corporation charter which

Marshall's nationalist decisions

it or even a colonial predecessor had granted. Limiting the powers of the States and extending those of the federal government in deference to the nationalism of the newer age, he had swept along with him in these decisions a majority of the Supreme Court justices, Federalist and Republican alike, much to the chagrin of men like Thomas Jefferson and Spencer Roane of Virginia who held much narrower views of the Constitution and of its limitations on the States.

Intermittently, ever since 1798, Republicans had insisted that neither Congress itself nor the Supreme Court could be the final judge of the powers of Congress, and had pointed to the individual States as judges of congressional usurpations of power. Marshall's decision in Cohens *vs.* Virginia had driven them from the ground that state courts could interpret the federal constitution and laws in final resort within the bounds of their respective States. In cases of federal usurpation the Virginian, John Taylor of Caroline, between 1820 and 1823 had advocated judgment on the part of the States as the bulwark of sectional rights. This new view was taken in 1827 by writers like Turnbull of South Carolina in *The Crisis*. In 1828 Calhoun cast the argument in a state paper, then not known to be his work, the *South Carolina Exposition and Protest*, molding it around a word borrowed from the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798—"nullification." By finding for South Carolina's oppressions a "remedy within the Union" he hoped to avert secession and civil war.

States' rights opinion, 1820–1830

The *Exposition* began with an economic analysis of the injustice to South Carolina in the protective policy of the nation. The remedy, Calhoun decided, was the nullification by a convention of the State, of the operation of the law within her boundaries, until a new constitutional amendment or interpretation by three-fourths of the States could give or deny Congress the power exercised. Here Calhoun left the question for the time being, still a little hazy. He had high hopes that, by the election of Jackson, a Tennessee cotton-planter, and by his own probable succession in 1832, South Carolina's tariff grievances might be redressed by act of Congress.

Calhoun's "Exposition"

The next step in the development of the doctrine was in the Great Debate in the Senate of the first Jackson Congress in 1829–1830. Its beginning was a resolution offered by Senator Foot of Connecticut that implied calling a halt on surveying the public lands and on placing new lands on sale. This was at once seized on by Benton of Missouri and others as renewed evidence of New England's hostility to the west and of a desire to check its normal growth. Western and southern senators threw in New England's face her sins of omission and commission, including the Hartford Convention and the malodorous war record of New England Federalism. Senator Robert Hayne of South Carolina took occasion to compare the unjust restrictions laid by the public land policy on western progress with those the tariff supposedly had imposed on the south. Webster of Massachusetts replied to clear New England of the charge of hostility to the west.

The debate on Foot's resolution

Hayne returned to the charge, with a crushing weight of evidence as to disloyalty in 1812; he assailed New England for her share in fastening the tariff on the south, and announced the doctrine of the South Carolina *Exposition* as the remedy. In reply, Webster repelled charges of disloyalty, some of which he might well have taken as personal to himself, stated in glorious oratory the principle of nationalism, and endeavored to demonstrate the illogicality of nullification, in one State, of a law held constitutional in the others and the impossibility of executing a nullifying ordinance without incurring the crime of treason. Webster's analysis of the Constitution, however, was muddy. He could pin Hayne on the illogicality of making the federal government a party to the alleged compact between the States that created it; but he was flying in the face of historical evidence when he denied that the Constitution was a compact and asserted it to be "the people's Constitution"—the creation of "the people of the United States."

Webster and Hayne

Essentially, it is impossible to bring the arguments of Hayne and Webster into sharp logical contrast because of hazy thinking on both sides. For a clear exposition of the older theory of the

relation of Constitution and States one can turn to the speech of Edward Livingston or to some of the later writings of Madison. The men of their school based their reasoning on two hypotheses: first, that a compact or agreement between States, such as they conceived the Constitution to be, might irrevocably divest each State of a part of its sovereignty to be exercised in the name of all the States jointly; at least it might divide the exercise of sovereign powers between the governments of States and nation. Necessarily, they considered sovereignty and the exercise of sovereign power divisible. To this school the question really involved in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions was little more than the right of the States and their legislatures to protest against encroachments on the sovereign powers they had reserved.

Was sovereignty divisible?

On the other hand, Calhoun in a series of state papers, the last and clearest being the *Letter to Governor Hamilton* of 1832, reasoned on the basis of the new political science of Austin, that sovereignty was indivisible. It was easy to multiply proofs that in 1776 the States were theoretically sovereign. Therefore, it followed that under neither Articles of Confederation nor Constitution could their sovereignty be alienated or diminished. In terming the Constitution a compact, Calhoun implied that there was no existing power that could possibly enforce it on the will of a sovereign State. The sovereignty of South Carolina in 1788 had merely adopted, in addition to her state government, a new government for regulating her external concerns. By purest chance it was the same government that twelve other States adopted. But over the respective powers of the two governments the sovereignty of South Carolina as represented in convention of her citizens was still supreme. If her central government exceeded its powers she could check it until she could see if three-fourths of the States, an amending majority, would grant it the desired power. Even then she could still decide for herself whether she would acquiesce in the grant or whether she would abrogate altogether her central government and peacefully secede from the Union.

Calhoun's doctrine of state sovereignty

If Calhoun be permitted to interpret his history in the light of his definitions his argument is logically unanswerable. That, as we have seen, is a serious "if." But even passing that over, his scheme becomes an absurdity. With twenty-four States, each possessing the right to abrogate a law within her borders, pending a leisurely determination as to its constitutionality, uniform and efficient government would disappear. In time the map of the United States would be dotted with enclave States, seceded or nullifying. Only if studied in the light of the later withdrawal of the south from the Union, and applied to sections rather than States, does his theory approach the facts.

The fallacy of nullification

The perfection of Calhoun's logic lay two years in the future. Men had not seen the issue clearly in 1830; national-minded supporters of Jackson had applauded Hayne's strictures on Jackson's party enemies in New England, and had ignored his exposition of nullification. But, with all his illogicality, Webster had made the issue of nationality against separatism; and it was freely indorsed by the passionately nationalist Jackson himself. At a Jefferson day banquet in Washington in 1830 the South Carolinians and their friends arranged the list of toasts to unite the idea of nullification with the hallowed name of Jefferson. They hoped by the attendance of Jackson to link his support to the doctrine; but they were dumbfounded when he rose to propose the volunteer toast, "Our Federal Union. It must be preserved." The executioner of Arbuthnot and Ambrister was giving fair notice of his attitude.

Jackson and the nullifiers

The Union party in South Carolina was strong enough to stave off the call of a convention through 1830 and 1831. When Jackson and his party, with a view to the vote of Pennsylvania, acquiesced in the tariff act of 1832, reducing the worst schedules of 1828, but definitely establishing the protective principle, the Union forces in South Carolina gave way to the nullifiers. The legislature called a convention which met at Columbia on November 19, and adopted an ordinance nullifying the operation of the tariff acts of 1828 and 1832, and de-

South Carolina nullifies the tariff

claring that the use of force would be regarded as a dissolution of the Union. The legislature passed acts for the execution of the ordinance. Jackson ever since the early fall had been considering the necessary measures to maintain federal authority, and strengthening the forces at Charleston. December 10, a proclamation was issued to the people of South Carolina, drafted by Jackson and revised and buttressed by Livingston. It was an eloquent arraignment of the folly of nullification and a plea for the Union.

The question after all was to be settled at Washington, and not at Charleston. While the state legislatures generally, replying to South Carolina's call for a general convention, were denying the right of nullification and secession, Calhoun, now occupying a South Carolina seat in the Senate, and Clay, who had been in concert with Calhoun in the presidential canvass just ended, were working out a compromise on the tariff. Jackson's friends pushed the "Force Bill" to provide all necessary means for collecting the revenue at Charleston; and Clay meanwhile offered a compromise tariff providing for a gradual reduction of tariff duties over a ten-year period. Both Force Bill and compromise tariff passed Congress on the same day, March 1, 1833. Since South Carolina had already suspended the operation of her nullification ordinance, all chance of a clash was avoided.

The compromise of 1833

It was a drawn battle. The South Carolina Convention could save its face by rescinding the nullification ordinance on the ground that the federal government had given way on the tariff. It could place on the records of the State an ordinance nullifying the Force Bill to remain there until 1860. Clay's compromise tariff had prevented Jackson from trying fairly the issue of nullification and secession thirty years before the Civil War. But the proclamation, and the vigor of Jackson's measures to enforce the laws of the Union served in 1861 as a precious example, sanctioned by the name of the great nationalist president.

The issue postponed for a generation

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

W. MacDonald, *Jacksonian Democracy* (*American Nation*, vol. XV). New York, 1906.
C. G. Bowers, *The Party Battles of the Jackson Period*. Boston, 1922.
W. M. Meigs, *The Life of Thomas Hart Benton*. Philadelphia, 1904.
H. E. von Holst, *John C. Calhoun*. New York, 1917.
J. S. Bassett, *The Life of Andrew Jackson*. 2 vols. (New Ed.) New York, 1925.
D. F. Houston, *A Critical Study of Nullification in South Carolina*. New York, 1896.
E. Channing, *A History of the United States*, vol. V. New York, 1921.
J. B. McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States*, vol. VI. New York, 1906.
A. J. Beveridge, *The Life of John Marshall*, vol. IV. Boston, 1919.
F. J. Turner, *Rise of the New West* (*American Nation*, vol. XIV). New York, 1906.
F. L. Paxson, *History of the American Frontier, 1763–1893*. Boston, 1924.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE REIGN OF ANDREW JACKSON

Andrew Jackson could attribute his first election to the presidency partly to the appeal of his personality, partly to disgust with the administration of Adams and the "corrupt bargain," and partly to the support of the personal followings of his former rivals Calhoun and Crawford. One of his greatest achievements was to forge out of personal and sectional elements a national party with a creed, a program, an *esprit de corps*, and an organization reaching from end to end of the Union.

Creation of the Democratic party

That Jackson and his political advisers should attempt something of the sort was inevitable. Like other presidents, Jackson had at least developed a program; and he soon discovered that without a political party to support him in its execution he was as helpless in the face of Congress as the most helpless of his predecessors. Congressmen who on election day formally professed their faith in Jackson saw no reason to support all or any of his measures in Congress, until the duty of regularity in the newborn Democratic party was pointed out to them by party leaders, lectured to them in Blair's party organ, the Washington *Globe*, and its satellite Jackson papers in their districts, and enforced on them by district conventions and earnest Jackson voters at the polls.

The need of party discipline

In the slowly changing Senate it was worse. Senators elected by coalitions of mild Jacksonians with the opposition, senators like Tazewell of Virginia, disgruntled in the search for office, and senators of the Calhoun following, made up the opposition majority, which Webster, Clay, and Calhoun manipulated against Jackson from 1831 to 1837. The remedy was found in a ramified Democratic party organization to nominate and elect local officers, state legislatures, governors, congressmen,

The senate opposition

and senators pledged to the Jackson faith. The elements which would not be fused in the mass, went in most cases to make up the Whig party.

This result was in part accomplished by the extension throughout the States of the party convention system for the choice of national, state and local candidates. Hand in hand with the convention system went the idea of party regularity— namely that no party man by his acts in an office to which the party had elected him could set his private opinion against the party faith; no man could run against a duly nominated party candidate and still call himself a party member. The party convention, replacing as a means of nomination the caucus, or the announcement by the candidate or his friends, was intended to be as democratically representative of the party as Congress or state legislatures were representative of the people. The more loosely organized Whigs often applied hard names to the party convention, and termed party regularity "proscription for opinion's sake"; ultimately they themselves adopted of necessity both devices.

Party machinery

The Democratic party creed developed out of the measures into which Jackson and his associates were led. On the tariff, to conciliate Pennsylvania, the keystone State in the party as in the Union, Jackson was committed generally to moderate protective duties. On internal improvements his precise stand is harder to define; for internal improvements might mean many different things, each one raising its own crop of constitutional quibbles pro and con. It might mean the direct expenditure of the nation's money in a State with or without the State's consent, the administration with tolls of the work so constructed, the subscription for stock in a corporation undertaking the task, the donation of money to a State for a specific work, the donation of public land to her similarly, the division of money or public lands among States for such enterprises as they chose to undertake. The internal improvements undertaken might be wholly in a State; they might pass through two or more States, or remove a bar to commerce

The internal improvement issue

between States. They might be located in territories, where of course the question of constitutionality did not arise, or in States where it did. They might be harbors or lighthouses on the ocean or Great Lakes, river improvements below or above customs ports of entry, canals, post or military roads, railroads. Happy was the man who could define precisely the line of constitutionality as it meandered among all these cases.

Jackson's earlier utterances and record had been generally in favor of internal improvements; but as president his vetoes showed that his views as to the power of Congress were contracting. First and most famous was his veto on May 27, 1830, of the bill for subscription to the stock of the Maysville Turnpike Road Company on the ground that the enterprise was local to Kentucky. In subsequent vetoes, as of the Louisville and Portland Canal Company, he advanced to the position that subscription to the stock of a private corporation was unconstitutional. Generally he approved appropriations for improvements in rivers and harbors of national importance; on roads practically the only appropriations of his time were for the Cumberland Road. That highway too was supposedly built for the States through which it ran out of the proceeds of sales of public land within their borders; the procedure was based on solemn compact made with them on their admission to the Union.

Jackson opposes internal improvement

Naturally the Maysville and other vetoes attracted such strict constructionists as were not alienated by Jackson's vigorous policy toward South Carolina. These, in great measure, were to be found in the south. Localities that had pet projects were, of course, bitter, though sensible men could always ask themselves the question whether it were reasonable to take the money of all the United States for one local improvement, instead of relying on local levies for it. In the west the Jacksonian attitude on internal improvements was the best card of the Whigs, but it was set off by Jackson's western attitude on Indians and public lands.

Political results of Jackson's vetoes

Jackson was an old Indian fighter, but not, on that account,

necessarily moved by inhumanity to the Indians. Yet as a man whose life had been lived near them he recognized the fact that organized Indian tribes could not subsist side by side with white settlements, and that fate had destined the Indian to go. The decade 1820–1830 had seen comparatively few Indian cessions in the north; in Georgia the federal government delayed the removal of the Cherokee and the Creeks. There Jackson made no effort to interfere with the State, which in 1830 extended her jurisdiction over the Indian tribes, defying Marshall's decision in Worcester *vs.* Georgia that the Cherokee were a nation over which the laws of Georgia could have force only in conformity with treaties and acts of Congress. Jackson has been criticized for not enforcing it as vigorously as he met nullification in South Carolina; his excuse must be that the decision of Marshall, if executed, would have produced an intolerable state of affairs. Ultimately by new cession-treaties the Creeks were removed after 1832, and the Cherokee by 1836; the Choctaw and Chickasaw of northern Mississippi were removed in 1833 to the newly created Indian Territory west of Arkansas. In the north, by 1835, the cessions had practically cleared the States east of the Mississippi. The Black Hawk War of 1832 was a final flurry in northern Illinois and Wisconsin.

Jackson's Indian policy

As to the Indians, Jackson's policy was that of an enlightened westerner. On public lands the policy advocated by his supporters in Congress, if not fully satisfactory to the west, was as satisfactory as eastern interests would permit. The man making a home in the west would have liked a sharp reduction in the minimum price of $1.25 an acre at which public lands sold at private sale; especially would he have liked, were it possible, such a reduction as was urged by Senator Thomas Hart Benton, the Missouri champion of the settler—25 cents each year the land remained unsold, until if unsold at a price of 25 cents an acre it would revert to the State. Such a regulation would draw population to the poorer lands as well as to the better, and would help to make settlement more compact. Failing of this, the settler at least demanded preëmption, namely, that if he settled on un-

The public land question

improved land before the public sales he should be privileged to buy it at the minimum price, and not see a speculator bid in his choice tract and improvements at the value his industry had given them. It is true that this did not often happen. Intermittently, in the 'thirties, temporary and local preëmption acts were in force. When they were not, the settlers banded together before the public sales, adjusted their claims by committees of their own choice and attended the sales in a body. Woe to the speculator who dared to bid on any improvement! Sometimes where lands were not desirable, or sold slowly, a squatter held a government farm for a generation without troubling to buy it.

The eastern public land policy

To the eastern congressman such doings were downright lawlessness. He could see no difference between a squatter on unused public land he did not own, and the same squatter in the corner of the congressman's own orchard. In vain he was told that the squatter performed a real service in the extension of settlement over the wilderness, and merited considerate treatment. Easterners hoped that the flow of population to the west, stripping worn-out eastern farms of tenants and eastern manufacturers of cheap hands, might intermittently be checked by such devices as were proposed in Foot's Resolution. Westerners accordingly stood by Benton in the party that seemed most committed to a liberal policy.

The rival policies of east and west were sharply contrasted in 1832, when by referring a public land resolution to Clay's committee on manufactures, his opponents sought to pin him on the question. The proposal which he reported, thereafter known as distribution, was to divide among the States the proceeds of public land sales, with 15 per cent first deducted for the benefit of the States in which the lands lay. The bill Clay submitted was referred to the committee on public lands, which reported, instead,

Clay's Distribution Bill

a measure for the reduction of public lands remaining five years unsold to 50 cents an acre, and of newly opened lands to $1 an acre; as to distribution, it assigned the public-land States 20 per cent instead of 15 per cent. Clay's measure passed the Senate but failed in the House. By

giving the older States a pecuniary interest in the proceeds of sales it might have postponed indefinitely a more western policy.

Jackson left no doubt in his message of December, 1832, as to his position. He advocated sales to actual settlers in small tracts at a price sufficient to pay the costs of obtaining cessions from the Indians, and of the public land administration. Clay's distribution measure, however, passed both houses only to be pocketed by Jackson. Again in 1833–1834 and in 1834–1835 did Clay urge his measure; but it failed of passage. The distribution bill was hard for Clay and the Whigs to defend in the public-land States; it contributed greatly to keeping those States Democratic.

Jackson's public land policy

In foreign affairs Jackson reaped the fruit of the increased prestige and power afforded by the newly awakened national spirit. His policy was guided by a series of able secretaries of state, Van Buren, Livingston, McLane, and Forsyth. At the outset Van Buren adroitly reassured the diplomatic corps who feared an upsetting of forms of diplomatic intercourse by a president whose enemies represented him as a savage bully, the executioner of Arbuthnot and Ambrister. Their presentation to a man of stately good manners who in diplomatic phrase apprised them of his hope for harmony in international affairs, reassured them and their governments.

Jackson and foreign affairs

One of the first questions settled was that of the British West India trade. This, almost the oldest commerce of America, had been cut off after 1783 when American ships were barred from entrance to the island ports. The United States ever since had been seeking to gain the privilege by diplomatic means. In 1822, Great Britain had opened it under restrictions, but as the United States had failed to make coördinate concessions called for by Act of Parliament of 1825, the intercourse had been closed to American ships by the British in 1826 and to British ships by the Americans in 1827. The trade sank almost to zero. Van Buren promptly applied for the reëxtension of the act of 1825 to the United States on the ground that a new administration in the United States had changed her diplomatic policy, and

The West India trade

she now asked as a favor what she had claimed as a right. In 1830 the trade was fully opened to ships of both nations.

With France, Jackson's policy approached the edge of war in collecting claims for spoliations in the Napoleonic era. A treaty was concluded in 1831 with the Citizen King, Louis Philippe, for the payment of twenty-five millions of francs in claims. The king, however, did not dare press the French Chambers to pass the needed appropriations. In 1834 Jackson recommended reprisals on French property. Clay and the Whigs opposed the President, and factiously defeated in the last hours of the session an appropriation of $3,000,000 for fortifications. Generally the Whig attitude was such as to encourage France in the belief that the nation was not behind Jackson's demand; she took offense at Jackson's message and recalled her minister. The Chambers meanwhile appropriated the needed sum, subject to a satisfactory explanation of Jackson's message. Jackson, refusing to abate a word of it, insisted his message was a communication between departments of government and not open to diplomatic notice. This satisfied French honor, and in 1836 payments began.

The French claims

The main issue upon which the Democratic party formed, splitting men by economic interests rather than by sections, was the United States Bank. Since Langdon Cheves as its president had retrieved the Bank's affairs he had been succeeded by the brilliant Nicholas Biddle, littérateur, spoiled child of fortune, conscious of the power he wielded over the finance and business of the country. The Bank, conservatively managed, checked any undue extension of credits by the lesser banks of the States. The earlier attacks of the States upon it, frustrated by the decisions of McCulloch *vs.* Maryland and Osborn *vs.* The Bank, had subsided. The Bank had its enemies in Congress but they were outnumbered by its powerful friends, attorneys, and beneficiaries. Its permanence seemed assured.

The Second Bank

Jackson's hostility to the Bank probably began in a vague distrust of all banking as tending to speculation and inflation. He distrusted especially the branch at Nashville; he believed the branches at Lexington, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, New

Hampshire, had played politics against him. In his first message to Congress he planned to include a slashing attack on the Bank; but his friend, James A. Hamilton, rewrote the passage, merely raising a question as to the Bank's constitutionality and stating that the institution had failed to establish a uniform and stable currency. Both statements were open to criticism. The Bank had certainly come as near doing the latter as was humanly possible. The former question had been supposedly settled by the Supreme Court; and for the executive to reopen it was not customary. A committee of Congress made up of Jackson men reported that the difficulties in Jackson's proposal of a bank based on the credit of the government were insuperable.

Jackson's hostility to the Bank

In his second annual message Jackson presented an outline of such a bank as he had in mind. Congress paid little attention. The Bank had strong friends among Jackson's trusted supporters and endeavored to win his confidence and mitigate his hostility. Jackson in his third message under the guidance of Livingston and McLane, both friendly to the Bank, simply left the question to Congress and the people. The part of wisdom might have been for Biddle to forego an attempt to make the question of extending the Bank's charter an issue in the election of 1832. But Clay was anxious for the Bank's active support, Webster backed him, and Biddle was persuaded to introduce a petition for recharter although the existing charter had four years yet to run. The bill passed on July 3 on test votes of 28–20 in the Senate and 107 to 86 in the House.

The Bank issue forced on Jackson

Jackson took up the gauntlet that Clay had thrown down. He returned the bill with a veto message intended as a campaign document, the main argument in which was the Bank's monopoly and its control over the finance and business of the country. For the first time dread of financial monopoly appeared in American politics. Jackson met the question of constitutionality by asserting that each branch of the government has the right to decide such questions for itself. The point is an interesting one. If the president considers himself not bound

Jackson's Bank veto

by a decision of the Supreme Court, he may disregard it so as to prevent the issue being brought before the courts for a reversal of his action. The doctrine is dubious, and of interest mainly as raising the question whether any method of interpretation can be devised under our system of government without leaving the Supreme Court the final judge not merely of its own powers but also of those of the other agencies of government.

The campaign of 1832

Clay as candidate against Jackson for the presidency had great hopes. He counted much on the influence of the Bank among the mercantile classes whose weight in politics had hitherto been great. He hoped to deflect votes to himself through Calhoun and his group of states' rights men. Clay's close friend, William Wirt, had been nominated the year before as candidate of the Anti-Masons, a party born in indignation at the alleged murder of William Morgan for betraying Masonic secrets; and Clay hoped to manipulate Wirt's friends to his advantage. All three groups had held nominating conventions at Baltimore; that of the Democrats nominated Jackson and Van Buren. Clay's National Republicans had nominated him, with John Sergeant, chief counsel for the Bank, for vice president. A young men's convention had confirmed the nominations, and drawn up a platform.

The Bank gave zealous support to Clay's campaign. It subsidized presses like J. Watson Webb's *New York Courier and Enquirer*, formerly a Jackson paper; it distributed documents lavishly; it used influence. But the campaign against the "monster" led by Blair and the *Globe* in the Jackson papers of the country proved irresistible. Clay and Biddle learned to their cost that the classes and the politicians were not the people. Jackson had the popular vote 687,502 to 530,189. Clay and Wirt carried all New England but Maine and New Hampshire; Clay also had Kentucky, Delaware and a part of Maryland. South Carolina threw away her vote on John Floyd of Virginia, and Jackson had the rest—219 electoral votes to 49 for Clay and 7 for Wirt.

Jackson's triumph

Jackson's appetite for war on the Bank had been whetted. He

distrusted his followers in Congress and feared another application for recharter might succeed unless a powerful blow were dealt the "monster." Secretly he planned to take advantage of the clause in the charter allowing the secretary of the treasury in his discretion to remove the United States deposits from the Bank, stating his reasons to Congress at its next session. Through a pliable secretary of the treasury he might pare the Bank's claws before another application for recharter could be presented.

Jackson plans removal of the deposits

In his message of December, 1832, Jackson had instanced a rather shady transaction by which the Bank had prevented for a year the presentation for redemption of five millions of United States debt, and he had raised the question as to whether the government deposits were safe. Congress after investigation voted that they were, 109 to 46. A bill for sale of the nation's bank stock holdings was lost 102 to 91. Under these circumstances Jackson ran great risks in assuming responsibility for removal of the deposits. Van Buren, although popularly supposed as a representative of New York to be hostile to the Bank, was won over only with difficulty. Livingston was got rid of, and McLane was promoted from the Treasury to the State Department where he could no longer protect the Bank. In his place Jackson appointed William J. Duane of Pennsylvania. Finally, late in the summer of 1833, Duane refused to act, and Jackson appointed in his room Roger B. Taney who, as attorney-general, had been emphatic in support of the removal. In a paper read to the cabinet, Jackson had previously set forth his theory that Cabinet officers were virtually subordinate department heads to the president, who, being responsible for their acts, might dictate their policy and remove them at his pleasure.

Jackson's preparations for removal

September 26, 1833, Taney began the process of depositing collections in certain selected state banks, the funds already on deposit in the Bank of the United States being drawn out as they were needed for disbursements. Biddle at once sharply contracted his discounts. In a measure, of course, this was necessary, as his reserves were lowered by the removals; yet

Removal of the deposits

his purpose was not merely to protect himself, but also to bring on a financial stringency that would compel a return of the deposits.

For the next few months Biddle's panic ruined merchants and threw laborers out of work. Deputations flocked to Washington to be received by Jackson, and told by him, seemingly in a towering passion, to go to Nicholas Biddle for relief, that the people were behind Jackson in his war on the "monster." In the Senate the National Republican leaders exhausted their eloquence on the iniquities of Jackson, and demanded with every grace and trick of rhetoric the return of the deposits. Their efforts culminated in the passage of resolutions of censure on Jackson, declaring his reasons for removal insufficient, and he himself guilty of assumption of power in derogation of the Constitution and the laws. Jackson retorted in a masterly protest, which he asked in vain to have placed in the journals of the Senate. Its basis was the impropriety of censure by one branch of government on another; since the censure imported an impeachable offense, it amounted to an advance judgment on the president by the body that might be called on to try him. The constitutional point was cleverly taken.

Biddle's panic; the senate censure

Finally Biddle was forced by the representations of his own friends to extend credits, and allay the panic; once it was thus proven that he had withheld relief, he alienated from the Bank its former friends, who had to admit that Jackson had been right in blaming the "monster" for the public distress. Biddle had proved Jackson's great point, that the power to harass the business of the whole country was too dangerous to be intrusted to a single corporation or to one man. By the end of 1834 the Bank's hopes of recharter were forever damned. It wound up its business, continued operation under a Pennsylvania State charter, and went down in the aftermath of the panic of 1837.

Defeat of the Bank

There remained the question of the Senate resolutions of censure on Jackson. Benton served notice that he would fight to expunge them from the Senate Journals. The Democratic party machine set to work. State legislatures instructed their senators to vote for

expunging. Hostile senators were defeated for reëlection. The opposition majority gradually wasted away and in 1837, before Jackson's retirement from office, Benton forced through a vote for writing across the resolutions on the Senate Journal the words: "Expunged by order of the Senate this sixteenth day of January in the year of our Lord 1837." **The expunging resolution** Then and thereafter it was argued that the measure violated the constitutional provision that each house keep a journal of its proceedings. But alleging that a journal is not kept because part of it is so expunged as to remain legible is little better than quibbling.

During Jackson's administration the Democratic party had come into being, and its machinery of control was more democratic for that day than anything seen hitherto throughout the Union. Its principles were, first, that the United States government, while a government of strictly limited powers, was a national government, with full power within its constitutional rights to enforce its will. **Democratic principles** The party favored a western policy toward the Indians, and a system of public land administration that helped moneyless men to make homes, rather than brought revenue to the government. It stood against great financial monopolies like the Bank as dangerous to republican government. In New York, with the group known as the Locofocos, and in the west, democratic doctrines were taking more and more extreme forms—the rights of men as against the rights of property, distrust of all banks and of all corporate privileges. Indeed, in spite of the slaveholders of the Democratic party in the South, on the doctrine of human rights in the North the Democrat stood very near to the abolitionist.

The course of events of the last two decades helped to supply the personnel for the party. Naturally it was strong on the frontier and in the upcountry, where nature herself enforced democracy on man; but other elements swelled its numbers in the older settled sections. With the close of the War of 1812 migration had again begun to pour from Europe. It was still in great measure from the British Isles, but now there were many native Irish to

supplement the former streams of English and Scotch. These elements were often induced to migrate not only by the economic depression that marked the close of the Napoleonic Wars, but also by a latent dislike of rule by aristocracies and of the autocratic governments established in the name of legitimate monarchy on the overthrown French Revolution. In the Monroe Doctrine the United States had announced the American system as liberty, the European as despotism; and the recruits that repaired to her standard naturally sided with a party democratic in name and creed.

Personnel of the Democratic party

Much of the European migration went to swell the democracy of the west; but some of it lingered in eastern cities. Here economic forces were at work side by side with political ones. With economic expansion, a distinct laboring class was developing. Under the possibility of mass production of machinery the old master and journeyman system was breaking down into one of employer and workmen, labor and capital incarnate. Workmen began to combine in unions to obtain higher wages or shorter hours of labor, unions that flourished for a while, only to go under in the panic of 1837 and the resulting period of unemployment. A Workingmen's party of 1830 put forward demands for a ten-hour day, higher wages, abolition of imprisonment for debt, free schools, and no convict labor. It changed into the so-called Locofoco party and finally was absorbed by the Democrats as the national government recognized the ten-hour principle on government works.

Labor movements and democracy

In New England the Democrats were generally the lower classes of the towns and the upland farmers, often led by Methodists and Baptists educated at Brown, the upstart Rhode Island university that was anathema to more conservative New England elements. The Democratic party at one time or another controlled most of the New England States, establishing itself in real strength in all but Massachusetts and Vermont. After the Dorr insurrection of 1842 it overthrew the old Rhode Island charter of 1663, replacing it with a constitution better fitted to the modern age.

New England Democrats

This was but one instance of the functioning of democracy in a series of more liberal state constitutions. New Jersey in 1844, Wisconsin in 1846 and 1848, Iowa in 1844 and 1846, Illinois in 1848, Kentucky, Ohio and Michigan in 1850, Indiana in 1851, framed new and more liberal organic laws. Generally they sought to attain democracy by making all offices elective; most of them installed a judiciary elected for a term of years, in place of the older ones appointed by governors and legislature with indefinite tenure: quite often they placed limitations on the power of the legislature to issue special charters to corporations, especially banks; occasionally they sought to make banking democratic by prescribing the passage of a general law in compliance with which any one might establish a bank. One or two, as in Wisconsin, prescribed limitations on the seizure of homesteads for debt. Accompanying them came a body of legislation, homestead exemption laws, abolition of imprisonment for debt, abolition of the barbarous punishments of whipping, branding, and the pillory that survived from the earlier period.

Democratic state constitutions

Even wilder notions of reform and progress were in the air. Amid threats and violence the propaganda for the abolition of slavery had begun; amid taunts and hisses a few women were launching a campaign for women's rights designed to give women equal opportunity with men in education and to relieve them from the legislation by which a girl with her property and her labor passed from absolute subjection to her father to absolute subjection to her husband. The schools that were to become women's colleges were appearing in the 'thirties and 'forties still disguised under the name of seminaries. The period saw the multiplication of Utopian communities designed by doctrinaires on economic, social, and religious principles to ameliorate the human race. They ranged from Brook Farm, the intellectual expression of the New England philosophers, through New Harmony, Robert Dale Owen's pioneer economic experiment in Indiana designed to prove that economic environment would regenerate the supposed victims of heredity, to Fourier phalanxes that were frankly communistic associations, to Shaker communi-

Ideas of social reform

ties that enforced celibacy, and to free love communities whose doctrines proclaimed the most startling immoralities. In all this unrest, this searching after new and better principles of living and standards of life, the conservative saw the working of the leaven of democratic political ideas.

The Whig party, so named in 1834, that was gathering together old Jackson elements which had been thrown off in the evolution of the Democratic party, was not nearly so homogeneous as its rival. Dislike of Jackson was almost its sole principle of unity. It included men like John Tyler of Virginia, a believer in states' rights and an opposer of Jackson in his vigorous assertion of nationality against South Carolina. On the other hand, Webster and Clay stood for a liberal interpretation of the Constitution to allow of protective tariffs, internal improvements, and a bank. They stood essentially for the classes of trade and finance and respectability.

The Whig party

The personality of Jackson dominates this epoch in American history. Out of the popular enthusiasm for him the Democratic party was born. Moreover, he had sensed, first among American presidents, in his election in 1828, and in his war on the Bank, that in the warm glow of national sentiment that had followed the War of 1812, a people of the United States had come into being. The common people, enfranchised by the first years of the nineteenth century, were looking over the state bounds that hitherto had been so important, to claim fellowship with each other throughout the Union on the basis of common enthusiasm for their country. Jackson had felt that the president of the United States could appeal to this new political body, could become its leader; and doing so, he raised the office of president to new heights of power and influence. Not merely the leader of his party, but also the leader of the nation, the Old Hero came into office to find the president dependent for his nomination or election on the House of Representatives, dependent on the Senate for his appointments, and striving feebly by the use of patronage to make head against them both. He left office on the morrow of the day on which the Senate in

Jackson as the nation's leader

the expunging resolution had been compelled by the president's party to bow as the House already had done, to the people's will.

The portrait of Andrew Jackson left by men who wrote history in the next generation has been drawn as a senile, violent, and passionate old man, the contemner of the Constitution, and the sponsor for the spoils system. Much of this picture is made with materials furnished by Whig politicians who, beaten by Jackson in every encounter, feared the man, and even after his retirement from office and after his death feared the magic and glamour of his name.

The real Jackson

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

A. C. Cole, *The Whig Party in the South.* Washington, 1913.
D. R. Fox, *The Decline of Aristocracy in the Politics of New York.* New York, 1919.
W. MacDonald, *Jacksonian Democracy* (*American Nation*, vol. XV). New York, 1906.
C. G. Bowers, *The Party Battles of the Jackson Period.* Boston, 1922.
W. M. Meigs, *The Life of Thomas Hart Benton.* Philadelphia, 1904.
H. E. von Holst, *John C. Calhoun.* New York, 1917.
J. S. Bassett, *The Life of Andrew Jackson.* 2 vols. (New Ed.) New York, 1925.
D. F. Houston, *A Critical Study of Nullification in South Carolina.* New York, 1896.
E. Channing, *A History of the United States*, vol. V. New York, 1921.
J. B. McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States*, vol. VI. New York, 1906.
A. J. Beveridge, *The Life of John Marshall*, vol. IV. Boston, 1919.
F. J. Turner, *Rise of the New West* (*American Nation*, vol. XIV). New York, 1906.
F. L. Paxson, *History of the American Frontier, 1763–1893.* Boston, 1924.

CHAPTER XIX

THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY

I

On the rosy horizon of the new American nation of Jackson's day hung one ominous cloud. While improved means of transportation and closer commercial relations between sections were developing, while churches, political parties, and similar organizations were cementing national unity, the economic interests of the North and South were steadily diverging. Economic forces, in the years that followed, were to widen the fissure, breaking one after another the surface ties of religion and politics until at last the federal Union was no longer able to hold the sections together. In this economic divergence, slavery, although not the only factor, was a very important one. While groups of northern men were more and more making it the target of moral criticism, the leaders of public opinion in the South grew more and more certain that it must be protected as the mainspring of southern life; and when they decided that they could no longer protect it in the Union, they made the southern Confederacy and the Civil War on its behalf.

Sectionalism

In the year 1790 North and South were essentially agricultural. Leaving aside the petty products of the New England farmer's long winter evenings, both sections bought their manufactured goods from England. The North in its agriculture was committed to cereal and stock farming; the South to a few staples—tobacco, rice, indigo, and later sugar, hemp, and cotton. The northerner financed and executed the carrying of his produce to market; the southerner tended to leave the trade in his staples to be financed a year ahead by foreign merchants.

Early similarity of North and South

These sectional divergences were not vital; but the whole course

of the nineteenth century increased them. The prosperous days of neutral trade in the Napoleonic wars accumulated capital in New England and the North. When the Jeffersonian restrictive measures and the War of 1812 cut off the supply of English goods, the North, despite the southern upcountry products, acquired a national market, and at the end of the war it was natural that she should exact from the rest of the nation higher and higher tariff protection for the infant industries thus born.

Northern manufactures, 1807–1815

The South soon noticed the effects. The cotton that had leaped into importance with Eli Whitney's invention of the cotton gin for removing the seed from the fiber, was one of the United States' great purchasing assets in world markets; but the tariffs hindered the South's receiving direct imports in return for it, and compelled her to buy, at higher and higher prices, coarse cloth for her negroes and her finer articles of consumption, in great measure from the North. More and more northern merchants carried on her trade with resulting profits, advancing the reckless cotton planter the proceeds of his next crop. From 1830 on, the South was prone to consider the divers economic bonds that tied her to the North as parasitic vines that drained her substance. Repeatedly in the next generation she made attempts to free herself by the establishment of manufactures, by gestures toward direct trade with Europe. Incidentally she made more or less violent political war on the tariff, though in this her Whig elements would not let her be altogether consistent.

The South at an economic disadvantage

Agriculture and agricultural methods in the sections were also diverging. In the North, despite a few exceptions the prevailing agricultural unit was the small farm with diversified produce of cereals and live stock. This was the type that flourished in the newer States of the northwest. In the South the controlling element in agriculture was more and more the large plantation holding. There were of course exceptions. In the poorer clay sections and pine barrens a low type of shiftless small farmer developed. In the mountain regions, the

Extension of the plantation

mountain whites farmed little patches, and hated vainly the great slaveholders of the low sections who dominated their States. In the first push of population into the Gulf States region the small farmer moved side by side with his brother in the North. But in the lower South it was the plantation that jostled the small farmer into the less desirable lands; and the economics of cotton production turned not on the small farmer, who raised two bales with his own hands, but on the great planter. The advance of the plantation split a deep rift in the early economic solidarity of northwest and southwest.

The plantation system reproduced the older agriculture of Virginia, which was essentially the ownership of a body of labor, and the use of that labor on practically limitless lands to farm tract after tract to the point of soil exhaustion. This system had been profitable in Virginia while lands still stretched away before the colony, and had made the colonial aristocracy whose mansions still survive as proof of its magnificence. It would work in the lower South so long as new soils were available, so long as the planter could migrate with his negroes from the worn-out fields of the old South to purchase fresh lands cleared by the farmers of the newer South. Yet the system always demanded new lands to waste. The plantation system by the very rule of its being had ever to acquire new territory. By the days of the Civil War it was even aspiring to supplant the pioneer in the northwest as it had done in the southwest, and it supported the policy of national aggrandizement that despoiled Mexico of her possessions north of the Rio Grande.

Weakness of the plantation system

In earlier colonial times, the indentured white servant had formed a part of this capitalized fund of labor; but by the Revolution it was made up generally of negro slaves. In 1776, slavery was legal from end to end of the colonies, though in the North the negroes, unsuited to the diversified operations of the northern farm, were usually mere objects of luxurious display as house and body servants. In the South, they were still a decisive economic force. In the eighteenth

Opinion of slavery in 1776


DENSITY of POPULATION
in 1840
92°
87°
82°
77°
72°
67°
50°
45°
40°
35°
30°
25°
Under 2 inhabitants per square mile
2 to 6 " " " "
6 to 18 " " " "
18 to 45 " " " "
45 to 90 " " " "
Over 90 " " " "

century, the era of reason, slavery in the abstract seemed to thinking men a barbarism as unworthy their enlightenment as torture, execution by hanging, drawing and quartering, or persecution for witchcraft. Their criticism was echoed by the Quaker antislavery doctrine, by the opposition of Methodism in its early stages and of Congregationalism after emancipation had taken place in New England. Through direct or gradual emancipation slavery by 1830 had been everywhere put in process of extinction north of Delaware and Maryland.

Difficulty of emancipation

The Revolutionary leaders of Virginia were precluded from a similar course by the magnitude of their problem. The heavy cost which emancipation would cast on slaveowners or on the State, the difficulty of economic readjustment, the question of the social status of the free negro all required careful consideration. Virginians were responsible in earlier years for keeping slavery from the northwest, and in 1808 for barring the African slave trade. But criticism of slavery on moral grounds they resented as unjust, and something to be passionately resented. Slavery to them in the concrete was a mild institution, patriarchal rather than economic, and they discounted the theoretical moral objection to it by pointing to their actual practice.

Cotton culture gives slavery new life

From the beginning, however, the States of the extreme South, South Carolina and Georgia, were frankly committed to slavery. Profitable in 1787, slavery became vastly more so when the development of the cotton industry devised a new crop preëminently adapted to slave labor. Most months in the year cotton demands some attention. It can be grown in great fields that employ hands by the dozen under one overseer, it can utilize at cotton picking both sexes and all ages from the nimble fingers of childhood to the uncertain ones of old age. Given fresh soils it is superlatively profitable. Europe, once accustomed to the new textile, developed a demand which absorbed even the ever-increasing supply. The lowering prices consequent on that increasing supply pinched the well-used soils of South Carolina until in 1830 she turned to nullification; but

from the virgin lands of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi the migrated cotton planter extracted his full profit. The demand was always for more slaves and more land. Virginia and the older South supplied the former. Opinion it is true was against the sale of slaves south except for discipline or financial distress, but droves were sent steadily from the border States to the new cotton South. High-spirited slaveowners were stung to madness by being assailed as breeders of slaves for the southern markets; but for better or worse they were, despite themselves; and self-interest led the older South, sharing as it did in the economic welfare of the newer South, to indorse the political program of expansion. By 1830 the South had generally abandoned the deprecating attitude of apology and was the avowed defender of the slavery system.

Calhoun's defense of slavery

Partly in response to abolitionist attack the South developed an economic and social defense for slavery—perhaps most ably stated by John C. Calhoun, who after 1830 became the spokesman of the new slavery. Generally the pro-slavery advocate urged that everywhere and at almost every time in the world's history labor was exploited by capital. In England and the North exploitation took place by the wage system, a teeming birth rate always tending to increase the supply of labor and to push wages down to the starvation limit, at which the laborer was paid by his employer just enough to sustain life and to rear a family to supply labor for the next generation. Was it not better to admit frankly that the laborer and his family belonged to the capitalist, and to place upon him corresponding responsibilities for their well-being? Further, with two races largely represented in the same community, slavery was the most successful way of keeping the lower in the necessary subjection to the higher, and preventing race war. Any civilization necessarily depended on the existence of a leisure class supported by the labor of others, and slavery in the South was playing the same rôle it had played in the unrivaled culture of the Athens of Pericles.

The clergyman supported this argument with a biblical one,

based on the recognition of a system of slavery in the world of the Old and New Testament, ignoring as best he could the ethical teaching of Jesus and the pricking of sensitive consciences that tried to square it with slavery. It was significant that, as the half-century mark neared, the Methodist and Baptist communions, in earlier years representing the poorer elements of the community and, in the case of Methodism at least, avowedly antislavery, were to join with Presbyterian and Episcopalian in defense of the "peculiar institution" of the South.

The Biblical pro-slavery argument

The nature of slavery was such that by appeal to interests it summoned diverse elements to its support. Probably it was really better than an economic loss only to the great planter who numbered his slaves by the fifties or hundreds; but the smaller planter, barely making a comfortable living out of fifteen or twenty, and the small farmer or professional man with but one or two, feared a property loss if slavery were threatened, and therefore joined with the great slaveholders in its support. By wealth and influence this class dominated their States; the slaveholders of the border States had their interest in the rising prices paid for their slaves for lower southern plantations. The western farmer, whose live stock and corn the South often bought rather than divert slave labor from King Cotton to raise food, had his loss to fear if the South left the Union; so had the New England manufacturer and merchant whose profits grew from southern financial recklessness. The southern clergy and the southern colleges naturally supported the interests of the men of wealth in their community.

Defenders of slavery

The policy which the slavery interests naturally adopted was, first, a limitation of the power of the federal government to prevent interference with slavery by federal authority; second, the extension of the slave area to multiply its votes and to preserve its equality in the Senate; and, third, the acquisition of new territory to permit extension and the formation of new slave States. Dimly foreseen by a few thinkers at the first, by the 'fifties the slavery interests were firmly united

The slave-owners' policy

on this program, and under the leadership of a few wealthy and intelligent men, those interests were working for its attainment.

We can now criticize dispassionately the slavery position in the light of later experience. The staple crop of the South can be grown even by free negro labor though perhaps not so efficiently as under the old system. The investment of capital in labor was an economic handicap which probably only fertile soils kept from becoming an economic disaster. Certainly it left the South without free capital with which to finance its agriculture and develop manufacture. Slavery caused labor to be regarded as degrading and thus kept away the better class of free white workmen. On the other hand, emancipation at any time down to the Civil War entailed an economic burden which neither the States, the nation, nor the owners were willing to bear.

Slavery in the light of history

Under the slave system, of course, waste, inefficiency, and idleness were inevitable as they always are when men have no incentive to ambition. Efficient work could rarely be got save by harsh measures on the part of the overseers. The tendency of negro slaves to idle and to waste or destroy property was the despair of the planter; perhaps it was due as much to the race from which the laborer sprung as to his unfree status. However, the free negro, if shiftless in his way of living, is more efficient as a worker for himself than he is described to have been for others as a slave.

Inefficiency of slaves

On the social side the consequences were generally for the worse. Undoubtedly slavery prevented the ill-feeling between the races that has steadily developed of late years both North and South. As for the negroes, generally enslaved from the more docile African tribes, their adjustment to the situation is shown by the rapidity with which they multiplied. In general the men of the race do not seem to have chafed under slavery. The abolitionist, in gauging the race and its reactions on this point from the few individuals with initiative enough to escape and to make their way hundreds of miles to freedom, was the victim of a most disastrous fallacy. A worse social result of slavery

Social effects of slavery

was the effect on the dominant race of having men and women always at hand as a butt for their passions. The fire-eating southern senator in Congress and the southern brawler and duelist in their own persons were the worst arguments against the system they defended.

Unquestionably Garrisonian abolition had its share in molding the slavery attitude into its uncompromising form. In 1831 William Lloyd Garrison, a printer imbued with anti-slavery doctrine, began at Boston the publication of the *Liberator*, in which he denounced slavery as a sin in the slaveholder and in the citizen who acquiesced in it, and demanded immediate and universal emancipation. Garrison's personality, as stern and as uncompromising as the dourest of the Puritans, was reflected in his writing. His diatribes on slavery stung like a whiplash on his opponents. Around him gathered the Anti-Slavery Society, at first a little group of men and women, advocates of various reforms, in numbers thoroughly insignificant and not much less so in influence.

Abolitionism

By its vehemence in the cause, the antislavery group stirred up disturbances in the North. Breaking up abolition meetings by violence and mobbing abolitionists became common. Public sentiment and legislation turned even on their protégés, the free negroes. A series of mob outrages culminated in the dragging of Garrison with a rope around his body through the streets of Boston in 1835, the wrecking of the office of the *Philanthropist* in Cincinnati in 1836, and the slaying of Elijah Lovejoy at Alton in 1837. Then a reaction set in. Violence defeated its own end. While the abolition movement showed its own intense vitality in the way abolitionists quarreled with each other over principles, seceded, and reunited, a much larger body of antislavery opinion grew around them; it regarded them as fanatics but was shocked at the violence they suffered from the opposition.

Anti-abolitionist mobs

The slavery element itself contributed largely to this result. It had met the first abolitionist attack by threats of death for abolitionists caught in the South, and even by rewards for kid-

naping them thither. Fearing possible incendiary effects on the slaves from the abolition newspapers and from woodcuts depicting acts of cruelty to negroes, they sought to exclude these from the South. With the connivance of the Postmaster-General Amos Kendall, southern postmasters scanned the mails for such material and destroyed it; but Calhoun was not satisfied and in 1836 tried to secure the passage of an act prohibiting the circulation of such mail matter in any State objecting to it.

Exclusion of abolitionist tracts from the mails

More important was the question of abolition petitions in Congress. On any ordinary interpretation of the powers of Congress they certainly included the right to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia; and so long as the right of petition stood unimpaired Congress could hardly refrain from the form of receiving and considering any petition respectfully asking that they abolish it. At first such petitions were received and referred to committees that reported against them. But even this alarmed the slavery leaders. In the Senate in 1836 Calhoun demanded that the petitions be not received. Buchanan proposed the expedient of immediate rejection of the petitions without reference to a committee; this compromise was adopted. Later in the same session the House adopted a rule—the famous "gag resolution"—that all petitions on the subject should be laid on the table without printing or reference. It passed by a vote of 117–68, John Quincy Adams from his seat vehemently protesting it a violation of the Constitution, the rules of the House and the rights of his constituents.

The right of petition

Adams, a member of Congress since 1831 and hitherto active in the presentation of abolition petitions, began a deliberate crusade against the infringement of the right of petition. In 1837 proslavery congressmen made a savage attack on him on a technicality connected with a petition he presented. Out-maneuvered by the veteran parliamentarian, they exhibited only their own headlong rashness. Year after year the gag resolutions were adopted in more and more stringent form, until finally in 1844 they were abandoned. By that

The gag resolutions: their results

time the mischief to the slavery cause was done. The legislatures of Vermont and Massachusetts had protested against the gag. The large number of thinking men who deprecated interference with the principles of civil liberty had been forced into working agreement with the antislavery groups. Adams, far removed from the abolitionists in opinion, had been driven into a position of seeming coöperation with them. He had gained one or two allies in his fight, Slade of Vermont and Giddings of Ohio. The latter, censured by the House for antislavery resolutions he presented in 1842, resigned and was promptly reëlected by his constituents.

The federal government had its own difficulties from slavery in international relations in a world in which the concensus of civilized opinion was against the "institution." Despite the Act of 1808 the foreign slave trade continued under the American flag, and the United States would not allow British frigates to search any vessel flying it. Not until 1842 did she agree to a joint cruising squadron on the African coast. Another question arose out of the case of ships carrying slaves from Atlantic to Gulf ports, and wrecked or forced by weather into British West India Islands. Great Britain considered such slaves free on the ground that she did not recognize slavery on the high seas. Finally she paid for those freed in this manner prior to West Indian emancipation. In 1841 slaves on the *Creole* mutinied and carried their vessel into Nassau where the British government set them free. Webster, as secretary of state, in pressing for an indemnity took the ground that slaves legally held in States allowing slavery had their status continued and protected by the Constitution of the United States on the high seas. The question was finally decided for the United States; but from it had arisen the further question as to whether slavery was supported by the Constitution or not.

Slavery as an international question

It was apropos of the *Creole* that Giddings had received the censure mentioned above; he had introduced resolutions to the effect that slavery being contrary to the law of nations could have force only by virtue of the local or municipal laws of the States, and that the Constitution did not, as Webster argued, extend the

operation of those laws outside state bounds. In this he had touched a question vital to the slave power. Five years before, in a series of resolutions presented to the Senate, Calhoun had spun a web of arid logic to prove that the federal government had the express duty of fostering and protecting slavery everywhere. Between his doctrines and Giddings' lay the issue whether slavery in the United States should expand and flourish or should slowly decay.

Did slavery follow the flag?

II

Into the election of Martin Van Buren as his successor Jackson threw all his political sagacity and personal influence. Van Buren's election as vice president in 1832 had designated him for the succession; in 1835 he was nominated by the Democratic convention, with R. M. Johnson of Kentucky for vice president. However, Van Buren was a load for the party to carry. He had acquired a reputation for trickery and finesse in politics that obscured his real ability as diplomat and administrator. Something feline, something effeminate attached to him in the popular imagination; and his robustious running mate, whose emphatic clothes, and breezy manner bespoke the westerner, and who claimed to have killed Tecumseh with his own hand, was a stronger vote-getter than Van Buren himself.

The election of 1836

The opposition however were handicapped by the divergent elements that made up their party; old Federalists like Webster, old Republicans like Clay, old Adams men of 1828, states' rights men like John Tyler of Virginia, men who had broken with Jackson over appointments, internal improvements, the bank, the expunging resolution, could unite on but one issue, distrust of Jackson and the executive power. As supposed defenders of the legislature, they borrowed for their party from English and revolutionary history the name of Whig. Their best chance was to cut into Van Buren's vote in the hope that the election could be thrown into Congress. In so weakening the Democratic strength they were partially successful. Tennessee and Georgia cast their votes for Hugh L. White, a malcontent

The Whig opposition

Jacksonian from Tennessee. South Carolina threw away her votes on Mangum of North Carolina; Massachusetts voted for Webster. William Henry Harrison of Ohio, a man whom the preceding age had seemingly left a political bankrupt, mustered 73 votes—Indiana, Ohio, Kentucky, Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, and Vermont.

Van Buren was scarcely in office when he was confronted with the panic of 1837. Blamed, like most panics in the popular mind, to the president in whose administration it chanced to fall, it had been preparing for five years at least. There had been reckless speculation in the public lands. For a decade after the abolition of the credit system, sales had been small. Then they began again. In State after State, northwest and southwest, they leaped to millions of acres, sometimes sold at speculative advances on the minimum price. At the same time settlement in the west seemed to give a solid basis for the heavy sales. From Europe and the older States migration had passed into the west. New farms clustered in the former wilderness, and out of the midst of them grew new speculative cities like the early Chicago.

Land speculation

Men dreamed of even larger profits from rising land values, if only roads, canals, and railroads were at hand to lead to a market. In 1828 the first railroad track had been laid in the United States, in 1830 the steam locomotive was first successfully used. Railroads sprang up by private or local enterprise, often to connect two points for no apparent good reason. The Erie Canal's phenomenal success, Pennsylvania's road and inclined-plane crossing of the Alleghenies both seemed to encourage investment in the hopes of the future. State after State, like New York and Massachusetts, offered subsidies to private railroad companies; the western States especially, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, the newly admitted Michigan, and the States of the southwest, plunged into vast schemes of internal improvements on state credit.

Internal improvement schemes

Various factors made this easy. Under the protective tariffs since 1828 money had been rolling into the federal treasury beyond

its needs. With the tariff determined by sectional compromise until 1842, the surplus was applied to the debt until the debt was absolutely extinguished. Then the strict constructionists could think of nothing to do with the hoard in the treasury but to divide it among the States, who thus seemed to have ample funds assured for their schemes of internal improvement. In addition foreign bankers were also eager to lend, especially on the credit of northern States; and banking facilities in the United States since the removal of the deposits were even more promising.

The surplus

The obvious result of the removal of the deposits from the Bank of the United States, once the immediate panic had subsided, was to increase the resources of the state bank depositaries of the federal government. It was natural that banks of that reckless age should use government deposits as a basis for headlong expansion of credit in both deposits and bank notes. Banks had plenty of money to lend, and charmed by the flood of paper profits that flowed upon them, States like Kentucky, Indiana, and Illinois founded banks in which the State reaped a share of the profits for a paper subscription to the capital stock.

Reckless banking

And the paper notes so recklessly issued could be used at land offices for purchasing good, black government acres and gilt-edged town sites! From 1835 on, the administration had felt uneasy and had been limiting the receipt of bank notes at the land offices—none less than $5 after September 30, 1835, none under $10 after July 4, 1836. On July 11, 1836, to take effect August 15, was issued the specie circular, prohibiting the receipt for public lands of anything but gold or silver or land warrants, except in purchases by actual settlers up to December 15.

The specie circular

With undue inflation, all was ready for a grand financial panic. The failure of English firms in the American trade in November, 1836, set off the bomb. The panic in the east cut off the revenue so that funds for distribution were no longer available. Instead the federal government had to borrow for expenses, and in 1841 the bonded debt reappeared. The banks suspended specie payments; works of internal improvement got

The panic of 1837

into difficulties and stopped. State banks and state-chartered banks crashed down in ruin. Land became a drug on the market, and ruin and distress were everywhere. Several of the States for a time suspended payment of foreign debts. Mississippi absolutely repudiated a $5,000,000 foreign loan to a state bank. By 1838 the first effects of the panic had run their course and the banks had generally resumed, only to suspend again in the next year, for another and a longer period.

Van Buren met the crisis with the most statesmanlike act of his career. Calling Congress in special session for September, 1837, he proposed the measure later called the Independent Treasury—namely, that the government should divorce its business altogether from the banks, and receive and pay out its money through its own officers, keeping it in its own vaults. As finally passed in 1846, the subtreasury remained our financial policy until the Federal Reserve System went into effect three-quarters of a century later. The Whigs poured forth their contempt on the measure, ridiculing the divorce of banks and government, and insisting on the revival of a national bank.

The subtreasury proposed

The Democrats, with but a narrow majority in Congress, were divided on the measure. The Locofoco or radical Democrats eagerly took up the anti-bank doctrine; the conservatives fought the "subtreasury" until its final passage; then they either went over to the Whigs or acquiesced under pressure. The party machinery and party presses were used to bring recalcitrant congressmen into line, and July 4, 1840, the act passed. It naturally became an issue in the campaign of 1840.

The Democrats divided

For that campaign Van Buren was the Democratic candidate, nominated at Baltimore in 1840 on a platform based on the party record. In the previous December the Whigs, sidetracking Clay as too old a politician and with too many enemies, nominated Harrison and Tyler on no platform. The campaign they waged was an appeal to sentiment, a travesty on the Jackson campaign of 1828. Harrison, little better than a mediocrity, was invested with the glamour of a

The campaign of 1840

preceding generation as a brave general who befriended his old soldiers in distress, a simple farmer whose latchstring was always out, a patriarch whose years reached back to the golden days of Washington, and a statesman who if elected would restore the glorious past. In monster mass meetings in the west on Harrison's old battlegrounds, in ceremonies around log cabins in cities, where merchants and mechanics pledged each other in cider drawn from the keg in tin cups, and in parades with log-cabin floats, the appeal was made frankly to sentiment and imagination. Everywhere the symbols of hard cider, log cabins, coonskins—the coon became the Whig emblem—appealed to the voters. Van Buren was overwhelmed with ridicule as a fop and dandy who spent the money of the people on gold spoons and elaborate furnishings for the White House, a man fit only to give place to the Hero of Tippecanoe. Attempts at argument were whistled away in campaign ballads. The subtreasury was linked with a wise proposal for a territorial army as a union of "purse and sword" destructive to liberty. Defalcations of Democratic officeholders were made the text of diatribes on what would happen when public moneys were intrusted to such men in cash; absconding defaulters in newspaper slang became "subtreasurers." A New York collector who defaulted for a million lent his name to enrich the political dictionary with the verb "to swartwout."

"A farce or a tornado," so Van Buren is said to have forecast the success of the Whig campaign, and a tornado it proved. The popular vote for either party rose almost a half million from 1836, and Van Buren was beaten by a popular majority of less than 150,000; but he obtained only 60 electoral votes. Only New Hampshire, Virginia, South Carolina, Alabama, Arkansas, Missouri, and Illinois supported him. The little Liberty party, that had entered the campaign with James G. Birney as candidate, polled but a few votes; its appearance marked a break with the ideal of Garrison to abstain from participation in politics, and a determination to fight slavery by the ballot as well as by the spoken word.

Election of Harrison

With Harrison elected, and a safe majority in both Houses of Congress, Clay and his associates planned to put through the program they had not announced. Harrison showed signs of restlessness under Clay's control; but the scramble of the Whigs for offices broke the last remnant of his strength, and he died on April 4, 1841. Of the "Tippecanoe and Tyler too" of the slogan of 1840, the Whigs were now to experience the "Tyler too." John Tyler had a fairly consistent states' rights record and had broken with Jackson over the Force Bill; he had never changed his views, was bound by no platform, and saw no reason why he should not put his ideas into effect. As the first succeeding vice president he asserted his right to all the powers and dignities of the president; for the time he retained Harrison's cabinet.

John Tyler

Congress met in special session on May 31, 1841. In a series of resolutions Clay announced a Whig program, repeal of the subtreasury, a Bank of the United States, higher tariff, distribution of proceeds of the public lands. Congress under his orders passed the subtreasury repeal, and a Bank Bill. On August 16 Tyler vetoed the latter, partly on constitutional objections as to the right of the Bank to establish branches in the States without their consent. Clay's followers were not strong enough to pass the bill over the veto, and drew a second bill. Supposedly, it was framed in coöperation with the President to meet his scruples, but this seems doubtful. When Tyler a second time used his veto the wrath of the Whigs broke forth, and he was formally read out of the party. The Clay men in his cabinet resigned, but Webster, not on too good terms with Clay, stayed on; later he alleged that his reason was the opportunity of settling the Maine boundary dispute.

Tyler breaks with the Whigs

Under these circumstances the remaining legislation of Tyler's term was necessarily the fruit of cross purposes. The tariff was revised, generally upward, in 1842. A Distribution Act was passed in 1841 but only with a proviso that it should not go into effect until tariff duties were under 20 per cent. It was never operative; a more important part of the act was the section which established the principle of preëmption for

Legislation under Tyler

the first time as a fixed policy. In foreign affairs the great achievement of the administration was the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 by which the northern boundary of Maine was finally fixed on a compromise between American and British claims. A diplomatic question of British aggression in the *Caroline* matter is worth only a mention.

Party politics in the period was a welter of confusion. The great men of the Whigs followed Clay in renouncing all connection with Tyler. The disaster that had followed the choice of the nominees in 1840 indicated Clay, the party's natural leader, as the standard bearer in 1844. He kept himself prominently before the country, and modified his slavery views slightly in the southern direction. Webster, until he finally left Tyler's cabinet, was denounced as little better than a traitor; and he never fully regained his party standing.

Webster and Clay

Tyler had the ambition to succeed himself in the presidency, and undertook the almost impossible task of building himself a party. His strict constructionist views drew in a few states' rights Democrats; the patronage drew in a good many more Democrats who, while not deserting their party, were willing to hold desirable offices. Out of the "corporal's guard" so mustered Tyler hoped to make a party on the issue of the acquisition of Texas. His advances in that direction will be treated in the next chapter.

Tyler's personal party

Most significant of all were the changes taking place in the Democratic party. That party had been dividing imperceptibly into two factions, the Locofoco and the conservative. The Locofocos genuinely represented the ideals of democracy and the rights of man and they distrusted wealth as expressed in corporate institutions. The subtreasury policy was distinctly Locofoco and Van Buren had aligned himself with the group on the issue. The defeat of 1840 was therefore essentially a Locofoco defeat.

The Locofocos

The conservatives in general represented elements of wealth in the party, especially the slaveholding democracy of the South. To them the essential part of the democratic creed was strict con-

struction and states' rights. They agreed most cordially with Tyler's policy of securing Texas. Gaining possession of the party machinery with the nomination and election of Polk in 1844, they were to turn the party more and more to what it finally became: the bulwark of protection for the slaveholders of the South.

The conservatives

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

A. B. Hart, *Slavery and Abolition* (*American Nation*, vol. XVI). New York, 1906.

J. Macy, *The Anti-Slavery Crusade* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. XXVIII). New Haven, 1919.

D. Kinley, *The Independent Treasury of the United States*. Washington, 1910.

A. O. Craven, *Soil Exhaustion as a Factor in the Agricultural History of Virginia and Maryland, 1606–1860*. Urbana, Ill., 1925.

E. Channing, *A History of the United States*, vols. V and VI. New York, 1921–1925.

J. B. McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States*, vols. VII and VIII. New York, 1910–1913.

CHAPTER XX

MANIFEST DESTINY

The enthusiastic nationalism which had been growing ever since 1815 reached its climax at the end of the Jackson era. The nation fervently believed that intrusted to its keeping were sacred principles of liberty destined to illumine the world. Secure in republican virtue, the people of the United States could afford to await the day when an enlightened Europe should cast aside the monarchical robe for the toga. The Whigs, it is true, had misgivings; they inclined to believe that liberty in the United States, if it were saved from the untutored mob at all, would be saved as by fire. They had their doubts about the floods of emigrants from Europe, especially in view of their marked predilection for the Democratic party. The Democrats, however, welcomed the emigrant as a refugee from the forces of despotism and a recruit to the forces of liberty, and were serenely confident that the American people in its wisdom was about to break the last shackles of aristocracy and the money power, and stand forth in ideal freedom, the wonder of the world. They had no doubt therefore of the moral right of the United States to spread her free institutions across the rest of the continent. The doctrine of the manifest destiny of the American Republic to span North America was invoked by the Democrats in a period of territorial acquisition that rounded out our occupation of the continent's temperate zone.

National self-satisfaction and expansion

This expansion was in two directions. Through a compromise with Britain on our claim to the Oregon country, we received the future States of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho, while she received British Columbia. The United States annexed Texas a decade after she won her independence from Mexico, and in a war on Mexico in behalf of Texan boundary claims found it necessary to appropriate Cali-

Oregon, Texas, and the southwest

fornia and New Mexico, comprising the whole remainder of the Spanish territory for which the United States then had any use. The growth of our appetite for these regions can be traced a score of years before we obtained them.

Our claim and Great Britain's to Oregon have already been set forth, the convention of 1818 leaving them compromised for a renewable ten-year period. In the 'twenties the United States had offered first the line of 51° and then 49° as possible boundaries. The best British counter proposal was 49° to the Columbia River and its course to the sea. On this basis there

The Oregon question



was no chance of an understanding; hence the United States and Great Britain agreed to disagree, especially as the span of the "Great American Desert" seemed an insuperable obstacle to

Oregon's political incorporation in the United States; even Benton believed it must become a sister republic.

At first the Hudson's Bay Company had its own way in the territory. Astor had abandoned his enterprise, and the occasional fur traders who followed in the track of Lewis and Clark up the Missouri had established no posts. Yet the 'twenties and 'thirties saw the fur trade based on St. Louis establish itself firmly in the Far Northwest. The Jackson's Hole country became a rendezvous of the trade. Moreover, American missionaries reached Oregon in 1834 to preach to the Indians; in 1836 a second missionary band successfully crossed the plains in wagons with women; pioneers followed them. With population, arose the need of courts and jurisdiction; American settlers urged the United States to take decisive steps in assertion of her rights. It is not necessary to suppose that the thrilling ride of the missionary Marcus Whitman back across the mountains in 1842 was needed to save the American claim to Oregon.

American interest in Oregon aroused

In negotiating the Ashburton boundary treaty of 1842, Lord Ashburton had instructions on no account to yield the line of 49°. Negotiations continued until, in 1844, a motion was introduced in the Senate to give notice of termination of joint occupancy. Democratic senators like Buchanan insisted on the United States' claim to all Oregon. Transmuted into "the reannexation of Texas and the reoccupation of Oregon" in the Democratic platform, and into the Democratic campaign slogan of "54° 40′ or fight" the sentiment voiced a headlong defiance of Great Britain.

54° 40′ or fight

To Oregon we could establish a color of title; to Texas we could show little, and to California or New Mexico, none at all. Over all this territory had passed the Spanish colonial system; the establishment of missions presided over by Jesuit fathers or Franciscan friars who grouped around them the Indians to be ruled politically and religiously, and set to work by their ghostly fathers. Among the missions were set the presidios or military garrisons for their pro-

Spanish expansion in the southwest

tection, held by soldiers settled on the land. Behind the missions and the presidios came, when opportunity offered, the hacienda of the rancher and the villages of subsidized immigrants.

The first northward expansion of New Spain had come, in the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century, with the occupation of New Mexico and the establishment of Santa Fé. La Salle's colony in Texas, and the seating of the French in Louisiana had led the Spanish early in the eighteenth century to push the mission and the presidio beyond the Sabine to cover the French outposts. When Spain's acquisition of Louisiana in 1762 relieved her of the French menace on her borders she abandoned her outposts in Texas, leaving little settlement beyond Nacogdoches, Béxar, later San Antonio, and Goliad.

Spanish Texas and New Mexico

California had fixed the attention of the first Spanish conquerors. But the difficulty of the voyage north from Mexico in the teeth of trade winds and the Japan current caused the repeated failure of expeditions to explore and occupy it. The concrete attraction was a settlement at some California port convenient for the Manila galleon to touch at, as she followed the currents eastward on her return voyage to Mexico. Lower California, or Baja California, was occupied by Jesuit missions after 1697. In 1769 José de Gálvez, an energetic official who desired to forestall the Russians on the northern coast, undertook an occupation of Alta California. His agent, Portolá, discovered the landlocked San Francisco Bay. The Franciscan friars who under the guidance of the holy Junípero Serra had replaced Jesuits in Baja California established a chain of missions from San Diego to San Francisco. In California the period of expansion, "the dying glow of Spanish glory, the sunset dream and last" had ended by 1782. Thenceforth no new mission was established and things went their way until Napoleon in Spain had overset the ancient Spanish empire in America.

Spanish California

The revolts in the Spanish colonies in 1810 had for their main result the throwing open of the trade hitherto jealously monopolized by the Spaniards. True, ever since the end of the eighteenth

century, American, English, and Russian ships had been touching at California ports under plea of distress, and, with the connivance of Spanish officials, engaging in trade. But after 1810 the connection of Alta California with New Spain was of the slightest, and commerce flourished, subject only to the corrupt exactions of capricious governors in their interpretation of equally capricious tariffs. To California Boston ships brought cargoes of Yankee notions to exchange for hides from the vast herds of cattle that grazed on the fertile hills. That commerce has been immortalized in Dana's *Two Years Before the Mast*, the story of a Harvard student who sought adventure and eye-rest in a California trading ship of 1836. An overland trade from St. Louis to Santa Fé by wagon train is described in Gregg's *Commerce of the Prairies*.

The California trade

The inhabitants of Texas also espoused the cause of the Revolution of 1810, but unfortunately Texas lay within reach of Mexico. A bloodthirsty and successful royalist general achieved peace by making the land a solitude. A decade later, Moses Austin, a Connecticut Yankee who had formerly resided in Spanish Louisiana, asked permission to establish a colony of three hundred families in Texas. The approaching Mexican Declaration of Independence of 1821 probably assured the success of his petition; but his death left the execution of his plans to his son Stephen F. Austin. The new Mexican government carefully prescribed the terms on which empresarios who brought in families by the hundred were to receive *labors* of arable land and *sitios* of range; it also prescribed that all immigrants must be good Catholics. But neither of these stipulations was paid much attention by Austin or the men who swarmed in, mainly from the South. Austin secured a suspension in Texas of the Mexican laws against slavery, in the belief that that part of the world could be cultivated only by negro slaves.

The Austins colonize Texas

By 1830 the growing Mexican jealousy of the increased number of American settlers, of their trade relations with the United States, and of that nation's repeated offers to purchase Texas,

led to the enforcement of a prohibitive tariff to limit Texan trade to Mexico. The result was a revolt in Texas coincident with a successful revolution in Mexico led by Santa Ana. By 1835 the wheel of Mexican politics had turned. The conservative forces now backed by Santa Ana designed to abolish the federal system and establish a strong central government on the ruins of the States. In 1836 the new constitution was completed; it was to be forced on Texas which had been practically autonomous since 1832. Texas offered armed resistance in the name of the abolished federal constitution of 1824. Stephen Austin had disapproved of independence if Mexico could be induced to go back to the old status—toleration of slavery, of trade with the United States, and of American immigration; he much preferred this to the risks of rebellion. Finally he gave way, and the independence of Texas was proclaimed on March 2, 1836.

Texas and Mexico, 1830–1836

Santa Ana had already begun his invasion with a proclamation of death and confiscation to all rebels. On March 6, 1836, with two thousand men he stormed the Alamo at San Antonio which was held by one hundred and eighty-eight Texans and American volunteers who resisted to the last man. Another force of Texans under Fannin surrendered under promise of quarter, only to be shot wholesale by Santa Ana's order. He now began his pursuit of Sam Houston, who after a wrecked career in Tennessee had started life anew as general of the Texan army. Santa Ana blundered his pursuit sadly, allowing Houston to close on his rear at San Jacinto with his escape cut off by a lagoon. The charge of Houston's Texans on the Mexican breastworks decided the fate of Texas on April 21, 1836. Twenty-five Texan casualties were to be set against 838 Mexican, plus 730 prisoners including Santa Ana himself. The independence of Texas was thenceforth assured as far as a Mexican reconquest was concerned. She had thereafter to struggle with shaky finances, and in default of Mexican recognition to obtain diplomatic status in the world. Naturally her first glance was to the United States.

Texan independence achieved, 1836

At this point begins the story of the relations between Mexico and the United States that ended in the Mexican War. As the United States gravely tried the methods of traditional diplomacy, without displaying the faintest conception of the working of the Mexican variety of the Latin mind, the situation continually bordered on the comic.

United States and Mexico

In the Mexico of the second quarter of the nineteenth century, commerce and the professions, except the Church, offered prizes insignificant besides those of the game of politics; politics resolved itself into a contest between the ins and the outs in which revolution succeeded revolution and constitution succeeded constitution, year by year. A revolt in the army was a conventional way of accession to power, and an election usually served to confirm the results of a *coup d'état*. So far as any difference over principle dignified the sordid mess, it was the conservative, the supporter of the Church and her vast property, against the radical who was the advocate of reforms and the would-be despoiler of ecclesiastical wealth.

Nineteenth-century Mexico

In politics so played the army officer had an exceptionally good seat at the table. Among these players of the game one remains in the memory as the archetype of Mexican political soldier. Rhetorician, poser, deceiver of friend and foe alike, a general with a scapegoat always ready for a blunder too huge to be distorted by report into a success, lining his own pockets with millions, now in power, now ruling through a figurehead, now in temporary exile—one of the political gamblers typifies all the vices of his kind and sets them off by a vigor and energy of action all his own! In power or exile, in peace or war, the striking figure of Mexico is always Don Santa Ana.

Santa Ana

The literal Anglo-Saxon Republic of the North was puzzled by her Hispanic-American neighbor to the South. Her government plunging from one revolution to the next, continually plundered neutral property. When foreign ministers presented demands for redress they were put off by procrastination, or answered by insolent defiance and by appeals to

Mexican irritations

a most incomprehensible code of honor—honor that was not ashamed of unpaid claims, that could vapor threats in reply to peaceful expostulation, and then back down before a show of force, anxious only to hide its abject surrender behind the smallest rags of concession to its sense of punctilio.

Of course the Republic of the North was not destitute of soldiers and politicians who could deal in rhetoric on occasion themselves; but the native dry sense of humor imposed silence on them when the facts too clearly gave the lie to their tropes. For years the United States dealt patiently with her neighbor until at last Mexican delinquencies seemed to offer full moral justification for the acquisition of the more desirable northern provinces in satisfaction of just claims that apparently would never voluntarily be paid. Claims were always the sore point of diplomacy between the Republics. In December, 1836, the American minister finally demanded his passports, and Jackson soon after recommended reprisals. The matter was however left to an arbitration in 1840, which awarded 30 per cent of the American claims; the 30 per cent continued unpaid. With less restraint than the United States, France had previously enforced payment of her claims by seizing Vera Cruz, and Great Britain by the moral suasion of a squadron.

Unpaid claims

The Texas situation complicated matters. Before 1836 the United States government would have been glad at any time to buy Texas, although the nation showed little interest. The abolitionists attacked the project because of the existence of Texan slavery; that the settlement of Texas was a plot of southerners to bring new slave territory into the Union, as sometimes alleged, is unlikely to the last degree. The revolt of 1836 of course stirred up sympathy; mass meetings were held, and volunteer companies and money raised; but despite the protests of the Mexican minister there probably were no serious technical violations of neutrality. In 1836 Jackson had authorized General Gaines to advance beyond the border if necessary to check Indian depredations. Gaines moved without due cause, the Mexican minister protested, demanded his pass-

The United States and Texas to 1837

ports, and published a pamphlet attack on the United States which the Mexican government, much to Jackson's wrath, did not disavow. As to recognition of Texas, Jackson insisted on delaying until Mexican reconquest was manifestly impossible. He indicated his belief that this condition existed by nominating a diplomatic representative on March 3, 1837.

Thus officially recognized, Texas began to press for annexation to the United States. This the administration of Van Buren obstinately refused to consider. It would involve war with Mexico, and the hostility of the north and east to the project was evidenced by a storm of petitions. The administration of President Lamar, 1838–1841, which ran Texas in debt to the point of bankruptcy, now turned against annexation. Texas began to reach out for support to France and Great Britain. The latter in particular would have been glad to see Texas in diplomatic subordination to her, especially if slavery were abolished. A cotton-growing free nation next door to the United States suited England's aims, but the possibility of it filled the South with alarm; and John Tyler, a southern president, once more opened the question of acquiring Texas.

Texas and England

At the same time Sam Houston, president of Texas from 1841 to 1844, thought again of annexation. In the background of American diplomacy during the next few years was always the shadow of Great Britain, whose dominance in Texas or California was the bogey of the American State Department. On a false report in 1842 that Mexico had ceded California to Great Britain the American Commodore Jones seized Monterey and held it for a day until he was convinced that the cession had not taken place. In October, 1843, Tyler's government opened negotiations with Texas for annexation. On the death of Upshur in February, 1844, Calhoun succeeded him as secretary of state, and pushed the negotiation. A treaty of annexation was signed on April 12, 1844. Rejected in the Senate, it became the main issue of the presidential campaign.

President Tyler reopens annexation

The previous course of events had indicated that Clay and Van Buren were the probable candidates of the Whig and Democratic

parties. Apparently without collusion, both men came out on the same day with letters opposing the annexation of Texas. As a result Van Buren lost the nomination. Jackson was committed to annexation, and contrary to his wishes his name was involved against his protégé. The two-thirds rule in the Democratic Convention prevented Van Buren's nomination, and on the ninth ballot was chosen the first of American dark horses, James K. Polk of Tennessee. Repeatedly the two-thirds rule has had the result of choosing a candidate acceptable to most elements of the party, but the first choice of few. Polk had had a career in Congress, had been speaker and was a man of strong will and Calvinist conscience.

The Texas issue defeats Van Buren

The campaign between Polk and Clay, who had secured the Whig nomination, turned on the Texas issue. Clay's former stand against annexation assured him strength in the North; but he endeavored to hedge to gain southern votes, thus confirming in their opposition to him the little Liberty party group. Their vote in New York was more than the narrow majority of 5,106 by which Polk carried it; and carrying the electoral votes of New York gave him in the electoral college 170 votes to 105.

The election of 1844

Polk came into office pledged by the Democratic party to the reannexation of Texas and the reoccupation of Oregon; and the two questions may henceforth be considered together. Before Polk took office Tyler had pushed the question of annexation. He had aspired to the presidency on it, and while withdrawing from a third party candidacy in Polk's favor, he wished to carry away the honor of the achievement. To escape the requirement of a two-thirds Senate vote to pass a treaty he planned to annex Texas by a joint resolution which passed the House by a vote of 132–76 and the Senate by 27–25, practically on party lines. On March 2, 1845, Tyler acted on the resolution, which was accepted by a Texas convention on July 4, and by a popular vote in October.

Tyler consummates annexation, 1845

On the passage of the joint resolution, the Mexican minister had demanded his passports, but Mexico was in no condition to fulfill

her previous threats of war. England with France's support would perhaps have been willing to make diplomatic representations against annexation, if Mexico would have abandoned her vain dreams of some day reconquering her lost province. Too late, after the passage of the joint resolution, she made overtures to Texas for a cessation of hostilities; but Texan opinion was already fixed for annexation. There remained the question of the southern boundary of Texas as the seed of war between the United States and Mexico.

Mexico and Texan annexation, 1845–1846

Diplomatic attention now turned to the Pacific coast. In 1835 the acquisition of the Golden Gate had been suggested to the United States government; intermittently thereafter proposals of purchase had been made. In 1842 the United States would have seized it rather than see Great Britain acquire it; and Polk now was prepared to purchase it in satisfaction of unsatisfied claims of American citizens on Mexico. On the Oregon question there was real danger of war with Great Britain. On coming into office, Polk had directed James Buchanan, his secretary of state, to offer England once more the line of 49° on the ground that the United States had previously conceded it. When Pakenham, the British minister, rejected the offer, Polk again took position on 54° 40′. The west clamored for war with our ancient enemy for all Oregon.

The Oregon crisis, 1845–1846

Polk had no intention of going so far. He was willing to await a satisfactory offer from the British cabinet. In 1846 a resolution giving notice of termination of joint occupancy passed both House and Senate; it was couched in such conciliatory language that the British ministry, if peacefully minded, could use it as a pretext of making on their own account an offer of 49°; the offer was made, and accepted on June 15, 1846. The irreconcilable westerners damned Polk for his surrender, but he had acquired all that could have been had even at the price of war, and all the United States had previously claimed. His diplomacy indeed had been so downright that had the British foreign minister at the moment been the peppery Viscount Palmerston, instead of the pacific Lord Aberdeen, war might well have resulted.

The Oregon adjustment, 1846

Even before the Oregon difficulty had been decided, the United States and Mexico had drifted into war. Mexico's last chance of saving California without abject submission to the United States had passed when she had neglected to conciliate Great Britain and France by the recognition of Texan independence, and when the approaching Oregon settlement left England with no further reason for war with the United States. In population Mexico had not a half, in commerce not a sixth, and in manufactures hardly a tenth of the resources of her northern rival. Her politics were torn by self-seeking rivals in revolutions, her military raw material, of mixed Indian and Spanish blood, was patient rather than brave, bloodthirsty rather than valiant, her navy was inferior even to that of Texas; she had not the slightest chance of success.

Weakness of Mexico

Since July, 1845, American troops had been stationed at Corpus Christi, south of the Nueces, which Mexico claimed was the Texan boundary. In January, 1846, General Taylor was ordered to advance to the Rio Grande. Because of a revolution the Mexican government had refused to receive Slidell, an American envoy sent late in 1845 with a proposal for reopening diplomatic relations on the basis of the Rio Grande boundary and the purchase of California. On April 24 the Mexican forces crossed the Rio Grande and hostilities began. In a battle which was virtually an artillery duel at Palo Alto on May 8, 2,300 United States troops beat 3,200 Mexicans, inflicting five-fold loss. In a general action at Resaca de la Palma, May 9, a workmanlike coördination of cavalry and artillery again defeated the Mexicans with undue loss.

Outbreak of the Mexican War

Meanwhile the news of the first hostilities had reached Polk and he sent to Congress a war message based on Mexico's refusal to receive Slidell, and on the attack on Taylor in territory claimed by Texas. The shedding of American blood on American soil, he said, caused war to exist by the act of Mexico herself. The Whigs intermittently opposed the war, Corwin of Ohio later going so far oratorically as to put in the mouths of the Mexicans the words "greet you with bloody hands and wel-

Whig opposition to the war

come you to hospitable graves." Calhoun did not vote on the war resolution; but it was emphatically a Democratic party war.

California had fallen into American hands within two months. The Pacific squadron had secret instructions to seize the ports in case of war. A certain Captain John C. Frémont on an exploring expedition had so conducted himself as to be ordered out of Mexican territory; while still ignorant of the outbreak of war, he returned to coöperate with American settlers in the Sacramento Valley, who set up a "Bear Flag State" of their own. Hostilities began June 10, 1846; in July, Commodore Sloat took possession, and by January of 1847 American control was complete. In August an expedition under Kearny moving westward overland occupied Santa Fé. Polk now had gained all that he wanted, and had only to induce Mexico to recognize the fact that the military decision was against her. That was the end of all future operations.

Conquest of California and New Mexico, 1846

The United States blundered cheerfully into the war with the vaguest sort of intelligence as to topography, roads, fortifications, climate, and seasons. Fortunately the regular army though small was admirably disciplined and commanded by excellent field officers with excellent engineers. It succeeded in making good troops from some of the volunteer regiments poured in by the States in their enthusiasm for war. The volunteers, however, who were rushed to the Rio Grande in the "sickly season," suffered quite unnecessary losses from disease.

Campaigns in Mexico

It was unfortunate that both high American general officers were Whigs. Zachary Taylor's success has been variously attributed to luck, personal magnetism, and good staff officers. Winfield Scott was an admirable general officer except in ability to get on harmoniously with his superiors. With them he passed from one squabble to another. To supplement the Whig generals, Polk considered from time to time the appointment of Democratic politicians as major or lieutenant generals; several including James Shields of Illinois and Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire were appointed brigadiers with results not so bad as might have been expected.

American generals

The most obvious plan of campaign of course was for Taylor to move in from the north. In September he captured Monterey, allowing the garrison to retire to San Luis Potosí. It was now the plan of the War Department that he should extend his operations no further; but in defiance of recommendations he advanced to Saltillo. The administration had allowed Santa Ana to return from exile on his promise to secure peace. Successfully deceiving the American government, as he usually did, he turned out to be the one man capable of organizing Mexico for war. Raising a new army he advanced against Taylor, who had been weakened by detachments sent to Scott's expedition to Vera Cruz, but who still refused to obey orders to fall back to Monterey. He awaited the oncoming Mexican forces at Buena Vista.

Taylor's campaign

Taylor's chosen battlefield was a plateau at the base of the mountains, rendered difficult at its lower edge by deep-cut ravines. Santa Ana's line of march cut in between the American forces and the mountains so that the full Mexican strength could not be deployed against Taylor. Because of the dividing ravines the battle was a series of desultory combats of regiment against regiment, fought on a mile semicircle. In numbers not one to three in the battle of February 22d and 23d, the American forces repulsed their assailants. In a country where water could not be had this repulse forced Santa Ana to retreat and his retreat became a rout in which his army melted away. Buena Vista was a colonel's battle, but Taylor's command in it was to make him president.

Buena Vista

The expedition to Vera Cruz was intended to seek the shorter route to the city of Mexico from the seacoast. It was placed under Scott's command, in spite of Senator Benton's ambitions to be lieutenant general. The first and most difficult part of the task was to concentrate for the capture of Vera Cruz early in the spring, and to get off the coast before the yellow fever season began. On March 29, 1847, the capture of Vera Cruz was completed.

Capture of Vera Cruz

Moving his forces off the coastal plains, Scott advanced into the mountains, having continually to detach transport guards to

keep a supply line open, and to send back volunteer troops whose enlistments were expiring. Santa Ana had returned from his defeat at Buena Vista to oppose Scott. At Cerro Gordo he took up an almost impregnable position on the line of march; but one of Scott's engineer officers, Captain Robert E. Lee, reconnoitered a way to turn it, and Scott pushed on his way to Mexico City. He was now accompanied by Nicholas Trist, as special negotiator, who was ready to take advantage of any weakening on the part of the Mexicans to press the American terms of peace. But Santa Ana and his Congress each tried to put on the other the responsibility for negotiation; in the end this proved a means of delaying Scott's advance.

Scott's advance on Mexico City

When he reached the Valley of Mexico, Scott had to make his way over causeways and volcanic slag fields in the midst of the lagoons and marshes that protected the City of Mexico. Here again his engineers explored routes by which the enemy's flank was turned and struck from the rear at the so-called battle of Contreras, August 19–20. In exploiting his advantage Scott stormed Churubusco, unnecessarily perhaps, on the same day.

Contreras and Churubusco

Then came another armistice allowing the Mexicans to recover against a renewal of hostilities. Scott stormed the position of El Molino del Rey on September 8 for no better reason than the supposition that it was a cannon foundry. He captured the heights of Chapultepec, which defended the northern causeway, and entered the city; Santa Ana retired with his forces to Guadalupe Hidalgo. Some sniping and civilian fighting were put down by severe methods and the city was reduced to order. The Mexican army turned to the coast to strike at the American communications; it was unsuccessful, and it wasted away. From Santa Fé, Doniphan had moved down to Buena Vista, and Sterling Price had captured Chihuahua, so that one-half Mexico's territory was under military occupation.

Mexico defeated

It was now necessary to maintain some sort of a Mexican government that could negotiate a peace. Trist, despite the fact that he had been recalled, continued to negotiate and finally secured a


UNORGANIZED TERRITORY
PACIFIC OCEAN
ATLANTIC OCEAN
GULF OF MEXICO
TROPIC OF CANCER
Sacramento R.
San Francisco
Monterey
Santa Barbara
Los Angeles
San Diego
Bent's Fort
Santa Fé
GADSDEN PURCHASE
Chihuahua
Nacogdoches
Natchitoches R.
San Jacinto
San Antonio
Goliad
Nueces R.
Corpus Christi
Palo Alto
Rio Grande R.
Monterey
Saltillo
Buena Vista
Rio de las Palmas
San Luis Potosí
Tampico
Cerro Gordo
Guadalupe Hidalgo
Mexico
Vera Cruz
New Orleans
WISCONSIN
MICHIGAN
NEW YORK
MAINE
VERMONT
NEW HAMPSHIRE
MASSACHUSETTS
RHODE ISLAND
CONNECTICUT
IOWA
ILLINOIS
INDIANA
OHIO
PENNSYLVANIA
NEW JERSEY
DELAWARE
MISSOURI
KENTUCKY
VIRGINIA
MARYLAND
TENNESSEE
NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTH CAROLINA
ARKANSAS
MISSISSIPPI
ALABAMA
GEORGIA
LOUISIANA
FLORIDA
UNITED STATES, TEXAS, and MEXICO 1846 - 1848
Spanish Cession 1819
Mexican Cession 1843
Gadsden Purchase 1853
Western Boundary of Spanish Texas 1816
Western Boundary Claimed by Texas

treaty of peace known as the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. It fixed the international boundary at the Rio Grande, the southern boundary of New Mexico, the Gila and the Colorado rivers, and the line dividing upper and lower California. The United States, in consideration of the Mexican cessions, assumed all claims of her citizens against Mexico, and paid fifteen million dollars additional. With the final ratification May 30, 1848, a great era of American expansion had closed. It now remained to settle the question of slavery in the newly acquired territory; and Mexico was to have her full revenge for her despoliation.

Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

J. P. Garrison, *Westward Extension* (*American Nation*, vol. XVII). New York, 1906.
J. H. Smith, *The Annexation of Texas*. New York, 1911.
G. L. Rives, *The United States and Mexico*, 1821–1848. 2 vols. New York, 1913.
J. H. Smith, *The War with Mexico*. 2 vols. New York, 1919.
J. Schafer, *A History of the Pacific Northwest*. New York, 1918.
E. Channing, *A History of the United States*, vol. V. New York, 1921.
J. B. McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States*, vols. VII and VIII. New York, 1910–1913.
F. L. Paxson, *History of the American Frontier, 1763–1893*. Boston, 1924.

CHAPTER XXI

SLAVERY EXTENSION AND THE COMPROMISE OF 1850

The year 1846 marked the ending of one era of politics and the beginning of another. It saw definitely settled, by the Walker Tariff of 1846 and the reënacted subtreasury, the main issues that had divided Whig and Democrat in the 'thirties—protection and the Bank of the United States. It saw the nation realize on her intangible assets in Oregon by accepting undisputed possession of a part of the region. It saw her, provoked at last beyond endurance by the weak insolence of Mexico, stretch out her hand to seize the coveted and defenseless borderlands on the Rio Grande and the Pacific. Above all it saw the Wilmot Proviso raise the issue of slavery in the territories which was to lead on steadily to secession and civil war.

1846: the end of an era

The Wilmot Proviso was the fruit of the irritation of northern Democrats at the aggressive policy of southward expansion. The northern wing of the party in the campaign of 1844 had salved their consciences on the annexation of slave territory in Texas, by setting off against it the defiant claim to all of Oregon, inevitably a future home of freedom. As responsible diplomats, however, Polk and Buchanan had found it necessary to compromise the "54° 40′ or fight" of the slogan with which they had campaigned as irresponsible politicians. It was unfortunate that they further insisted to the limit on the extreme boundary claims of Texas. The seeming proslavery trend of the administration policy of expansion aroused northern irritation; Democrats of the Van Buren wing took adroit political advantage of it to avenge the southern triumph in the 1844 convention.

Anti-slavery sentiment

It will be remembered that, at the last stage before war with Mexico, Polk had hoped to extort from her government's consciousness of weakness a sale of California and a readjustment of

boundary. A small sum of ready money would be needed to pay in hand to the Mexican government to enable it to sustain itself. Following this plan therefore on August 8, 1846, Polk requested of Congress an appropriation of two millions. A bill was at once introduced in the House. To it, David Wilmot of Pennsylvania, the tool of a Van Buren Democrat, offered an amendment barring slavery in the territory thus to be acquired from Mexico. The famous Wilmot Proviso, adopted in the House by a vote of 83 to 64, went to the Senate. There a vote on the bill was prevented by the end of the session.

The Wilmot Proviso

An issue had been made between northern and southern men on slavery in the territories. The request for money was repeated in the president's message of December, 1846. Again the Proviso was inserted in the House by 115 to 106, only to be refused in the Senate 21 to 31. Finally the House dropped the Proviso—all the southerners but one voting with twenty-three northern Democrats to drop it. The Proviso had aroused the enthusiasm of the North, and ten state legislatures passed resolutions of approval.

The issue joined

The Van Buren faction of the Democrats, dubbed Barn-burners in New York state politics, carried the issue of exclusion of slavery from the territories into the campaign of 1848. The Democratic convention at Baltimore nominated Lewis Cass of Michigan, a strong Union man always willing to conciliate the South on slavery. He had committed himself in 1847, in the famous Nicholson Letter, to the doctrine that the people in the territories rather than Congress should decide the question of freedom or slavery; but by an overwhelming vote the convention refused to insert the doctrine in the platform. The Van Buren or Barn-burner Democrats combined with other elements into a Free Soil party, nominated Van Buren for president on a platform of the Proviso, internal improvements, free lands to actual settlers, and a revenue tariff—demands typical of the democracy of the northwest. John P. Hale, the Liberty candidate, withdrew in Van Buren's favor.

The Free Soil party

The Whigs cannily adopted once more the policy of 1840, and

nominated the most available military hero, General Zachary Taylor. In his long career as a soldier Taylor had had no opportunity to express his political views, and his utterances in the campaign were impenetrable. He was, however, a slaveholder which helped to reconcile the Whigs of the South to him; the revolt of the Van Buren Democrats in the Free Soil party threw New York to him, which clinched the election. Both houses of Congress were Democratic.

Election of Taylor

The uncertainty as to Taylor's views had prevented the issue of slavery in the territories from being a sharply dividing question in the campaign; but in Congress it had already drawn a sectional line of division. Northern men, convinced that slavery was wrong and inexpedient, were resolved to limit it to the States where it already existed, and to keep it out of the territories. Southern men resented the moral proscription of the distinctive institution of the South, and the attempt to exclude southerners as slaveholders from participation in any territory acquired by common blood and treasure. With North and South deadlocked as to future legislation, each side sought to gain advantage by arguing that the institution did or did not exist in the newly acquired territory. Did Mexican law survive to render slavery nonexistent in New Mexico or California? Or did the Constitution of the United States, protecting the property of all its citizens, extend to the slaveholder of the South its protection in his share of the spoils of Mexico? Or, on principles of democracy, as Cass argued, were the inhabitants of the territory to decide the issue? The last question indeed was the most pertinent, for they were already on the point of deciding it.

Did slavery follow the flag?

On July 27, 1848, the Senate passed a measure known as the Clayton Compromise. It validated the existing laws prohibiting slavery in the newly organized Oregon Territory, but forbade New Mexico or California to legislate on the subject, leaving the Supreme Court to decide whether or not the Constitution extended slavery to the territories. The House rejected the measure for one which extended to Oregon the principle of the Ordinance of 1787 with its time-honored pro-

Contest for the territories

hibition of slavery. The Senate amended this by extending the line of the Missouri Compromise, 36° 30′, to the Pacific Ocean. Again a session of Congress ended with nothing decided. In his last annual message of December, 1848, Polk pleaded for the Senate measure of consideration to the South—the extension of 36° 30′, or acquiescence in the Supreme Court's decision. Instead, the House, where northern votes preponderated, passed a bill organizing California as a free territory; the Senate would not take it up.

Before Congress met again in the fall of 1849 the new settlers of California had decided the question for themselves. The United States had thought of California hitherto solely as a land of herds and wonderful harbors. But in January of 1848 placer gold fields, of richness hitherto undreamed of in the world's history, were discovered; and with the lure of the precious metal, men came to California by scores of thousands. They came, if they could afford it, by ship around the Horn, or to and across the Isthmus of Panama; if they were poor they made the toilsome overland journey across the plains, unpeopled for thousands of miles save by Indians. They came in all classes, merchants, clerks, laborers, adventurers, gamblers, desperadoes. They poured into the gold fields, they built up the new city of San Francisco, and when the fungus of crime arose among them, they cut it off with the vigilante committees that acted as judge, jury, and executioner. To supply a government for their clustering thousands was unnecessary. Americans of the mid-nineteenth century were able to provide their own. They called a convention in September of 1849 which drew up an antislavery constitution, established a state government, and applied for admission to the Union.

California and the Forty-Niners

President Taylor, now entered on his term of office, took strong antislavery ground. He had encouraged the California movement and a similar one in New Mexico, and recommended to Congress in his first annual message that it recognize both governments. The question had exasperated the South too deeply for her to accept such complete defeat at the hands of the North. John C. Calhoun and his beloved South Carolina were rapidly

acquiring influence throughout the lower South. Ever since the days of nullification, Calhoun, out of the theory of the sovereignty of the States, had woven nets of doctrine to protect the institutions of the southern minority against northern aggression. In 1837 he had committed the Senate to the doctrine that the United States Constitution protected slavery on the high seas and in the territories; but in the earlier stages of the controversy over the Wilmot Proviso he had shrunk from the full application of his theory. Not until the defeat of the proposal to extend to the Pacific the Missouri Compromise line did he propose to "go back and stand upon the Constitution" as protecting slavery everywhere in the territories. He was now afraid, deeply as he had loved the Union in his younger days, that southern rights were no longer safe under it. In this conviction, southern leaders from other States, Yancey, Quitman, Toombs, and Jefferson Davis, moved to the support of Calhoun and South Carolina. Openly they "calculated the value of the Union" to the South, and now projected the secession of their States from the Union, were not their full "rights" in the territories, under the Constitution, accorded them.

The South prepares for the decisive struggle

Between the southern president with his northern principles, and his Free-State followers, on the one hand, and the defiant advocates of southern secession on the other, moved a group of politicans, southern as well as northern, who hoped to save the Union by compromise. Their ostensible leader was Henry Clay, purged of the personal ambitions of his earlier years, his fascinating personality ripe to descend in history transfigured by his love for the Union. In January, 1850, Clay proposed in the Senate terms of compromise: the admission of California as a free State, and the organization of the remainder of Mexican spoils into the territories of Utah and New Mexico without reference to slavery. Texas, threatening war on the United States over her restricted boundary, and therefore complicating the slavery issue, was to be paid to relinquish her claim; against the abolition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia was set a stringent fugitive slave law.

Clay and the Compromise of 1850

In a great speech of February 5 and 6, 1850, Clay pleaded for his resolutions, bidding the North be satisfied with the fact that nature had excluded slavery from Utah or New Mexico by enactments that the South could not resent as it could acts of Congress. A month later, March 4, 1850, Calhoun, sitting in the Senate with the hand of death upon him, too ill to be heard, listened to his last great speech read by a fellow senator. In it, the cold logic of the man sounded as remote and dispassionate as though already voiced from another world. He traced the process of northern aggression on the South by centralization of government, by tariff, by slavery agitation, deduced from this the cleavage of the two sections in interest, in religious and political organization, and foretold their separation, unless the North conceded the South her full rights under Calhoun's view of the Constitution, and forebore agitation against her essential institutions. A few days later Calhoun was dead, but in the ten years following, his spirit and ideas led the party of southern secession, stronger by far than any group that had ever obeyed him in life.

Calhoun's last speech

Daniel Webster, still with lingering hopes of the presidency at southern hands and fearing for the Union, on the 7th of March made a speech urging the compromise and deprecating the violence of the northern agitation against slavery in the territories. It outraged the "conscience Whigs" who had formerly looked on Webster as a champion of freedom, but it rallied the Massachusetts "Cotton Whigs" and other conservative elements of the North to the support of the compromise. Democratic leaders were working in the same direction. Lewis Cass thought the slavery question inconsiderable beside the danger to the Union. Stephen A. Douglas, Illinois senator since 1846, who like a good Democrat had obeyed the instructions of his state legislature to vote for the Wilmot Proviso, devoted his force as a debater, his genius as a political manipulator for the compromise. In him spoke the voice of the newer west, sprung from North and South alike, but yielding her first allegiance to the Union and demanding its preservation at any price.

Compromise sentiment

The northern and southern irreconcilables were yet too strong. On April 18 the compromise was referred to a Senate committee of 13, which May 8 introduced its measures only to see them voted down. Southern secession elements met in the Nashville Convention on June 3, 1850. Taylor, in whom the obstinacy of a lifelong soldier rose to a virtue, was resolved to maintain the authority of the Union in the immediate instance of the Texan claims to New Mexico. Exposure to a Washington midsummer sun, however, killed the old man, July 9, 1850.

Death of Taylor

His death assured the enactment of the compromise. Millard Fillmore of New York, the vice president, took middle ground on the question. Douglas, with rare parliamentary skill, rallied a following in the northwest, and with the additional votes of Pennsylvania and Missouri passed the measures, one by one, the median bloc uniting alternately with southern or northern votes as the case required.

Douglas passes the compromise

As the compromise finally passed, it recognized California as a free State, paid Texas to relinquish her claims on New Mexico, and organized Utah and New Mexico as territories without reference to slavery. The Wilmot Proviso was thus put to bed. The city of Washington had long been a collecting point for negroes, from Maryland and Virginia, destined for the southern market. Northern representatives had long been galled by the concomitants of slave jails, whips and fetters, and by the sardonic comments of foreign travelers on the existence of these things under the shadow of the Capitol of a nation that boasted of freedom. The slave trade in the District accordingly was now prohibited by the compromise.

The territories and the slave trade

Against this was set a piece of legislation for southern advantage. The Constitution had prescribed the return of "persons held to labor in one State escaping into another" as it euphuistically called fugitive slaves. The federal fugitive slave law of 1793 had used the coöperation of state courts and officials in the return of fugitives. Necessarily the spectacle of unhappy negroes dragged back into slavery was an unpleasant one; few northern men cared to assist at it. In 1842

The fugitive slave question

the Supreme Court in Prigg *vs.* Pennsylvania had held that state officials could not be required to perform such duties. As a result many States had passed acts rendering impossible the participation of their judges and sheriffs in the return of fugitives; there was no adequate federal machinery to take their place.

The South now was to have a fugitive slave law with teeth in it, that bit deep into Anglo-Saxon traditions of personal liberty. Federal commissioners were established under the act who on summary hearings without juries were to authorize southern claimants to remove to their own States persons whom they claimed as slaves, there to have their rights as masters adjudged. The act and its enforcement were to be a standing irritation in the North that finally heated northern opinion as high as southern.

The fugitive slave law of 1850

For the present, however, the majority of northern opinion was gained for the compromise. Douglas, in a brilliant speech at Chicago, won over a hostile audience to the support of the measure. The election to the Senate of Benjamin Wade in Ohio and of Charles Sumner in Massachusetts by coalitions in the legislatures, marked the last effort of the anti-compromise group. Northern Whigs and Democrats alike worked to consolidate their section for conciliation.

The North for conciliation

In the South the advocates of the compromise had to fight in State after State the advocates of immediate disunion. Texas and South Carolina remained prepared for trouble if the intervening States would coöperate. In Georgia and Mississippi especially came the struggle. Georgia under the leadership of the Georgia Whigs, Stephens and Toombs, indorsed the compromises with the proviso that secession would result from the prohibition of slavery in the territories or the nullification of the fugitive slave law. In 1851 in Mississippi Foote beat Jefferson Davis for governor on the same issue.

Defeat of the disunionists in the South

The immediate danger of southern secession and civil war had been averted; whether for good or ill cannot be said. Speculation as to the probable result of such a contest is fruitful only so far as it induces us to examine carefully the existing situation. Un-

doubtedly South and North were more nearly equal in population, wealth, manufactures, and railroads, in 1850 than in 1860. But it must also be remembered that the secession leaders were active in the decade 1850–1860 to organize southern opinion in their favor and to consolidate the political domination of the plantation. In 1850 the Union element would have been stronger even in the South than it was in 1860, and in the North it would have been spared the enfeebling effect of ten years' surrender to southern opinion by a large group of northern leaders. More cannot be said.

Probable issue of civil war in 1850

In domestic legislation the three years, 1851–1853, are singularly barren. Beside an enactment virtually establishing the gold standard and an act carrying out Benton's old land policy, graduation—reducing the price of public land in proportion to the time it remained unsold—there is little of note in either legislation or policy. The avowed aim of the friends of the compromise was to silence any possible discussion of the slavery issue.

Domestic legislation

The campaign of 1852 was a dreary and barren one. The Whigs missed their old issues of tariff, bank, and the rule of the classes, all long since decided against them. They also lost ground because they had formerly had a slight antislavery tendency that now had to be repressed. After a hard convention fight they nominated a military hero, General Winfield Scott, over Webster and Fillmore. Unfortunately Scott was a man whose pomposity of manner approached the asinine, and whose mannerisms obscured his native ability. He had also the reputation of hostility to foreigners. With the Georgia Whigs rejecting him as opposed to the compromise, and Webster advising his friends to vote for Pierce, the campaign was lost before it began.

Election of 1852

For the Democratic nomination the veteran Pennsylvania and New York politicians, Buchanan and Marcy, had contended with the brilliant young Douglas. His organ, the *Democratic Review*, had been too slashing in attacks on the "old fogies" in the party, and the old fogies were revenged when on the forty-ninth ballot the convention nominated the handsome

Franklin Pierce

Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire, who had a somewhat colorless Mexican War record as a political brigadier general. Insignificant as he was, he swept the country, winning 254 electoral votes to 42—Massachusetts, Kentucky, Vermont, and Tennessee. Van Buren had deserted the Free Soil party, and it polled but 156,000 votes.

Before the election was over, both Webster and Clay were dead. Webster's reputation, somewhat marred in later years by his pursuit of his presidential aspirations, remained local to New England, on the basis of his defense of the Union in 1830. But Clay, his name gilded by the unselfishness of his last years, became a national patron saint.

Death of Clay and Webster

To find among statesmen of the later day a man holding the position that Clay enjoyed in the evening of his life is impossible; the generation of the 'eighties might have understood a comparison with Blaine. Clay was a personality, gracious, tender, brilliant, eloquent with words of inspired patriotism, whose very vulnerability to criticism for shortcomings of private and public life only made his lovers more vehement in his defense. Then, too, in the last decade before the Civil War, when sectional strife was tearing North and South asunder the figure that appealed to men's imagination was not Jackson, the maintainer of the federal government by the strong arm of national authority, but Clay, the preserver of the Union through compromise, conciliation, and brotherly love. To that figure Whig and Democrat alike professed allegiance. In the Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858 the old Whig and the Democrat contended as to which wore the mantle of policy of the transfigured statesman.

The Clay tradition

The foreign policy of the United States from 1850 to 1855 was more or less deliberately used to draw popular attention from the slavery issue and to foster national pride. American secretaries of state and envoys spoke to foreign governments in defiant tones. The era of shirt-sleeve diplomacy was ushered in by Webster, as secretary in 1850, in his defiant avowal to Austria of the interest of the United States in the struggle for democracy of the revolting province of Hungary.

American foreign policy

In 1853 Commodore Perry broke down the isolation of Japan by forcing on it diplomatic and trade relations with the United States.

Another series of foreign questions arose with Great Britain in Central America. The development of California and the conveniences of the Isthmus canal route to it made a canal between the Atlantic and Pacific a thing both desirable and probable. The route across Nicaragua was then more favored and the United States negotiated with that state a treaty for its construction. In view of British interests in the region the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 was negotiated, both nations agreeing by it to maintain the neutrality of the Nicaragua or any other transisthmian canal.

The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty

For future generations this was the most important fact regarding the treaty. It had a more immediate interest to the 'fifties. The contracting nations had agreed to renounce old claims to dominions in Central America; by private memorandum, however, Great Britain had retained certain claims and protectorates she already held on the east coast; she even added to them; and clashes between her shadowy protectorates and American merchantmen and ships of war threatened for a time to involve the nations in hostilities, especially as the secret memorandum was not revealed until 1853. Marcy, Pierce's secretary of state, vigorously protested against Great Britain's course but showed no inclination to press the matter to extremities.

Isthmian questions

The inauguration of Pierce brought to a head the interest of the United States in the Spanish province of Cuba; for the South looked on it with longing as a reservoir of negro slaves. In 1849 and 1851 Lopez had led filibustering expeditions to revolutionize it. In the second raid the Spanish government had executed fifty participants, many of them young southerners of good blood, among them the son of Senator Crittenden of Kentucky. Pierce's ministers on the Continent, Soulé at Madrid, Mason at Paris, Buchanan at London, meeting in 1854 at Ostend to discuss the Cuban question, produced the Ostend Manifesto, which claimed that Spain was morally bound to sell

The United States and Cuba

Cuba to the United States as necessary for the safety of slavery. Should she not, the United States might be justified in its seizure. Marcy disavowed the ministers, as he had previously disavowed Soulé for presenting an ultimatum to Spain in the case of the seizure of the *Black Warrior* for violation of Cuban regulations. But the Ostend Manifesto stood in northern opinion as an aggressive foreign policy that was really an aggression of the slave interest; and it fused with the indignation aroused by the operation of the Fugitive Slave Law, as unhappy negroes seized in northern cities were carried back to slavery. Under the circumstances, an attempt to reopen the territorial settlement of the slavery question was destined to produce a terrific reaction on northern opinion.

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

T. C. Smith, *Parties and Slavery* (*American Nation*, vol. XVIII). New York, 1906.
J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, vols. I and II. New York, 1892.
A. Johnson, *Stephen A. Douglas*. New York, 1908.
E. Channing, *A History of the United States*, vol. VI. New York, 1925.
J. B. McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States*, vol. VIII. New York, 1913.
A. C. Cole, *The Whig Party in the South*. Washington, 1913.

CHAPTER XXII

THE 'FIFTIES: THE KANSAS–NEBRASKA ACT

I

The last hectic decade before the Civil War revealed the full effect of the mechanical inventions that, on the foundations of Rome and of the Renaissance, had been building the modern world. At the dawn of the eighteenth century manufacture was not much more efficient than in the slave factories of imperial Rome; men's habitations were not more comfortable; an intelligent Athenian gentleman would have been able to understand any advances that had been made in pure science, except in mathematics. Only on the sea and in war had progress been made. Julius Cæsar, whose infantry engaged with the pilum at a few dozen yards, would have been worsted by the musketry and evolutions of the Prussians at two hundred. On the Atlantic, Lysander would have maneuvered a fleet of triremes in vain against ships of the line, even if he had not been first overwhelmed by their guns, or lost on the ocean by their use of compass and quadrant.

Progress of the world to 1700

The universe was altered to its foundations by the power of steam; the eighteenth century saw its utilization for large-scale manufacture and the concurrent beginnings of the complication of machinery; the nineteenth century saw it applied to navigation on river or ocean, and, for land travel, produce the locomotive. The principle of electricity was pregnant with changes even more revolutionary for the future; it had a first application in the annihilation of distance and time for the written message by the telegraph and the transatlantic cable. With large-scale manufacturing and rapid travel and transport the great city developed with new problems of police, lighting, water supply, and sewage. To feed it, the reaper multiplied manyfold the fields one man could reap in harvest; no longer

Steam and electricity

was the crop limited by the number of hands that could swing the scythe during the all-too-short harvest moon.

The key to the whole development is probably the railroad. Not until 1834 had men finally abandoned the concept of a simple trackway on which all men who will may draw their wagons by their own horses. With the adoption of the locomotive it necessarily became something that, unlike the road and the canal, must be operated by a single agency which itself transports the public and their goods. Early construction was

The railroads



by radiation out from cities to capture inland trade that would not come to them by water. Baltimore began in 1828 with the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad as a route to the west to stave off the ruin to her trade threatened by the Potomac Canal. In

rugged New England, where there was little local traffic, the railroad developed in the 'thirties as Boston reached out to Albany and Buffalo to tap the commerce of the new west. New York was spurred to rivalry in the building of the Erie. And so through the 'thirties and 'forties the railroad developed, sometimes faster and sometimes slower, in New England and the north-central States. Standard guages to facilitate building up railroad systems were a crying need not fully satisfied until after the Civil War. In the 'forties the railroads assumed importance in Michigan and in Ohio as a supplement to the state canals. But in Illinois as a result of the failure of the state's internal improvement scheme of 1837 the railroads did not appear until the 'fifties, when eastern capitalists built them as links in large systems. The decade saw the linking up of east and west by one through line after another, the Lake Shore, the Michigan Central, the Pennsylvania, the Baltimore and Ohio. Hitherto the natural drift of the northwest's commerce had been southward and westward by the rivers to the South, where western foodstuffs were sold for slave consumption. Now it turned to the northeast, and political ties followed the economic.

The South had been lagging behind in railroad construction. Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and New Orleans, competing markets for upland cotton, had each projected railroads to deflect it from rival markets to their own. At one time the Charleston and Hamburg was the longest railroad in the world under one management. Yet the southern planter was not too enthusiastic. He could haul his cotton to market with his own teams over roads however poor; so he avoided tollgate and railroad alike. Cotton railroad freights were necessarily seasonal, and during the rest of the year the railroads starved. Labor for them was scarce, and capital was either invested in slaves or mortgaged for last year's debts. It was not surprising that in 1860 the railway mileage of the North was 21,964 and that of the seceding South 8,648.

Why southern railroad building lagged

While thus the railroad was remaking the internal commerce of the country, American shipping was in its last golden sunset.

Half a century of American merchantmen culminated in the clipper ship built for the utmost speed on the voyage to California. With slender hulls and an enormous spread of canvas, under a favorable wind the clipper ships would occasionally equal or even surpass the present power of steam. One or two of the old clipper ships have left records of runs on which they would literally show their heels to battleships of the United States navy of the present. But as the clipper was the last American triumph in an industry that demanded close association of timber and tidewater, it marked the beginning of the decline before the iron steamship. In such construction Great Britain had the advantage of materials. The American-subsidized Collins line failed in competition with the British Cunard, and in 1856 we abandoned the leadership in transatlantic steamship lines to Great Britain.

The clipper ship

In the United States the railroads contributed to the development of urban life. Without them the increased city population of the next decades could not have been employed, supplied, or even fed. As cities enlarged their areas, systems of local transport such as busses and street cars, extended water and sewage systems became essential. Gas, used at first for lighting streets, began to replace lamps in houses. The dairy replaced the family cow for the children of the cities. Slums grew, and claimed their share of the immigration that was pouring in. City governments, expending great sums of money as in New York, became scandalously corrupt. Tammany Hall evolved into the Tweed Ring with its peculation in municipal contracts.

City life

State legislatures caught the taint of corruption. With railroads, manufacturing companies, and banks clamoring for charters to permit corporate organization and immunity, came bribery. Sometimes it came from without the State with capital to build railroads under favorable or monopolistic franchises. Indeed the increase of capital was one of the significant things of the age. Not merely could the railroads not have been built without it; municipal development in cities, greater manufacturing plants and industries, great department

Capitalism and corruption

stores like A. T. Stewart's in New York bore witness to its presence. Increase of bank capital from $217,000,000 to $343,000,000 between 1850 and 1857 testified to its multiplication in the fluid form. Of course it came by millions from abroad for investment, especially in railroads. Whether domestic or foreign, it was present; the multiplication of great corporations such as railroads with stocks to be bought and sold facilitated its manipulation and gave rise to stock exchanges.

With these things came inevitably changes in society. Speculation in lands, the former easy road to wealth, was now supplemented by speculation in stocks and corporate charters. Wealth could be made or lost on a single gambler's stake. Great paper fortunes arose, accumulated by shifty methods that trod close to the criminal; they faded away as quickly as they rose.

New-rich society

With the power of lavish expenditure, the wives of the men who made fortunes were storming the portals of the society formerly made solid by the merchant, the lawyer, and the statesman. Society displayed more lavishly, and found watering places and summer resorts at which to disport itself in Saratoga, Newport, and the north shore of Massachusetts Bay. Garish and lavish homes and entertainments modeled on the tinsel court of the Empress Eugénie replaced the fine taste of the older period in house and furniture. The Victorian parlor, heavy with curtains and carpets, crowded with tasteless and uncomfortable furniture, garnished with bric-a-brac, had captured American taste.

At the same time that the new-rich were swamping the older aristocracy, the scepter of government was passing from it. A generation back the law or a political career attracted the best brains of the country and represented the highest ideal of public service. Now business engrossed its share of native ability, and business men tended to enter politics only with their pocket-books. The growth of democracy had weakened everywhere, except in the South, the political leadership formerly enjoyed by the landholder and the city aristocrat. The new generation lost the sense of the duty of

The upper classes abandon politics

public life that the fathers had inherited from England. When the pursuit of political office required catering to the poorer classes of the electorate, it turned away in disdain to seek amusement.

The society of the 'fifties was not a prepossessing one. It had developed a prudishness that was the butt of sophisticated European visitors. Ill health and physical weakness in men and women characterized it, and became romantic and fascinating. A college boy to be interesting to girls in the 'forties had to be pale and sickly; the favorite heroine of popular fiction was the fragile girl dying of consumption. The European visitors charged ill health to the climate and to huge meals of indigestibles served to people living inactive lives. The conquered frontier had taken its toll in fever and ague on the generation that conquered it. In the sedentary classes poor health may be ascribed partly to the buckwheat cakes, syrups, and pastries to which bluff Englishmen laid it, partly to lack of any real exercise. The 'fifties exercised by proxy in boxing and horse racing. Louisa M. Alcott, reared in this generation, saw nothing absurd in describing a hard-fought game of croquet. The Civil War had yet to do its work of transforming young Americans into athletes.

American society in the 'fifties

Intellectually the times did not show much greater progress. Good historical writing was being done by Bancroft, Parkman, Prescott, and Motley, but there was no leader in imaginative work to fulfill the promise of the earlier decades. Irving, Hawthorne, Poe, and Bryant had struck an original American note; but it was hardly echoed by Lowell, Whittier, and Longfellow. The last was almost wholly the product of European influences, and Whittier and Lowell only become convincing when like Mrs. Stowe with *Uncle Tom's Cabin* they draw force from deep-set convictions on politics and slavery. These topics, treated in a lighter vein, produced the only real American literature of the period, that of humor. John Phœnix, "Doesticks" and many another satirist, gave a distinctive touch to American newspapers. Greatest of all was Charles Farrar Browne who as "Artemus Ward" wrote with a keen appreciation of the shoddy in

American literature of the 'fifties

the American life, thought, literature, and drama of the times. The sensational metropolitan newspaper sold for a penny, seeking a vast circulation, had been in existence a dozen years. City newspapers like the *New York Tribune* became larger and larger with huge sheets of closely printed columns. The *Tribune's* influence spread more widely through western subscriptions than the *Globe* and the *New York Evening Post* of the 'thirties, but in essentials it was hardly a better paper. The new periodicals of the period, *Harper's* and the *Atlantic Monthly*, set a decent standard of periodical literature but hardly a great one.

The period showed not much advance in denominational religion. Churches in cities had grown wealthier, and paid higher salaries to their pastors. Deism and atheism were not so fashionable as they had been in an earlier generation. Occasionally as in 1858 there were waves of revivalism. Despite the increase in religious newspapers, periodicals, and churches it is questionable if religion more than held the place it had in the earlier and more simple frontier communities. The great denominations, Presbyterian, Baptist, and Methodist, had split in the 'thirties and 'forties on northern and southern lines on the question of slavery. But that did not hinder the northern churches, toward the end of the decade, from becoming hesitant on the subject. The southern branches of all the churches were definitely proslavery, and searched the Scriptures for arguments to maintain the peculiar institution of the South.

The churches

Collegiate education was at a standstill. Colleges had multiplied, but standards were little better than in earlier years. The work required of a student at Harvard, Yale, or Columbia, only approached in thoroughness that of the universities of France, England, or Germany. Specific graduate training except for law or medicine was unheard of. The South had latterly taken to establishing colleges of her own such as the University of Mississippi, to obviate the necessity of sending her sons to the northern schools of Yale and Princeton. Throughout the west denominational colleges for training for the ministry had sprung up. Significant of the future were the first state universities in

Education

actual operation, Michigan and Wisconsin. Their standards were perhaps not much inferior to those of the east. In primary and secondary education the North had been steadily advancing. With the development of professional spirit and the search for improved methods of education had come normal schools for training teachers. The North was definitely committed to the ideal of the free primary school and was systematically at work to realize it.

Of the various sections, the middle States since 1820 had risen in population from 2,699,845 to 7,458,985 in 1860. New York as a national commercial metropolis had definitely outstripped its nearest rivals, Boston and Philadelphia. In manufacturing, the region, especially the coal and iron district of Pennsylvania, was developing fast. In agriculture its more fertile regions in New York and Pennsylvania were able to meet the competition of the fresh western soils.

The middle States

New England's population had risen from 1,660,071 in 1820 to 3,135,283 in 1860. The most striking development since 1815 had been the growth of the mill towns at the water-power sites of the streams, Dover, Manchester, Lowell, Fall River, and many more. The textile mills, protected by tariffs in the enjoyment of the southern market, afforded an investment for the capital of the Brahmins, and a means to force their control on the newer New England. They were what they had been intellectually in the days of Winthrop and Dudley; the newer ideas of Emerson, Thoreau, and Bronson Alcott, and the revamped Puritanism of the abolitionists were anathema to them.

New England

The inhabitants of the New England upcountry were swinging westward as they had been a generation past. Competing on stony New England hillsides with the prairies of the west, even in cattle grazing, was hopeless; so to Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa swarmed the upcountry farmers, sometimes moving by towns and transplanting an old New England village name to a new western site, carrying with them the Congregational Church and the passion for the free school and the town meeting. Gen-

New England migrates to the west

erally they reached the land of promise by the Erie Canal and the Great Lakes, but for the farther west the canvas-covered lumbering prairie schooner, drawn by horses, followed by cattle, loaded with household goods and the rising generation, once more set out on its voyage. The half-faced camp of logs, walled up on three sides with an open fire in front to warm the feet of the sleeping family, as well as the log cabin, persisted in the newer pioneer movement. Side by side with the thrifty New Englander were men of the middle States, and the German, British, or Scandinavian emigrants.

The growth of the west is to be estimated partly in terms of States. After the admission of Missouri in 1821 there was a fifteen years' lull in the fashioning of commonwealths. Then in 1836–1837 Michigan and Arkansas followed each other. In 1846 and 1848 Iowa and Wisconsin balanced the southern States of Florida and Texas. Minnesota completed the tier first beyond the Mississippi in 1858 with no southern counterweight available. While population organized itself thus in new communities it also filled up the older States of the northwest. Exclusive of Missouri the west in 1860 had some eight million inhabitants. Thus the 'fifties saw the peopling by the Illinois Central Railroad of what had been the desert of eastern, and the frontier of southern, Illinois. In all this territory the problems of the pioneer were, generally speaking, uniform. Ax or fire cleared the forest to afford cornfields in which the stumps rotted amid the growing corn. The heavy prairie sod was broken by breaking-plows and yokes of oxen, and fenced by rails split on distant timber land, or hedged by planting of the Osage orange. Before the plow, the herds, marked and branded, grazing on the open range, driven east on the hoof in the fall by cattle buyers before the days of the railroad, slowly disappeared. Boom towns sprang up and decayed like mushrooms. Cincinnati, Cleveland, Indianapolis, Detroit, Milwaukee, St. Louis, and Chicago displayed astonishing permanent achievements in growth of population.

The newer west

In a word, the east was swarming into the west. Population from the impoverished New England country farms and New


DENSITY of POPULATION
EAST of the ONE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN
in 1860
97°
92°
87°
82°
77°
72°
67°
50°
45°
40°
35°
30°
25°
Under 2 inhabitants per sq. mi.
2 to 6
6 to 18
18 to 45
45 to 90
Over 90

York was pouring into the old Northwest, and Iowa and Minnesota beyond. German and Scandinavian elements were growing in importance in the same sections, with new ideas that were to reverse the political opinions of the older settled sections. Railroads were riveting the west to the east and riveting also western dependence on eastern capital. Invested in western railroads, eastern capital became a force far more potent than when lent on crop advances to southern planters. Western agriculture was being transformed also by the reaper. No longer was the output of grain limited to what a man might reap by hand in the few days of harvest; crops could spread over greater and greater areas and more and more labor be set free from the farm for the factory or the battlefield. The prairies of the western States offered the reaper its best field. Factories were established in their midst, and at the end of the decade they made the old Northwest a factor in the world's supply of food. Above all, politically the new West had nothing more to hope for in the way of public lands or internal improvements from the strict constructionists who ruled southern politics. The sectional alliance of a generation between West and South was drawing to an end.

Western progress

The South economically and socially exhibited an evolution of tendencies already described. In 1850 the border States contained 5,154,206 whites and 1,755,192 negroes; the lower South had 2,943,256 whites and 2,460,422 negroes. The black belts, including the limestone areas of Kentucky and Tennessee, and the great area that stretched from Georgia to Mississippi in the lower South, were the controlling factors. Black belts, black both in respect to their rich dirt and their thronging negro slaves, were the seat of the rich plantations whose masters were coming more and more to direct the South's political course. Southern efforts toward diversification of agriculture, promotion of manufacture, and direct trade with Europe, continued. But the yearly southern conventions that discussed such matters were falling more and more under secessionist influence. The poorer sections of the lower South, the home of the "poor white," the small farmer, and the small slaveowner, usually

The South

Democratic in politics, were being drawn into the course of plantation policy; significantly enough they were the sections in which opposition to secession appeared in 1861. The plantation South, demanding newer lands to exploit and new slave States to preserve the balance of the sections in the Senate, had its eyes on the farther west.

That new Pacific Coast region had already produced one State, California, in 1850, and was to produce a second, Oregon in 1859.

The Pacific coast

In population the gold hunters of 1850, superimposed on the older Spanish element, numbered 323,177 by 1860; the farmers of the fertile Oregon valleys were 52,160. Curiously both States were under proslavery Democratic control; but so long as their constitutions were free the South could not count on their permanent subjection to her.

Between the Pacific Coast communities and the frontier in Missouri and Iowa lay fifteen hundred miles of plain, arid plateau, and mountain. The Pike's Peak gold rush of 1859 was destined to draw some population into the future State of Colorado. Since 1846 a Mormon colony had sprung up on Great Salt Lake despotically ruled by the strong arm of Brigham Young. The trade routes across the plains had been traversed for well over a century.

The Great American Desert

Lines of posts, Fort Leavenworth, Fort Laramie, Fort Kearny, Fort Bridger, Fort Hall, Fort Boise, and Bent's Fort, guarded them from hostile Indians; but the need of some permanent transcontinental communication in the form of railways was destined to bring the general exploitation of the region into politics as a deadly contest between North and South.

I

The repeal of the Missouri Compromise

From the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 and its repeal of the Missouri Compromise the history of the United States runs straight to secession and the Civil War. A generation ago men wrote confidently, and generally not in compliment, of the motives of Senator Douglas in engineering the measure; but more careful study has left them a mystery.

The earlier policy of the United States had regarded the lands beyond the Missouri River as the Great American Desert, a natural frontier of America and therefore fit to be abandoned to the Indians for all time. From more desirable regions, by treaty after treaty, the northern Indians had been moved thither. Then in the middle 'forties a flood of emigrants to Utah, to Oregon and California had moved across them; the permanent communication of the United States with its possessions on the Pacific Coast seemed to require a transcontinental railroad, and northern men like Douglas wished a northern route to it based on Chicago or St. Louis rather than a southern one across the Gadsden Purchase of 1853 with a terminus at New Orleans. However if such a railroad was to be built through northern territory, that territory must be organized. Hence we have repeated attempts on the part of Douglas before the session of 1853–1854 to pass a bill for the organization of the Nebraska Territory. Always the southern senators opposed in sufficient numbers to defeat the measure.

The Pacific railroad projects

On January 4, 1854, Douglas reported to the Senate a new Nebraska Bill with the proviso that the territory might enter the Union as a State with or without slavery. The report was vague; but on January 16 and 17 amendments were offered to it, repealing and affirming the Missouri Compromise. Douglas accepted that of Dixon repealing the Compromise. President Pierce, on January 22, gave his assent to it as a measure of party policy. January 24 Douglas introduced a new bill, creating Kansas as well as Nebraska Territory and expressly repealing the Missouri Compromise on the ground that it was superseded by the Compromise of 1850. Finally he was to rephrase this, using the words "inconsistent with," and added the proviso "the true intent and meaning of this act, not to legislate slavery into any territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom; but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their own domestic institutions in their own way." So framed, the bill passed the Senate after a month of furious debate, March 3, 1854, by a vote of 37 to 14.

The Kansas-Nebraska Bill

In the House with the preponderating northern representation the struggle was more doubtful. The rising storm of protest in the North, voiced by Free-State legislatures, newspapers, and pulpits, made the act's passage difficult, and gave point to the parliamentary contest against it. Finally on May 22 it passed 113 to 100. Twelve southern Whigs voted in the majority; the minority consisted of forty-two northern Democrats, two southern ones, forty-five northern, and seven southern Whigs and four Free Democrats.

Passage of the act

The question as to Douglas' motive in the repeal of the Missouri Compromise is as difficult as any historical inquiry into character and conscience. The theory, voiced by Chase's protest of January 24, 1854, and indorsed by historical students until fifteen years ago, was that it was a play on Douglas' part for southern votes for the presidency. The possibility has been suggested that the impelling force to the repeal was Senator Atcheson, from Missouri, where the proslavery party had become bitter and extreme in its struggle to defeat Thomas Hart Benton. Still another theory is that Douglas to secure a northern route for the Pacific Railroad was willing to amuse the South with hopes of slavery extension into the wastes of Kansas. There are difficulties with the first two theories, and the third fits in logically with Douglas' known interests; but it cannot yet be regarded as proved.

Douglas' motives

The opposition to the bill, in a sense, is a puzzle also. It began by newspaper attacks within a few days of the bill's introduction; it was directed by Senator Chase's "appeal of the Independent Democrats," published on January 24. It appeared in speeches against the bill from Seward of New York, Sumner of Massachusetts and Wade of Ohio in the Senate. It was reëchoed in a storm of protest throughout the Union.

Opposition to the Nebraska Act

There was much occasion for the outburst. Douglas' argument that the Missouri Compromise had been superseded by the principle of nonintervention, as applied to Utah and New Mexico by the Compromise of 1850, was a flimsy one. Subsequent legislation

could have no effect in altering what was virtually a sectional bargain to the gain of the section that had already reaped its full advantage. Northern sentiment no doubt had been irritated by repeated cases under the Fugitive Slave Law; but even this does not account for a political storm that destroyed the Whig party and split the Democratic party in two. Personal opposition to Douglas of course had its share. The men who assailed him in the Senate, on clear grounds of principle, were assailing their most dreaded antagonist in debate on ground where he was at a logical disadvantage. In Illinois the first opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska Act came in part from disgruntled Democratic leaders distanced by Douglas in the party—men who in the days of the Civil War were little short of disloyal. Yet, discounting the personal factor, and writing down at the highest possible figure the rage of the North at the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, there remains much about the events of 1854 that we cannot explain..

Causes of the anti-Nebraska outburst

The first outburst of indignation was especially against Douglas. He said later that he traveled from Washington to Chicago in the light of his blazing effigies. In Chicago, his home, a mob howled him down when he tried to defend the act. In his own State he was unable to prevent the defeat of his colleague, Senator Shields, by the anti-Nebraska Democrat, Lyman Trumbull, who carried off the senatorship from Abraham Lincoln, the most prominent spokesman in Illinois of the opposition to the bill.

Attacks on Douglas

The formation out of Abolitionists, Free Soilers, Whigs, and anti-Nebraska Democrats of an Anti-Nebraska party, later to become the Republican party, is the essential, positive creation of the campaign. That party had its foundation in the northwest. It was first made, and christened Republican, at a mass convention at Jackson, Michigan, July 6, 1854. In Wisconsin, Ohio, and Indiana, it organized similarly a week later. In Iowa the anti-slavery Democrats indorsed the Whig candidate for governor. In Illinois the organization was at first confined to the abolition and free-soil Democrats; the anti-

The Republican party

Nebraska Democrats and the Whigs like Lincoln held carefully aloof from the organization as too radical. As a result, the Congressional elections of 1854, in certain Illinois districts, showed as many as four candidates in the field. In the east the development was quite different from that in the northwest. The Republican party formed only in Maine. In Vermont and New York the anti-Nebraska groups supported the Whig nominees; everywhere in the east the situation was complicated by the Know-Nothing or American party.

The Know-Nothings

There had always been in the Whig party an undercurrent of nativist sentiment that looked on the foreigner, especially when a Roman Catholic, as a menace to American institutions, and one that should be kept outside the franchise. The swarming immigration of the late 'forties had provoked the formation, in 1850, of a secret order known as the Order of the Star Spangled Banner. In 1854 it took advantage of the anti-Nebraska revulsion to enter politics on a large scale. As its members were instructed, when questioned, to deny all knowledge of the order, it soon acquired the nickname of Know-Nothings. It swept Massachusetts by a two-thirds vote, cast two-fifths of the vote in Pennsylvania, and one-fourth in New York. The newly elected Congress included 75 Democrats, 117 Americans or Know-Nothings, and 40 Republicans.

The contest for Kansas

Before the new Congress met, popular sovereignty had had its first trial in Kansas. New settlers had begun to push out from Missouri into the valley of the Missouri River, early in 1854. The New England Emigrant Aid Society was founded to encourage northern settlement in Kansas, in the hope of turning the tables against slavery and incidentally of returning profits to investors; and under its fostering care little free settlements of northern men appeared in the valley of the Kansas. To the hot-headed followers of Senator Atcheson in Missouri, it seemed that Kansas had been a present to the South, which an organization of the hated Yankees was trying to filch from her; and at the election of a territorial delegate to Congress in 1854, bands of Missouri men came into the territory to help elect

by their votes a proslavery man. March 30, 1855, the election of the territorial legislature was similarly carried by five thousand armed Missourians. The territorial governor A. H. Reeder, attempted to throw out a part of the votes for fraud. He was speedily overruled by the legislature, which proceeded to adopt as the law of the territory the complete Missouri slave code. Reeder was removed by Pierce, in August, 1855, for an attempt to appropriate a government reservation for his land speculations. Northern men insisted it was because he had not been sufficiently subservient to slavery.

Antislavery men, however, had been coming to Kansas in numbers. Under the leadership of Dr. Charles Robinson they held an irregular constitutional convention at Topeka on October 23, drew up a constitution which prohibited both slavery and the residence of free negroes, applied for admission to the Union under it, and set up a state government which organized in March of 1856. In January of 1856 President Pierce in a message to Congress had denounced the whole Topeka movement as lawless and irregular.

The Topeka convention

The issue confronted a Congress that had barely been able to organize. The Know-Nothing group, despite their preponderance in numbers, lacked unity on the slavery issue. At the same time that Know-Nothings in northern legislatures were helping to pass personal liberty laws which went to various lengths in opposing enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law, a convention of the order adopted a resolution that Congress should not legislate on slavery in the territories. As a result the Know-Nothings spread to the South, and there became the minority party, but except in New York lost ground steadily in the North. In Congress a long battle over the speakership of the House resulted in the election of Nathaniel P. Banks of Massachusetts, a Know-Nothing who had turned Republican.

The Know-Nothings in Congress

The Democrats, in the local elections of 1855, recovered much of the ground they had lost. The events of the session of Congress that followed showed them that the Republicans were their main opponents in the presidential contest of 1856; their game was, there-

fore, to get the Kansas issue settled if possible before election day. Accordingly they pressed the plan of Toombs for an enabling act providing for the election of a constitutional convention on a fair registration. The Republicans, who knew the value of their issue, were not going to let the Democrats escape from the previous record of fraud and violence in behalf of slavery. A Republican majority of a House committee on Kansas reported that the difficulties were due solely to interference from Missouri and not as Douglas asserted to the activity of the Emigrant Aid Society. They recommended that Kansas become a State under the Topeka Constitution.

Kansas and the election of 1856

Meanwhile in the spring of 1856 open war had broken out in Kansas. Under instructions from a certain federal judge, named Lecompte, a Kansas grand jury returned true bills for treason against the Topeka State leaders, and denounced as nuisances the Free-State press and hotel at Lawrence. The Free-State leaders fled or were imprisoned, and a proslavery mob, led by Atcheson, destroyed the press and hotel at Lawrence. A savage war of murder and riot began; and John Brown, of the Free-State faction, had made the soubriquet of "Osawatomie" attached to his name notorious for his brutal murder of five proslavery men. Reeder had been succeeded as governor by Shannon, and Shannon by Geary, who through vigorous measures succeeded by the fall of 1856 in checking the war and restoring order.

The border war in Kansas

The excitement caused by "border ruffianism" in Kansas was pitched even higher by the assault on Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts by Preston Brooks of the House of Representatives. Sumner had previously assailed Senator Butler of South Carolina, a kinsman of Brooks, in terms of Miltonian invective. As Sumner did not recognize the code of the duel, Brooks felt at liberty to assault him in his seat in the Senate Chamber with a heavy stick, inflicting permanent injury that kept Sumner out of the Senate for years. The South approved what it termed a well-merited chastisement; the North denounced it as the assault of a cowardly bully. The two sections

Brooks's assault on Sumner

discovered that the breach between them was widened by a failure to agree on so fundamental a matter as fair play in physical encounter.

In 1856 the Democrats nominated for the presidency James Buchanan, an old-time Pennsylvania politician, once a Federalist, senator, secretary of state under Polk, a man of a compromising disposition, grown weaker and less self-reliant in his decisions with advancing age; "the mild old Federalist Hunker," Greeley habitually termed him. The platform adopted the Douglas doctrine on the territories. The Republicans nominated a personality with no political record to defend, in John C. Frémont, the adventurous officer who had helped in the conquest of California, and whose romantic marriage to the daughter of Benton threw about him a glamour of sentiment. The Republican platform condemned slavery and polygamy as twin relics of barbarism and pledged the party to noninterference with slavery in the States and to its extinction in the territories. Specifically it demanded the admission of Kansas under the Topeka Constitution. The candidate of the antislavery Americans, Banks, withdrew from the race; the southern Americans nominated Fillmore. In the contest up to the adjournment of Congress on August 30, campaign material was continually arising from the debates of Congress on the Kansas issue. The report of the committee of the House, the defeat of the Toombs bill, the defeat in the Senate of the bill to admit Kansas under the Topeka Constitution, all reacted on the campaign from day to day.

Frémont, Buchanan, and Fillmore

Justified morally as the Republican attack on slavery was, its consequences were bound to be far-reaching. To exclude slavery from new territory meant its ultimate extinction in the United States, as well as a much earlier decline in the value of slave property, as the wasteful slave system exhausted the cotton fields of the South. The men controlling southern politics and opinion from college, press, and pulpit were ready to try the chance of war before seeing this assault on their property. Conservative and timorous men of the North shrank from this issue. There was an inevitable drift to Buchanan of such votes, encouraged by his

pledges of fair play in Kansas. As minister to England during the contest over the Kansas-Nebraska bill, he was not concerned directly in the issue. His election was secured by the vote of Pennsylvania with New Jersey, Indiana, Illinois, and California. He carried every southern State except Maryland, which fell to Fillmore, and was elected by 174 votes to 114. The popular vote was Buchanan 1,838,169, Frémont 1,341,264, and Fillmore 874,534.

Election of Buchanan

The election of 1856 had postponed once more the crisis on the slavery issue, but postponed it only in case the Kansas question was adequately and fairly settled. The new Republican party remained an ominous political fact. It stood squarely on opposition to slavery in the territories. It controlled New England and New York, and almost controlled the northwest. In Illinois it had elected its governor while losing its presidential ticket. It had drawn in the greater part of the German element. It was frankly antislavery, and necessarily sectional. Its leaders were a group of extremely able men. Seward of New York was an old Whig, sardonic, able in administration and politics, but scorning the meaner arts of the politician. Behind him stood his faithful political henchman, Thurlow Weed of Albany. In New York politics his mortal enemy was Horace Greeley, editor of the *New York Tribune*, who wielded influence over Republicans throughout the nation; and who, next to Blair, was perhaps the most influential editor the United States has ever seen.

Republican leaders in the east

In Massachusetts, Sumner, removed by Brooks's assault from active participation in politics, was an aristocrat with brilliant intellect, the highest social connections and a haughty aloofness from the sordid details of politics. The Republicans in Massachusetts were actively led by two self-made men, Henry Wilson and N. P. Banks. In Pennsylvania the boss of the Republican machine, Simon Cameron, was a politician and not a statesman. In the northwest the Ohio leaders, Chase and Wade, so far had no rivals. Wade was a rough-tongued, headstrong debater, who called a spade a spade, and who opposed to the arrogance of the slavery leaders based on their allegiance to

Republican leaders in the west

the code of the duel, the boisterous insolence of a man whose code was avowedly the rough and tumble fight. Salmon P. Chase, senator and governor of Ohio, able financier, clever political manager, followed the mirage of the presidency so far that it led him into devious ways. The greatest of all the Republican leaders, though he received 110 votes for vice president in the Republican Convention of 1856, hardly showed as yet above the horizon of Illinois politics.

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

K. C. Babcock, *The Scandinavian Element in the United States.* Urbana, Ill., 1914.
A. B. Faust, *The German Element in the United States,* 2 vols. Boston, 1909.
W. E. Dodd, *Jefferson Davis* (*American Crisis Biographies*). Philadelphia, 1907.
E. Channing, *A History of the American People,* vol. VI. New York, 1925.
J. B. McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States,* vol. VIII. New York, 1913.
J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States,* vols. I and II. New York, 1892.
A. Johnson, *Stephen A. Douglas.* New York, 1908.
T. C. Smith, *Parties and Slavery* (*American Nation,* vol. XVIII). New York, 1906.
F. L. Paxson, *History of the American Frontier, 1763–1893.* Boston, 1924.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE REPUBLICAN TRIUMPH

I

To timid men the election of the conservative Buchanan over the headstrong Frémont seemed to offer the Union a new lease of life. The Democrats had added to their southern bloc enough northern votes to control a national election, despite the ominous sectional strength of the Republicans. With fair play in Kansas, to which Buchanan stood pledged, it might be hoped that Republicanism, the fruit of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and of Bleeding Kansas, might not survive its issue, and might prove as evanescent as Know-Nothingism. National harmony seemed possible, if only the slavery question could be let alone. Immediately on the heels of Buchanan's inauguration, however, came events to confirm northerners in their belief in an aggressive slave power, events which were not only to perpetuate the Republican party, but also to split the Democrats North and South.

The triumph of moderation, 1856

The first of these events was a decision of the United States Supreme Court, handed down March 6, 1857, in the case of Dred Scott. The circumstances of the suit must be briefly reviewed. In a series of decisions, prior to 1840, the highest courts of Missouri had awarded freedom to Missouri negroes who sued on the ground that they had been freed through being taken by their masters to free territory. In 1852, however, the Missouri Supreme Court had reversed itself on this point. Suit had been brought for the freedom of a certain Dred Scott, who as slave of an army surgeon, Dr. Emerson, had been taken first to Illinois, then to Fort Snelling, in territory made free by the Missouri Compromise. In Scott's case, the court held that in returning to Missouri he did not bring freedom

The case of Dred Scott

with him from free territory, but resumed the status of slavery on touching slave soil.

Probably antislavery advocates at this point saw the opportunity for a test case. As Dred Scott had passed to the nominal ownership of a citizen of New York, and himself claimed to be a citizen of Missouri, suit was now brought in his behalf in the United States courts, which took jurisdiction as between citizens of different States. In the Missouri Circuit Federal Court, the "master," Sandford, pled that Scott, as a descendant of Africans brought to the United States and sold as slaves, was not and could not be a citizen of the United States, with standing in United States courts. The Circuit Court overruled the plea, but on the merits of the case decided that it could not go back of the interpretation of the Missouri State courts as to what gave a man freedom under the laws of Missouri. The case was now carried to the Supreme Court of the United States. On a first argument the court hesitated as to whether the plea regarding Scott's citizenship was part of the record before them for review. Finally, deciding it was not, they adjudged the case solely on the ground taken by the Circuit Court—that the Supreme Court of Missouri was the final interpreter of Missouri's laws as to Scott's freedom or slavery; on this basis they commissioned Justice Nelson to write their decision. But Justice Wayne considered that an excellent opportunity existed for settling, under sanction of the Supreme Court, the troublous questions raised by the Republicans. Southern partisans lent their influence to win over Chief Justice Taney to this point of view, and the court decided that Taney should write a general opinion on the case at large.

Scott's case in the courts

Taney first took up and decided the question raised by the plea as to the citizenship of negroes, although the court had previously ruled that the plea was not open for discussion. By a long legal argument, in defiance of the facts, he urged that in 1789 negroes had not been considered a class whose members could be citizens of the United States. Having proved that Scott had no standing in the court, his opinion might have ended;

Taney's opinion

but he went on to consider the effect on Scott's status of his residence in free territory. He could have settled even this point by referring to the results of his residence in the free State of Illinois, but he finally reached the question of the effect of Scott's residence in the Louisiana Purchase and of the Missouri Compromise itself. His opinion was that of Calhoun; that neither Congress nor any power created by Congress could exclude from the territories of the United States the citizen of any State by refusing him permission to enjoy his slave property.

Both the force and propriety of Taney's opinion were open to serious question. On some of the points he presumed to settle he was not supported by a majority of the court. The six justices who decided the Missouri Compromise invalid reached their decisions by diverse and even contradictory lines of argument. Two justices, McLean and Curtis, dissented completely. Moreover, the function of a court is to decide cases, and to state only so much law as is necessary to settle the case in hand. To enunciate principles of constitutional interpretation not necessary to the decision in hand was to give advance notice to litigants of the way points of law arising in future cases would be decided, and to serve notice on Congress, and on the people of the United States, of an interpretation of the Constitution to which they must hereafter conform. The Republicans insisted that Taney had done this and that his utterances as to the unconstitutionality of the Missouri Compromise were *obiter dicta*.

To make the matter worse a persistent atmosphere of collusion and agreement hung about the case. In its very inception it was at variance with fact. So far from being held a slave, Dred Scott had been turned loose to shift for himself on the death of his master, the army surgeon, and the lawyers who originally sued for his freedom had hoped to collect damages for his retention in slavery after he had been freed by the air of free territory. Emerson's widow had married a Massachusetts antislavery man who had had Scott transferred to Sandford to enable a test case to be brought in the federal courts; and Scott himself was freed by his master as soon

Artificial character of the Dred Scott case

as the Supreme Court had finally pronounced him a slave. Both slavery and antislavery advocates at different times had tried to make it a test case; as a test case the suit had been argued in the Supreme Court by some of the ablest lawyers of the nation; and a test case always carries with it an atmosphere of suspicion.

The decision at once begat political strife. The Democrats insisted that it disposed of the Republican doctrine of the power of Congress to prohibit slavery in the territories, and deprived the party of its sole reason for being. The Republicans retaliated by attacks on the Supreme Court. Some of them charged that it had been packed for years to prepare for such a decision. They charged the majority justices with intrigue and deceit, and insisted that the utterances of Taney as *obiter dicta* could be disregarded. The only result of the decision was to throw the Supreme Court into political strife, and in the minds of a great mass of the people destroy its fair repute for impartiality.

The Republicans and the Supreme Court

The progress of events in Kansas translated the decision into events. The proslavery legislature of the territory in 1856 had set for June 15, 1857, an election of delegates to a constitutional convention. Despite the urging of Robert J. Walker, the new governor of the territory, a man whose position lifted him above all suspicion of fraud, the Free-State party refused to take part in the election; they had an excuse for this in the fact that the apportionment was unfairly made. By October, however, they had been won over by Walker to participate in electing a territorial legislature which they controlled.

Affairs in Kansas, 1857

The constitutional convention held at Lecompton, however, was overwhelmingly proslavery and it drew up a constitution to protect slavery as far as possible in any case. Walker insisted it should be submitted to the voters for approval or rejection, a step which hot-headed southerners denounced. Ultimately, the only question submitted to the voters was the constitution "with slavery" or "without slavery." Angry at the fraud, the Free-State voters refused to vote on it at all.

Lecompton Constitution

Walker, in December of 1857, appeared in Washington to urge Buchanan to repudiate the constitution altogether.

It is difficult to plumb the minds of southern leaders, such as Jefferson Davis, who overbore the timid president into indorsing the Lecompton swindle. It is true that in southern States constitutions had not usually been submitted to the voters; but it is also true that a large majority in Kansas was clearly against the document; and the validity of its framing could be defended only by a tenuous course of reasoning. The course of the southern leaders can be explained only by imputing to them the theory that the South had a moral right to a share in the territories for slavery and should be accorded it by any means.

Policy of the southern leaders

In sending to Congress the Lecompton constitution, Buchanan split his party. Douglas had sounded Illinois opinion in the fall, and returning to Washington, defied the president on the issue. The advocate of popular sovereignty could find no logic to defend the violation of justice in Kansas. Meanwhile the Free-State men in Kansas had refused to vote, and the constitution had been adopted "with slavery" by a vote of 6,226 to 569. The Free-State voters held a subsequent election January 4 by which the constitution was rejected 10,226 to 162. Manifestly five-eighths at least of the voters of Kansas opposed the Lecompton document; but Buchanan on February 2, 1858, sent the constitution to Congress, and recommended the admission of Kansas under it.

Buchanan supports the Lecompton constitution

The slavery question once more burned at red heat as in 1856. The Republicans mustered their forces against the constitution; and Douglas, with three northwest Democratic senators and some twenty-two congressmen, attacked it on the grounds of popular sovereignty. To punish him and to hold revolters in line, the administration began the proscription and removal of officeholders of Douglas' following. The constitution passed the Senate 33–25, but in the House by a vote of 120–112 the anti-Lecompton men forced an amendment for resubmission to the people. English, of Indiana, proposed an administration compro-

Defeat of Lecompton

mise by which, if the constitution was accepted, the State should have a larger dole of federal lands; if rejected, the State should not be admitted until it had the population to entitle it to a congressman. Such a measure—virtually a bribe and a threat to influence what supposedly was to be a free vote—is hard to reconcile with any theory of the exalted political morals of the administration, or of the southern statesmen who controlled it. The compromise was adopted despite Douglas' opposition. August 2, 1858, by a vote of 11,812 to 1926 the people of Kansas wrote the most crushing commentary on the iniquity of Buchanan's Kansas policy.

Douglas and the Republicans

The effect of the Lecompton question on politics could not be foretold. Douglas, who would come up for reëlection to the Senate before the Illinois General Assembly which was to be elected in 1858, was faced with the bitter opposition of the administration, which beheaded Douglas postmasters and appointed "National Democratic" ones in their place, subsidized anti-Douglas newspapers and mustered against him worn-out and discredited politicians. In spite of this, Douglas had the party machinery, the real party newspapers, and above all the rank and file of the party with him. His reception at Chicago was a triumph. Seward and the Republicans had believed that Douglas and his little band of revolters could be enlisted in the Republican ranks. Douglas had probably made overtures to them, promising to support the Republicans in the presidential election of 1860 in return for their help to reëlect him to the Senate in 1858. Greeley's *New York Tribune* deprecated the Republican opposition to him in Illinois. But Illinois Republicans understood that Douglas would not be absorbed in the Republican ranks, but rather would himself absorb the western wing of the party. Disregarding the admonitions of eastern leaders, they put forward Abraham Lincoln as their "first and only" candidate for the senatorship.

Abraham Lincoln had been born, in 1809, of a good Kentucky family which in his father had suffered an eclipse. Moving with the frontier, his father migrated first to Indiana, and then to

Illinois. Lincoln came of age in 1830 and struck out for himself, finally settling in Sangamon County. His wit and his personality lifted him out of the manual labor of pioneer life, as postmaster, militia captain, and member of the state legislature from 1834.

Abraham Lincoln

First a storekeeper and a surveyor, he studied law and began practice in 1837, locating in Springfield, the new capital of Illinois. Here he throve as lawyer and politician, married an aristocratic Kentucky girl, Mary Todd, went to Congress, and ruined himself politically by opposing the Mexican War. From 1849 to 1854 he took no part in politics though his mind dwelt much on the slavery issue.

In 1854 he had made the repeal of the Missouri Compromise the basis of an aggressive attack on Douglas. He had held aloof from the more radical opposition group, and had hoped for election to the Senate by a coalition of anti-Nebraska Whigs and Democrats; but the steadiness of five of the Democratic revolters enabled them to force the election of the Democrat, Lyman Trumbull. A full-fledged Republican, receiving votes for vice president in the Convention of 1856, Lincoln now stood forward to contest the senatorship with Douglas in a fight to influence the choice of Democratic or Republican members of the legislature. He had the earnest support of his party and especially of Trumbull, but his best asset was himself. A homely wit, a plain sincerity of purpose, a marvelous power of lucid statement outweighed awkwardness of person and delivery, and made him a dread antagonist to Douglas. The rivals agreed to adjust their speaking tours to allow seven joint debates at points throughout the State.

Lincoln and the senatorship, 1854–1858

Before open-air audiences of westerners, desperately in earnest for Democrat or Republican, coming in thousands by railroad, by wagon, on foot, with floats, banners, and slogans, Lincoln and Douglas pitted skill acquired in years of political stump speaking. The contest essentially turned on the old Whig vote of the middle counties of the State, hesitant about Black Republicanism, yet disliking the old Democratic foe. To win this group Douglas assailed Lincoln

The Lincoln-Douglas debates

as a radical supporter of abolition, and an enemy of slavery in the South, a defamer of the Supreme Court, one whose policy threatened the Union. To hold his Democratic supporters he painted Lincoln as the favorer of the negro in opposition to the white man.

Meeting these attacks, Lincoln tried to pin Douglas squarely on the question of popular sovereignty and the effect of the Dred Scott decision on it. He demanded, in the Freeport debate, whether at any time a territory could prohibit slavery; and Douglas reaffirmed the doctrine later known as the Freeport Heresy—that by failing to pass laws to protect slavery, a territorial legislature could destroy it. The doctrine served to hold the Democrats of the northwest to Douglas, but rendered his chances of southern support for the presidency more desperate than ever. In a few high points of the debate Lincoln, as by inspiration, condemned slavery as a violation of the dignity of labor, and approached it not as a question of political expediency but as a moral issue.

The Freeport Heresy

The election went to Douglas. The southern districts of the State were over-represented in the legislature, the old Whigs of central Illinois supported Douglas as against Lincoln. In re-electing him the State sent him back to the Senate as a defiance of the administration's course in Kansas. The vote of the administration faction against him had been pitiful; he remained the last Democrat of national prominence who could hold the party in the northwest in line. But Lincoln, though defeated, had also become a national figure. Occasional newspapers listed his name in their columns as a candidate for the presidential nomination; more generally he was mentioned as a possible cabinet member in case of Republican success in 1860. In an address at Cooper Institute in New York, in 1860, which was a clear-cut historical demonstration of the right of Congress to legislate on slavery for the territories, he made the east acquainted with his personality.

Success of Douglas

Two events in 1859 tended to solidify southern opinion behind the more extreme leaders of the section, who looked fairly in the

face the probability of disunion in case of the election of a Republican president in 1860. In the fall of 1859 John Brown, a fanatical antislavery partisan leader in Kansas with a record of violence and aggression, had planned with a few extreme New England antislavery men for the establishment, near Harper's Ferry, Virginia, of a group of runaway slaves to be drawn from neighboring plantations and armed as the nucleus for a slave revolt. On October 16, 1859, Brown with a few followers seized the government arsenal. His uprising was nipped at once; he himself was tried for treason, condemned and executed. Futile as his attempt was, it seemed to the South a menace of a horrible slave insurrection. Though most of the North deprecated the attempt, the fact that even a few men had been found to finance and justify it, raised the question whether the South should longer run the risk to slavery that union with the North involved.

John Brown's raid

The second event, the indorsement by sixty-four Republican congressmen of Hinton Rowan Helper's *Impending Crisis of the South* threatened the control of southern politics by the planting classes. Helper, himself a poor white, spoke for his class. Maintaining that slavery benefited the few who owned slaves and harmed the many who did not, he advocated a political revolution of the poor whites. In a House of Representatives almost equally divided between parties—109 Republicans, 88 administration Democrats, 13 Douglas Democrats, 26 Americans, and one Whig—the southern men fought the election to the speakership of any Republican who had indorsed Helper's book. Not until February 1, 1860, was a compromise candidate, Pennington of New Jersey, elected by a bare majority. Opinion was so excited in Congress that members went armed in fear of violence. Despite the success of Douglas in Illinois the southern leaders served notice that on the vital interests of slavery the South could trust him no more than it could a Republican. In the Senate Davis introduced resolutions setting forth the extreme southern doctrine of the rights of slavery in the territories as a step in reading Douglas out of the party. Split

Helper's "Impending Crisis"

into warring factions, the Democratic party confronted its national convention of 1860.

In the Republican party Seward was the outstanding candidate for the presidential nomination; but in more than twenty years of political conflict in high places he had stated his position on too many points, and made himself too many enemies. In his own State Greeley was his enemy; against him was a series of lesser candidates—Chase of Ohio, Cameron of Pennsylvania, Smith of Indiana, and Lincoln of Illinois, each with a smaller following. The Republicans had also their choice of men like Judge Edward Bates of Missouri, an old Whig; but his antiforeign record made him impossible to a party which needed the German vote for success.

Republican presidential aspirants

Lincoln had a great advantage because the convention met at Chicago; he had an advantage also in the adroitness with which the Illinois delegates worked for him. They stressed his fair record on the foreign question, his Kentucky birth, as calculated to win him votes of southern extraction, his moderation on the slavery issue as compared with Seward. By persuasion or by bargain they won the anti-Seward forces to consider Lincoln as a second choice, and on the third ballot he was nominated, with Hannibal Hamlin of Maine as vice president. The platform was moderate. To win Pennsylvania a protective tariff plank was added; the extremely low tariff of 1857 had been followed by the panic, and protectionist sentiment was rife once more.

The nomination of Lincoln

The Republicans, despite Seward's disappointment, parted in harmony; but the Democratic convention meeting at Charleston split in two. The southern elements demanded the complete recognition of their claims to the territories. When Douglas' northern Democrats substituted an evasive quibble, the delegations, in whole or part of nine southern States, withdrew. Douglas could not command two-thirds of the full convention and it adjourned to meet at Baltimore June 18. Five more southern States withdrew, and then the convention by a two-thirds vote of those present nominated Douglas;

The split in the Democratic party

Herschel V. Johnson of Georgia was finally chosen as vice presidential candidate. The seceders at Baltimore, twenty-one States represented, nominated John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky and Joseph Lane of Oregon. Those of the Charleston seceders who had not joined the Baltimore group later indorsed this ticket. On May 9, a Whig remnant met at Baltimore as the Constitutional Union party, and nominated John Bell of Tennessee, and Edward Everett of Massachusetts on a platform of "the Constitution of the country, the union of the States, and the enforcement of the laws."

In explaining the course of various groups, one must always bear in mind the power of personal ambition and animosity, the temptation ever present in moments of supreme excitement to take dramatic action. Without these it is hard to explain the course of the group that nominated Breckinridge and Lane. They possibly hoped that they could throw the election into the House of Representatives and the Senate, and there secure the election of one of their candidates; but even so their preferring a gambler's chance, such as this, to supporting Douglas is not easily understood. Douglas, himself a slaveholder, would not be suspected of a crusade against slavery in the territories against the will of their inhabitants. If nothing could keep the South in the Union save more territory for the expansion of slavery, then and then only were the southern leaders logical in their course.

The southern policy

The election of Lincoln was a foregone conclusion. Fusion tickets, of the anti-Republican elements in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, had no effect save to divide the vote of New Jersey between Lincoln and Douglas. Throughout the North Douglas carried a very strong minority vote; in State after State he trod close upon Lincoln's majority. Of the popular vote Lincoln had 1,866,452, Douglas 1,376,957, Breckinridge 849,781, Bell 588,879. Lincoln carried every Free-State electoral vote, except three for Douglas in New Jersey. Douglas also carried Missouri. Bell won Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia, and Breckinridge the lower South, Bell running there as minority candidate.

Election of Lincoln

II

Immediately after the triumph of Lincoln the Republican leaders undertook the task of cabinet making, and the Republican rank and file began to scramble for offices. As a campaign policy the Republicans had laughed at threats and warnings of secession, and not at first would they face the situation in sober earnest; a seceding and defiant South, and a weak administration half inclined to sympathize with it, anxious only to get out of office and cast the burden of the future on the shoulders of the new president.

November-December, 1860

In the secession movement South Carolina led. No sooner was the triumph of Lincoln known, than the legislature called an election for a state convention to meet December 17. On the 20th of December this body solemnly repealed the act of the convention of 1788 ratifying the federal Constitution, thereby, in the light of approved secession theory, reassuming an absolute independence of the Union.

South Carolina secedes

The theory of secession, upon which the southern States acted, has already been discussed, and needs only to be briefly summed up here. Assuming, as southern political theorists did, the doctrine that sovereignty is indivisible, that no middle ground exists between the absolute independence of a State and her absolute inclusion and integration in another, they found in the history of the United States before 1788 the undoubted proof that the States had called themselves sovereign, and had even exercised powers inseparable from sovereignty. They concluded that, in 1787–1788 the States as sovereigns had adopted the federal Constitution, essentially a better league or treaty between them, their sovereignty of course remaining unimpaired. Hence by the whim of their sovereign wills, far more when just cause was given by the aggression of their allies, the sovereign States might withdraw from the league.

The secession argument

The men who argued against the doctrine on the basis of the existence of an American nation, of a people of the United States, in 1776, were moved by the inevitable temptation which lures the

debater to take ground precisely opposite to his opponent's; it was easy to demonstrate that while these things may have existed in reality, they certainly had no contemporary recognition. On the other hand, if the records of the government and of the federal convention be interpreted in the light of the view, generally held in the eighteenth century, that sovereignty was divisible, that sovereign States by treaty or compact with each other could surrender a part of their sovereign rights to be exercised by a common government, that the duties of citizenship of the United States were imposed in certain fields of government on the same persons who also bore duties of citizenship to the States, the whole course of action of the fathers becomes clear and unmistakable. No basis is left for secession as a constitutional right.

Anti-secession argument

There remains the question as to how secession is to be dealt with, supposing the federal government refuses to recognize the right; if it calls forth the military powers of the Union against a seceding State, it is imposing its will on the State by force—coercing a State. Rather than see the seceding cotton States coerced, some of the border slave States followed them out of the Union. Yet, if the federal government be content to fulfill its stated duties to and on the citizens of the seceded State—if it persists in maintaining its mails, its courts, its customs collection, above all its military and naval posts within the State, and in case these functions are interfered with, protects them by adequate power—here it is not coercing a State but merely enforcing on individual citizens the laws of the Union. This in theory was the position of the Republican president at first; but the magnitude of the task, of course, inevitably led to the method of real war.

Coercion

The secession of South Carolina was followed by that of Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, and Louisiana, January 9–26, 1861. Meeting in convention at Montgomery, Alabama, they drew up a provisional constitution, and elected Jefferson Davis of Mississippi and Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia president and vice president. The constitution so drawn up was in

many respects a southern commentary on the constitutional history of the United States. It borrowed from Mexico the right of a state legislature to impeach federal officers acting within the State. The president held office for six years and could not be reëlected. He could veto individual items in appropriation bills. Congress could not lay protective duties or appropriate for internal improvements. It could admit cabinet members to the privilege of discussing matters pertaining to their departments in either house; something like a budget originating with the executive was made possible. Naturally, the constitution protected slave property and slavery in the territories of the new republic, while prohibiting the African slave trade as a concession to world opinion.

The southern confederacy

That the exercise of the rights of secession bore immediate fruit in a new Confederation was proof that state sovereignty merely cloaked the withdrawal of the plantation interests from the Union. It may be asked whether the new government would not have gained in power by assuming a direct origin in revolution. To wage a war for independence, while professing in theory a state sovereignty which military exigency continually made it necessary to disregard, was illogical. Of course state sovereignty put the seal of legality upon the procedure, but was it worth the price in efficiency?

Secession versus revolution

President Buchanan approached the questions raised by secession as a feeble partisan, not as a vigorous executive. His annual message denied the right of secession, admitted no power in the federal government to check it, and scolded the Republicans for bringing it about. To inject partisanship into the problem did not help its solution. Most of the questions, arising from the impending secession of South Carolina, Buchanan could evade. He could refrain from appointing federal officers in the place of those who resigned, he could refrain from collecting duties at a fort or on a ship off Charleston, but the question as to the disposal of garrisoned federal military posts in Charleston harbor he could not escape.

Buchanan's policy

In the fall of 1860 the forts at Charleston included Castle Pinck-

ney, on an islet within half a mile of the city, and Fort Moultrie on Sullivan's Island, north of the channel into the harbor, some three miles from the city. Near it, rising from a shoal amid the channels and nearing completion, the key to the harbor defenses, was Fort Sumter. Held by a sufficient garrison, its powerful guns could dominate the batteries on the mainlands opposite, and could blockade completely the channels leading to the harbor. Its walls rising almost from the water rendered a storm from boats impossible. Fort Moultrie, where the little harbor garrison of 80 officers and men was stationed, could have been taken with ease by a mob, let alone a military force. It became essential to South Carolina and her friends to prevent the reënforcement of the garrison of Moultrie or its removal to Fort Sumter.

Charleston

The resulting tragi-comedy at Washington, enacted from mid-November, 1860, to the first week of April, 1861 is a difficult thing to understand. High officials of government, avowed agents of South Carolina, avowed sympathizers with secession, exhorted and bullied the trembling Buchanan, and later reasoned with the facile Seward against any decisive measures at Charleston. Men whom Andrew Jackson would have been sorely tempted to hang, told Buchanan to his face that his word was pledged to South Carolina to do nothing. All this is explained by the fact that few men, Democrats or Republicans, clearly sensed the situation. Seward, who thought for several weeks that he was the spokesman for Lincoln's administration, believed if secession were ignored it would die out. Buchanan's previous hopes of checking further disunionist measures were fed with warnings that reënforcements sent to Charleston would bring bloodshed and sweep the cotton States and border States alike into secession. He had the delusion that if he gained time the difficulty would abate; at all events he could postpone action till he was out of office. His cabinet pulled him two ways. Cass and Holt and Judge Jeremiah S. Black were advocates of vigorous measures. Thompson, Howell Cobb, and Floyd, all later secessionists, decried them. Jefferson Davis, and other southerners of

1860–1861: the winter of confusion

weight, used their influence over Buchanan to further their ends, after they and their States were personally involved in secession. With a paralyzed administration the counsels of the high officers of the army and navy were futile.

As early as November, warnings had been coming to Buchanan that reënforcing Charleston would lead to a violent outbreak and precipitate trouble. The officers at Charleston, doing their best to make Moultrie and Sumter defensible, asked in vain for reënforcements. A commanding officer, Colonel Gardner, was withdrawn by Secretary of War Floyd because he drew ammunition from the government arsenal at Charleston. The protest of South Carolina authorities was sufficient to induce Floyd to order the return of forty muskets drawn from the arsenal. Cass had vainly protested and had resigned from the cabinet on December 12.

The situation at Charleston

Major Robert Anderson, Gardner's successor, at last took the responsibility in his own hands and forced the issue. He had asked in vain for reënforcements sufficient to garrison the forts; but he had been grudgingly given discretionary authority to move his little force to any of the other forts if he had reason to believe an attack on him was intended. On the night of December 26, with the skill of professional soldiers he and his officers slipped their little command past the South Carolina guard boats and placed it with sufficient stores for present use behind the impregnable walls of Fort Sumter.

Anderson occupies Sumter

The friends of secession in Washington let loose a storm of protest to Buchanan telling him he was in honor bound to order Anderson back to Moultrie, or to evacuate the harbor; that he had given his word, in return for South Carolina's engagement not to molest the forts, that Anderson should not move. Commissioners from South Carolina, sent to negotiate a financial dissolution of partnership with the United States, added their voice to this colossal impudence.

Southern influence on Buchanan

Fortunately Floyd's resignation on account of financial irreg-

ularities had been requested a few days before the cabinet meeting of December 29, and though present, he was shorn of his former influence. Cobb had resigned December 8. Black, now secretary of state, Holt, who was to succeed Floyd, and Edwin M. Stanton, replacing Holt as attorney-general, at last succeeded in bracing up Buchanan to the point of approving Anderson's course. Thenceforth the policy of the government was no longer dictated by secessionists. Thompson resigned on January 7, 1861. Pressure of financial interests compelled the appointment of John A. Dix as secretary of the treasury.

The secessionists leave the cabinet

Holt's first move as secretary of war was a bold one. He proposed to reënforce and provision the garrison of Sumter. As the South Carolina forces had already seized Castle Pinckney and Fort Moultrie, and were erecting new batteries at Cummings Point on the south side of the channel, force would be necessary. General Scott was unwise enough in the hope of securing secrecy to send the merchant steamer *Star of the West* with additional recruits and supplies. The secret leaked out. January 9, the *Star of the West* was fired on by the secessionists and turned back, while Anderson hesitated to return the fire and silence the South Carolina batteries. Anderson had caught sufficiently the policy of temporizing with the South Carolina authorities not to ask for a second attempt at his relief. He remained, supplied with fresh provisions on sufferance from Charleston, while the state troops, and later the confederate authorities, strengthened their batteries and made all preparations to cut Fort Sumter off from relief, and ultimately to reduce it. At the end of a month relief would have been a difficult military and naval problem.

"The Star of the West"

A similar situation developed at Fort Pickens, near Pensacola, which the federal garrison held after the abandonment of the navy yard to the Confederates. General Twiggs surrendered the United States troops in Texas. Arsenals and ordnance supplies were seized throughout the South and used to prepare her ports for defense and her armies for attack. There was naval force enough to reduce Pen-

Confederate seizures of forts and munitions

sacola but the government would not act. So Buchanan's administration dragged in dotage to its close.

It was inevitable that attempts should be made to settle the question of secession by compromise. On the meeting of Congress, committees in both House and Senate were appointed December 4 and 18 respectively to consider possible compromises. The Senate committee set itself to canvass proposed constitutional amendments offered by Senator Crittenden of Kentucky. They extended the Missouri Compromise line through all territory now held or later to be acquired; provided against abolition of slavery in places within the slave States controlled by the federal government, against interference with the domestic slave trade, and for compensation by the federal government for fugitive slaves forcibly rescued. These were to be irrepealable. In addition the northern States were to be urged to repeal their personal liberty laws, the Fugitive Slave Act was to be modified to the advantage of the North, and the African slave trade suppressed.

Attempts at compromise

Undoubtedly this program commanded the support of moderates. The secessionist senators would have accepted it had the Republicans given it their adhesion. The Republicans made it clear, however, that they would not abandon the platform on which they had won. Some of them inclined to believe that secession was a flurry that would soon be over, and that during the absence of southern representatives in Congress their own legislation could be gotten through. They were willing to recommend repeal of the personal liberty laws and enforcement of the fugitive slave law; they were willing to put in the Constitution, by irrepealable amendment, a specific bar to the power of Congress to interfere with slavery in the States; they would even admit New Mexico with a slave code; but there they stopped. On reopening the question of slavery in the territories their leaders, with Lincoln at their head, were inflexible.

The Republicans refuse to give way

A second attempt at compromise outside Congress arose from the call issued by Virginia for a peace convention which met at

Washington on February 4. About two-thirds of the States were represented; the absence of the cotton States and of Michigan and Wisconsin was significant. The convention finally drew up a constitutional amendment that satisfied the moderates, but could not be accepted by the Republicans, and therefore would not be by the seceded States. Everything now turned on the course to be taken by Lincoln.

The peace convention

Since the election Lincoln had selected his cabinet. It included the chief Republican leaders, Seward as secretary of state, Chase as secretary of the treasury. The reason for the appointment of Simon Cameron, boss of Pennsylvania, as secretary of war, was less obvious—the payment of a political debt probably. Gideon Welles of Connecticut made a competent secretary of the navy. Montgomery Blair of Maryland, son of Francis P. Blair, was postmaster-general, and the former Whig, Edward Bates of Missouri, attorney-general. To the two border-State members Lincoln would have been willing to add another southerner. But Gilmer of North Carolina declined, and Caleb Smith of Indiana became secretary of the interior. Lincoln's progress to the capital February 11–23 was a speech-making tour. The last stage was performed secretly under fear of an assassination plot. Care had been taken in Washington, by General Scott and Charles P. Stone, to prepare a force of regulars and militia sufficient to prevent any attempt at a southern *coup d'état* at the inauguration.

Lincoln's cabinet

The inaugural address, closing with an appeal of real literary beauty to the South on behalf of the Union was, necessarily, the first official announcement of Lincoln's course. It announced his attention to "hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government, and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere." The authority of the federal government was to be enforced, but without needless military display.

Lincoln's inaugural

The first problem which presented itself was of course the

southern forts still held by the United States, Pickens and Sumter. While Lincoln was still searching for the solution, he had to put aside Seward's insistence on settling and executing himself the whole policy domestic and foreign; once Lincoln had hit on the solution, he had to overcome the resistance of his cabinet. On March 4, a message from Anderson reached Washington to the effect that his provisions would hold out for but a month longer. General Scott, when consulted as to the force necessary to relieve Sumter, named a great armament that would take months to organize. Lincoln now turned to Gustavus V. Fox, a former naval officer, who in February had proposed the scheme of a naval force outside the harbor and the running in of men and supplies in boats of small draft under cover of night. Scott pronounced it impossible, and March 15 the cabinet voted 5–2 against attempting relief on grounds of political expediency. Only Chase and Blair were for it.

Lincoln and Fort Sumter

Seward now felt at liberty to offer private assurance to representatives of the Confederacy that the administration did not intend to interfere with the military situation. Justices Campbell and Nelson of the Supreme Court carried an informal assurance to the confederate commissioners that Fort Sumter would be evacuated shortly. On April 1, Seward had submitted to the President a suggestion that he be given a free hand in carrying out a sabre-rattling policy calculated to provoke Spain and France to war in the hope that it would reunite the nation. If the gambler's throw were to have a chance of success, naturally there should be no irritation of the South. Lincoln had pigeonholed the scheme with a private note to Seward that served to convince him, once for all, of the fact that the President meant to be master of the administration's policy. Thenceforth Seward had the task of escaping the pledge he had given informally to representatives of the confederate government.

Seward attempts to dictate the policy

For Lincoln's mind was moving steadily in the direction of an attempt to reprovision and not to reënforce Fort Sumter. He saw Sumter as a pledge, that, held in the hand of the government,

could compel the Confederacy either to see her new nationalism set at naught or to fire on the flag of the United States a shot that would unite the North. Fox had visited Charleston, had seen Anderson, and insisted that relief was possible. Private emissaries of the President at the same time had reported that there was no union sentiment left in South Carolina. March 29, the cabinet voted 5–2 for an attempt at relief, only Seward and Smith being in the negative. Lincoln at once ordered an expedition set out.

Lincoln resolves to provision Sumter

The confederate commissioners still thought they drew assurances from Seward that evacuation was intended; but information of the preparations by the War and Navy Departments leaked out to the confederate authorities. On April 8, Lincoln served formal notice on the government of South Carolina that an attempt would be made to reprovision Sumter, and that no attempt would be made to reënforce with men or arms unless it were attacked. Serving open notice and thus forcing the issue was the first of the master strokes of Lincoln's statecraft.

Lincoln gives notice to South Carolina

The expedition of relief was a failure. A tangle of military orders, given by inexperienced civilian officials, resulted in the loss of the support of the powerful warship *Powhatan*. Without it, and after the steam tugs to be used in transferring supplies were scattered by a heavy gale, the expedition lay helpless off Charleston, on April 12, within sight and hearing of the bombardment of Fort Sumter.

Failure of the expedition

Beauregard, commanding for the Confederacy at Charleston, had accepted Lincoln's challenge. He had intercepted the last mails from Fort Sumter, learning the state of the garrison and of the plans to relieve it. He had summoned Anderson to surrender on the 11th, and receiving a refusal, had served notice on the morning of the 12th that fire would open on the fort in an hour. At half-past four a signal gun had flashed from Fort Johnson, and Edmund Ruffin, an aged Virginian, had fired from Morris Island the first gun against the military forces of the United States.

The Confederates strike the first blow

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

F. E. Chadwick, *Causes of the Civil War* (*American Nation*, vol. XIX). New York, 1906.
J. W. Burgess, *The Middle Period*. New York, 1897.
——, *The Civil War and the Constitution, 1859–1865*. 2 vols. New York, 1901.
E. Channing, *A History of the United States*, vol. VI. New York, 1925.
J. B. McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States*, vol. VIII. New York, 1913.
J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, vols. I and II. New York, 1892.
A. Johnson, *Stephen A. Douglas*. New York, 1908.
T. C. Smith, *Parties and Slavery* (*American Nation*, vol. XVIII). New York, 1906.
F. L. Paxson, *History of the American Frontier, 1763–1893*. Boston, 1924.
W. E. Dodd, *Jefferson Davis* (*American Crisis Biographies*). Philadelphia, 1907.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE WAR FOR THE UNION

Fully garrisoned and provisioned Fort Sumter might have made head against the powerful confederate batteries that, armed with guns seized in federal arsenals, had sprung up like mushrooms in the past three months. But the strongest faces of Sumter naturally turned to the sea; the little garrison, on scanty rations, could not work even all the guns available against the Confederates. Unchecked by sufficient counter-battery, the confederate fire kept the defenders from the upper barbette tier of guns, set the works in flames, imperiled the powder magazine, and, finally, April 13, compelled the surrender of the fort on terms. The gallant defense, reported to a listening nation, had done its work.

The fall of Fort Sumter

Throughout the Union the attack on Sumter cleared the atmosphere like a clap of thunder. Everywhere it impelled decision. Lincoln's answer was unflinching. On the fifteenth of April he called on the governors of the States for 75,000 men for three months to enforce obedience to the laws against "combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings." Northern Democrats had to choose between the maintenance of the Union on the one hand, and sympathy for slavery and the seceding South, belief in states' rights, dread of civil war, and partisan hostility to the Black Republican president on the other. In the Confederacy dissent from the majority for the time was silenced; and northern editors, who had been voicing sympathy with secession, found their personal safety depended upon advocating support of the federal authority by whatever measures should prove necessary. Stephen A. Douglas, loyally coming to Lincoln's aid, threw his vast influence with the northern Democracy in support of the President and the war. His last and supreme effort to undo the mischief

Unanimity, North and South

he had begun in 1854 exhausted a body racked by his dynamic energy. He died at Chicago, June 3, 1861.

The decision of the border States was for the moment the crucial question. North Carolina, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Virginia together had a white population of 2,828,106; Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri had 2,498,891 more. Thrown into the scale with either North or South their weight would turn the balance. Virginia's state convention decided for secession on April 17 under the excitement of the news from Sumter. A popular vote on the question, May 23, ratified a foregone conclusion. But inasmuch as the vote demonstrated that northwestern Virginia was opposed to secession, General George B. McClellan, in a short campaign, expelled the secessionist forces from that territory. Recognized as the State of Virginia, it was permitted to send representatives to Congress and in 1863 was admitted as the State of West Virginia. North Carolina made her decision for secession May 20; after Virginia's action, this was inevitable. Arkansas passed her ordinance of secession May 6, Tennessee hers May 8, confirmed by a popular majority of 58,000 on June 8.

The decision of the border States

Here the success of the forces of secession ended. Maryland for the first few days of the war was in doubt. The Sixth Massachusetts regiment passing through Baltimore to the defense of Washington was mobbed by secessionist sympathizers; April 20 and 21 railroad bridges and telegraphic communications from Washington to the north were broken; Lincoln felt himself cut off from the nation until, on April 25, the Eighth Massachusetts and Seventh New York regiments arrived by way of Annapolis. Maryland was occupied by northern troops: a judicious barring of secessionist members of the legislature from attendance secured a loyal Assembly to coöperate with the loyal Governor Hicks. Thenceforth the State was distinctly an asset of the Union. Delaware necessarily followed her example.

Maryland

The problem of Kentucky and Missouri was a serious one. Southern Indiana and Illinois lay in the same zone with these slave States and were largely settled by men of southern extraction. In

Illinois there was an abortive movement to separate the southern counties from the Union and join them to the Confederacy. It was checked by the influence of Douglas, and the promptness of Governor Yates in occupying Cairo in force. But to obviate all danger Missouri and Kentucky must be held in the Union. In Missouri, the Governor, Claiborne Jackson, with General Sterling Price, advocated secession; but Francis P. Blair, Jr., son of Jackson's old editor, and Captain Nathaniel Lyon of the United States army, with the active aid of Governor Yates armed and organized the loyal elements, broke up the secessionist Camp Jackson, and drove the confederate forces to the borders of the State. The death of Lyon in the lost battle of Wilson's Creek did not undo his work. There was campaigning yet to do in Missouri, but the Confederates finally sank to guerilla warfare.

Missouri

In Kentucky, Governor Magoffin had sorrowfully denied Lincoln's call for troops of April 15; the legislature, meeting on May 6, declared the State neutral in the contest. But Lincoln sent eminent Kentuckians to organize military forces for the Union and a strongly unionist legislature was elected in August. Kentucky, Missouri, and Maryland, battlegrounds of the war, though furnishing the confederate army with perhaps an eighth of its men, cast their weight with the Union.

Kentucky

The need for the loyalty of the border States and of the northern Democrats gave Lincoln a difficult road to tread with respect to slavery. While the more radical Republicans clamored for turning the war into a crusade against slavery, and while such a course seemed necessary to hold European public opinion for the Union, Lincoln feared the effect of such measures on more conservative elements. Compelled to steer between the two extremes, his policy necessarily seemed to vacillate. Generally sensing and following the undercurrent of popular opinion with rare skill, he very often had but a qualified support from the leaders of either wing.

The border-State policy

At the beginning, the North underestimated its military problem; it seemed child's play to defeat the meager military forces of a body of conspirators who had overturned the established state


THE CIVIL WAR
Main Railroad Lines
ATLANTIC OCEAN
GULF OF MEXICO
95°
90°
85°
80°
75°
40°
35°
30°
KANSAS
INDIAN TERR.
ARKANSAS
MISSOURI
ILLINOIS
INDIANA
OHIO
KENTUCKY
TENNESSEE
MISSISSIPPI
LOUISIANA
TEXAS
ALABAMA
GEORGIA
FLORIDA
SOUTH CAROLINA
NORTH CAROLINA
VIRGINIA
WEST VIRGINIA
PENNSYLVANIA
NEW JERSEY
MD.
DEL.
Missouri R.
St. Louis
Wilson's Creek
Columbus
Island No. 10
Cairo
Ft. Henry
Ft. Donelson
Wabash R.
Ohio R.
Louisville
Cincinnati
Covington
Perryville
Bowling Green
Mill Springs
Cumberland R.
Nashville
Franklin
Stone River
Knoxville
Arkansas R.
Memphis
Shiloh
Chattanooga
Tennessee R.
Corinth
Dalton
Resaca
Cassville
Allatoona
Kenesaw Mt.
Atlanta
Chickamauga
Red R.
Champion's Hill
Black R.
Yazoo R.
Vicksburg
Grand Gulf
Port Gibson
Clinton
Jackson
Raymond
Port Hudson
Mobile
Tombigbee R.
Alabama R.
Montgomery
Pensacola
New Orleans
Charleston
Savannah
Savannah R.
Ocmulgee R.
Altamaha R.
Cape Fear R.
Cape Fear
Washington
Baltimore
Annapolis
Richmond
James R.
York R.

governments of the South. Only gradually was the fact recognized that the confederate leaders controlled the resources of their section as fully as the governments of the North, and that the overrunning of the South and the defeat of its full military strength were necessary preliminaries to success. The available southern white military population was about a quarter that of the North; but the presence of the negro made it possible to release from labor an undue proportion of white males for military service. A thinly settled theater of operations with barriers of forest, mountains, and marsh, with few railroads made the problem of communications for invading armies a serious one, simplified only by the possible use of the rivers and the sea as means of transport.

The North's military task

In military leadership the South at the beginning had the advantage. Many able officers of the old army cast in their lot with the Confederacy, among them Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson, perhaps the deepest students of the military art in America. To counteract them, Lincoln had to search out and develop commanders for his armies. Formerly military historians accused him of interfering with his generals and hampering their activity. Now students of military history have come to regard his conduct as a model for civilian rulers of a nation at war. Knowing nothing of the military art, Lincoln set himself to study the great writers on war; soon his keen judgment and common sense penetrated to the heart of its secrets. Until 1864 his strategic concepts were usually sounder than those of his generals; he grasped as few men have done the necessity of coördinating military activity with the political ends to be attained by it. His withholding McDowell's force from McClellan, once severely criticised, now appears the part of true military wisdom; his later attempt to trap Jackson in the Shenandoah, strategically sound, failed only through slackness in the generals who sought to execute it.

On water the federal government had the advantage. Most of its navy it saved from the Confederates. The great shipping interests of the North assured additional vessels and seamen in any desired amount. This superiority showed itself even on the inland

waters of the west where flotillas of ironclad gunboats on the Mississippi, Tennessee, and Cumberland were a decisive factor in military success. On the seacoast, Lincoln promptly used his advantage in a blockade of the southern coast line, proclaimed April 19 and speedily made effective. By joint military and naval operations the federal government during the war seized one southern port after another, Pensacola, Savannah, New Orleans, the North Carolina sounds, and Mobile.

Northern naval superiority

The effect of the blockade on the results of the war was very great. In the early years of the struggle, at least, the South's manufactures were insignificant for the supply and equipment of great armies. Most of what she used, apart from her seizures of federal property, she expected to import. This could be done in swift blockade-running steamers through her few ports; until the fall of Vicksburg cut the lines of supply that crossed the Mississippi it could be done through Mexico. But it became increasingly difficult to get past the blockade any considerable quantity of cotton, the great southern staple on which the South had hoped to base her finance.

The blockade

Cotton was an international factor in the war. The textile mills of France and England depended for their supply on exports of southern cotton; and the South always hoped that distress would force their governments by a naval demonstration to break the federal blockade and procure the raw materials for their mills. In spite of heavy surplus stocks of cotton in Europe at the outset distress did ensue; the federal government did its best to procure supplies of cotton to be sent abroad to alleviate it. Some was captured; more was obtained by barter through the lines of the armies. It was often necessary to let military supplies slip through in exchange. Unsavory cotton speculators thronged in the wake of the army. General officers often took their profits in the speculation and planned their campaigns more with reference to stores of cotton than to the position of enemy forces. There was too much sordid trafficking in the blood of the men fighting for the Union; but cotton as an industrial

Cotton

necessity to France and Great Britain was a diplomatic necessity to the North.

As far as troops were concerned, Lincoln's original call, for state quotas for three months, was limited rather by his belief as to the limits of his legal powers than by his underestimate of the needs of the situation. In May he called for 42,000 volunteers for three years, and for enlistments of 22,000 in the army and 18,000 in the navy. Men loyally came in far greater numbers than could be used, the finest of the nation in intelligence and moral sense. In front of Washington, a little army began to gather under General Irvin McDowell, mainly infantry, much of it in the bizarre Zouave and Turco uniforms made the fashion by the French War of 1859, most of it enthusiastic but ill-trained. The transfer of the confederate capital from Montgomery to Richmond insured hot campaigning across Virginia, and in July McDowell with 30,000 men attempted a forward movement against a confederate force of inferior numbers posted at Manassas on Bull Run.

First military preparations

McDowell's attack was well planned and reasonably well executed. General Patterson, a relic of the War of 1812, who commanded in the Shenandoah with a force supposed to contain that of the confederate General Joseph E. Johnston, let Johnston get away to support Beauregard with a portion of his force before McDowell's attack began. Even so the federal forces had the better of it until the debouching on their flank of the remainder of Johnston's force caused a panic that sent their whole army in headlong flight to Washington.

Bull Run

The nation faced the disaster as an incentive to serious endeavor. Congress, meeting on July 4, had given the President what seemed ample means for carrying on the war. It approved his previous acts, authorized 500,000 volunteers, allowed a loan of $250,000,000, laid a direct tax of $20,000,000, an income tax estimated to bring $10,000,000 more, and an increase in import duties. It passed an act confiscating property used in support of the rebellion; the confederate Congress had already confiscated all individual debts due from south-

The special session of Congress


PENNSYLVANIA
Chambersburg
Gettysburg
MARYLAND
Antietam Cr.
Monocacy R.
Sharpsburg
Harpers Ferry
Baltimore
Winchester
Potomac R.
Cedar Creek
Shenandoah R.
Fisher's Hill
Washington
Thoroughfare Gap
Manassas Jc.
Chancellorsville
Fredericksburg
Rapidan R.
Rappahannock R.
Spottsylvania
North Anna R.
VIRGINIA
CHESAPEAKE BAY
James R.
Richmond
Cold Harbor
Savage's Station
York R.
Lynchburg
FRAYSER'S FARM
Appomattox C.H.
Malvern Hill
Harrison's Landing
Petersburg
Yorktown
James R.
Five Forks
NORTH CAROLINA
Norfolk
CAMPAIGNS in the EAST 1861 - 1865
Railroads

erners to northern merchants. Congress also passed the Crittenden Resolution declaring that the purpose of the war was to preserve the Federal Union, and then adjourned to give the executive a free hand.

General McClellan, a brilliant West Pointer, then about thirty-five years old, was given the command and the task of making an army out of the raw materials pouring in through enlistment. He had a good Mexican War record, and on the eve of the rebellion was president of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad. In an easy and triumphant campaign he had cleared the Confederates out of Western Virginia. In organizing the Army of the Potomac he accomplished wonders. The various arms and staff services of a modern army were developed and trained to efficiency; the army acquired an *esprit de corps*, and a confidence and love for "Little Mac" never afterwards broken. That his achievements and popularity were going to his head, so that he treated even the President with scant courtesy, that he kept polishing the great weapon he had forged, forbearing to use his army on the good autumn roads of Virginia against the far inferior forces of Johnston, that he tended always to believe his army weaker than his adversary's, were ominous signs not apparent to the public.

McClellan

While McClellan was still hesitating in the east, the campaign on a strategic scale had opened in the west. For the Confederacy, Albert Sidney Johnston, a Kentuckian, and one of the ablest officers of the old army, held a line marked by posts at Bowling Green, Kentucky, at Forts Donelson and Henry on the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers where they approach each other within a few miles, and at Columbus on the Mississippi. Under the direction of General Halleck, commanding at St. Louis, General Ulysses S. Grant, in February, 1862, undertook to break the line at its center.

The confederate line in the west

Grant was a West Pointer who had done good service in the Mexican War. Despondency and intemperance in a lonely Pacific post had caused his resignation from the army under a cloud, and seemingly ruined a fine career. He had lived for a time

at St. Louis in narrow circumstances. Employed at Galena by his father the year before the war, he had been drawn into the service and had risen from command to command in the desultory campaigning of the summer and fall of 1861. He now led an expedition largely of Illinois troops with gunboats against Forts Henry and Donelson. On February 6, Fort Henry, weakly garrisoned and assailed by the gunboats, surrendered, the garrison marching to Donelson. Here Grant attacked a week later. Attacks on the 13th by the army, and the 14th by the gunboats failed. On the 15th the garrison attempted a sortie which routed a part of the besieging force. Far from being panic-stricken, Grant, with his characteristic ability to recognize an opponent's embarrassments, decided the garrison was attempting to escape, and ordered a vigorous attack which gained a lodgment on the works.

Grant at Forts Henry and Donelson

Johnston had given Fort Donelson a garrison sufficient in numbers, but not in leadership. Of the generals there, Floyd, former secretary of war, mainly wished to escape capture himself. Pillow was little better, and both slipped from the fortress, leaving Buckner, the ablest of the three, to surrender it to Grant with about 15,000 men. With the navigation of the Kentucky and Tennessee Rivers open to northern gunboats and available for federal transport and supply, the Confederates could no longer maintain themselves in western Tennessee. Johnston was compelled to abandon his whole line and to fall back on Corinth in northern Mississippi, the most important railroad junction in the lower South. His prestige suffered severely from his ill-fortune; Beauregard was sent to assist him.

The Confederates retreat to Corinth

Grant had shown his strength as a general at Donelson; he was now to show his weakness at Shiloh. Pushing up the Tennessee in pursuit, he scattered his divisions in camps of instruction along the river beyond supporting distance of each other. He was so full of plans for an offensive that he disregarded the chance that the foe might try one. Buell, with the Army of the Ohio, was marching to join him; before the juncture could be made, Albert Sidney Johnston, determined to retrieve his

Shiloh

lost prestige and the confederate fortune in the west, fell suddenly April 6 on Grant's exposed divisions at Shiloh. The Federals, surprised but bravely resisting, were driven to a last stand on the edge of the river at nightfall; here Grant imperturbably gathered his fresh troops, and with Buell's supporting forces next day repulsed the enemy and drove him back to Corinth. Johnston had fallen on the first day.

The Confederates were far from regarding Shiloh as a victory. At New Orleans the young novelist, George W. Cable, saw a town "that had never really been glad again after that awful day of Shiloh." He had seen its people uncovered "in silence to let the body of Albert Sidney Johnston, their great chevalier, pass slowly up St. Charles Street behind the muffled drums while on the quivering hearts was written as with a knife the death roll of that lost battle." But the North was equally stricken by it. Grant's subordinates railed against him for the slaughter his carelessness had caused. "No sadder day will I hope ever come for Illinois than that sad Sunday when the flower of her soldiers were decimated at Pittsburg [Shiloh] unless the day Grant was made a Brigadier General or that upon which he was promoted may be regarded as more unfortunate," wrote Brigadier General John M. Palmer to Trumbull. Pressure was brought to bear on Lincoln to remove him. Lincoln, whose judgment seized on the fact that by hard fighting Grant had retrieved a blunder, gave as answer, "I can't spare this man; he fights."

Shiloh and Grant's reputation

Elsewhere in the west the war had gone well for the federal cause. On January 18, General George H. Thomas at Mill Springs, Kentucky, had defeated the invading force of General Zollicoffer. On April 7 Pope had dislodged the Confederates from Island No. 10 on the Mississippi near the southern Missouri boundary, opening the river as far south as Memphis. April 23, Farragut with an ocean-going fleet had run the batteries below New Orleans and on May 1 the military forces had taken possession of the city, Farragut then ascending the river to meet the federal gunboat fleet at Vicksburg. The time for its fall had not yet come.

Other western successes

In view of the difficulties with the Army of the Potomac and McClellan Lincoln's exclamation on Grant is doubly significant. With a splendid army and superior numbers, it was well-nigh impossible to stir that general into decisive action; instead of success in a theater of war where, after the western victories, success would have been decisive, only disappointment followed. It had taken a specific order from the President to force McClellan, early in March, to advance against the confederate army at Manassas only to find it evacuated, and long ranges of batteries that had terrified the federal scouts merely Quaker guns made of logs.

McClellan's hesitation

In a further advance on Richmond, Lincoln wished McClellan to move overland from the north to keep always between J. E. Johnston's army and Washington. There were difficulties of transport for this route in the lack of roads, the stretches of barren country such as the famous Wilderness, and the rivers. McClellan insisted on transporting his army by water to the York or the James River and using them as a base for attack. Lincoln consented on condition that a sufficient force be kept to protect Washington. Finding that McClellan expected the forces in the Shenandoah to do this duty, Lincoln detached from McClellan the corps of McDowell—40,000 men. McClellan was furious at the interference, but had to acquiesce. He later alleged as a reason for using the York rather than the James as his route that he expected to have the use of McDowell on that more northern line and not on the other. General Robert E. Lee, military adviser to President Davis, planned by the use of interior lines to attack the scattered federal forces in detail and prevent their concentration against the weaker confederate army.

The peninsular campaign

McClellan, finally landing his force, began the leisurely siege of Yorktown and the confederate lines. From April 11 to May 3 the Confederates amused him, until his preparations for bombardment were complete, when Johnston withdrew his force. The Confederates simultaneously evacuated Norfolk after destroying their ironclad *Merrimac*. On March 8 the *Merrimac* in battle with the blockading fleet had

Yorktown: the "Monitor and Merrimac"

destroyed two wooden ships of the old type. The destruction of the rest of the fleet was averted only by the arrival of the federal ironclad *Monitor*,—the "cheese box on a raft," whose only targets for enemy fire were her armored turret and pilot house. The advent of the confederate ironclad had alarmed Washington with fear of an attack by it; the repulse of the *Merrimac* by the *Monitor* relieved the situation; but armor had come to supplement the use of steam in naval warfare.

With the evacuation of Norfolk, McClellan failed to take the easier line of the James River; afterward he claimed that he operated by the York in the hope of getting McDowell's coöperation there. To keep McDowell away, Lee dispatched General T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson for a campaign against the federal forces in the Valley of Virginia. Jackson, now about thirty-eight years old, was a West Pointer, who had filled unhappily the position of a college teacher in mathematics while he pursued with ardor the study of the art of war. A Puritan so fervent that he prayed from moment to moment in the saddle for God's help in the task he had on hand, so fanatical that he believed the enemies of the Confederacy were the enemies of the Lord, to be cut off in their sins, Jackson was not in action so much a "Stonewall" as a rapier.

Stonewall Jackson

The first Valley campaign need not be detailed. Suffice it to say that federal forces were scattered through the valley under various generals—N. P. Banks, Shields, Milroy, Sexton, Frémont—the latter, despite his utter incompetence, employed in order to conciliate his radical admirers. Jackson fell first on one, then on another of the scattered forces. Usually, he commanded superior numbers; federal troops fought bravely and federal officers maneuvered them well against the enemy but in vain. After raiding the valley, threatening Washington, causing McDowell to be retained to defend it, and evading an attempt to trap him on his retreat, Jackson retired early in June, his work well done. McDowell had been kept from reënforcing McClellan.

Jackson's Valley campaign

Meanwhile, on May 31, Johnston had attacked McClellan out-

side Richmond at the battle of Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines; as in many such combats, the Federals were first defeated, and the Confederates finally repulsed. Johnston was seriously wounded and Lee took his place in active command. Lee had been perhaps the ablest officer of the old United States army, and had refused high command in the union army to cast in his lot with Virginia, his native State. His assumption of active command brought him to popular notice. Handsome, soldierly, unselfish, a great leader of men, and an even greater strategist, almost superhuman in his faultless character, he was destined to be to the Confederates the idealization of their cause.

Robert E. Lee

For the present Lee fortified himself so thoroughly on the outskirts of Richmond that McClellan with his 100,000 men did not dare attack the Confederates whose actual strength of 65,000 he greatly overestimated. Lee next planned an offensive against the part of McClellan's army north of the Chickahominy under Fitz-John Porter. Stonewall Jackson failed to coöperate promptly, the Confederates suffered an early repulse, and in the battle of Gaines's Mill, June 27, Porter made head with 25,000 against double his numbers. McClellan, deceived by false reports of the confederate superior strength, failed to take advantage with his own vastly superior forces of their weakness south of the Chickahominy, or to reënforce Porter, who was finally driven back across the river.

Gaines's Mill

McClellan's line of supply to the York was now endangered. Lee had expected him to retreat down that river, but instead, burning his surplus supplies, he abandoned his lines on the York, and retreated south to the James. Once aware of the "change of base" the Confederates failed to break the movement in combats at Savage's Station, June 29, and Frayser's Farm, June 30. An assault on the federal army at last in position on the James at Malvern Hill, on July 1, was repulsed with heavy loss. After a further retreat to Harrison's Landing, McClellan began to reorganize.

The change of base

Lincoln was bitterly disappointed and placed his hopes elsewhere. He had already brought General John Pope from his

triumph at Island No. 10 and placed him in command of the forces of Banks, Frémont, and McDowell—the Army of Virginia. Halleck, under whose auspices in the west the successes of Pope and Grant were won, was brought to Washington also as commander-in-chief. Pope unwisely issued some vainglorious and bloodthirsty proclamations which caused the Confederates to threaten retaliation, and piqued the old commanders of the Army of the Potomac. With a view to reënforcing Pope and initiating a campaign against Richmond from the north, Lincoln ordered the withdrawal of McClellan's army by water from the James to the Rappahannock. Lee, operating on short interior lines, now turned against Pope.

Pope and Halleck

Pope with an inferior force wisely retreated before Lee beyond the Rappahannock, which he was required to hold as his channel of support from McClellan's army. To checkmate him Lee now used a contemptuously daring combination. Jackson was sent by a roundabout march, emerging from the Bull Run Mountains at Thoroughfare Gap in Pope's rear, to cut his communication with Washington and destroy his stores. Pope turned to attack Jackson; but meanwhile Lee had passed the rest of his army through the Gap to support his lieutenant. Pope persisted in fighting at once without waiting for reënforcement from McClellan. His forces were driven disastrously, August 30, in a battle known as the Second Bull Run. Pope had shown energy rather than judgment; it was suspected, unjustly, it now seems, that some of McClellan's satellites like Fitz-John Porter had deliberately sacrificed him to their jealousy, and Porter was ultimately made the scapegoat. Pope was relieved of command and McClellan recalled to restore the army morale.

The Second Bull Run

Lee now took the opportunity to carry the war into the enemy country. The Confederates hoped to detach Maryland to the Confederacy; and, by the Shenandoah Valley, Lee began the invasion early in September, McClellan moving on the interior line to keep between Lee and Baltimore and Washington. By singular good fortune McClellan obtained a copy of Lee's confidential order for the movement, revealing the

Antietam

division of his army and the detachment of Jackson to seize the garrison of Harper's Ferry. McClellan's delay in pushing over South Mountain, the passes of which were forced by the Federals on the 14th, and his delay in attacking Lee until Jackson had returned made the battle of Antietam, September 17, indecisive. But Lee retreated from Maryland; and Lincoln took advantage of the change in fortune to issue the Emancipation Proclamation, which marked a complete reversal of his policy.

The extremes of union opinion

In order to keep the northern Democrats and the loyal border-State men in the struggle for the Union it had seemed necessary to avoid any appearance of attacking property in slaves. Border-State men would hardly give military support to a régime which threatened their property; War Democrats, who had formerly accused their Republican opponents of cherishing a project of abolition, could hardly be expected to bear arms to enable it to be put into execution. At the same time, the Republicans and some of the most zealous of War Democrats believed that slavery, by the attempt to break up the Union in its name, had put itself out of constitutional protection and could and should be rooted up, lest, when the rebellion ended, it should remain as excuse for fresh trouble. Between these two groups Lincoln had to pick his way as best he might.

Frémont's proclamation

The question first arose in connection with Frémont's military government in Missouri. August 30, 1861, he issued a proclamation freeing the slaves of all persons in Missouri bearing arms against the United States. Lincoln first asked him to modify it; Frémont failing, Lincoln, on September 11, himself rescinded it. Proof of the incompetency and corruption of Frémont's rule in Missouri caused the President to remove him, November 2, 1861. As he was, for his proclamation, the darling of the radical Republicans, his removal provoked deep indignation and angry criticism of Lincoln. Frémont had to be employed again, as we have seen, in command in West Virginia.

Previously another union officer, destined to be only less popular with the radicals than Frémont, had taken another important step.

This was the application to negroes of the term "Contraband of War" as an excuse for refusing to return runaways to their masters. General Benjamin F. Butler, like a lawyer, argued that as negroes were a possible source of labor on military works they were contraband; the term leaped into current slang as a synonym for negro. In spite of Butler's quibble, many officers of Democratic persuasion were sedulously careful to return runaway slaves who took refuge with their commands.

Benjamin F. Butler; the Contrabands

The session of Congress of 1861–1862 was marked by proposals for the compensated emancipation of the slaves of the loyal border States. Lincoln repeatedly urged this measure, calling the border-State congressmen on July 12 to hear his plea for it. He had revoked an order of General Hunter, freeing all slaves in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, but by the end of July, 1862, he had come to the conclusion that the time was ripe to emancipate by executive proclamation the slaves of the sections persisting in rebellion. On July 22, he read to the cabinet the draft of his proclamation. Seward pointed out the inexpediency of its issue in a time of defeat, and it was reserved until the 22d of September when the victory of Antietam could be used as a pretext for it.

Lincoln decides on emancipation

The proclamation decreed the emancipation of all slaves in all parts of the Union that had not returned to their allegiance by January 1, 1863. Naturally it did not affect the loyal border States, or the sections of the Confederacy conquered by the union forces. It was essentially a measure of war, based on the war power of the president for the distress of an enemy. Without a constitutional amendment Congress could not claim the power so far to interfere with the rights of the States to regulate their local concerns as to pass an act freeing a single slave. By the same military power, the exercise of which by his generals he had steadily checked, Abraham Lincoln, as commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States, issued a Proclamation of Emancipation to harass the enemy against whom these armies were directed.

The Emancipation Proclamation

The reasons why his act had at last become inevitable can easily be imagined. With every minute the war lasted, with every dollar and every life expended, the futility of reconquering the South to the Union, and leaving it the institution it had declared the head of the corner of its new political edifice, became more evident. Slaves were used for the benefit of the Confederacy to raise cotton it might sell abroad, to raise food for the fighting men, to labor in intrenchments, to act as wagoners, and relieve white men for the fighting front. Recognized as free, the negroes could be encouraged to flee to the union lines and carry their labor thither, even to serve in federal uniforms against their old masters. Of course the proclamation would alienate the border States and Democratic support, just as taxes and arbitrary arrests were already alienating them; but public opinion had reached an equilibrium where the preponderance lay on the side of emancipation; and in deference to it Lincoln's proclamation was issued.

Why emancipation was necessary

Lincoln was by no means satisfied with McClellan's failure to take advantage of Lee's reverse or to pursue him after it. When McClellan allowed Lee to recross the Blue Ridge and again to place his army in front of Richmond, Lincoln relieved him of command. In his place the President appointed Ambrose E. Burnside, one of the corps commanders of the army, a man who as a subordinate had shown outstanding loyalty to his commanders; unambitious, he had already once declined the supreme command. Now he accepted it under orders. December 13, he launched a disastrous attack on the heights behind the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg. The useless slaughter horrified the country. Burnside demanded either his own removal or that of Hooker and Franklin, his corps commanders, and was himself removed. Hooker was appointed in his place—a dashing, picturesque soldier, prone to cavil at his superiors. In appointing him Lincoln alluded to the report that he aspired to a military dictatorship and reminded him that only a victorious commander could establish one. The Virginia winter cut off all further campaigning until May.

Burnside and Fredericksburg

In the west, since Shiloh, the war had been going aimlessly. Halleck had superintended the taking of Corinth; but for want of means of communication, while the Mississippi was held by the Confederates at Vicksburg, invasion could not well penetrate below the line of the Tennessee, and the confederate cavalry under Forrest and Morgan kept Buell's and Grant's supply line in continual peril. Coincident with Lee's invasion of Maryland, the Confederates took the offensive in the west; Kirby Smith emerged from the Cumberland Mountains to threaten Covington and Cincinnati, while Braxton Bragg marched on Louisville. Buell's offensive on Chattanooga, undertaken to gratify Lincoln's hobby of bringing help to the Unionists of East Tennessee, had to be abandoned to clear Kentucky of Confederates. The indecisive battle of Perryville caused Bragg's retreat from the State. Buell was however relieved from command as a result of the dissatisfaction of the governors of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Rosecrans, fresh from an indecisive battle against the Confederates at Corinth, replaced him. Moving as deliberately as Buell had done, it was not until late December that he encountered Bragg near Stone River or Murfreesboro, December 31 to January 2. From a bloody combat Rosecrans gained little more than the field of battle.

The war in the west

January 1, 1863, as the September Proclamation had provided, Lincoln issued a second proclamation freeing all slaves in districts still in rebellion on that date. The first proclamation had contributed to political reverses in the election of the fall of 1862; for successes in the field to add luster to it, the second proclamation had to ask credit from the future campaigns of 1863.

The second Emancipation Proclamation

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

J. K. Hosmer, *The Appeal to Arms* (*American Nation*, vol. XX). New York, 1907.
J. K. Hosmer, *Outcome of the Civil War* (*American Nation*, vol. XXI). New York, 1907.
F. L. Paxson, *The American Civil War*. London, 1912.
Sir F. B. Maurice, *Robert E. Lee, the Soldier*. Boston, 1925.

E. D. Fite, *Social and Industrial Conditions in the North during the Civil War.* New York, 1910.
J. C. Schwab, *The Confederate States of America, 1861–1865.* New York, 1901.
H. Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams: An Autobiography.* New York, 1918.
C. F. Adams, Jr., *Studies Military and Diplomatic, 1775–1865.* New York, 1911.
E. D. Adams, *Great Britain and the American Civil War.* 2 vols. London, 1925.
J. G. Randall, *Constitutional Problems under Lincoln.* New York, 1926.
E. Channing, *A History of the United States,* vol. VI. New York, 1925.
J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States,* vols. III–V. New York, 1895–1906.
F. L. Paxson, *History of the American Frontier, 1763–1893.* Boston, 1924.
J. W. Burgess, *The Middle Period.* New York, 1897.
——, *The Civil War and the Constitution, 1859–1865.* 2 vols. New York, 1901.

CHAPTER XXV

THE TRIUMPH OF THE NORTH

I

The operations in the field by which it sought the triumph of its cause were only a part of the task of the federal government. It had also to recruit its armies, to finance the war, to conciliate foreign powers, and above all to guide public opinion at home so as to retain its loyal support in the face of heavy taxes, long casualty lists, and arbitrary suppression of discontent. The undertaking became more and more difficult through the series of military reverses of 1862, especially when, in addition to the partisan program of legislation put through by the Republican Congress of 1862, the administration had to defend the transformation of the war from a fight for the Union to a crusade against slavery. That, point for point, the Confederate States were confronted with problems even more serious, was a fact which northern statesmen in moods of despondency were too prone to forget.

The tasks of the federal government

First may be considered the problems that arose out of foreign relations. With but three powers did those relations affect the success of the North in the war. Russia was consistently the friend of the federal government. Before the outbreak of war, Stoeckl, the Russian minister, had participated in the informal relations between federal officials and confederate emissaries; he was always helpful, and never overstepped the bounds of diplomatic caution. At a critical time of the war, September, 1863, when a rupture with England was likely, a Russian fleet visited New York in what was distinctly understood as a gesture of friendship.

Foreign relations: Russia

France, on the other hand, under Napoleon III, half an emperor, half an imperial adventurer, was generally unfriendly. Slidell, the confederate emissary to the court of France, had Napoleon's

ear; the emperor was taking advantage of the war to establish a French empire in Mexico; probably he would have intervened to stop the war at any time when England was prepared to move in concert. The key to the situation, therefore, is the story of our relations with England—of changing public opinion in upper and lower orders of society, of economic interests of cotton spinners, of jealousy of republican institutions in the New World, of questions of neutral duty. Through all, the fortunes of the United States were guided by a perfect diplomat, Charles Francis Adams, United States minister to Great Britain. Son of President John Quincy Adams, grandson of President John Adams, even aristocratic British society had to respect him for his birth, his gentility, his manners, his faultless polish in mind and taste, his perfection in diplomatic form.

Foreign relations: France and England

When Adams first arrived in England in May, 1861, he was confronted with England's proclamation of the Confederacy as a belligerent; that is, that the contest between the sections was a war and not a suppression of an insurrection in which the means used were the private concern of the nation concerned. This declaration, in which the powers of Europe concurred, was of course in line with the facts; it was made inevitable by Lincoln's proclamation of blockade, for in international law a blockade is essentially a weapon of war. In gauging English public opinion, Adams found that the upper order of society, represented by such newspapers as the *Times*, was inclined to sympathize with the South. Especially was this apparent after the news of Bull Run, when it became evident that the war was not the affair of a moment. Inasmuch as English public opinion had come to condemn slavery very strongly, its partiality to the slave-power was surprising; but the upper classes distrusted republican institutions, traced in the secession movement a welcome proof of their futility, and hoped to see them overthrown or discredited. To the aristocratic basis of southern society on the plantation, the English landholder could give a sympathetic understanding. The commercial classes were jealous of the competition of American shipping; as the block-

England recognizes the South as a belligerent; upper class opinion

ade cut off cotton shipments, and manufacturers and hands in Lancashire felt the pinch, a cry went up for the breaking of the blockade. As to slavery, men soothed their consciences by pointing to the Crittenden Resolution as proof that the war had nothing to do with the institution.

English opinion and the North

The United States was destined to find, in increasing measure, a touching trust and friendship in the very working classes so deeply affected by the cotton famine. It had friends among the liberals in such men as Milnes and Forster. Charles Sumner and Asa Gray in their correspondence with their friends, the Duchess of Argyll and Charles Darwin, labored to confirm them in sympathy for the North.

Mason and Slidell

In the fall of 1861, an international incident occurred which might well have led to war. Mason and Slidell, confederate commissioners to England and France, had evaded the blockade and at Habana got on board an English mail steamer, the *Trent*. The *Trent* was stopped by the American warship *San Jacinto*, commanded by Captain Wilkes, and Mason and Slidell taken from her. Northern opinion was at first inclined to justify the act. It seemed an exercise of the right of search and impressment which Great Britain had formerly arrogated to herself. War with Great Britain could be faced with a clear conscience. The British government demanded the return of the envoys, and began military preparations. War was averted through Seward's sober second thought, through the diplomatic tact of Lord Lyons, British minister at Washington, and through the English Prince Consort, who, on the eve of his untimely death, expended his last strength in softening a dispatch that was almost an ultimatum. Mason and Slidell were released to do what they could as official representatives of the Confederacy in Europe.

The "Alabama"

The United States speedily had a grievance of her own to air—the English supply of munitions to confederate agents. With reason, she protested against the fitting out in English ports of fleet confederate commerce-destroyers like the *Florida*. When the famous *Alabama* was being built by Laird's shipyard in 1862, Adams offered affidavits as to her true

character and protested in vain to the British government. After many delays, he made the fact so clear that orders for her seizure had to be issued; just in time, the *Alabama* slipped out to sea on a "trial trip," took on crew and armament at the Azores and set out on her mission against federal commerce, capturing vessels and burning them at sea.

Ruin of American shipping

The confederate cruisers worked to the advantage of England in the ruin of American shipping. The transition in naval construction from wood to iron was of course taking from American shipyards their advantage in cheap timber; but the *Alabama* and the *Florida* accentuated the process, not merely by the vessels which they destroyed but by the far greater number which they drove to registry under foreign flags. When, in 1871, the claims of the United States against Great Britain for depredations by commerce-destroyers fitted in her ports were adjudicated, the United States was allowed damages for vessels destroyed, but not for the resulting prolongation of the war or the ruin of her shipping.

Emancipation wins the lower classes

America might have hoped that the Emancipation Proclamation would have had a favorable effect on British opinion. But the upper class pointed out the limited extent of the emancipation, ignoring the fact that even what was done could be done solely through a constitutional technicality. It affected to regard the proclamation as a gambler's throw by a losing gamester, as an attempt to incite servile war. It even tried to justify slavery. But very touching was the attitude of the lower classes who now instinctively sensed Lincoln's great doctrine that the war of the North against slavery was a struggle for the dignity and right of labor everywhere in the world, and rallied behind the leadership of the Great Emancipator. The public meetings in behalf of the North, sneered at in the beginning as disgusting manifestations of the prejudice of the rabble, created a great wave of sympathy with the union cause, with which even the aristocratic government had to reckon.

Looked at dispassionately, that government had generally tried to fulfill its duties, though not too eagerly. In a more or less

honest opinion that the attempt to subdue the South was futile—an opinion natural enough to those who looked merely at the military situation and ignored the superior resources and grim purpose of the North—the cabinet in the summer of 1862 had been at the point of intervention in order to stop the war. Gladstone, in a famous speech, had forecast such action, saying that Jefferson Davis had made an army and was making a navy and a nation. More than anything else, the Emancipation Proclamation, with its impression on the lower orders, forestalled intervention.

The English ministry and the war

Throughout the winter and spring of 1863, the aristocracy still rejoiced in southern successes. It discounted the news of Gettysburg, it first affected to disbelieve the news of Vicksburg, then received it in gloomy silence. Adams girded himself for his last battle with the British government. Confederate agents were building, at Laird's, two powerful rams to be used in breaking the federal blockade. Very adroitly they were transferred to French hands in a false sale that may even have deceived the Lairds. Adams had seemingly exhausted the resources of his diplomacy in urging their detention, and finally addressed to Lord John Russell a note with the significant words, "It would be superfluous in me to point out to your lordship that this is war." The note was crossed by one from Russell announcing the seizure of the rams, which left a British ministry, containing the jingo Viscount Palmerston, in the situation of having receded from an untenable position before a threat of war.

The Battle of the Rams

With British directness, British officialdom thenceforth took its conqueror to its heart. Palmerston, the brusque, the terror of foreign diplomats, greeted the stately victor with the affectionately familiar "How d'ye do, Adams?" Adams, as his son neatly put it, was thenceforth the recognized leader of Her Majesty's American opposition, and accorded corresponding deference. The Battle of the Rams was the last serious diplomatic problem of the war for the United States.

The triumph of Adams

Internally, the government had the task of conciliating the

necessary support for its policies. Here, its problem was much like that of its confederate opponent. Both encountered storms of protest over the heavy toll in men and money which they had to levy, and over the arbitrary measures of government necessary to enforce it. In certain States, both North and South, this protest was voiced by legislatures or governors. But Jefferson Davis had little difficulty with his Congresses. That they servilely recorded the decrees of the executive and did no more was the complaint of observers. The eye of the South was on Davis' relations with his generals, rather than with his Congress; the war had enlisted the ablest southerners in directing military operations. Lincoln, however, had Congresses supported by strong sections of public opinion, and had to win them over, or compromise as he might between their measures and his own. Not only on general principles but on lesser details of policy the executive and the legislature often clashed. Congress showed jealousy of the fact that the executive, as commander-in-chief, by military proclamation might settle questions of slavery and reconstruction on which the constitutional limitations of the legislative power precluded it from passing laws. On the other hand, the joint Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War was continually prying into military operations and doing little except to foment quarrels between generals over the proper apportionment of praise and blame.

Civilians and the war, North and South

In dealing with public opinion at large, the federal authorities used more stringent methods of silencing expressions of opinion hostile to the government and the war, than had been officially enforced in any earlier crisis. It was the irony of fate that Lincoln, who as a congressman had been the keen critic of the Mexican War, should have been the enforcer of measures to silence expressions of dissent regarding the Civil War. In fact, the homely, ungainly figure and simple, open demeanor of Lincoln, so remote from the popular idea of a tyrant, helped to cloak his arbitrary acts. As far as the government policy was formally announced, it was couched in the executive proclamation of September 24, 1862. This set forth as offenses

Federal repression of criticism

the discouragement of enlistment and the giving aid and comfort to rebels, and indicated the method of punishing them before courts-martial, under suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

Congress authorized the President to suspend by executive act the writ of habeas corpus; it required, however, that names of all persons arrested by military authority be furnished to the federal judges, and that all prisoners be set at liberty if not indicted within a specific period. In practice, this provision was ignored. Theoretically, this act would have superseded the proclamation of September 24; actually, before and after act and proclamation, persons were arrested by thousands by executive or military order, held prisoners under military authority, and refused writs of habeas corpus.

Suspension of Habeas Corpus

The most notorious cases occurred under General Burnside, commanding the Department of the Ohio. Vallandigham, a congressman and a rabid opponent of the war, denounced it and the government in a political speech in Ohio. He was arrested by soldiers on May 5, 1863, tried by a military commission, and sentenced to imprisonment. His sentence was commuted by Lincoln to deportation through the confederate lines. As a shining victim of arbitrary power, he was regarded as a martyr, and in 1863 on the strength of his sufferings ran for governor of Ohio *in absentia*. Lincoln's better judgment had doubted the expediency of the procedure against Vallandigham; but rather than disavow Burnside, he had mitigated the sentence and then defended it with all his political cleverness. When, however, on June 3, 1863, Burnside, using military force, stopped the publication of the *Chicago Times*, Lincoln saw that his general had gone too far, and hastened to rescind the order.

Vallandigham: suppression of the "Times"

The fall elections of 1862 ran against the administration. For this, a series of causes may be assigned: the usual two-year reaction against any administration, dissatisfaction with the war and its conduct, with the Emancipation Proclamation, with the policy of arbitrary arrests. The administration lost the States of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin, in elections for congressmen

Republican reverses 1862

and governors or state legislatures. The New England congressmen and the aggressive Unionists who were elected from the border States controlled by the federal armies preserved the administration majority; they even made its tone more uncompromising inasmuch as the Republican members who had been defeated came from close districts in which moderation was necessary to success. In New York, Horatio Seymour, the victorious Democratic governor, yielded the administration a qualified support. In Indiana and Illinois, Democratic legislatures made overtures toward negotiations with the South and were suspected of even more serious designs. In slackened enlistments and loan subscriptions, in clashes between union and confederate sympathizers, which in Indiana and Illinois bordered on guerilla warfare, in wild plots for the release of confederate prisoners of war, and for the firing of northern cities, more extreme hostility to the administration appeared.

Northern wartime finance

The equipment and financing of the fighting forces was a huge task, but, for the North, by no means impossible. As to the actual procurement and distribution of materials required by army and navy, the waxing manufactures of the North, supplemented by the markets of Europe, offered all that was needed. Occasionally, greater wisdom might have been asked in such details as the procurement of breech-loading rifles in quantity; equipment was often shoddy; but, generally speaking, the armies of the North were well supplied. The procuring of funds naturally fell on Chase, the secretary of the treasury. It is easy to point out mistakes in his financing; but the wonder is that the huge sums used ever were raised at all.

War finance: its principles

A nation at war must decide in what proportions it will divide the cost between present and future generations. It may elect to make a heavy levy on the generation that is profiting from boom times, high prices, and quick sales—the fruit of the extraordinary demands of war on industry. Its financing must then be by short-time loans made to anticipate the yield from heavy taxes. Or it may lay the load on the shoulders of future generations by long-term

bond issues, and by systems of paper money. All war finance is an application in varying proportion of these two principles.

Of course, the sums needed for carrying on the war far transcended the first estimates of July, 1861. At that time, it will be remembered, Congress had placed its main reliance on an authorized loan of $250,000,000. This had been placed in installments with the bankers of the country; it was hoped that the government by paying out for supplies the specie received from the first installments would enable the bankers to accumulate specie for succeeding ones. But Chase was unreasonable in his demands, and the frail system broke down in a suspension of specie payments on December 28, 1861. The government was confronted by a deficit of $143,000,000, and a debt of $267,000,000 in bonds and short-term notes.

Suspension of specie payments

Congress now took a hand in prescribing a financial remedy that had far-reaching results. Against Chase's better judgment, it authorized, by act of February 25, 1862, the issue of $150,000,000 in legal tender notes—later famous as the "Greenbacks." No present provision was made for their redemption; the government simply passed out to its creditors promises to pay, and by a legal tender provision, allowed them in turn to force the promises on their creditors. The procedure was of very doubtful constitutionality since the Constitution grants to Congress only the power "To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin,—" and could scarcely be justified by anything but the war powers.

Legal tender

One issue of irredeemable paper always calls for another, for when paper appears specie takes to hiding, or goes to a premium, and additional currency to replace it must be provided. On July 11, 1862, Congress authorized $150,000,000 more in greenbacks; and on January 17, 1863, $100,000,000 additional. At the peak, however, there were some $447,000,000 of the notes in circulation. They depreciated in value, while gold sold at a premium. An act of Congress to check depreciation had no results; a few days later (June–July, 1864) gold reached the point where $100 gold bought $285 in greenbacks. Not

The greenbacks

until the immediate prospect of redemption of the greenbacks in gold was at hand, in 1878, did the premium entirely disappear.

Fortunately, Congress showed greater wisdom in its other measures of finance. It increased taxation again and again; it passed an internal revenue act that included an income tax, July 1, 1862, and a new tariff, July 14. It authorized one bond issue after another. In February, 1862, it provided for $500,000,000 in the "five-twenties," redeemable after five years or payable in twenty, and yielding 6 per cent interest. Chase refused to sell these at less than par, and as the price of a bond is the result of an equation in which the factors are safety, the interest rate, and the length of time the investment can be counted on to run, he sold but a small portion of them, and had to use short-term notes to supply current needs. By December, 1862, the government was confronted with another financial crisis: debts and soldiers unpaid, short-term notes coming due, and a deficit of $418,000,000. Congress rose to the occasion and in the same session that witnessed the Draft Act, the National Banking Act, and the suspension of habeas corpus, it authorized the huge sum of $900,000,000 in bonds and other evidences of indebtedness. Chase had learned his lesson in finance. With the coöperation of the banker, Jay Cooke, loans were floated by the novel device of promoting the resale of bonds among people of small means, hitherto unused to investment in securities. By 1865, the bonded debt of the government had reached the then appalling sum of two billion, eight hundred and forty-four millions.

War taxes and war loans

To provide a market for bonds in 1863 Congress had passed a far-reaching measure, the National Bank Act. As early as 1838, New York had passed a general banking act by which any group of persons complying with the law could establish a bank, and issue bank notes secured by state bonds deposited with a state official. Other States had copied the act. The Civil War, by depreciating southern state bonds, had wrecked the system in several States. There was a further weakness in the system, that, while under ordinary circumstances it provided ultimate security, it included no provision for immediate redemp-

National Bank Act

tion of notes to protect them against temporary depreciation. In 1863, Congress passed an act allowing the establishment of national banks on similar lines, with notes secured by government bonds, and elaborate provisions for cash reserves. Few were organized and a supplementary act to remedy defects was passed in 1864. Finally, by an act going into effect in 1866, putting a 10 per cent tax on state bank notes, all but the national banks were forced out of the field of note issue.

The raising of men for the war was an even more serious business than the raising of money. At the outset, volunteers of the finest type flowed in. Men with the spirit of adventure, men with a fine moral purpose and sense of duty, men of fine intellect, filled the ranks of the federal armies. Many fell in battle; many stayed in the ranks who should have been used as officer material in place of the indifferent stuff that was too prevalent in later years of the war. Volunteering was generally by companies and regiments; men of local influence sufficient to raise a regiment assumed the higher commissions in it; the privates elected their own company officers. Natural leaders were selected in this way, and if they had the mental alertness to put their leadership to account in the new game of war, they made good officers. If they were unfitted by some mental trait for military command, until they were weeded out, their men suffered.

The volunteers

As volunteering failed to bring men fast enough, bounties were tried; federal, state, and local bounties sometimes totaled well above $1000 a man. March 3, 1863, a Conscription Act was passed providing for the enrollment by districts, of men from twenty to forty-five and the drawing by lot of a quota in each district. There were exemptions for the physically unfit and for high public officials, for men who were the sole support of dependent families, and for criminals; an unfortunate provision was added that a man might be exempted on finding a substitute or on paying $300. The execution of the draft by federal officers, and the section allowing the rich to buy their way out, caused dissatisfaction and some resistance. In July, 1863, a riot broke out in New York City which left it for days in the hands of a

Conscription

lawless mob, robbing, plundering, burning, and venting their hatred on negroes as the cause of the war. The Conscription Act served as an incentive to volunteering and to the offering of bounties by local authorities. Otherwise, it was of no great importance in securing men for the army.

Brokers and bounty-jumpers

The system of bounties and the draft act produced certain unsavory types, the substitute broker, who bought up substitutes for drafted men where he could, and the bounty-jumper. The substitute broker carried his searches for men so far that certain States passed acts prohibiting the operation of such brokers within their limits. The bounty-jumper offered himself as a substitute, or enlisted for bounty, and then promptly deserted to reënlist again. There is a record of one individual having been caught after "bounty-jumping" thirty-two times.

Mistakes of military organization

In the last years of the war, all these things reduced the efficiency of the union army. Desertions were common, and the men brought in by bounties or the draft were not the enthusiastic boys of 1861. The system of organizing new companies and regiments instead of filling the depleted ranks of the old was unfortunate. The veterans would have instilled their own morale and *esprit de corps* in replacements who would have learned the game of war quickly by example and precept, instead of going into action in raw units and paying for their instruction in blood. Giving to men of local prominence commissions in the new units they had raised, appeared to be an excellent way to provide troops; but it sent raw officers into battle, commanding raw recruits. The multiplication of regiments, brigades, divisions, corps, and armies with comparatively small numbers in the units, unnecessarily complicated the handling of men in battle.

In their difficulties and their divisions of counsel and purpose northern generals and statesmen were prone to exaggerate the unity, skill, and resources of their opponents. As far as the morale of the Confederacy is concerned, historical students have tended to perpetuate the error. As to material resources, the South was

badly off from the first; her manufactures and railroads were completely inadequate to supply armies so great as those she was forced to put in the field. They were even inadequate to supply her civilian population with comforts and necessaries. As the northern blockade grew more and more efficient, it necessarily hindered the importation of munitions of war and supplies. Actually, it did prevent the exportation of cotton to pay for them. While cotton piled up in southern warehouses, southern statesmen vainly hoped to induce England or France to supply their idle mills by raising the blockade, or by permitting the building of rams by which the Confederates could raise it themselves. To a certain degree, the Confederacy improvised manufactures of cannon and powder. By 1865, the Confederacy's supply officers professed to believe that the development of her manufactures had rendered her independent of foreign supply; fortunately for them, their faith was not tested in practice.

Difficulties of the South: the blockade

It is strange that the South, with the negro labor in its plantations, failed to supply food in abundance to its armies and its civil population. This was due to inefficient railroad communication from section to section, and to an inefficient quartermaster service, about which southern generals vainly protested to Davis. The South raised its revenues partly by produce loans. The first of them was floated August 19, 1861, for $100,000,000, cotton and other produce being taken in payment. Beyond this, with from first to last only a few tens of millions of specie, the southern government relied on floods of paper money, which depreciated to ridiculous rates of discount, commodities losing their ordinary value relations to each other in fabulous paper prices apparently regulated by pure caprice.

Defects of southern transport: confederate currency

In the Confederacy, the central government subordinated all else to the military conduct of the war. No constructive measures came from the confederate Congress; department secretaries usually become mere puppets, while the two strong personalities of Davis and Judah P. Benjamin reached out

Davis and Benjamin

over the heads of subordinates to direct every phase of the government's activity. Benjamin, adroit and able mentally, played the Confederacy's hand for all it was worth, and when it was lost, went to England to achieve a brilliant career in the law. Davis, himself a West Pointer and soldier, guided the military destinies of the Confederacy strongly if imperfectly. He was a man of strong likes and dislikes; Beauregard and Joseph E. Johnston never had his confidence; Braxton Bragg, Hood, and Pemberton, his favorites, retained it long after their commands had lost faith in them. Such failings contrasted sharply with the complete freedom from all personal prejudices and selfish ends that marked Lincoln's dealings with his generals.

Davis' high-handed rule naturally provoked criticism. By the end of the war the governors of North Carolina and Georgia, Vance and Brown, were openly defiant. Judges of these sections used the habeas corpus to release drafted men. The population of the mountain country was strongly unionist in sympathy. The Conscription Act of the Confederacy, far-reaching and drastic, was passed in 1862, a year before that of the federal government. It called out a much larger percentage of the population than that of the North; but by desertions, forged exemptions, or open defiance, it was widely evaded. Even so, considering how much the Confederacy was the fruit of upper-class interests, the support which it drew from the lower classes is amazing. By a strange paradox, as the supply of white men decreased, the South was compelled to consider the use of negro troops. Some are said to have been used as early as 1862. In 1865, they appeared to be the sole remaining resource of Lee's army and only the collapse of the Confederacy prevented their employment.

Southern disaffection

II

In the east, in the spring of 1863, Hooker, with a reorganized army far superior in numbers to Lee's, opened his campaign with success. By April 30, four of his corps had crossed the Rappahannock and on May 1 had taken their position outside the so-called "Wilderness," a tangle of second growth and

Chancellorsville

underbrush in the neighborhood of Chancellorsville. Then by an excess of caution quite out of character, Hooker withdrew his advancing forces within the Wilderness and took up a defensive position. Stonewall Jackson now executed the last and greatest of his outflanking attacks. From early in the morning of May 2, his columns swung westward. The federal generals fatuously believed the movement a retreat until in the early evening he fell furiously on the right flank of Hooker's army. The rout of the Eleventh Corps was too well paid for in the loss of Jackson, mortally wounded by mistake by his own men. The next day Lee in full force attacked all along the line. Hooker resisted feebly, his troops were driven from the field and, though much superior in numbers, recrossed the Rappahannock.

Lee may be pardoned for having thought the game sufficiently in his own hand to warrant an offensive into northern territory. He hoped that a battle won on northern soil would force the federal government to concede southern independence. His columns headed to the northwest, swinging into Maryland and Pennsylvania, his extreme advance penetrating as far east as Harrisburg, whose immediate capture was averted by the destruction of the Pennsylvania Railroad bridge across the Susquehanna. Meanwhile, Hooker had been following along an interior line to protect Washington and Baltimore from attack. A dispute with the War Department over the disposition of the Harper's Ferry garrison led to his resignation of command on June 27, to be succeeded by General George G. Meade, a steady, conscientious officer who felt the full burden of his responsibility. Four days later, in the maze of federal and confederate columns operating in Pennsylvania, a confederate force moving southwest clashed with Buford and Reynolds at Gettysburg. To this nucleus rushed all the atoms of either side for what might be the decisive struggle of the war.

Lee invades Pennsylvania

On the first day at Gettysburg, the outnumbered federal forces were pushed back to a defensive position, shaped like a fishhook, based on Cemetery Ridge. In furious assaults on the two flanks of the position on July 2, Lee made further but not

decisive gains. For the third day, Longstreet urged a flanking movement on the federal left, but Lee preferred a direct charge on the federal center. The battle of July 3 began with a furious artillery duel. The federal batteries ceased fire to husband ammunition; the confederate leaders hoped they were silenced and launched Pickett's assaulting columns of 15,000 men. Torn by the federal barrage and musketry, they melted away in the federal lines, and left the battle of Gettysburg a confederate reverse. Meade bitterly disappointed Lincoln by allowing Lee to escape unharried to Virginia; but events in the west, in the same days, had given an entirely different aspect to the situation.

Gettysburg

At Vicksburg, the natural fortress that blocked the Mississippi River to advance from the north, the union generals had been fumbling ever since the spring of 1862. The terrain made assault supremely difficult. On the east bank, opposite a hairpin bend in the river, the city sat on its high bluffs which the union forces had tried in vain to assault from the marshy bottom lands of the Yazoo. To use the bluffs as a line of approach from the northeast, a long and dangerous line of communication independent of the river would have to be built up. Across the river to the west, was low land cut by intricate bayous and channels through which vain attempts had been made to dig canals that might serve as routes of supply for an army operating to the south.

Vicksburg: its situation and importance

In April of 1863, Grant made a supreme attempt at the defiant confederate fortress by a plan of campaign that was desperate. He moved his army overland on the Louisiana side to a point well below Vicksburg, while on the nights of April 16 and 22 the gunboats and store-ships ran the batteries of the fortress to join him. Using them to set his army across the river and supply his immediate needs, he cut loose from all communications and plunged into the country to the northeast to seek his opponent in a campaign that, for concept and execution, Napoleon might have envied.

Grant's plan

Of the confederate generals, Pemberton, a Pennsylvanian and a favorite of Davis, lay at Vicksburg with 40,000 men. Joseph E.

Johnston, with 15,000, was at Jackson, Mississippi, forty miles to the east. With 43,000, Grant lunged northeast from Port Gibson, beating Johnston's forces at Raymond, May 12, and at Jackson, May 15. Pemberton, meanwhile, had moved uncertainly to the south to cut the communications that Grant had abandoned. Moving north again in the hope of uniting with Johnston at Clinton, he met Grant, who, after Jackson, had turned his columns sharply to the west. At Champion's Hill on May 16, and at Big Black River on the 17th, Grant struck Pemberton, driving him within the fortifications of Vicksburg.

The Vicksburg campaign

At last the federal forces had attained their coveted position on the high land east of the town. It was now simple to reopen communication with the north by the Mississippi River. Supplies and reënforcements poured in, adequate to enable Grant to fend off Johnston with one hand, while the grasp of the other tightened on Pemberton in Vicksburg. Checked in two assaults on the town May 19 and 22, Grant opened a regular siege and investment, ended by the capitulation of Pemberton on July 4. As a result four days later, Port Hudson, 125 miles due south, surrendered to General Banks who had moved up from New Orleans. From source to mouth, the Mississippi was now in federal hands. Union patrol ships rendered communication between east and west banks difficult or impossible. The route to Europe by way of Texas and Mexico was closed and the Confederacy was cut in two.

The Mississippi in federal control

Once more in 1863, the figure of the conqueror of Vicksburg was to catch the popular imagination, appearing seemingly at the psychological moment to turn defeat into victory in the Chattanooga campaign. In the late summer of 1863 Rosecrans and Burnside were pushing into East Tennessee, again in pursuit of Lincoln's dream of the liberation of the unionist mountaineers. Burnside had penetrated to Knoxville, and Rosecrans to Chattanooga on the eastward course of the Tennessee. Moving forward from this point, Rosecrans was attacked September 19–20 at Chickamauga by Bragg. A blundering order of Rosecrans,

Chickamauga

too literally obeyed, left a gap through which the Confederates plunged to sweep from the field the federal right and center. The left wing, under George H. Thomas, the "Rock of Chickamauga," stood its ground in the storm; but retreat to Chattanooga was inevitable. With one poor wagon road to the north still open, but with the river blocked, the federal forces were loosely besieged.

Chattanooga

Hooker, from the Army of the Potomac, Sherman, from the armies of the west, brought reënforcements. Grant was placed in supreme command. His first step was to carry out a scheme already devised to clear the roads south of the river. Then on November 24–25, western and eastern troops, vying with each other, and, in the enthusiasm of the charge, disregarding orders to halt, hurled the Confederates off Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. Bragg, defeated, was swept back into Georgia. Sherman was sent to raise the siege of Knoxville, where Longstreet, detached from Bragg's army, had been pressing Burnside. In general, with victory for the union armies and with bright prospects for the next year, the campaigns of 1863 closed. Save in New Jersey, the elections had reflected the optimistic union sentiment and supported the government.

The campaigns of 1864

For the campaign of 1864, Grant with the rank of lieutenant general was given supreme command of the union armies, though he elected to direct the operations of the Army of the Potomac still nominally under the command of Meade. In the west, William T. Sherman, the skillful lieutenant of Grant at Vicksburg and Chattanooga, was placed in command of a force including the Armies of the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio, confronting the Confederates now under Joseph E. Johnston at Dalton.

Sherman and J. E. Johnston

Sherman began the campaign on May 6, with some 100,000 men against 75,000. For two months he worked his way southwestward toward Atlanta, flanking or maneuvering Johnston out of one intrenched position after another. He gained Dalton on May 12, and fought a battle at Resaca on May 15. At Cassville, May 19, Johnston had hoped to take the offensive, but his corps commanders, usually critical of his

Fabian policy, disapproved. The retreat continued, Johnston being outflanked again at Allatoona. For more than two weeks, Sherman tried direct attacks, flank movements, and trench warfare, before he compelled Johnston to evacuate his strongly intrenched lines at Lost and Kenesaw Mountains.

By July 9, Johnston was maneuvering before Atlanta, his army intact, with high morale, his opponent compelled to expose a long line of communication difficult to guard beyond Chattanooga. Johnston, unfortunately, had not the confidence of Davis and his adviser, Bragg; Hood, one of his corps commanders, a favorite of Davis, had been critical. When Johnston wisely refused to tie his maneuvers to the defense of Atlanta and give unconditional assurances that he would hold it, he was removed from command, July 17; Hood was put in his place. Too late, Hood was to recognize the difference between criticism and performance. Now he lashed out at Sherman's encircling coils in the combats of Peach Tree Creek on July 20, Atlanta, on July 22, Ezra Church, on July 28. Though victorious in each of them, Sherman was, however, at a standstill.

Hood supersedes Johnston

Results in the east had been worse for the Union. May 3, Grant had crossed the Rapidan and plunged into the Wilderness. Here, with half his enemy's force, Lee attacked hotly and was counterattacked in turn. May 7, Grant moved by the left to Spottsylvania Court House to outflank Lee. His opponent forestalled the maneuver and Grant's attack failed with heavy loss. In a series of maneuvers on the North Anna River, he gained no advantage. On June 3, shifting by the flank again, he flung his forces, stoically conscious that they were going to certain death, against the confederate lines at Cold Harbor. In a month's fighting he had inflicted heavy losses on Lee, but had suffered far more heavily, 55,000 casualties among troops as irreplaceable in quality as Lee's were in numbers. The policy of spending your own men to kill off the enemy's is a gloomy one for army and nation. When, after Cold Harbor, Grant shifted his army south of the James, confronting Lee again intrenched at Petersburg, it was evident that no strategic gain whatsoever had

The Wilderness campaign

ensued from a bloody campaign. Lee was so far from worsted that he could send Early down the Shenandoah in a raid that, July 11, brought him to the suburbs of Washington, and enabled him, July 30, to place Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, under contribution. With reason, Davis could argue that the Confederacy had the better of the military situation.

All this had its effect on the presidential campaign. To begin with, there was dissatisfaction with Lincoln among the Republican leaders of the more radical cast. Salmon P. Chase since the fall of 1863 had been in a receptive mood as to the presidential nomination, and he found favor with the radical leaders. Upon discovering that he could not control the Ohio delegation in the Republican Convention, he withdrew from the contest. June 29, he resigned as secretary of the treasury, Lincoln appointing Senator W. P. Fessenden of Maine to succeed him, and placing Chase himself in the chair of the deceased Chief Justice Taney.

Republican presidential aspirants

However, a malcontent following of radical Republicans met at Cleveland May 31 and nominated Frémont for the presidency. A week later a party convention, that, under the name of "Union," included Republican and Democratic elements, unanimously nominated Lincoln. In deference to the border States, Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, replaced Hamlin as the candidate for vice president. Horace Greeley of the *Tribune*, with influence out of all proportion to his steadiness of judgment, now followed a line of action that suggested conformity to the waves of popular emotion rather than any consistent statesmanship. He had urged Lincoln to open negotiations for peace with the Confederates and was adroitly maneuvered into the discovery that Davis, in view of the military situation, would consider no terms but independence. Then he jumped to the conclusion that Lincoln, as a moderate, had no chance of election and that an out-and-out radical should be run in his place. Meeting on August 29, the Democrats nominated McClellan, unfortunately adopting a platform plank that declared the war a failure. Lincoln had almost given up hope of his reëlection and privately noted his inten-

The canvass of 1864

tion of coöperating with McClellan to save the Union before he took office, inasmuch as afterward, bound by the Democratic platform, McClellan could do nothing but end the war on southern terms.

But military success reversed the situation. Five days after the Democratic Convention had voted the war a failure, Sherman captured Atlanta; with the fleet Farragut had already captured Mobile Bay. In September and October, Sheridan, in command of the federal forces in the Shenandoah, defeated Early at Opequon Creek, Fisher's Hill, and Cedar Creek, the last battle turned from defeat to victory by Sheridan's famous ride; the poem celebrating it did full service in the political campaign. The union politicians centered their attack on the fatal declaration of the Democratic platform that the war was a failure, to which Sherman and Sheridan were at last piling up disproofs. The disaffected masses of Republican voters were pushed back in line; the Germans in the central States were won back by Gustavus Koerner. Frémont withdrew his candidacy in return for the removal of Montgomery Blair from the cabinet. The Republicans swept the North, 212 votes to 21; Congress was to be strongly Republican.

Federal victories; Lincoln reëlected

The tide of military success flowed on. Grant's constant pounding at Lee kept him from detaching troops to other theaters of war where decisive results were being obtained. This was especially true of Sherman's campaign. After taking Atlanta in September, Sherman might have compared himself to Napoleon at Moscow—in an enemy city far from his own base, with an enemy army preparing to operate on his line of communications. Sherman it was, however, who was to will the destruction of Atlanta as a source of confederate supply. The threat to his communication caused him to meditate a plan made possible by the seacoast and the union navy 250 miles away—to break his own line of communications and head for the sea. Leaving Thomas with a force to watch Hood, Sherman, with 62,000, left Atlanta November 16, devastating the territory his columns covered. The march through Georgia was unmarred by violence to man or woman, but it swept the country of supplies, destroying

The march to the sea

everything that might be of use to the confederate army, a policy already practiced by Sheridan in the Shenandoah. Sherman reached Savannah in time to present the city and its stores of cotton as a Christmas gift to the nation.

Meanwhile, Hood had taken the offensive against Thomas' force, inferior in trained soldiers if not in numbers. He followed Thomas' retreat, to be checked at Franklin in a savage rearguard action. At Nashville, Thomas drew in outlying forces, and made his preparations deliberately; at last on December 15, with twice Hood's numbers, he fell on him and beat him to pieces in the battle of Nashville.

Nashville

After Savannah, Sherman turned his columns northward, devastating the country he traversed, with especial zest in South Carolina, the cradle of secession. Finally, in April, 1865, his army united with federal forces operating inland from Cape Fear River. By that time the war had practically ended. The reverses of the fall and winter of 1864–1865 had made the civilians of the Confederacy despondent of the issue. Pessimism of mothers, sisters, and sweethearts weakened the morale of the fighting forces. In the actual military situation of 1865, the confederate government might possibly have held out until the war-weary North offered terms; but by the spring of 1865, the "will to victory" of its soldiers was gone.

Collapse of the Confederacy

At Richmond, where Grant had been exhausting Lee's army all winter, decisive operations began at the end of March. Lee had at last concluded that it was no longer possible to hold Grant off at Richmond and planned to escape to North Carolina to unite with forces commanded by Johnston, in front of Sherman. His first blow at Fort Stedman, south of Petersburg, was unsuccessful. On April 1, Sheridan at Five Forks, to the southwest of Petersburg, gained a decided advantage; on the 2d, a general assault carried Petersburg, and on the 3d, Lee evacuated Richmond, moving westward. Supplies failed to meet him at the point he had directed, Sheridan's cavalry headed him at Appomattox Court House, and on April 9, Lee surrendered his army to Grant on terms of capitulation.

Appomattox

Appomattox stood properly in popular imagination as the end of the war. There were great regions of the South yet untouched by the federal forces. The trans-Mississippi country, where in 1864 an expedition under Banks had failed, was almost intact. There were scattered confederate forces in many places, and the danger that they might break up into guerilla bands was present; but liberal terms from the union generals averted it. Sherman, indeed, was disavowed for granting political terms to Johnston, who surrendered April 26. On May 4, Dick Taylor surrendered all troops left in Mississippi and Alabama; May 26, Kirby Smith yielded the trans-Mississippi. Jefferson Davis, attempting flight with a small cavalry escort, was captured in Georgia.

Submission of the Confederacy

Appomattox was permanently marked by the soldierly courtesy of Grant to his defeated antagonist. In the respect of union and confederate veterans for each other was the best hope of the future; but a few days later a tragedy in Washington stirred the passion of revenge. For some time a conspiracy had been on foot against the lives of the leaders of the administration. In pursuance of it, on April 14, John Wilkes Booth assassinated Lincoln in his box at Ford's Theater; an attempt on the life of Seward at the same time was unsuccessful. The conspirators were hunted down. Booth was shot by pursuing cavalry in a burning barn. Other conspirators, tried by military commission, were condemned to death and executed. The North, even though some radical leaders believed the taking off of Lincoln a godsend because it removed a hindrance to the proper punishment of the South, was in no mood for mercy to his assassins.

The assassination of Lincoln

The world has long since recorded its estimate of Abraham Lincoln as one of the great men of all time. The story of the boy who, by integrity and ability, rose from the lowliest origin to the highest seat of power, and the report of the kindliness, sympathy, mercy, simplicity, and unselfishness of the great war president, removed by violence at the moment his mighty task was achieved, win the hearts of all races of the world and will win them in all future ages. By the time two

The apotheosis of Lincoln

thousand years have elapsed, the gaunt figure may become to the world like the seated Buddha, a symbol of the divine.

The true Lincoln

Before the apotheosis takes place, the historian must still record that Lincoln was a man and a statesman with shortcomings and foibles like other men. To him, Lincoln is a popular leader who, in sensing the drift of public opinion and in directing it, excelled all men in his day; a man who, in the midst of a savage civil war, kept himself mercifully free of vindictiveness, who hated the sins of rebellion and slaveholding without hating the sinners. A civilian, accustomed to the ways of the peace-time politician, whom fate compelled to study the art of war, he sought early and late for leaders for his armies, never letting self-interest or personal predilection blind him to merit or defect. He appears as the man who was able to nerve the will of the nation to a long and apparently hopeless struggle until out of repeated failure came success. He appears, finally, as the advocate of a policy of early reconciliation with the South, a policy in which he had differed with the leaders of Congress, a policy in which his successor ignominiously failed. The acceptance of his plan of reconstruction, could he have lived to bring it about, would have been the greatest triumph of his career.

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

J. K. Hosmer, *The Appeal to Arms* (*American Nation*, vol. XX). New York, 1907.
——, *Outcome of the Civil War* (*American Nation*, vol. XXI). New York, 1907.
F. L. Paxson, *The Civil War*. London, 1911.
Sir F. B. Maurice, *Robert E. Lee, the Soldier*. Boston, 1925.
E. D. Fite, *Social and Industrial Conditions in the North during the Civil War*. New York, 1910.
J. C. Schwab, *The Confederate States of America, 1861–1865*. New York, 1904.
H. Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams: An Autobiography*. New York, 1918.
C. F. Adams, Jr., *Studies Military and Diplomatic, 1775–1865*. New York, 1911.
E. D. Adams, *Great Britain and the American Civil War*. 2 vols. London, 1925.
J. G. Randall, *Constitutional Problems under Lincoln*. New York, 1926.
E. Channing, *A History of the United States*, vol. VI. New York, 1925.
J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, vols. III–V. New York, 1895–1904.
F. L. Paxson, *History of the American Frontier, 1763–1893*. Boston, 1924.
J. W. Burgess, *The Middle Period*. New York, 1897.
——, *The Civil War and the Constitution, 1859–1865*. 2 vols. New York, 1901.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865–1877

In a sense, the theoretical problem of reconstruction inevitably turns upon the theory of the war that one employs. Admit the southern view that the States under a constitutional right of secession, had actually seceded from the Union, and the advocate of state sovereignty must admit further that they had been conquered in war and as conquered provinces, had to look to the conqueror for the definition of their political status; they might even be held in subjection to the victorious North. Admit on the other hand, that the Union was an indestructible union of indestructible States, that the southern state governments had been overturned in 1861 by a military conspiracy which it had taken four years of fighting to suppress, and it necessarily followed that once the conspiracy was broken and there was no chance of its resurrection, the States regained all their rights in the Union. In the solution of the question, theory actually became the mere handmaid of political expediency, burdened with the task of justifying its acts. There was a program of abolition to be put into full effect in the South; there was the Republican party—still a sectional party as in 1856, 1860, and 1864—determined to establish itself in southern States; there were senatorial courtesy and congressional pride to take umbrage at attempts by the president to ignore them in reconstruction. Actually, all these things produced the policy of reconstruction finally evolved. And Congress, jealously contending with Lincoln over a policy, finally pushed his successor aside and made a program of its own, with results that were permanently regrettable.

The question of reconstruction

However absolute on a superficial view was the power in reconstruction bestowed on Congress by the victorious northern armies, a statesman must have recognized two fundamental practical limitations to it. First, an economic reconstruction must pre-

cede and accompany the political one. Capital must be found to repair the devastation of cotton warehouse, factory, and railroad. Negro labor must be utilized on the basis of personal freedom, a solution that previously had seemed impossible. The negro's new position in society and his old master's as well must be adjusted. The account of the South with northern capital must be liquidated and means found to start her on the new path. The South, in short, must make her adjustment to the economic world of the nineteenth century and in this, sooner or later, the ablest minds of the South must be allowed to coöperate. Second, more fundamental still, unless the South was to remain an economic and political abscess on the Union, a source of danger in peace and war, the southern whites must be admitted to a political voice in the solution of the problem.

Problems of reconstruction

The story of the economic reconstruction of the South must be told elsewhere except in so far as it concerns political reconstruction. The story of political reconstruction begins with the war itself, and the existence of loyal communities within the bounds of seceding States. That the loyal inhabitants of western Virginia should be deprived of state government and representation in Congress seemed most unfair; senators and congressmen from "Virginia" sat in Congress, and a state government under Governor Pierpoint gave formal assent to the division of the State of Virginia and the establishment, in 1863, of a new State called West Virginia. The Pierpoint government, a mere shadow once West Virginia was parted from it, remained at Alexandria, electing representatives to Congress whom Congress at length refused to receive, and being snubbed by the adjacent military commander, General Butler.

The loyal governments

In Tennessee, North Carolina, and Louisiana, States where federal armies had gained a foothold, Lincoln followed a policy looking to the speedy reëstablishment of loyal state governments. In all these, in 1862, military governors were first established as nuclei for loyal sentiment. In a proclamation of December 8, 1863, Lincoln announced definite terms of reconstruction. When one-tenth of the citizens

Lincoln's plan of reconstruction

of any State, save Virginia, would take an oath of loyalty to the Union, they might organize a civil government. In Tennessee, Louisiana, and Arkansas, conventions were accordingly held, and governments set up, but Congress by refusing seats to their representatives indicated its opinion that it, too, was entitled to a voice in the matter.

In the session of 1863–1864, Congress advanced its own counter-proposals of reconstruction in the Wade-Davis bill—not a tenth, but a majority of the whites in any State must take an oath of allegiance, before it could elect a constitutional convention to embody in its fundamental law provisions for the disenfranchisement of high confederate officials, the repudiation of all debts incurred for the confederate cause, and the abolition of slavery. The measure passed House and Senate, but on July 4, 1864, Lincoln pocketed it, alleging that Congress had no such power to abolish slavery as that which he enjoyed as commander-in-chief. Lincoln and Congress had not passed out of their dead-lock, when Booth's bullet ended Lincoln's career.

The Wade-Davis Bill

The radical leaders in Congress at first hoped that Andrew Johnson, a narrow, violent man who had forced his way up from the lowest ranks in life, and hated the southern aristocracy, would adopt, in reconstruction and otherwise, a policy more vigorously anti-southern than Lincoln's. Johnson at first gave promise of this; but soon under the guidance of moderates he gave over the scheme of avenging Lincoln's murder on the captive southern leaders, and initiated an extremely liberal reconstruction policy. He issued proclamations of amnesty excepting only the leaders of the Confederacy, men who had held federal offices or commissions, and men of wealth; he recognized existing governments in Virginia, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Arkansas, and proceeded to appoint provisional governors in the other States. He directed the formation of state conventions by those classes eligible to vote in 1860 who had taken necessary oaths; these conventions generally annulled secession ordinances and confederate debts, abolished slavery,

Andrew Johnson carries out Lincoln's policy

and provided for duly elected state governments which with one exception ratified the Thirteenth Amendment. By December, 1865, all the southern States except Texas had so reorganized. Would Congress accept the *fait accompli* and admit their representatives?

The abolition of slavery

Meanwhile, the complete abolition of slavery had come about. The Thirteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, abolishing slavery, introduced originally in the congressional session of 1863–1864, had failed of adoption by the necessary two-thirds of each house and had gone over as an issue in the campaign of 1864. It was passed by Congress early in 1865, and the assent to it of the reconstructed States insured its adoption on December 18, 1865. Slavery had now been abolished in the District of Columbia and the Territories on April 16 and June 19, 1862; in all the seceding States except Tennessee and parts of Virginia and Louisiana by Lincoln's definitive proclamation of January 1, 1863; in Maryland, Arkansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Missouri by state action in 1864–1865; and in Kentucky and Delaware by the Thirteenth Amendment itself.

Congress bars the southern representatives

The adoption of the amendment undoubtedly had its effect on the attitude of Congress toward the States reconstructed by Johnson. The Thirteenth Amendment would have given the southern States representation for all their negroes instead of for three-fifths of their slaves. That increase in representation should be the reward of rebellion seemed ridiculous, especially as no southern State had enfranchised the blacks, and some States had already adopted regulations limiting their testimony in the courts, their social rights, and their freedom of seeking employment. Some of the southern codes seemed calculated to substitute for slavery a system of peonage. Congress, therefore, refused to receive the southern senators and representatives, and set a joint committee of fifteen to consider at large the question of reconstruction.

The first result of congressional action was a bill extending the term of the Freedman's Bureau, an organization created in 1865,

for one year, to supervise throughout the South the economic, marital, and other relations of the freed blacks and to protect them from oppression. Johnson promptly challenged Congress by vetoing the extension bill; for the moment, the Senate failed to override the veto. He followed it by the veto, on March 27, 1866, of the civil rights bill, which was intended to protect the negroes by the interposition of federal officers and courts against oppression, but the act passed over his veto.

The Freedman's Bureau Bill

The joint committee of Congress on reconstruction now submitted its report in full. It claimed for Congress the full legislative power and the final word in reconstruction. For the present, its policy was summed up in the Fourteenth Amendment, to be passed by Congress and ratified by the States. The amendment, long and elaborate, protected the negro against any discrimination as to civil or social rights, adjusted southern apportionment to the classes that were accorded the franchise, disqualified from federal or state office those who had joined the Confederacy after taking an oath in any official capacity to the federal government, and canceled all confederate debts. It was passed by Congress June 13, 1866; a new Freedman's Bureau bill was now passed again over Johnson's veto.

The Fourteenth Amendment

Johnson's reconstruction policy had been based on the theory that the good intentions and sincere repentance of the masses of the southern people could be trusted, and that a union party would develop among them. The policy of the radicals in Congress was based on a contrary theory of suspicion; it intended in the Fourteenth Amendment to take the South's bond for future good behavior. It was based likewise on the party fear that the Republican party could never hope for a foothold in a South where the negro was disfranchised, and that northern and southern disloyalists might yet strike hands in the Democratic party to control the federal government. Between these two views, the moderates wavered; but the headstrong conduct of Johnson and his manifest determination to withstand Congress threw moderates and radicals together.

The radical policy of reconstruction

Both sides entered into the campaign of 1866 for the election of a new Congress. Johnson called into his cabinet three new members of recognized ability, Browning, Randall, and Stanbery, in place of three of Lincoln's later appointees who were retiring.

The election of 1866

These men, with Johnson, set about organizing a party north and south to carry out their views. A National Union Convention was held in Philadelphia; it was offset by another composed of the radical elements; each of the conventions had its work ratified by a soldiers' and sailors' convention and the congressional campaign began. Johnson's violence of speech and lack of dignity in his attacks on his opponents contributed to the overthrow of his cause; in the new Congress the radicals were assured of a majority.

In the session of the retiring Congress, 1866–1867, they again took up the work of reconstruction. They found that every southern State but Tennessee, which had been admitted to representation in Congress in July, 1866, had rejected the Fourteenth Amendment; and the moderates perforce had to follow the radicals in more extreme measures.

The reconstruction acts

By the Tenure of Office Act of March 2, 1867, they tied the president's hands by limiting his power of removal; by a clause inserted in the army appropriation act, they took away his power of issuing orders to the army otherwise than through Grant, its commanding general. Interference with Johnson's subordinates who should execute the will of Congress was thus prevented. The Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867, next swept away completely the civil governments set up by Johnson in 1865 and substituted military rule in ten States. Reorganization of civil government in them was to be conditioned only on limited rebel disfranchisement, full negro suffrage, and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Not until it had been adopted, could any reconstructed State be represented in Congress. By special act, the newly elected Congress was called to meet in special session March 4, 1867, and it passed the supplementary reconstruction acts, explaining and enlarging the provisions of the previous one. The whole procedure was in defiance of a Supreme Court decision—

Ex parte Milligan—that military rule can be employed only in an actual state of war.

Johnson, his vetoes overridden, his powers of appointment and administration limited by acts of Congress, stood by helplessly. He had inherited from Lincoln's cabinet Edwin M. Stanton, secretary of war, under whom lay the administration of the reconstruction acts. Stanton had favored the radical policy, acting meanwhile a part of duplicity in the meetings of the cabinet. On August 12, 1867, Johnson removed him, as the Tenure of Office Act permitted, subject to the approval of the Senate, and appointed Grant in his place. On January 13, 1868, the Senate adjudged Johnson's assigned reasons for the removal insufficient. Johnson had expected Grant to retain the office, so that the constitutional right of Congress to limit the executive power of removal could be referred to the courts; but Grant, under circumstances that suggested double-dealing on his part, promptly surrendered possession to Stanton. To try the issue once more, Johnson definitely removed Stanton on February 21, 1868; three days later, the House of Representatives moved the President's impeachment.

Johnson and Stanton

For over a year, the radical Republican leaders had been searching for a means of getting rid of Johnson. Nothing in his course hitherto would have fitted the Constitution's definition of impeachable offenses—"High crimes and misdemeanors." The seeming violation of the Tenure of Office Act in Stanton's removal might supply the needed cause for impeachment, but the constitutionality of the act was open to question and it was doubtful if the wording covered the case of a cabinet member appointed, like Stanton, in a preceding administration.

The impeachment of Johnson

To draw on their hesitant followers and secure the needed two-thirds in the Senate, the House leaders, notably Thaddeus Stevens, advanced the doctrine that even for ordinary acts of bad taste a president might be impeached; thus, impeachment did not necessarily affix a moral stigma, but was merely a way of insuring that the president hold office subject to the will of two-thirds of Congress. This interpretation of the Con-

The acquittal of Johnson

stitution was not to stand. Johnson was ably defended before the Senate, when it tried the impeachment. A very few moderate Republican senators were unwilling to stultify themselves by voting that Johnson's alleged violation of the Tenure of Office Act, and his vituperation of Congress in public speeches were grounds of impeachment. On the test articles, conviction failed by one vote; but more senators stood ready to vote against the articles if it were necessary. Johnson therefore remained president, beaten by Congress on his reconstruction policy, but not removed from office by it.

Meanwhile, the Congressional plan of reconstruction under the guidance of generals of the army and the protection of its troops, was going into effect in the former States of the Confederacy.

The operation of reconstruction

Under the reconstruction acts, the natural leaders of the South generally stood disfranchised for their participation in the Confederacy. Their places in leadership were taken by northerners of varying degrees of fortune who had settled in the South after the war; the South had, however, insisted on classing them all as "Carpetbaggers," the term insinuating that that article of luggage would have contained all their earthly possessions upon their arrival. They were supplemented by the "Scalawags," the term applied to southern men whose participation in the rebellion was not such as to disqualify them from an active part in reconstruction. In some States there were strong white unionist elements to support the program; but its backbone everywhere was the negro. Dazzled by his new political privileges, organized by Loyal Leagues or Union Leagues into a party following, taught that all his freedom came from the Republican party, and all his happiness depended on keeping it in power, the negro slipped for a time out of the guidance of his old masters, and pushed forward men of his own race to share leadership with Carpetbagger and Scalawag. The disfranchised whites worked with such organizations as the Knights of the White Camelia or the Ku Klux Klan to keep the negroes' new liberty from leading to a reign of violence, and, by playing on the physical or superstitious fears of the blacks, to recover domination over them.

The actual details of reconstruction varied from State to State. In all except Mississippi, constitutions framed by Carpetbagger, Scalawag, and negro were accepted by popular vote. In Alabama, the conservatives refrained from voting to prevent the constitution from having a majority, but Congress recognized it along with six others. Virginia and Texas did not complete their reconstruction until after 1868, but enough states were reconstructed to secure the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment on July 20, 1868, and to give the Republicans surety of the election of Grant to the presidency.

The new southern constitutions

Grant, the general who had ended the war, secure in the affections of his old soldiers, was the logical candidate for the radicals, who now stood distinct from the Union party of 1864, and once more assumed the name Republican. The Democrats had the task of seeking a candidate who could unite the discordant elements of opposition to the now solid Republican left. They were hampered by the question of the greenbacks, injected into the campaign by Pendleton. They had strong candidates available with records of unflinching support to the war—Johnson, Salmon P. Chase, and F. P. Blair, Jr., but they selected instead Horatio Seymour whose support as governor of New York had been given to the war with reservations to say the least. Aside from the currency question, which will be treated in a later chapter, the issues of the campaign necessarily arose from the reconstruction policy of Congress. The electoral vote of 214–80, by which Grant was elected, would seem an overwhelming indorsement of it, were it not that the votes which North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Alabama, and Arkansas cast for Grant were in themselves the fruit of that policy. Reconstructed though they were, Georgia and Louisiana cast their votes for Seymour.

The election of Grant

Grant carried into the presidency the imperturbable stolidity of character that had marked him on many a bloody field. Whether from motives of friendship he appointed insignificant men to high office or sought the society of gambling financiers and accepted rich presents from them, he never showed a trace of

concern when the proof of the unworthiness of his associates came to light. His personal integrity probably unstained, he stood unmoved in the midst of an age when gambling and speculation by the shiftiest of men of the business world corrupted the world of politics, when members of his cabinet accepted bribes, when frauds like the Whisky Ring touched his private secretary, when railway stocks and bonds were distributed among congressmen in return for favors conferred or expected. The moral deterioration which modern war seems to bring in its wake was in full tide in the administrations of the war-hero president. That corruption spread from Congress not merely to the States of the North, but also to those of the South, leading simple legislatures of negro and Scalawag into lavish bond grants to railways and lavish expenditures of public money, was natural; but southern critics have usually treated such results as due solely to the reconstruction policy.

Grant's administrations: corruption

The burden of corruption, however, fell with peculiar weight on the South. Devastated and exhausted by the war, it needed railways and manufactures to put it in touch with the newer industrial age. Under any circumstances, the southern States would have incurred heavy postwar debts; and there were many wasteful or fraudulent bond issues, which long since have, in effect, been repudiated. To such misdeeds the negro legislature of South Carolina, which wasted public money on expensive fittings for the State House to be carried to the homes of the members each session, and provided expensive solid and liquid refreshments for their consumption, lent a touch of the picturesque. Men with any political wisdom must have seen that the attempt to govern the South in the interests of the Republican party through the negro race was sure in the long run to end in failure. The demonstrated incompetence of the race and its chosen leaders in the years after 1868, accentuated by the difficult problems of those years, was sure, sooner or later, to necessitate a return of the southern governments to the old ruling class.

Misgovernment in the South

At first better things for the South were hoped of Grant; men thought the presage of them lay in the laconic sentence of his acceptance, "Let us have peace." Indeed, he persuaded Congress to permit Texas, Mississippi, and Virginia, still unreconstructed in 1868, to vote separately on the disfranchising clauses of their constitutions; these clauses were duly rejected by Mississippi and Virginia. As a preliminary to their reconstruction, however, these States were required to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment, definitely establishing negro suffrage. After Georgia, thrown back in the reconstruction process by the refusal of her legislature to admit negro members, had been reconstructed anew, the congressional plan of reconstruction by 1870 was fully executed.

The completion of reconstruction

At this point, other political issues of those years may be mentioned. Deferring questions of financial policy, those of foreign affairs stand next to reconstruction. The United States continued territorial expansion. Alaska was bought of Russia in 1867, partly to round out the continental possessions, partly in grateful recognition of Russia's support in the Civil War. The United States sought to buy of Denmark her islands in the West Indies, but has acquired them only in our own day. In 1870, the Senate failed to agree to a treaty which Grant had much at heart, for the annexation to the United States of the island republic of San Domingo. The revolt of Cuba against Spain led to filibustering expeditions; and the capture, in 1873, by a Spanish cruiser, of the *Virginius* and the execution of a part of her passengers and crew threatened to bring war with Spain, averted only by Spanish reparations and the discovery that the American register of the *Viginius* was fraudulent.

Foreign policy

With France and Great Britain, the United States had to settle the scores run up during the war. Seward had tolerated the presence of French troops in Mexico to sustain the government of the Emperor Maximilian. Once the war was over the demands of the United States for their immediate withdrawal could be enforced by her victorious armies, and were not to be denied. Maximilian fatuously remained after the troops of

France and Mexico

his patron Napoleon III had left, only to be captured and shot by the Mexican republicans.

Against England, the United States pressed demands for damages done by confederate cruisers fitted out in British ports. Less valid was the alleged grievance of the United States by the recognition of confederate belligerency. Senator Sumner's demand for "indirect damages," arising from the activity of the commerce destroyers, damages for the ruin of the American merchant marine and the prolongation of the war was also of doubtful equity. To such claims Great Britain would not listen; and only after the United States informally agreed not to press them, did she sign the Treaty of Washington, May 8, 1871, submitting to arbitration the questions of the northwest boundary and the *Alabama* claims. Arbitration of the latter awarded $15,500,000 damages against Great Britain for direct captures by the *Alabama*, *Florida*, and *Shenandoah*. The northwest boundary dispute was arbitrated by the German emperor, and questions at issue between the powers as to the fisheries were settled by a mixed commission.

The "Alabama" claims arbitrated

The postwar international course of the United States, distinguished by arbitrations in the interests of world peace, is a singular tribute to her moderation. France and England, in their foreign policy during the war, had calculated on the dismemberment of the United States into small struggling nations, or at any rate on her deposition for many years from the position of power to which she had risen by 1860. Her emergence from the struggle, welded into a powerful nation fully conscious of her strength, her ability demonstrated to enforce her national will from end to end of her bounds, her purposes furnished with mighty veteran armies and able generals, might well have been a terrible international portent. The theatrical emperor of France had felt it necessary to comply with her demands in Mexico with ludicrous promptness. England, thenceforth holding Canada by sufferance of the great republic, without an ally in Europe, might well be thankful that Grant had no aspirations for further military glory, and that so far as the American people knew or cared any-

America's foreign policy

thing about European affairs, they regarded the monarchical Old World with a condescending good will quite in the national character.

After 1870, reconstruction unwound itself as it must have done inevitably. By force, by playing on superstitious awe, by address, by appeal to the former slave's recognition of his old master's superiority, the confederate leaders, under the name of conservatives, were steadily advancing to recovery of their state governments in spite of one federal statute after another cast as barriers in their way. The Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, was intended to give to the United States courts jurisdiction in imposing penalties on individuals for infringements of the rights of others under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, in accord with state laws or constitutions; it further prescribed federal penalties for officeholding by Confederates disfranchised by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Ku Klux Act of April 20, 1871, allowed the suspension of habeas corpus and the use of military force to put down local disorders. An act of February 28, 1871, provided for federal supervision of congressional elections. Congress seemed bent on invading the whole field of government formerly allotted to the States. Northern men themselves might note with displeasure the effect of the acts of 1870–1871 and of the constitutional amendments on the right of northern communities to regulate their local concerns.

The undoing of reconstruction

Corruption under Grant, and the crude violence of congressional enforcement of reconstruction, produced the Liberal Republican movement of 1872. Originating in Missouri in the decision to accord full privileges of citizenship to former Confederates, it spread throughout the North as a movement for liberality to the South and for ability and honesty in government. With the Democrats seemingly prepared to indorse the Liberal Republican candidate, prospects of Grant's defeat seemed rosy. Unfortunately, the convention passed over liberals like David Davis or Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, and Charles Francis Adams of Massachusetts, to nomi-

The Liberal Republican movement; Grant's reelection

nate Horace Greeley, the colorful, flighty editor of the *New York Tribune*, Whig, Republican, and protectionist throughout his forty years' career. For the Democrats to support him was to stultify their record and to make defeat inevitable. Greeley carried only Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, Georgia, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Texas with 66 electoral votes out of 352.

Disorder in the South

In the South the next four years saw intolerable conditions bearing fruit in confusion, violence, and local civil war. The Republicans resorted desperately to "returning boards" and other electoral devices to throw out hostile majorities and shape election returns to their own will. The negroes pressed into more and more offices, ultimately finding their way even to the United States Senate. In Louisiana, in 1872–1873, there were two rival governments; the Republican or Kellogg régime was held in power only by the negroes and by United States troops. In Arkansas, in 1874, occurred the "Brooks and Baxter War" between rival governors, but here and in Texas, Grant refused to use the army.

The Supreme Court and reconstruction

In the direction of southern restoration were the decisions of the Supreme Court, timorously made, it is true. True, in Texas *vs.* White, 1869, Chase and the court virtually acquiesced in congressional reconstruction. But in the Slaughter House Cases of 1873, the court decided that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments did not extend national jurisdiction into new fields to protect individual initiative from interference by state or local governments, but were intended solely to prevent interference by the States with the newly acquired freedom of the negro. The Fourteenth Amendment has since been invoked time and again by citizens, falling in any particular category, as a protection against state legislation aimed at that special class; but the courts have not indorsed so broad an interpretation. Thus in 1875, the court decided that the Enforcement Act of 1870 was unconstitutional so far as it did not limit its range to cases where the right to vote was officially denied by state action.

Promise of victory in 1876 was held out to the Democrats by a

tidal sweep of the nation in 1874. The contest between Hayes and Wheeler, the Republican nominees, and Tilden and Hendricks, the Democrats, was sure to be close. In Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina, the southern States where the Republicans and the blacks still ruled, the struggle took the form of intimidation of negroes by the Democrats and manipulation of state election machinery by the Republicans. In South Carolina and parts of Louisiana, the election became almost a civil war; for the last time the federal troops were used to turn the scale.

The election of 1876

In the nation at large, the Democrats gained 184 undisputed electoral votes—New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Connecticut, West Virginia, Indiana, and all the South save the three radical States. The States undoubtedly Republican cast but 163 votes. On the night of the election, the Republican leaders resolved to claim the election and trust to winning their three southern States: California and Oregon, probably theirs, would then give in all 185 votes for Hayes to 184 for Tilden. As time developed the situation, it became clear that South Carolina was safely Republican. In Florida, the returning board manipulated a close vote to secure a like result, though from both States the Democrats forwarded contesting returns. In Louisiana, the Republican returning board had a considerable clear majority to overcome, which it coolly did. From this State, also, the Democrats filed contesting returns. In Oregon, a Republican elector was a postmaster and, as a federal officeholder, disqualified. The Democratic governor of the State attempted to recognize the highest Democratic candidate for elector in his place.

The contested election

The fear was widespread that the disputed election might provoke a civil war. The Constitution, prescribing that the votes cast by electors for president and vice president shall be opened and counted in Congress, is quite vague as to the specific individual who shall count; in a case where the election turned on the validity of any one of four contesting returns, his identity was of tremendous importance. Leaders of both parties finally compromised the question on the appointment of

The electoral commission

an electoral commission of five senators, five congressmen, and five justices of the Supreme Court, to which questions in dispute should be referred for final settlement. Originally, it had been planned that the commission include seven Republicans, seven Democrats, and Justice David Davis, independent in politics, who had the casting vote. But his election as senator from Illinois and consequent retirement from the bench, made it necessary to fill his place with a Republican justice, the only one available. Accordingly the commission consisted of eight Republicans and seven Democrats.

The seating of Hayes

Therefore, as Senate and House proceeded with the count of the electoral votes, the double returns in each case were sent to a partisan commission. To begin with it decided that it would not go behind the returns to canvass the results they represented, being concerned only with their official form. Florida, Louisiana, Oregon, and South Carolina, on the face of the returns, were successively assigned by the Commission to Hayes. The Democrats in Congress were furious and vainly endeavored to filibuster, to prevent a completion of the count. On the morning of March 2, the election of Hayes and Wheeler was formally announced.

The abandonment of the northern reconstruction policy

Already Democratic leaders, and Republicans who could speak as to Hayes' intentions, had come to a secret agreement. The Democrats acquiesced in Hayes' election, understanding his purpose to be to withdraw the federal troops that in Louisiana and South Carolina sustained the last of the radical governors against their Democratic opponents. The price for Hayes' inauguration, in a word, was the abandonment on the part of the federal government of further enforcement of the reconstruction schemes of 1867–1868.

And so the political fruits of the Civil War were finally reaped. Four years of war and twelve years of reconstruction had written in red across the text of the Constitution the interpretation that the United States was a nation; and the States, irrevocably bound in the Union, were infinitely nearer to being local administrative

areas than independent sovereigns. To the Constitution of the United States there had been definitely added in formal phrases the doctrines of abolition of slavery, of equal civil and social rights for the negroes, of negro suffrage. For eight years through the executive arm, the federal government had sought to enforce them. Now, recognizing them as pure limitations on the legislative capacity of the States, that government abandoned to the federal judiciary the barren task of checking state legislation that evidently contravened them. Against the acts of individuals, the negro must rely on the doubtful help of state courts.

The permanent results of the Civil War

In the movement which had dethroned the carpetbag governments, the negro in a degree had sought again the leadership of his old masters; and his complete disfranchisement came only in the future at the hands of the poor whites, politically self-conscious at last and jealous of the old plantation lords. By "grandfather clauses," vesting the suffrage in classes whose grandfathers could vote, by literacy tests that could be applied at the discretion of election officials, and by intimidation, the negro vote was made a nullity. In all parts of the South where the Republican party sought control by reconstruction, it has been relegated to the place of a permanent minority party; and the name of Democrat is a necessary preliminary to all political aspirations save those that may be satisfied by federal offices in the gift of Republican presidents.

The solid South

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

W. A. Dunning, *Reconstruction Political and Economic* (*American Nation*, vol. XXII). New York, 1907.
J. W. Burgess, *Reconstruction and the Constitution, 1866–1876*. New York, 1902.
F. L. Paxson, *The New Nation*. Boston, 1915.
E. P. Oberholtzer, *A History of the United States since the Civil War*, vols. I–III. New York, 1917–1926.
P. L. Haworth, *The United States in Our Own Times, 1865–1920*. New York, 1920.
L. B. Shippee, *Recent American History*. New York, 1924.
W. L. Fleming, *Documentary History of Reconstruction*. 2 vols. Cleveland, 1906—1907.
——, *The Sequel of Appomattox* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. XXXII). New Haven, 1919.

J. W. Garner, *Reconstruction in Mississippi.* New York, 1901.
C. W. Ramsdell, *Reconstruction in Texas.* New York, 1910.
D. M. Dewitt, *The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson.* New York, 1903.
C. E. Chadsey, *The Struggle between President Johnson and Congress over Reconstruction.* New York, 1896.
H. Thompson, *The New South* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. XLII). New Haven, 1919.
J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, vols. V–VII. New York, 1904–1906.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE NEW ORDER IN AMERICAN LIFE

"Railroad Trains, Side-Bar Buggies, Coal-Oil Lamps, and the Civil War had come along with a Rush and disarranged primitive conditions. The Frontier had retreated away over into Kansas." In a single sentence, an American humorist has epitomized an epoch. In the United States, a great middle class had discarded both the political and social leadership of its older aristocracy, had established fashions of life, thought, and ethics for itself and had imposed outward allegiance to these ideals on its new leaders. The Queen Anne or "jigsaw gothic" frame cottage, its parlor carpeted in rag rug or ingrain, a red table cover on the parlor table, a lurid kerosene lamp on the table cover, was the center around which American middle-class life revolved. Heating arrangements alternated between the open fireplace and the base-burner iron stove. The kitchen range was the tool of the housewife who baked her own bread in it, and from it conjured vast meals, from sausage and buckwheat cakes in the morning to apple pie in the evening, with which she wrecked the health of her "men folks." Plumbing and sanitation were still primitive. The zinc bathtub was just replacing the simpler movable tub that had done service on Saturday night since the late Middle Ages. Washing appliances were wash bowl, pitcher, and washstand, in each bedroom, gayly embroidered "splashers" protecting the wallpaper from spattering. The wooden bedstead was topped with a patchwork quilt of geometrical design, and the carpet on the floor was of woven rag.

The American middle class

Up and down from this norm, American life graded. The small upper class with finer acquired tastes stood quite aloof. But the man who gained sudden wealth by business acuteness or by discovering oil or coal under his farm, merely enlarged his old standards of living. His house was huge, of brick or stone; his furni-

ture elaborately carved walnut, his parlors littered with bric-a-brac. "Rogers groups" of sculpture, appealing to the domestic or patriotic emotions, replaced "Currier and Ives" colored prints in the work of adornment. Crayons of his family became genuine oil portraits; the horse and buggy of his earlier days became a series of ostentatious carriages and pairs. On the other hand, the pioneer in the sod hut, which on the treeless plains of the west had taken the place of the log cabin, the poorer southern white, even the free negro, aspired to the red table cover and the lamp as symbols of achievement. Quite outside the picture were the growing slums of the large cities, the backward districts of the South, and the thronging masses of emigrants, some of them, like the German, persisting in a racial cult of the earnest and the joyous. But the American phalanx drew its ranks close; from the sod cabin to the overornate mansion, a man must be religious denominationally, must owe a party allegiance to Republican or Democratic leader, and must reverence accepted standards of good morals.

Upper and lower strata of American life

Civilization was still, in its essential, that of the small town and the village. Even the larger cities were not sufficiently large to prevent many of the dwellers in them from being in close touch with rural life. Those who came to the cities from the farm or the village often revisited the rural life and the friends they had left. The theater, improving though it was in its higher forms, was still the perquisite of the small, cultured class. The rural district or small town "opera house" was visited by traveling companies; *Uncle Tom's Cabin* companies were so numerous that playing certain of its characters was a well-defined calling: in dramatic periodicals appeared advertisements for a "Tom," a "Legree" or a "Marks."

Rural survivals

Organized sport was slowly making its way into American life. The Civil War had spread a knowledge of baseball from end to end of the Union, and in the late 'sixties professional teams were supplementing the amateurs. Horse racing, even with the justification that it helped to improve the breed of the noblest of quadrupeds, was looked on askance. Prize fighting

Amusements

was frankly the sport of the unregenerate and the children of Belial. Family amusements for the virtuous were the buggy or carriage drive, the church social, and the picnic held along the countryside or in the stilted city park with its carefully fenced grass plots. Dancing was still frowned on by certain denominations and played a small part in comparison with what it later assumed.

Around the church revolved very much of the social life of the middle class. The Methodists clung to the great camp meetings of the frontier, long after the pioneer conditions that necessitated them had disappeared. The church social, bazaar, and Christmas tree were almost universal features. The minister, the most learned man in the community, was its oracle on religion, philosophy, and even politics. Ethically, the unpardonable sin was the lapse from strict sexual morals; about drinking, or frequenting saloons, if not about drunkenness, opinion among the godly was more divided. As to business, the church professed not to understand its moral problems, or to provide a code to cover them. Men of honor, of course, were what they always were; but sharp practice and finesse were not condemned even by pious opinion.

The church

Below this solid mass of middle-class life was a world which it as yet tried to ignore—the slums of the large cities, reeking with prostitution and disease, the noisy and tough saloon, and the sinister influence of such forces in the political life of the cities. However these conditions were deplored, no better remedy had as yet entered the middle-class mind than the conversion of the individual sinner. The application of social and political cures to the source of the evil was the whim of a few reformers.

The dregs of society

As we shall see, political life turned on the questions of reconstruction and the currency. The Civil War and its issues were especially the device of the demagogue. A class of politicians arose, often corrupt, more or less frankly avowing the use of bribery and political intrigue to secure the triumph of the party that espoused the righteous cause. A future president of the United States could jest in public on the use of money to carry a doubtful State in a close

Political hypocrisy and cynicism

election. Completely unabashed, the politician could turn from cynical frankness to an overwhelming solemnity in defense of vital issues such as greenbacks, free silver, tariff, or the Ku Klux Act. The most impenetrable mask of self-conceit helped its wearer most. "Are you really the great Mr. Conkling?" said a little boy accosting on the street the man who was the archetype of his class. "I am," said the Senator solemnly pointing upward, "but there is One greater than I."

The essence of the period was caught by Twain and Warner in the title of their novel "The Gilded Age." Fortunes were being made quickly and spent in garish display. The period of high prices, induced by the greenbacks and their depreciation, was a fundamental aid to easy money-making. Government contracts during the war had swollen the display at fashionable watering places like Saratoga. Gambling in gold prices, in stocks, especially in the stocks of roads like the Erie whose charter permitted indefinite issues of new stock, all made it possible to lose, and therefore to win, money. Above all, new fortunes were being made in land.

The gilded age

Land, as we have seen, was one of the fundamental sources of fortune in earlier days; then, however, its speculative value could arise only from its agricultural possibilities or its use as a town site. Now, with a system of titles that gave possession to the center of the earth, minerals beneath the surface yielded the owner a store of unearned wealth. The advance of the railways afforded at once a new use for coal and a means of transporting it great distances. Before the railroad, the exploitation of coal seams had been conditioned on the market within reach by river or canal. Now the anthracite beds of Pennsylvania were worked; in them, founded on a secret order, rose a lawless organization of the Irish—the Molly Maguires—who, until put down by detectives and judge, by a succession of murders terrorized the mine managers into surrendering to the demands of their operatives.

Coal

Even more startling was the rise of the oil industry. The "burning spring" had been a curiosity of the pioneer day. Not until 1849 did it even occur to some one to sell for its supposed

medicinal virtues the oil-impregnated spring water that bubbled from the earth. Not until 1857 was the first Pennsylvania oil well drilled. With the coming of gushers, with successive drillings, and the use for oil as an illuminant in the place of whale oil, came one boom after another in 1861, 1865, and later years. Speculative zeal, as always, ran ahead, risking its money on promising sites for wells. In January, 1865, it was estimated that the stock of oil corporations publicly known totaled $326,000,000. From Pennsylvania, the mania ran to West Virginia, Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, and California. Everywhere, the farmer under whose land lay oil or coal, suddenly found riches beyond his dreams poured in his lap. While the boom went on, John D. Rockefeller and the founders of the Standard Oil Company planned to exploit the product by a monopoly such as the world had never seen before.

Oil

Two fundamental inventions made in the earlier period were also about to work an overwhelming change in industrial life, in the very fundamentals of economic organization. Since men had learned to make iron hard and elastic, and called it steel, the difficulty of the charcoal forge process for its manufacture had consecrated the metal to comparatively precious uses—the weapon to which man intrusted his life and honor, the tool that was his constant companion. Nearly all steel was imported to the United States from Europe. But about 1850 a certain young man of Kentucky, named Kelly, engaged in manufacturing kettles, made steel by blowing air across molten iron. Suspicious customers would have none of it. A few years later Henry Bessemer described the same process to a group of jeering scientists in London. But the process remained. The manufacture of steel became cheap and simple. Steel became every man's servant; plentiful enough to replace iron in the rails of myriad railroads, to build great steamships, to serve as the elastic core and base for the great modern skyscrapers.

Cheap steel

The full utilization of steel in manufacture is based curiously enough on a second idea of the man whose cotton gin had revivified the plantation south in 1790—Eli Whitney. For Whit-

ney in the manufacture of muskets as early as 1798 had developed the use of interchangeable parts. Gravely, in a book which was the companion piece to the Rollo books, Jacob Abbott explained to his little readers how by this device a broken part in a musket, far from the factory, could be easily replaced, or even parts of two broken muskets could be fitted into one. That it gave the promise of turning out cheap and workable machines by the million, to be the tools and playthings of the lowest classes of society, instead of the possessions of the few who were rich enough to purchase the handicraft of the skilled workman, Abbott did not know. But once admit the necessary lathes, dies, and punches to produce myriads of parts nearly enough identical to function when fitted in turn into a machine, and an industrial revolution is at hand which dwarfs into insignificance the one made by the steam engine.

Standardized parts

Then there were the railroads. The net of their lines wove closer and closer across the north, and spun its threads out into the south and west. Sometimes as in the case of the great transcontinental lines they represented mighty investments of capital lured by great government bonuses of lands and bonds for every mile completed. Often they were built by subscription of towns or counties that hoped to gain new advantages in transport, or to prevent unfair discrimination in rates. In this heyday of individual enterprise, railroad building was unorganized and wasteful; consolidations gradually brought into logical systems the small roads built originally by the initiative of individual communities.

The railroads

Physically, the railroads were quite different from those we know to-day. From small and comfortless stations ran the single-track lines, on which light iron rails were just being replaced by steel. Over them, puffing locomotives with flaring smokestacks drew trains of wooden cars, unvestibuled, lighted dimly by oil lamps, heated by stoves. The age, however, took pride in gorgeously ornate palace cars and sleeping cars. The Westinghouse air-brake, invented in 1868, alone made it possible to handle flimsy cars at high speed. Even so, defective

Railroad equipment

track, head-on or rear-end collisions, or broken bridges caused a rapid series of accidents in which the passengers were sacrificed as a holocaust in a pile of blazing wreckage.

The age brought men once more face to face with the problems of that farther west of the Great Plains and the Rockies. The development of that region may be briefly reviewed. Since the eighteenth century, traders in their search for furs, had marked out the great highways through the region. Sometimes they penetrated it by the rivers from the north. Sometimes they made their way up the shallow reaches of the upper Missouri and its tributaries. In the early nineteenth century, steamboats fearfully navigated the upper Missouri, trading parties made their rendezvous in places like Jackson's Hole in the heart of the Rockies, and evaded as best they could the suspicion and hostility of the great tribes of the region.

Early trade to the Far West

Meanwhile, St. Louis had turned to the southwest as well as to the northwest. Over the Santa Fé Trail, her fleets of wagons set sail yearly across the desert for trade with the ancient Spanish settlement of Santa Fé in New Mexico. Since the end of the eighteenth century, Yankee traders had come around Cape Horn to the Pacific Coast where the Spaniards had established themselves in California. In 1804–1805 Lewis and Clark, at Jefferson's order, made their way up the Missouri and across to the Columbia and the Pacific Coast, while Pike and Long explored in 1806–1807 and 1819–1820 the mountain region to the south. John J. Astor had projected a fur-trading establishment in Oregon connected with the United States, not merely around the Horn, but also overland to Mackinac on Lake Michigan.

The Far West fur trade in the early nineteenth century

The War of 1812 ruined Astor's enterprise, and American statesmen were skeptical as to whether the vast treeless desert of the Plains, and the Rockies could ever be bridged to unite a Pacific Coast State to the Union. Then the passage of wagon-trains, of missionary and immigrant, to disturb the Hudson's Bay Company in their monopoly of Oregon, demonstrated a use for the region; and American states-

Remoteness of the Far West

men on the eve of a war with Mexico compromised with Great Britain by dividing an empire in the Pacific northwest.

An American community on the coast and in the Rocky Mountains was developing. The Mormons, a sect produced in the religious excitement of the 'twenties and 'thirties, believing in a Book of Mormon written on gold plates, miraculously revealed to Joseph Smith, the prophet of the Lord, had encountered persecution in Ohio, in Missouri, in Illinois. Finally, in 1846, their leader Joseph Smith murdered, themselves attacked by a mob outraged by their practice of polygamy, they were driven from Illinois, and, thousands strong, migrated across the plains to the desolate shores of Salt Lake where, under the autocratic leadership of Brigham Young, they made the desert bloom. There they drew in converts by the thousands who made the hard pilgrimage of the plains; they took wives for themselves and their sons, were fruitful, and prospered. They had thought they were migrating into Mexican territory, away from the accursed government of the United States, that had failed to avenge the murder of Joseph Smith. Erected into Utah Territory under that government in 1850, Brigham Young still ruled them and in his desert fastness defied the power of the federal authorities.

The Mormons

Meanwhile, the discovery of gold in California brought tens of thousands of emigrants across the plains and around Cape Horn from all parts of the world. In 1860, communities totaling 500,000 existed on the Pacific slope in California, Oregon, and Utah, separated from the United States by the great belt of desert and mountain. Connection between them overland was essential if political unity was to be preserved. It was perhaps the project of a Pacific railroad in 1854, which brought about the Kansas Nebraska bill.

The California gold rush

Successive advances in overland connections came. The army posts on the route to the farther west, at Leavenworth, Kearney, and Laramie, witnessed first the passage of the heavy prairie schooner, drawn by horses or oxen. Then came the stagecoach, with armed guards, jolted passengers, and precious baggage, symbol to a later age of the romance of the Wild

Overland travel

West. In 1860, came the pony express, a galloping rider changing his horse at relay after relay, protecting his precious packet of



express, and incidentally his own life, from prowling Indian and desperado.

Other phases of pioneer life appeared. Booms in silver and gold mining followed one another; the Pike's Peak rush and the founding of Denver on the eastern edge of the moun- **The mining booms** tain plateau came in 1859. The Virginia City boom, supplemented by later migrations to Helena, laid the foundations of Montana, a territory by 1864. Idaho as the result of a mining rush in 1861 became a territory two years later. An earlier mining

craze in Nevada had made it a territory in 1861 and a State in 1864, because two Republican senators and a nearby curb on the Mormons were needed. In defiance of Johnson's veto, Nebraska became a State in 1867; a few votes more to override his veto, and Colorado might have entered in the same year.

The Wild West

The lawless communities of the mountains presented another aspect of the Wild West, the boom town filled with saloons, prostitutes, and gamblers, where sudden death and robbery were the rule, and horse stealing—depriving a man in a wilderness of his means of travel—the one unpardonable sin. The prospector, packing his grubstake and tools on the back of a burro, prowling the mountains for the ever-elusive mine that would give him riches, is the romantic figure of the days of the gold and silver rushes.

The cattle country

Still another wild-western scene is the cattle range. After 1865, as the Pacific railroads crept westward, cattle owners bought great herds in Texas to be driven northward in the spring, fattened on the grass of the great plains, and shipped to the great packing establishments that arose from Omaha eastward to Chicago. Earlier stages of frontier life repeated themselves in the round-up, as the cattle were herded in the spring off the open range, and the newborn calf marked with the owner's brand borne by the cow it sucked. To control and protect the herds came the cowboy, picturesque in high-heeled boots, great leather chaps, and broad sombrero, skilled with the lariat, equally skilled with his six-shooter when he galloped into one of the wild cattle towns for a debauch. Cheap beef, marketed wholesale in such fashion, drove the eastern grazier out of business. To prevent a glut in the market, the cattlemen took to keeping their herds on the northern ranges even over winter. By the end of the 'eighties, however, economic reverses, and the encroachment of sheep herder homesteader or pioneer farmer, had ruined the ranchmen. Sometimes the ranches were maintained for sport; English noblemen, like the Earl of Dunraven, sought to build up great hunting preserves in the Rockies. But always in the end the homesteader won.

Trouble with the Indians afforded the last of the elements that

fused into the wild-western drama of the dime novels. No serious trouble occurred with the Indians of the far west until the Civil War, when they caught the hostility of union and confederate partisans that invaded even the western wilderness. A massacre by the Sioux in Minnesota in 1862 led to the infliction of savage punishment by the whites. In 1864, to avenge Cheyenne and Arapahoe outbreaks, Colonel Chivington, of Colorado, massacred a band of friendly Indians; and war blazed on the whole border. Thenceforth, there were Indian troubles. The Interior Department insisted on pacifying the Indian by subsidies or by such parts of them as Indian agents with qualified devotion to the red men would allow to reach them. The army, on the other hand, preached the use of the iron hand. Generally its policy prevailed. In the long series of Indian wars in the far west, the massacre of General Custer's whole command at the Little Big Horn stands out in lurid relief. Eventually, the Indian was penned on reservations, and when in outbreaks of religious fanaticism or of desperation he left them, was chased by troops. As a bar to the exploitation of the west, he was finally eliminated.

Indian wars

The advance of order into the newer west waited on the coming of the railroads. By 1862, the telegraph had spanned the continent. In the same year, the federal government promised vast subsidies in land and bonds for every mile of transcontinental railroad completed. The Union Pacific built westward from Omaha with construction gangs largly composed of Irish immigrants. The Central Pacific built from the coast eastward, with material brought around Cape Horn, and coolies imported from China. Avid for the federal bounties, each group tried to outbuild the other, and push the point of juncture west or east respectively. On May 10, 1869, near Promontory Point in Utah, the lines met and engines coming from the Pacific Coast and the Missouri River stood head to head.

The Pacific railroads

The Pacific railroad revolutionized the west. California was linked to the Mississippi Valley; Brigham Young found his theocratic despotism ended, and his empire brought to heel by the United States government; the Indian on the Great Plains found

himself beaten by the superior transportation of his white enemy; above all, new floods of population came in, and with it, public order and the end of the old period of lawlessness, save where, in the twentieth century, it was to blaze anew in labor wars. Other railroads hastened to join themselves to the Pacific. Other transcontinental lines, the Atlantic and Pacific, the Northern Pacific, and Texas Pacific, appeared. The west was ready to take its share in the politics of the nation. Both as an expanding frontier, and a bullion-producing region, it found its chief interest in the problem of the currency.

The west mastered

As a background to the study in succeeding chapters of events in the period after 1873, it is necessary at this point to state briefly the economic situation on two great issues which alone took clear form in national politics before 1880, the tariff and the currency. The question of the tariff was comparatively a simple one. The revenue tariffs of the prevailing Democratic administrations before the war had reached their lowest point in that of 1857. The ensuing panic and the insufficient revenue produced led the Republican party to include in its 1860 platform a moderate tariff plank designed to win protectionist Pennsylvania. The resulting Morrill Tariff of 1861 was very moderate; but the laying of Civil War excise duties on domestic manufacturers also made it necessary to lay countervailing customs duties to protect them against competition by foreign products that had not paid excise. But with the repeal of excise duties at the close of the war, manufacturers' lobbies saw to it that tariff duties remained. The west was prevailingly anti-tariff, but the reconstruction issues sufficed to keep it in the Republican party, which manifestly was the party of protection. In 1873, the tariff was reduced; but for a generation thereafter the tendency of rates was prevailingly upward.

The tariff

The issue of the tariff is easily understood. Protective duties ensure high prices for home products, enable capital to invade fields of production that otherwise would be engrossed by foreign industries, and compensate labor for high prices by supposedly high wages. That wages almost never rise as fast as prices, that the farmer, needing no protection

The economics of protection

for his products thanks to the virgin soil he tills, pays higher for all he consumes, are the things protectionists have to explain away.

The monetary issue, however, is one on which in many essentials experts are hopelessly at odds; in the politics of the era it was a dense fog. To penetrate it, one must go back to fundamentals. From the beginning of human history, men have been exchanging goods with each other; and they increasingly have tended to rate them in exchange by stating their value in terms of some commodity universally desired and of even quality: a Homeric hero, in a fit of generosity, exchanges a suit of armor worth a hundred oxen for one worth nine. In later days, in western Europe, the qualities of uniformity, general use, and desirability in the metals led men to value what they bartered in weights of iron, copper, silver, and gold. For convenience in trafficking, they divided metals into pieces of known weight and fineness attested by a stamp; and here coinage began.

Money: the standard of value

As civilization became more complex and values of goods were rated higher, men discarded the cheaper metals as standards of value. In gold and silver, men reckoned the worth of what they bought. Coins of baser metals, like copper, were relegated to the function of counters used in computing small prices; they circulated at a value much greater than the metal in them because government or community was ready to redeem them, directly or indirectly, at their face value in the precious metals. Issuing them became a prerogative of the government. On the other hand, the precious metals, gold and silver, were stamped into coins whose face value supposedly corresponded to the value of the bullion they contained.

Coinage

Here, coinages exhibit the growing pains of complex civilization. The causes that determine the value of gold and silver are partly the amount of labor needed to mine and refine them, partly the demand for them for articles of adornment and display, partly the demand for them as a currency. Like all other commodities, their value fluctuates from these causes; but

The value of money

as their value is taken as the one in which all other values are expressed, their fluctuation is not obvious. It is the prices of commodities which seem rather to rise and fall. Such fluctuations in the value of gold and silver become serious when covering long periods of years. A man lending a sum of capital for twenty years lends it in terms of gold dollars and expects repayment in terms of gold dollars; but, owing to the fluctuation in the value of gold, he may receive much less or more in purchasing power than he originally lent. If fluctuation of this sort goes too far, the consequences may be individual tragedies.

Nonmetallic currency

The situation is complicated further by the fact that communities in advanced civilization make use of great amounts of paper instruments, couched in terms of gold units. Paper money of various kinds is one instance; bank deposits and checks drawn on them, and other types of negotiable paper, are still others. In case these instruments are not redeemable on demand in some way, for gold units, their value depreciates as compared with gold, and prices of goods expressed in paper units are higher than gold prices, exactly as was the case with greenbacks compared with gold in the days of the Civil War. But even when no disparity exists between paper money and gold, it is a serious question if a large paper currency of this sort does not tend to raise the general price level.

Currency confused with capital

In a sense, this is due to the fact that currency and capital are easily confused. For instance, what a pioneer community most needs is manufactured goods of all sorts, to establish the outward conveniences of civilization, and the necessary commercial credits to obtain those goods. It necessarily has to import more than it exports; consequently its good money tends to leave it to pay its debts to older settled sections, at the very time when it most urgently needs the credits of fluid capital that will enable it to buy the surplus that it requires above the value of its own products. Hence it usually lays its very real woes to the fact that there is not enough "money" —coin or paper currency—in circulation to make the needed exchanges; and it clamors for more and cheaper money. At the

same time, moneyed institutions, like banks, that lend to producers, to a certain degree tend to increase the stock of fluid capital which enables men to purchase manufactures and pay wages to labor; and the larger the amount of fluid capital that is thus transmuted into purchasing power, the greater is the effective demand for goods and the higher their price. But even apart from such an increase in fluid capital, a rise in prices seems often to accompany an increase in paper money, even if the paper is on a par with gold; and classes that desire to borrow, or to pay off loans that they have already made, welcome such a situation because, in effect, the higher price level enables them to pay loans with a smaller amount of the commodities that they produce.

Such are the complications that may exist with paper currency, redeemable or irredeemable at its price in the standard metal; but the effects of two metals serving as standards of value are almost equally obscure. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the nations of European stock used both gold and silver as standards in their coinage; the amount of bullion in a gold or silver dollar was supposedly the amount that a dollar would purchase on the market. But here it must be remembered that both gold and silver are commodities whose value varies with the supply available and the use of it. The exploitation of the mines of the New World in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, lowered the value of both gold and silver but lowered that of silver relatively more. So long as the amount of bullion in a gold and a silver dollar remained fixed at the old rate, it followed that a pound of silver coined into dollars would exchange evenly against the same number of gold dollars, although, as bullion, the silver would purchase less gold than the equivalent gold dollars contained. With gold thus more valuable uncoined, it followed that silver would be coined and gold coin melted to bullion. The currency would tend to become entirely silver.

Gold and silver as monetary standards

While fluctuation in the ratios of the values of gold and silver were not extreme and coinage processes were rude and inaccurate,

both metals kept in circulation. But in the eighteenth century, accurate methods of refining and coining, and mechanical protections against clipping coins, made it possible for the crafty dealer in money to estimate precisely the amount of bullion in a coin and whether or no it was more valuable to him in coin or in bars. The slightest fluctuation in value was sufficient to drive one metal or the other out of circulation.

Difficulty of maintaining the double standard

This was the experience of the United States. In establishing the United States mint in 1792, Congress, by Hamilton's advice, set the coinage ratio at 15 to 1; that is, the weight of fine gold in a gold dollar was one-fifteenth the weight of fine silver in a silver dollar. For the next forty years, however, the market rate was always above this, fluctuating between 15.04 and 16.25. As a result, silver was more valuable at the mint, gold more valuable in the bullion market, and only silver coins stayed in circulation. In 1834, Congress changed the ratio to 16 to 1; never in the next two decades was the market ratio so high, and only gold was coined. The great influx of gold from California and Australia at last seemed to promise sufficient of the one metal to supply the world's standard currency. England, in 1816, had established the gold standard; and in 1853, a coinage act of the United States tacitly did the same, reducing the amount of silver in coins under a dollar to keep them in circulation, and abandoning the attempt to fix a ratio at which silver would be brought to the mint to be coined into dollars. In 1873, the decision of 1853 was given official standing, when the silver dollar was omitted from the list of United States coins. This act, the demonetization of silver, was later to be loudly denounced as "the crime of '73."

The United States' experiments in bimetallism

The bimetallist had a certain basis for his argument in favor of the free coinage of both metals. He could urge that if the whole world coined both at one ratio it would not be profitable to melt coins for export to take advantage of variations of the coinage rate between nation and nation. He could argue that a universal demand for both metals for coinage purposes would tend to minimize the fluctuations in the

The bimetallist argument

value of either. He could argue that the sole use of one metal in the world's coinage would create an undue demand for it, raise its value, and lower prices to the injury of the debtor classes. After 1874 the mortgage-burdened farmer and the silver producer of the west were to raise their voices for the remonetization of silver, the expansion of the currency, and the making of easy, abundant, and cheap money for debtors to use in paying debts. That since 1853 the most highly civilized nations of the world had been turning to the gold standard did not matter.

The battle for bimetallism, for the free coinage of silver, lay beyond the year 1873. Hitherto the rallying cry for inflationists had been the greenbacks. In the boom times of the Civil War the ambitious had borrowed on farm mortgages and other securities to find means for expansion. Their loans had been contracted in a depreciated paper currency; paying them in an appreciated one with commodities far cheaper than before they did not like. The debtor class found its representative in certain Democrats, notably George H. Pendleton, of Ohio, father of the "Ohio idea," namely, that the federal government should issue additional greenbacks to pay off the gold bonds that represented government indebtedness. This would supply more "money" in which debtors could pay their debts; incidentally it would keep up the declining price level. Pendleton's idea was indorsed by the Democrats in 1868. Actually the agitation prevented the further retirement of the greenbacks already in circulation; it even led to the paying out of sums already retired to provide for moving the crops in the fall of 1871; indeed twenty-six millions were paid out in attempts to check the panic of 1873. In 1875 Congress provided by law for the retirement of the issue, but three years later it directed that the amount then outstanding should be allowed to circulate. Redeemable for gold after January 1, 1879, the discount of the greenbacks from gold disappeared; and at par they circulate some $346,000,000 in the currency to this day.

The greenbacks: the "Ohio idea"

In the solid American community of the 'sixties and early 'seventies therefore it was only the declining price level that

caused attention to be paid to schemes of currency inflation. The panic of 1873, the crowding millions of immigrants, the unrest of ill-paid labor dissatisfied with working conditions, the despair of mortgage-ridden farmers, the blasting of the promises held out to pioneers by the newer west were to make the succeeding quarter century one of criticism, unrest, blind reaching out for economic panaceas to cure keenly felt economic ills. Currency inflation by paper or silver was one of the more conservative of the remedies proposed. The more radical ones ran to the length of anarchy, revolution, the overturn of the whole solid bloc of native American middle-class self-sufficiency and self-satisfaction.

American self-satisfaction

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

F. L. Paxson, *The Last American Frontier*. New York, 1910.
——, *Recent History of the United States*. Boston, 1921.
H. U. Faulkner, *American Economic History*. New York, 1924.
H. Thompson, *The Age of Invention* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. XXXVII). New Haven, 1921.
S. J. Buck, *The Granger Movement*. Cambridge, 1913.
——, *The Agrarian Crusade* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. XLV). New Haven, 1920.
J. Moody, *The Railroad Builders* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. XXXVIII). New Haven, 1919.
——, *The Masters of Capital* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. XLI). New Haven, 1919.
J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, vol. VIII. New York, 1919.
F. L. Paxson, *The New Nation*. Boston, 1915.
P. L. Haworth, *The United States in Our Own Times, 1865–1920*. New York, 1920.
L. B. Shippee, *Recent American History*, New York, 1924.
E. P. Oberholtzer, *A History of the United States since the Civil War*, vols. I–III. New York, 1917–1926.
H. Thompson, *The New South* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. XLII). New Haven, 1919.

CHAPTER XXVIII

ECONOMIC EXPANSION, 1873–1897

Twentieth-century American retailers do not often advertise that "a child can purchase here as safely as an adult"; for the business common sense of to-day takes for granted the advisability of the one-price system and of seeing that every customer gets the best value for his money that the store can afford him. But in the 'seventies, the common-law motto "let the buyer look out for himself" was still the rule of business, and a large proportion of men felt no shame in matching their bargaining ability or wits against a patron's, in taking a few cents' or dollars' advantage. A few men of affairs, with no lower standards of business morals but with vastly greater imagination, were to seize the opportunities afforded by the newer America and, through sharp practice on the grand scale, were to count their winnings by tens, and hundreds of millions.

The morals of business

The secret of the great fortunes is to be sought in the discovery by their makers of the modern principle of capitalization. Under the old industrial order, the value of a product or service depended on the amount and skill of the labor that went into it; the value of a man's business was the value of his workshop and tools plus the satisfied customers he might turn over to the man who bought him out; these last in the estimates of business values were modestly rated as "good will." But an invention that cut costs tremendously, the skill of a manager who by careful organization or the use of large-scale production was able to increase output faster than cost, might enable an article to be produced more cheaply and at the same time to yield a far larger profit. A railroad connecting distant points could furnish transportation for man and goods so expeditious that no previously known means such as stagecoach or cart could possibly rival it, and at the same time could make a large profit; a man with

Cost versus earning power as indexes of value

genius to weld a number of petty railroads into a system stretching for thousands of miles, could multiply these profits to an extent that his contemporaries deemed fabulous.

The capitalization of income and its profits

Huge profits, or the supposed possibility of them, produced a new means of valuing property—not its cost of building or replacement, but the capitalized value of its earning power. If a railroad could be built for a million dollars, and could earn in net revenue a hundred and twenty thousand dollars when interest on investments of similar security was 6 per cent, its stock was necessarily capitalized at two millions. Could investors be induced to believe its net earning power was, or could be made, $240,000 a year, they would buy its capital stock for four millions. Could a concern like the Standard Oil Company acquire all or nearly all the plants that refined oil, and all the pipe-lines that carried it, the company could pay the producer of crude oil as little as would keep him producing, charge the consuming class the price that would induce them to pay out the maximum amount for oil, and reserve the rest for profit. It might well be the interest on a sum fabulously greater than either the original cost or the expense of replacing pipe-lines and refineries.

The use of this principle of capitalization by a few farsighted buccaneers of finance, like Cornelius Vanderbilt, had begun a little before the panic of 1873; but that year may serve as the starting point of our study. In effect, it was the end of the Civil War period in the economic sense, just as 1877 was its political, and 1865 its military end. During the boom years of the Civil War, money was easily made even by the blind and inexpert. During the war, government contracts had lavishly rewarded the politically favored. After the war, depreciated greenbacks, carrying with them high wages and high prices, made for reckless spending. The Civil War had left the North in a mood of optimism, in which railroads, large-scale business, and the expansion of the frontier all seemed to promise prosperity.

The economic end of the Civil War

Then came, necessarily, the reaction, in the first of three great waves of business regression and expansion that swept the country

in the next generation, and often spread from it to the rest of the world. The first of these was the panic of 1873. The refunding of the great war debts of the United States on a coin basis, the likelihood of resumption of specie payments, a year or two of overproduction and low prices of farm products due to the too rapidly expanding frontier, led to a reaction that wiped out the bubble fortunes of the reckless and shortsighted, leaving the wiser heads of finance, in the following years, to build vast fortunes on the wreck.

The Panic of 1873

The panic is especially noteworthy as bringing down in ruin the great financial house of Jay Cooke & Co., of Philadelphia, owing to a huge issue of Northern Pacific Railroad bonds and overinvestment in the future of Duluth. With Cooke, a certain lurid element had appeared in American high finance. It was Cooke who had, by methods of door-to-door selling and wide-spread advertising, sold United States bond issues of the Civil War to small purchasers throughout the nation, unaccustomed hitherto to any purchase of securities. It was Cooke, who, allied with certain international banking firms of Jews in South Germany, had floated our loans and refunded them in 1871.

Jay Cooke & Co.

With Cooke's fall, there came to the front another banking firm, Drexel, Morgan & Co. of New York, made by the alliance of a house of German financiers in Philadelphia and the son of a certain Junius S. Morgan, who had gone to London, thriven as an export merchant, and established an international banking connection. In 1857 his son, J. Pierpont Morgan, had come to America to lend stability to a correspondent banking house. He and his firm, with its London connections, were destined to rise to the highest place in international finance. The work of an international banker must in general be conservative. He must select for underwriting, stock and bond issues which his foreign correspondent firms will find it possible to market among investors of their nations. To keep the prestige of his house, he must in general undertake to protect the financial interests of those who have bought of him; and the house of Morgan was again and again to undertake the reorganization of bankrupt

The House of Morgan

railroads, in order to save the interests of foreign investors. America had been a "graveyard for European capital" before Morgan's time; after him it was a profitable field for the investment of Europe's surplus wealth.

The railway systems

It will be simplest to follow the creation of some of the great railway systems of the country in this era and to see how the forces of capitalization and overcapitalization left fortunes in the hands of manipulators, ruined many small investors, charged the public high rates and at the same time enlarged the transportation facilities of the nation.

Cornelius Vanderbilt

The story really begins with one man, Cornelius Vanderbilt. Born in 1794, he began business with a ferryboat in New York harbor, and by 1861 was the owner of a line of ocean steamships. He bluntly told Abraham Lincoln, in presenting the federal government with a fast steamer for the navy, that he could afford to spend five million dollars to put down the rebellion. He emerged from it with a fortune of ten millions, married a woman barely thirty, and plunged into railway consolidations that before his death, in 1877 had increased his millions tenfold.

The New York Central system

Vanderbilt's essential accomplishment was, first, the linking together of three railways in New York into one railroad with a straight line from New York to Buffalo; he united the New York Central and the Hudson River Railroads and then leased to them the Harlem Railroad. By 1873, he had extended his control over the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern, and a railroad under a single management stretched from New York to Chicago. Better roadbed, steel instead of iron rails, better equipment, were only concomitants of a policy that cut running time between the two cities from fifty hours to twenty-four. By the time Vanderbilt died in 1877, quarreling to the last with his numerous adult children, his son W. H. Vanderbilt was ready to take his father's place. He lacked Cornelius' imagination, but had only to carry on his policy; he acquired control of the Michigan Central, the Big Four, and the Chicago and Northwestern. The necessity of shutting out roads built to compete with him

led him to acquire two of them, the New York, Chicago and St. Louis, called the Nickel Plate, and the so-called West Shore.

The methods by which the elder Vanderbilt multiplied his millions are caricatured in the story of the Erie Railroad. It had been completed between the Hudson and Lake Erie as early as 1851, capitalized at the then-unheard-of sum of twenty-six millions. It fell into the hands of a series of unscrupulous manipulators, one of whom, Daniel Drew—the astute "Uncle Daniel"—found in it ultimate ruin, and a second, Jay Gould, a huge fortune. The peculiarity of the Erie was its charter right of issuing bonds capable of being metamorphosed into stock with voting power. This provision enabled those in its control by lavish issues of new stock to defeat rivals seeking to buy sufficient stock to command a majority. A New York law allowing railroads to issue their capital stock to buy other lines, enabled those controlling the Erie to buy up unsuccessful connecting roads on their own account and sell them to the Erie for new issues of its stock in huge amounts. Vanderbilt, in 1867, had sought to capture control from Drew and Fisk, and a war ensued, marked by legal shifts and injunctions for and against new stock issues, made by judges subservient to either party. A grand trial of strength in bribery for the control of the New York Assembly was prevented, much to the disgust of that legislature, by a secret compromise. Of course such a system of things left the road hugely overcapitalized; by the time the wise ones had unloaded their stock on the public, it was ready, in 1875, for the first of four receiverships from which conservative business management has finally rescued it.

The Erie Railroad

The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad represented another phase of manipulation. It was one of the oldest of the extensive projects of the country. The last surviving signer of the Declaration of Independence, Charles Carroll of Maryland, had driven the first spike of the road in 1828. In the late 'fifties, under the régime of President Garrett, it began an impressive course of expansion and improvement. It paid large dividends, even during a savage rate war with the Pennsylvania in 1874. In

The B. & O.

the late 'eighties, the fact came out that this impressive showing had been due to the most reckless bookkeeping, to paying dividends when there were no profits, and what not. Morgan undertook the road's reorganization, but the interests previously allied with Garrett had retained the voting power; they forced out Morgan's representative, and made their own way to a receivership in 1896.

The Pennsylvania

The Pennsylvania Railroad under the presidency of J. Edgar Thompson, 1869–1874, had undertaken a deliberate scheme of expansion that was to involve the acquisition, in the Pittsburgh and Fort Wayne and the Panhandle, of two routes into Chicago and St. Louis, and the development of connections to New York. This policy produced the crowning achievement of 1899 when President Cassatt, by terrific expenditures of money for tunnels under the North and East Rivers, and for Manhattan real estate, undertook to give the Pennsylvania a New York City station and connections to Long Island and Connecticut.

Western railroads during this period had expanded and overcapitalized more than eastern ones, were that possible. After Cooke's failure of 1873, Henry Villard, with the support of German capital, took over the construction of the Northern Pacific. He completed the road to the Pacific; not until 1893 was its insolvency discovered. A mighty railroad baron of the generation, James J. Hill, dreamed of a second railroad to the Pacific and enlisted Canadian capital in the road later known as the Great Northern, completed through the northern wheat lands to the coast in 1893. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fé, built across the State of Kansas to Colorado by 1872, then followed most slavishly the old traders' route to Santa Fé. It acquired connections both with the Pacific Coast and Chicago, unwisely purchased the St. Louis and San Francisco (the "Frisco") and the Colorado Midland, and in 1893, the year of doom, went into a receivership.

New transcontinental roads

The Union Pacific, whose contest with the Central Pacific to press farthest to the point of union in 1869 had attracted the

world's attention, in 1880 had acquired the Kansas Pacific and Denver Pacific routes, and went into seemingly hopeless insolvency in 1893, owing great sums to the federal government as well as to private investors. The Southern Pacific prospered as the feudal domain of Collis P. Huntington. Between 1869 and 1883, other railroads linked themselves into the transcontinental systems—the Texas Pacific, the Rock Island, the Burlington, and the Northwestern.

The Union Pacific and the Southern Pacific

In studying the causes of the recurring receiverships, a few factors besides stock manipulation must be taken into account. First of these, in the west especially, was overbuilding. Between 1880–1890, 11,000 miles of railroad were built in Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado. No population existed there capable of supplying the business to make such roads profitable. Then it might happen that roads would starve because rivals controlled subsidiary lines and the freight that arose from them; or, occasionally, a road would be ruined by acquiring feeders that were not worth in freight what they cost.

Railroad overbuilding

Second of the contributory causes was excessive competition. In its extreme form, this involved building new railroads to parallel competitors. The classic example is the war between the Pennsylvania and the New York Central in the 'eighties, when the Pennsylvania built the West Shore to parallel the New York Central, and the Central retaliated by planning a line to run beside the Pennsylvania. The house of Morgan ended it by a truce, each road surrendering its competitive project to the other. Competition usually took the less extreme form of rate wars. Between two points, two competing railroads would cut rates for freight and passengers to ridiculously low figures. Overcapitalization and overexpansion, however, account for most of the disasters. All the cases in which stock was unloaded on the public for prices far above its real value, left their mark in public distrust of railroads and railroad men.

Railroad competition

In reducing the railroads to a sounder basis, the house of Morgan performed a service to the nation for which, even discounting the vast sums which it made for itself, it has hardly been given due

credit. At first, with the interests of their foreign investing clients in mind, the Morgans had held aloof from the reckless and unscrupulous game that was being played in railroad securities. Not until 1879, when they assisted W. H. Vanderbilt to transfer a large part of his holdings in the New York Central to English investors to save the road from attacks inspired by Vanderbilt's name, did they indicate that the situation could deserve their attention. Then came one case after another in which the Morgans intervened to set bankrupt roads in operation again. The process necessarily followed certain lines. They compelled the shareholders to write off the part of the stock that represented water in the capitalization; they induced bondholders to forego their interest for a time, perhaps to take stock instead of bonds, thereby becoming partners in the profit and loss of the road instead of creditors; they found the needed new capital. The Morgans failed on the Baltimore and Ohio, in 1887, because they had not taken over the voting power. Thenceforth, they saw to it that they controlled, by special voting agreements, the policy of the roads they undertook to reorganize. By 1898, the word of Morgan controlled the Southern, the Erie, the Reading, the Northern Pacific, the Central of Georgia, the Chesapeake and Ohio; he had a strong influence in the management of the Baltimore and Ohio, the Santa Fé and the "Vanderbilt Lines"—the New York Central system.

The Morgans and the railroads

If the unwary investor suffered cruelly in the days of paper capitalization and watered stock, the user of the roads suffered little less. It was not merely that the owners neglected to follow Vanderbilt's example in providing for public comfort and safety until state commissions compelled them to install steel rails, safety couplings, signals, crossing guards, and proper rolling stock. Rates were made on the basis of "charging what the traffic will bear," sharing with the user as little as possible of the profits of the new transportation era. Watered capital became the pretext for high rates on the plea that the holders were entitled to a fair return on their investment.

Railroad mismanagement

Rate wars have already been mentioned. Often they ended in

more or less unstable pools; the railroads connecting two points would agree to share pro rata freights between competitive points and to charge a far higher rate for shorter hauls where they had no competition. The injustice of charging more for a short haul than a long one sank into the public consciousness; the intricacy of varying rates on commodities, lower on those of large bulk and small value, seemed a mask for further discrimination.

Pooling; rate wars

The farmer, especially, found cause to complain; with low prices for agricultural produce, railroad rates often ate up by far the greater part of the sale price of his wheat, corn, or hogs once they had reached a market. At times, he sought relief in the building of competing roads. Counties, towns, and individuals subscribed to the stock and bonds of such enterprises. Often the promoters failed to build the roads, often they built them on other routes than those promised, often they sold them out to the roads with which they had been intended to compete. Lawsuits to enforce payment of bonds, repudiated as a result of such bad faith, became a commonplace in the middle west.

The farmer and the railroads

The aggrieved classes then turned to their governments for relief. In the earlier 'seventies, the roads of the older Northwest acquired the name of "Granger" roads because they had to deal, in such States as Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Iowa, with legislation designed to regulate them strictly. The Illinois General Assembly, after passing in 1871 a railroad law found unconstitutional, passed in 1873 an act for a railroad and warehouse commission empowered to regulate rates and conditions of traffic. Warehouses were included because of abuses in charging excessive rates for storing grain, or in paying for it at a rate lower than its true value, or in mixing good and fair grades of wheat in one bin. In other States, railroad political influence usually secured the repeal of such legislation; sometimes roads got rid of low rates by giving service that was proportionately bad. Even where railroad rate regulation survived, as in Illinois, there was always a difficulty in dealing with intrastate

Granger legislation

rates alone. Often it was economical to buy a ticket to the last station before a state border was passed, buy one at that station to the first station across the border and there buy a third ticket. The railroads resisted the payment of the legal rates. Often they sidetracked cars of farmers refusing to pay more than the standard fare. They fought the legislation in the courts, which, led by the Supreme Court of the United States in the first of the Granger Cases, Munn *vs.* Illinois, of 1876, affirmed the doctrine that railroads and warehouses were public utilities subject to closer regulation by the State than private businesses.

The Interstate Commerce Commission

To deal with the problem of interstate regulation, Congress, after one or two failures, passed in 1887 the Interstate Commerce Commission Act, creating a commission of five members, and establishing the principle that short and long haul discriminations and rebates were illegal. The commission had power to investigate and to bring legal proceedings before the courts to enforce their findings as to unfair action by the railways. Not until 1906 was the commission's power extended over other means of communication, and enlarged to include the right of fixing rates, subject to appeal by the railroads to the courts.

The railroads and western development

In defense of the misdeeds of the railroads there can always be pleaded the great result they accomplished in covering the continent with means of transportation and promoting its development. Railroad mileage increased from 9021 in 1850 to 30,635 in 1860, 52,914 in 1870, 93,669 in 1880. The increase of the population of the trans-Mississippi States from 4,536,475, in 1860 to 11,259,360 in 1880, must be credited to the railroads' account.

Public utility peculation

No such excuse can be urged for the men who in the same period exploited the public utilities of the expanding cities of the United States by the methods of the unscrupulous railroad privateers. They established great traction enterprises to buy up, at lavish prices, smaller street car systems which they themselves often owned; they paid dividends not warranted by earnings in order to push the stock of


125°
120°
115°
110°
105°
100°
45°
35°
30°
25°
DENSITY of
POPULATION in 1880
Under 2 inhabitants per square mile
2 to 6 " " " "
6 to 18 " " " "
18 to 45 " " " "
45 to 90 " " " "
Over 90 " " " "
115°
110°
105°
100°


90°
85°
80°
75°
70°
40°
35°
30°
25°
95°
90°
85°
80°

their enterprises to high figures; they constructed new lines for which they held contracts at excessive costs; finally they sold out and left the purchasers of the stock saddled with overcapitalization and public indignation at poor service. Such is the story of the careers of Elkins and Peter Widener in Philadelphia, of Charles T. Yerkes in Chicago, Thomas F. Ryan, and William C. Whitney in New York.

Necessarily, the cities advanced in conveniences as they grew in population. Paving, sidewalks, sewer systems, usually came at the expense of the property owner, the costs magnified, of course, by the corruption which the traction baron had introduced into boards of aldermen. The first electric trolley system came in 1887–1888 at Richmond, Virginia. The first elevated street railway appeared in New York in 1867, run by steam here and elsewhere, until electric power was substituted in the 'nineties. The arc light in its first and crudest form had supplemented gas as an illuminant on the streets at almost the same time. Of course the acquisition of traction and lighting franchises was attended by the corruption of city councils and governments, sometimes of state legislatures. Railroad influence on the legislatures was also potent, exercised by all means from free passes to sporadic or steady bribery. The venal legislatures were quick to learn the art of holding up the railroads by pushing hostile legislation until bribe money was forthcoming to purchase its abandonment. In certain instances corruption reached even to the Congress of the United States.

Municipal progress and corruption

Public opinion sensed what was going on so far as to voice an incoherent cry of rage at the street car companies and the railroads. With indignation, it coupled them indiscriminately with a third specimen of the iniquity of the day—the trusts. Of the trusts, the first was the Western Union Telegraph Company. The greatest and the most hated was the Standard Oil.

The trusts

The discovery of the use of refined petroleum as an illuminant, and the use of its by-products, such as naphtha and paraffin, came on the eve of the Civil War. The new light, available in

the country where gas was not to be had, crude as it seems today, was a tremendous advance on the tallow candle or the expensive sperm-oil lamp. A demand, enormous for that day, developed, supplied as was natural by numerous independent wells and refineries. To John D. Rockefeller, a young man who during the Civil War had accumulated a little capital in the commission business in Cleveland and who entered the oil business as a refiner, occurred the possibility of obtaining a monopoly of refined oil. By 1868, he and his associates were embarked on the path of monopoly by buying up refineries and the pipe-lines which carried crude oil from well to refinery. Rockefeller's success was partly due to the parsimony with which he hoarded capital to use at decisive moments, partly to improved methods of refining and utilizing by-products; but in a very considerable measure it is to be ascribed to the use of rebates—forcing the railroads to make special rates below those given his competitors on shipments of oil. He was for a time indirectly interested in a scheme by which rebates were granted to one group on all that their competitors shipped. The explosion of indignation which followed the exposure of this device forced a railway agreement, soon violated by the New York Central, to grant no more rebates. Meanwhile, by high-pressure marketing, by cutting prices in one district after another to ruin competitors, the Standard established its monopoly.

The Standard Oil Company

In 1882, the Standard Oil took the form of organization which has caused the word "trust" to be loosely applied to corporations organized to secure a monopoly. A holding company, or trust, was created to hold the stock of various subsidiary companies, and by voting this stock to direct their operations to a common end. The stock of the trust was of course distributed among the little group that surrounded Rockefeller, proportionate to their holdings in stock of the subsidiary companies. In 1892, the Ohio Supreme Court declared the trust illegal as constituting a restraint of free competition and ordered its dissolution, which was grudgingly carried out in 1899. A new organization under the same name replaced it.

The holding company

Meanwhile the Standard had entered the world of high finance. It had followed Rockefeller's early policy of hoarding great sums of capital to use in the exploiting of new fields of oil; and intermittently it used these idle funds in various profitable ways. About 1891, the Standard acquired the National City Bank of New York, which, as its financial agent, doled out its money in loans to stay the panic of 1893. A money power comparable to that of Morgan thus brought itself to the public attention.

Standard Oil finance

In other directions, great expansion of industry had taken place. Steel, fulfilling the promise of the Bessemer process, had revolutionized American industry at every turn. By 1890, the modern skyscraper office building was made possible by steel structural shapes. Steel, formerly imported, became an article of American export. Until 1869, but 50,000,000 tons of iron ore had been used in the United States. By 1910, 685,000,000 tons were used. The area of steel production extended from Pittsburgh west as far as Joliet, Illinois—the region where the shortest possible hauls unite the ore, scooped by carloads from the vast beds of the northern peninsula of Michigan and carried in ore boats to lake ports like Chicago and Cleveland, with the coke, product of the bituminous coal fields.

Steel production

In steel production the Carnegie Steel Company at Homestead, Pennsylvania, while not a monopoly, at the end of our period stood first. Headed by men like Andrew Carnegie, H. C. Frick, and Charles Schwab, it achieved results by the building of plants at the highest efficiency, the ruthless scrapping of outdated machines, the ruthless working of imported Polish labor, goaded to insurrection by Frick and pacified by the genius for leadership of Charles Schwab.

The Carnegie Steel Co.

Then there were developments based on steel—the locomotives of American railways, the agricultural machinery that aided year by year in the expansion of the frontier westward. The scouring plows that had conquered the tough prairie sod, the original reaper of McCormick, and those of his competitors, were supplemented by an increasing series of machines for farmers' use, cultivators, seeders, and what not. The reaper

Agricultural machinery

itself was improved in 1870 by the addition of a self-binder which bound the grain in sheaves as reaped, and a twine binder, of 1878, which obviated the difficulty that arose from the use of wire as binding material. American harvesting machines invaded the fields of the great wheat-producing nations and led the exportation of American standardized machinery.

Manufactures

The growth of manufacture is partly told by figures. The value of manufactured products for the United States rose from three and a third billion dollars in 1869 to almost four times as much in 1899; the total reached five billions in 1879 and nine billions in 1889. That in 1899 all but about one and a half billions of this was produced in institutions large enough to be classed as factories emphasizes the passing into relative unimportance of home manufacture. The development must in great measure be left to the imagination; a few figures will show the most important lines of production. Of the totals given above, in 1899 slaughtering and packing accounted for seven hundred and eighty-eight millions of dollars worth of product; flour and grist-mill production, five hundred and sixty millions; the lumber industry, seven hundred and seventy-three millions; textile fabrics, nine hundred and forty millions; leather, two hundred and four millions; printing and publishing, three hundred and ninety-five millions; agricultural implements, one hundred and one millions; paint and varnish, sixty-nine millions. Most of these, it will be seen, supplied the primary necessaries of food, clothing, and housing, or assisted in agriculture. Significant of the development of more advanced manufacture is the huge increase in iron and steel tonnage. Of pig iron, 1869 saw the production of 1,832,876 tons; 1899, 14,447,791. Steel production from a million tons in 1879 rose to above ten millions in twenty years. The future of the world seemed to be with iron and steel, and thanks to her ore deposits and the enterprise of her workmen, the United States rose fast to first rank among the industrial nations.

During the period 1873–1897, agriculture underwent its last great territorial expansion. The wheat lands of western Iowa, Minnesota, and the Dakotas were exploited mainly under the


125°
120°
115°
110°
105°
100°
45°
35°
30°
25°
DENSITY of
POPULATION in 1890
Under 2 inhabitants per square mile
2 to 6 " " " "
6 to 18 " " " "
18 to 45 " " " "
45 to 90 " " " "
90 or over
115°
110°
105°
100°


5°
90°
85°
80°
75°
70°
40°
35°
30°
25°
95°
90°
85°
80°

Homestead Act of 1862, granting a farm of 160 acres for three years' residence upon it. In the trans-Mississippi the government's huge land grants to Pacific railroads made them landlords only less important than itself. The exploitation of new farm lands reached into the western parts of Kansas and Nebraska, which, after the economic distress of the early 'nineties, are now prosperous communities. But when the grain farmer replaced the cattle range in Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming, encouraged by abnormally heavy rainfall in the early 'eighties, he ultimately found that without irrigation and water storage systems, much of the land could not be used successfully year in and year out. Methods of dry farming were only slowly evolved. As a result, from a frontier where success attends only the man supported by large capital, farming population for a time receded.

Conquest of the last frontier

In the South, the typical agricultural change in the period was the breaking up of the large estate into tenant holdings held on various tenures of crop-sharing by whites and negroes. The mountain whites remained as they had been for two generations. The general development of farm technique, and the increased use of machinery, scientific manures, rotation of crops, choice of stock, were things in which by the guidance of agricultural departments, bureaus, colleges, and such organizations as the Grange, real progress was made, but progress of a sort difficult to be grasped save from statistics. Textile mills throughout the cotton districts, with the advantage of "bringing the shuttles to the cotton" and cheap labor, effected a diversification of industry.

The post-war South

Most important of all, in a sense, the postwar period saw a vast expansion of population by renewed European migration. Migration, of course, had gone on even during the Civil War, when recruiting offices at Castle Garden drew the immigrant into the union armies as he stepped off the boat; after the war, it went on faster than ever before. The causes of it are to be found mainly in the desire for economic betterment. From Germany and England, where the industrial systems could not

Immigration

absorb the rapidly increasing population, from countries essentially agricultural and maritime like Scandinavia, from Ireland where population actually declined in the nineteenth century thanks to famine and migration, came masses of emigrants to seek permanent homes in the seemingly boundless limits of the United States.

Causes for migration

In the case of the German, dislike of the imperial government and of military service must be credited with part of the migrants. The Irishman, resenting English rule over his country, carried his dislike of England with him, to influence his vote as a naturalized American citizen. By the decade of the 'nineties, the Russian Jew, impelled partly by repressive discrimination against his race, partly by the lure of business opportunities in great American cities, was an important factor. The Italian, finding no chance in his overpopulated homeland, came over, and often in a few years of work acquired enough money to live in comfort in Italy the rest of his days. The Chinese migration to the western coast stirred up nativist opposition, became a political issue, and was checked with little regard to the sanctity of existing treaties with China.

The sectional distribution of immigration

The section of country to which the migration tended, as shown by the foreign-born population in the censuses of 1880, 1890, and 1900, is important. South of Maryland and Kentucky, it was absolutely negligible, save in Texas. The routes of liners did not run to southern ports; neither the absence of industry nor the presence of the negro was inviting. In the Mountain and Pacific States, save New Mexico, the proportion of foreign-born was high. In the West North-Central States, it ran in 1890 as high as 16.9 per cent in Iowa, and 35.7 per cent in Minnesota, representing the presence of Scandinavian and German elements. In this whole group of northern States between the Mississippi and the mountains, it averaged 18 per cent of the population in 1900. In the Old Northwest, the foreign element was mainly in Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, 17.1 per cent in 1880, 18.6 per cent in 1890, 16.4 per cent in 1900; it was a selection of all the races that had come to the New World. New York and Pennsylvania had a huge foreign-born population.

Including New Jersey, the Middle Atlantic States had in 1900, 3,302,116 or 21.4 per cent. New England's foreign population, mainly in Massachusetts, in 1900 reached 25.7 per cent. In the whole United States, the foreign-born were 6,559,679 in 1880, 9,121,867 in 1890, 10,213,817 in 1900. Of foreign-born and mixed parentage in 1900 there were 15,646,017.

Of the foreign elements, the most important from 1870 to 1900 were the Irish and the German, numbering in 1900, 1,615,459 Irish, 2,813,628 Germans. There were 1,167,623 English, 1,072,092 Scandinavians, about 500,000 Italians, about 640,000 each Russians, Poles, and Austrians. The German element was significant, not only in the great cities such as New York and Chicago, but in farming communities in Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Nebraska, Iowa, and Michigan. The Irish were strong in Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Illinois, tending to the great cities. The Scandinavians were the significant factor in the farming communities of the upper Mississippi Valley. Italian and Jew clung to the great cities. In 1910 the foreign population was 40 per cent in New York, 35 per cent in Chicago, 36 per cent in Boston, 24 per cent in Philadelphia, 19 per cent in St. Louis.

Foreign stocks

Urban population was increasing fast. The United States was becoming less and less rural. In 1820 less than 5 per cent of the population of the United States lived in places of 8000 population. In 1860 the proportion had increased to 16 per cent; in 1870 it was almost 21 per cent; in 1890 it was almost 30 per cent; in 1900 it was above 33 per cent. If places of 2500 and above be considered urban the figure for 1900 would be above 40 per cent. The total population of the United States, after all, is the abiding index to the nation's development in the period. From thirty-eight and one-half millions in 1870 it increased to fifty millions in 1880, to sixty-three millions in 1890, to seventy-six millions in 1900. That the numbers of the people engaged in remaking the United States economically and socially in the period covered by this chapter had practically doubled states its significance in the most emphatic terms.

Urban development

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

F. L. Paxson, *The Last American Frontier.* New York, 1910.
——, *Recent History of the United States.* Boston, 1921.
——, *The New Nation.* Boston, 1915.
H. U. Faulkner, *American Economic History.* New York, 1924.
H. Thompson, *The Age of Invention* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. XXXVII). New Haven, 1921.
S. J. Buck, *The Granger Movement.* Cambridge, 1913.
——, *The Agrarian Crusade* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. XLV). New Haven, 1920.
J. Moody, *The Railroad Builders* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. XXXVIII). New Haven, 1919.
——, *The Masters of Capital* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. XLI). New Haven, 1919.
J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, vol. VIII. New York, 1919.
P. L. Haworth, *The United States in Our Own Times, 1865–1920.* New York, 1920.
L. D. Shippee, *Recent American History*, New York, 1924.
E. P. Oberholtzer, *A History of the United States Since the Civil War*, vols. I–III. New York, 1917–1926.
H. Thompson, *The New South* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. XLII). New Haven, 1920.

CHAPTER XXIX

POLITICS, 1877–1897

Contrasted with the economic and social background of the same years, the politics of the twenty years between Hayes and McKinley is incomprehensible. The economic structure of America was remaking from the foundations; great surges of protest were rising from classes who felt themselves aggrieved and, not understanding what was hurting them, grasped at random for projects of reform. Yet professional politicians so far as possible ignored the change; they paid attention to the protests it evoked only when their own ascendancy was threatened; and the measures of redress they offered were only patent medicines. In so far as special interests demanded tariff protection,and sections and elements of the nation protested against it, protection was an issue; in so far as demands for currency expansion threatened party ascendancy, politicians played with measures of inflation. In so far as reformers protested against the cynically frank spoils system, politicians offered measures of civil service reform; in so far as there was outcry against the railroads and monopolies, they passed interstate commerce commission and antitrust acts.

The divorce of politics and real life

So far as possible, however, Republican leaders in the North and Democratic leaders in the South preferred to capitalize Civil War records, union or confederate, civil or military, and to align union veterans on the issue of the "bloody shirt" and ex-Confederates on white domination in the South. Both northern and southern leaders attributed sacrosanct character to the Republican and Democratic parties, and in the face of third-party movements preached loyalty to party for party's sake. However little the contests of major parties for control of the national government had to do with the actual life of the nation in the period, their story must be told.

Survival of reconstruction issues

The Republican party, disrupted under Grant by nepotism and

corruption that reached even to the president's cabinet, had been on the defensive in the campaign of 1876. Of the rivals for the nomination, Roscoe Conkling was the frank exponent and defender of the methods of Grant's administration. James G. Blaine, though smirched by complicity in a railroad scandal of 1869, represented a more liberal and enlightened element in the party: oratorical ability and personal magnetism like Henry Clay's were his strength. Morton, the war governor of Indiana, and Bristow of Kentucky, the exposer of the Whisky Ring, were candidates of other groups. Fortunately for the party, the struggle between Conkling and Blaine, as foreseen, became a deadlock, and a man already foreshadowed as a compromise candidate, Rutherford B. Hayes of Ohio, received the nomination.

The nomination of Hayes, 1876

Hayes was an engaging figure. He had served from beginning to end of the Civil War with Ohio troops; in two terms, as governor of Ohio, he had established a record as an honest and capable administrator who put efficiency in office above party. To save the Republican party in the State he had been run for a third term in 1875; elected, he stood forward as a candidate for the presidency. In his letter of acceptance, he pledged himself to a single term and to honesty in the public service. Both pledges he loyally carried out. Yet by the irony of fate, the taint of the election of 1877 clung to this upright man to the end. "You hold that Packard is not the legal governor of Louisiana," sneered Blaine, when Hayes withdrew the federal bayonets that sustained the carpetbag government of Louisiana, which had cast the State's electoral vote for him, "and President Hayes has no title." "I have known," said the genial Missouri Democrat, Champ Clark, a generation later, "seven Presidents of the United States and Rutherford B. Hayes."

Rutherford B. Hayes

Hayes, satisfied in his own conscience of the justice of his election, went unflinchingly forward in the path of duty as he saw it. He and Mrs. Hayes, a charming matron of the Victorian type, earned the applause of temperance advocates by excluding all wines from the menus of state dinners at the White House; whether or not thirsting European

Hayes's administration

diplomats were surreptitiously regaled with frozen punch, masquerading in oranges, is another question. Hayes, in the appointment of his cabinet, offended the Stalwart or Grant leaders by the removal of Don Cameron of Pennsylvania as secretary of war and by the appointment of the liberal Carl Schurz as secretary of the interior. Having satisfied all rancor at his confederate foes on the battlefield, Hayes was with difficulty deterred from appointing Joseph E. Johnston secretary of war; actually, as a gesture of liberality to the South, he appointed Key, another ex-Confederate, post-master-general.

In administration, Hayes announced a rule against the participation of officeholders in politics which was measurably enforced. The New York City customhouse administration was honeycombed with politics, inefficiency, and corruption; Hayes prepared to remedy it by removing A. B. Cornell and Chester A. Arthur, two of the chief officers. Here he ran foul of the great Roscoe Conkling, senator from New York, on his senatorial privilege to approve the distribution of patronage in the State. Hayes's nominees for the offices were rejected when first sent in, October 29, 1877. Hayes renominated them and, in the winter of 1879, carried his point despite Conkling and senatorial courtesy.

Hayes and Conkling

The outstanding political event of Hayes's administration was the so-called resumption of specie payments—the preparation for redeeming the greenbacks in gold. John Sherman, brother of General Sherman, as United States senator had had an important share in the legislation of the early 'seventies by which the federal bonded indebtedness had been refunded on a specie basis. He had also been responsible for the law of 1875 providing for the retirement of greenbacks till the amount outstanding fell to $300,000,000, and for their redemption in gold after January 1, 1879. Now as Hayes's secretary of the treasury he completed the execution of the legislation he had helped to frame. By negotiation with an international financial syndicate, he refunded the remaining Civil War bonds; and by the sale of additional bonds he accumulated a gold reserve of 140 millions

The resumption of specie payments

to serve as a base for the redemption of greenbacks tendered at the treasury.

The inflationists, who believed a contraction of the currency bore hard on the debtor classes, nearly wrecked his scheme before it was put in operation. In 1853 and 1873 the government had demonetized silver by abandoning statutory provisions for the coinage of silver dollars. The increase in silver production, and other causes, produced a sharp decline in the price of silver from 1874; to create a new demand for it the silver mine owners demanded the restoration of the metal to the coinage. In 1877, Richard Bland of Missouri introduced in Congress a bill, which was rushed through the lower house, providing that free coinage of silver should be resumed—that silver bullion should be coined into dollars for any person presenting it at the mint.

Free silver

Such a measure would have overset all Sherman's negotiations for refunding and resumption by destroying the faith of foreign financiers in the stability of the American currency. He therefore secured the modification in the Senate of Bland's bill to what is known as the Bland-Allison Act of 1878. Briefly, it provided that the secretary of the treasury purchase each month from two to four million dollars worth of silver to be coined into silver dollars. The measure was a sop to the inflationists and silver producers which Sherman believed would have no disastrous effects. Hayes, with a stiffer sense of right and wrong, vetoed it, but the practical politicians in House and Senate passed it over his veto.

The Bland-Allison Act

As the time for the redemption of greenbacks in gold approached, there were misgivings. Congress, still afraid of inflationist sentiment, provided that no greenbacks should be permanently retired from circulation after May 31, 1878. As a result, they remained at the sum at which they stand to-day—some 346 millions. The premium which gold commanded in greenbacks grew smaller and completely disappeared a few days before the day set for redemption. On the day itself, January 2, 1879, so great was the confidence inspired by Sherman's gold reserve, that at New York only $135,000 in greenbacks was presented for redemption in gold, and $400,000 in gold was exchanged for the more convenient

Resumption

greenbacks. The United States currency was once more on a specie basis.

As the result of this financial achievement, Sherman was the logical candidate for the Republican nomination in 1880. He was from Ohio, the State which was the party bulwark in the northwest, which since 1876 has provided the Republican candidate in seven elections out of thirteen. While engaged in securing his position in Ohio, he had incidentally given utterance to a political phrase that has become idiomatic. When visiting the State in 1879, ostensibly to look after his farms, he had protested that he came only to "repair my fences," a term to which the newspapers promptly gave its present political meaning. Against each other were pitted again Half-Breed and Stalwart—the ingratiating Blaine, and Grant, put forward for a third term by his old associates. The Stalwarts were defeated in an attempt to enforce a unit rule on the convention. Again the deadlock seemed likely to be broken by a compromise candidate from Ohio; but by a strange chance the convention turned to James A. Garfield, who had come from the State as one of Sherman's managers. Garfield protested, not too urgently, against being substituted for the man he had come to support. As a sop to the Stalwarts, Chester A. Arthur, turned out of the New York customhouse by Hayes, was nominated for vice president.

Sherman and the nomination, 1880

Garfield, nearer than anyone thought to the close of his career, had risen from the lowliest beginnings to a high position in Ohio politics and to high command in the Civil War. (He was brilliant, lovable, and withal a little of the spoiled child.) His opponent, the Democratic nominee, was the stolid and corpulent Winfield S. Hancock, who had been a Civil War general, and had ingratiated himself with the South by his brief term as military governor in Louisiana. He made the campaign noteworthy by blurting out the truth that the tariff was "a local question," a matter of bargain among the interests of sections.

Garfield against Hancock

Yet the alignment offered him little chance of success. Since the failure of reconstruction, the Democratic candidate could count on the electoral vote of the States of the Confederacy and

ordinarily on Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, and perhaps West Virginia. Indiana was a doubtful State, but inclined to be Republican. If the State of New York and one or both of her political dependencies, Connecticut and New Jersey, went Democratic, they assured a Democratic triumph. Otherwise, the Republican votes west of the Mississippi—California, Oregon, Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, and Minnesota—joined with their strength in the Old Northwest, New England and Pennsylvania would insure Republican victory. Garfield was elected by 214 electoral votes to 155.

The election of Garfield

The opening of Garfield's term and the tragedy that ended his life threw the public attention strongly on legislative civil service reform. At the outset of his term, the President, ignoring Conkling, removed the collector of New York to appoint one of Blaine's friends; Conkling and his satellite, Senator Thomas C. Platt, known in political slang as "Me-too" Platt, resigned to seek vindication by a reëlection from the New York legislature. Their triumphant return to the Senate would have written the rule of "senatorial courtesy" in appointments into our political system; fortunately both were defeated. Garfield, on the eve of his triumph, was shot in a Washington railroad station by a man who had brooded over office seeking until he had become mentally unbalanced; but the medical skill of that pre-aseptic age could not save the President; and his secretary of state, Blaine, spoke his eulogy in the ornate rhetoric of sentiment which in that day could still atone for lapses from integrity.

Garfield's assassination

The accession to the presidency of Chester A. Arthur, almost a discredited New York politician, came as a severe shock to all high-minded persons; but Arthur's character seemed to rise to the new responsibilities laid upon it. He became the advocate of civil service reform as, indeed, Grant had been before him. The first Civil Service Act was passed in 1883 applying to about 13,000 offices. There was to be a nonpartisan commission, to give examinations which were to determine rank on an eligibility list. The substitution of such a system was sneered at by Stalwarts like John A. Logan as a Chinese

Arthur and civil service

system; but term by term the number of offices to which the system applies has been increased, until now the field for political appointments is limited to a very few of the higher positions. The weakness, of course, is inherent that people fall into small offices and there rest content and go to seed in a monotonous routine, more and more weakly performed as they pass into senile decay. Yet with the decline in the value of salaries, permanence of tenure is more than ever essential to exclude unfit persons from appointment.

In 1882, Arthur showed a most commendable firmness in the veto of a Chinese exclusion act, and a river-and-harbor bill loaded with plums for constituencies of favored members, the latter bill passing over his veto. A tariff commission was appointed in the same year to reconsider the whole question of protection and the high duties that had survived the Civil War period of high taxes. The "local interests" in Congress attacked the commission report, and the bargaining between them produced a measure that even sound protectionists could not approve.

Arthur's administration

In the election of 1884, Arthur stood forward as a candidate for the nomination; he was unfortunate in that the high-minded group were not sufficiently convinced of his conversion, and the Stalwarts regarded him as something of a renegade. Blaine again put his personal appeal into the scales of a convention and this time defeated his rival. John A. Logan of Illinois, the "Black Eagle," a brave volunteer soldier who was at his best on the battlefield and at his worst in politics, was nominated for vice president and served to rally the old soldiers to the standard of the "bloody shirt." The "Confederate Brigadiers" who, with the ending of reconstruction, had found their way back to Congress, were pointed out as the enemies to be kept from power by all lawful means.

Blaine and Logan

Against Blaine and Logan the Democrats put forward one of the most remarkable men of his day in politics, Grover Cleveland, who as sheriff, as mayor of Buffalo, and as governor of New York, had established a reputation for blunt devotion to duty. Cleve-

land was not the manageable sort of statesman that politicians of the Tammany stripe desire. He was not highly educated, and had no graces to win popular affection; but he was immovably obstinate in what he considered right, and could not be lured or driven from a course he had resolved on by either hope or fear. The Republicans endeavored to make use of a scandal that had clouded his earlier life; but contrasted with the affair of the Mulligan letters, the situation drew from a shrewd observer the remark that as Blaine was unblemished in private life and tainted in public, it might be well to leave him in the sphere he adorned and to elevate Cleveland from the private life in which he was peccable to the public career in which his honor was unstained.

Grover Cleveland

The dilemma of many upright public men made the campaign known as the Mugwump campaign; Mugwumps were Republicans who, unable to stomach Blaine's record, forsook the sacred bonds of party allegiance and voted for Cleveland. Many a Republican, like Henry Cabot Lodge or Theodore Roosevelt, sorely tempted, put party first. Yet the campaign was exceedingly close. Near its end, in a public address in Blaine's presence, a Protestant clergyman alluded to the Democrats with fateful alliteration as the party of "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion." Blaine, although he had as secretary of state catered to the Irish in policy and appointments, and had their peculiar favor, failed to turn aside the phrase when he replied; it has been said that he had dozed off and had not heard it. Widely circulated by the Democrats in New York, it helped to turn the extremely narrow margin of 1149 votes by which Cleveland carried the State and won the election.

The Mugwumps; Cleveland elected

Hampered as he necessarily was by Republican majorities in House or Senate, Cleveland's term offered little in the way of constructive legislation. The belated Interstate Commerce Commission Act of 1887 was, of course, the fruit of the farmers' movement; it submitted to federal authority the regulation of common carriers beyond the control of a single State. Cleveland administered fearlessly and, on the whole, excellently. The accession of the Democrats to power

Cleveland's administration

after a quarter of a century of opposition naturally caused a demand for partisan removals and appointments. Some of Cleveland's were criticized by the civil service advocates, but, as the President said, the public saw only the cases where he yielded to pressure, not those where he stood firm against it. He added almost 12,000 positions to those under civil service regulation. The Rebel Brigadiers in the cabinet did not cause the disastrous results that Republicans had prophesied. Cleveland was betrayed into the error of attempting to return the captured Confederate battle flags to the States whose troops had carried them, a score of years before northern public opinion was ready for the step. His vetoes of pension bills caused savage comment on the fact that he had hired a substitute when drafted in the Civil War. But on the side of national power, his secretary of the navy, W. C. Whitney, the astute New York speculator in traction, developed the newer American navy. The President, himself, in a controversy with the Senate as to its right to inquire for the information on which the president appoints or removes, vindicated his right to make removals unquestioned. In 1887, the repeal of the last relics of the Tenure of Office Act restored the presidency and the Senate to the relative position which they had had before Johnson's time.

Into the campaign of 1888, Cleveland without seeking party counsel, flung the issue of tariff revision. His message in 1887 pointed to the growing surplus as an argument that the nation was collecting too much in taxes. Republicans claimed that the surplus, in itself no evil, might be applied to the public debt. The Mills tariff bill, passed by the Democratic House, was laid aside in the Republican Senate for a highly protectionist measure. Thus the issue went to the country. Cleveland had made enemies enough among the worse sections of his party, but his renomination was necessarily a foregone conclusion. On the Republican side, John Sherman was again an aspirant. Once more he had to complain of backwardness on the part of his Ohio cohorts when the honor went to Benjamin Harrison of Indiana, a lawyer so stiff and ungracious in manner

The tariff issue and the campaign of 1888

that men introduced to him were previously cautioned that his bearing was not to be taken as personal to themselves.

The inevitable ground swell against the party in power, the bloody shirt, and defection from Cleveland in New York were advantages that not even Harrison's personality could overcome. Despite a slight majority in the popular vote for Cleveland, Harrison was elected, and the Republicans, once more in office, prepared to harvest the fruit from the Civil War issues. The mounting revenue from the tariff, creating a great surplus in the treasury, had been the argument for tariff revision in the campaign; by a still more liberal pension law and enthusiastic administration of it under "Corporal" Tanner as commissioner, the Republicans planned to destroy the argument. They played with the idea of a law for federal control of elections in a last hope of recovering some of the southern States by preventing the counting out of negro votes. In the session of 1889–1890 they passed a new tariff law, known as the McKinley Bill, more protectionist than ever, with a provision for reciprocity agreements; in world trade, it inaugurated a new era of protection and tariff wars that led finally to the World War. Two acts bore Senator John Sherman's name, an act rendering combinations in restraint of trade unlawful, aimed at the monopolies to which the term "trusts" applied, and the Sherman Silver Purchase Act.

Republican legislation, 1889–1890

The latter act calls for some comment. The Bland-Allison Act of 1878, duly obeyed for twelve years, had resulted in the coinage of more silver dollars than could be used in the country's trade. City men objected to the weight and inconvenience of five or ten silver dollars in their pockets; the country districts did not absorb enough of them; even the device of issuing silver certificates in small denominations representing the deposit of silver dollars in the treasury had not helped. Unsatisfactory as the act was, the silver inflationists demanded that it be replaced by free coinage. The Silver Purchase Act, a compromise measure, called for the monthly purchase of four and a half million ounces of silver at the market price, notes

The Sherman Silver Purchase Act

known as "Treasury notes of 1890," with legal tender privileges, redeemable in coin, being issued in payment. The act threw a heavy burden on the dwindling gold surplus for the redemption of the greenbacks. If the time should ever come when the government should attempt to redeem greenback or treasury notes in silver dollars, the silver men could expect to see the country on the silver standard.

The country, in the election of 1890, registered its displeasure with the Republican party with crushing distinctness. Republican monetary legislation was open to criticism from the point of view of conservative eastern financiers, and the denatured Sherman Silver Purchase Act could not atone to the west for the higher prices insured by the "McKinley Tariff." There, the Populists cut deep into Republican strength and an overwhelmingly Democratic Congress was elected. The reaction had not run its course when the presidential year arrived. Harrison naturally was renominated to succeed himself; Blaine had coquetted with a rival candidacy but too late to secure results. The Democrats, in spite of the bitter opposition of Tammany, renominated Cleveland. The Populists again aided by their inroads on Republican strongholds. Since the last election, a block of western Republican States had been admitted—Washington, North and South Dakota, Montana in 1889, Idaho and Wyoming in 1890. But Cleveland was elected by 5,556,543 votes to 5,175,582.

Cleveland's second election

In his second term, fortune deserted him. The rising tide of discontent that had dragged the Republicans down in 1890 and 1892 was not to be checked by such a Democratic administration as Cleveland could give. Incapable of deviating from what he thought the right course, in order to court popular favor, he rendered his party more unpopular than the Republicans had been, and saw it snatched from his control by elements for which he had the most profound contempt and abhorrence.

Cleveland's second term

Barely had he been inaugurated when the world panic of 1893 broke like a thunderstorm in the United States, leaving in its path ruin, unemployment, low prices, and hard times. Not until 1897

did an improvement appear; the Republicans took advantage of the two dates to convince the nation that a Democratic administration always led to hard times. The Wilson tariff, passed by Congress in 1894, involved the same bargaining of protected interests that had distinguished Republican tariffs. Cleveland was so disgusted with the betrayal of the party faith that he let the act become law without his signature. The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the income tax provision intended to supplement the decrease of customs revenue, alleging that it was a direct tax and therefore must be levied on the States in proportion to the federal ratio; hard times added nothing to popular satisfaction with the new tariff.

The Panic of 1893; the Wilson tariff

Meanwhile, Cleveland's obstinate maintenance of the gold standard, winning the approval of eastern financiers, met the condemnation of the vast masses of the west, enamored of free silver. The Sherman Silver Purchase Act was rapidly eating into the gold reserve as the treasury notes issued in payment for silver bullion were presented for redemption. When it became necessary to redeem them in silver, the currency of the country would depreciate to a silver basis. Cleveland at once called a special session of Congress to meet, August 7, 1893, to consider a repeal of the act. Not for years afterward did the country know that on July first a most serious operation on the President's jaw was secretly performed in a yacht off New York. It was known that his vice president, Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois, would not resist the silver forces; the knowledge that the President's life was in the slightest jeopardy would have caused a run on the gold reserve that would have wrecked the currency at once. When Congress appeared, the silver group, strongly intrenched and over-represented in the Senate through the recent admission of western States with small population, opposed repeal. Only with Republican help was it accomplished; on the money issue, the Democrats were hopelessly split.

The repeal of the Sherman Act

Even with the repeal accomplished the question was whether it had not come too late. The gold reserve was dwindling fast under the assaults of treasury notes already in circulation, pre-

sented for redemption in gold and by legal requirement paid out to be again presented. To build up the gold reserve as fast as the "endless chain" scooped it away, Cleveland obstinately borrowed from New York financiers, like the Morgans, on one bond issue after another. Only when it was apparent that he would continue to do so indefinitely, if necessary, did public confidence return and the run on the reserve cease. The vocal masses of his party denounced him as the tool of Wall Street. The election of 1894 witnessed a Democratic overthrow like that of the Republicans four years before.

Cleveland maintains the gold standard

For the Republican presidential nomination in 1896, a candidate was once more being groomed in Ohio. The astute financier, Marcus A. Hanna, master of Cleveland traction and manipulator of state legislatures, had ambitions for national political sway; by an elaborately organized propaganda throughout the nation, he was putting forward Major William McKinley, a Civil War veteran of kindly disposition, and far more statesmanlike in outward presence than in reality. The close friend of Hanna, he was far more under Hanna's influence than he imagined. His authorship of the tariff of 1890 suggested the slogan: "Bill McKinley and the McKinley Bill"; on the important monetary issue he had leaned toward the silver side, but money was a perplexing issue on which many statesmen kept their minds open rather than clear. Hanna's elaborate preparations led to the easy nomination of McKinley on a Republican platform of protection that postponed the establishment of silver as a coördinate standard with gold until bimetallism could be set up by international agreement.

Hanna and McKinley

By the logic of events, the Republicans were compelled to take more decisive ground for the gold standard. Cleveland had completely lost control of his party; and with the discontent arising from hard times, it was to turn more completely in the direction of radicalism and populism than either major party had done before. When the Democrats met in convention in Chicago, the radical elements were in the saddle. They voted down a resolution indorsing

The Chicago Convention, 1896

Cleveland's administration, and one approving the gold standard. The silver men were manifestly in control; the surface indications seemed to point to the nomination of Bland or some other well-known silverite.

Then, with a dramatic entrance, one of the most significant personalities of American history took the center of the stage.

William Jennings Bryan

William Jennings Bryan, born in Illinois in 1860, a graduate of Illinois College, elected congressman from Nebraska in 1890, defeated for senator in 1894, delivered the famous "Cross of Gold" speech with its climax, "You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns, you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold," and in an instant achieved the place as a national figure that he held until his death a generation later. A presence at once magnetic and kindly, a voice silvery and powerful as a great organ, a mind with scope not far beyond the mass of those to whom he appealed, these would not have served him without the moral fervor which made him regard every political issue as a question of vice and virtue—free silver, anti-imperialism, government control of railroads, prohibition, anti-evolution. Yet he was always the shrewd party man as well as the moralist; if his party rejected one of his moral issues, he never rejected his party. His abiding appeal to the moral sense of the masses of his countrymen gave him unique influence over them; yet, for some strange reason of popular psychology, they never gave him the high office for which he was thrice an active and once, at least, a passive candidate.

Bryan's passionate plea for a moral monetary system in the shape of the free and unlimited coinage of silver at the ratio of

The campaign of 1896

sixteen to one, without waiting for the consent of any other nation, sent him as the Democratic candidate on a great speaking tour of the whole nation; everywhere he pleaded passionately for "the money of the fathers" as a matter of right against wrong. The Democratic party had adopted the Populist money doctrine; the Populists had to indorse the Democratic candidate. Cleveland and his friends, in disgust, set up a Gold Democrat ticket headed by John M. Palmer of Illinois and

S. B. Buckner of Kentucky, a union and a confederate general united on the avowed basis of defeating Bryan by luring Democratic votes from him. It was offset by a similar Silver Republican movement in behalf of Bryan led by Senator Teller, a seceder from the Republican convention.

To Bryan's campaign of emotion and enthusiasm, the wily Hanna opposed a campaign of organization, education, and appeal to interest. Delegation after delegation trooped into Canton, Ohio, to hear McKinley, on his front porch, deliver harangues, later to be spread by a newspaper publicity system throughout the country. Campaign literature, in all the languages, supplemented the press with its syndicated campaign material. Buttons, badges, huge lead coins in derision of the "Bryan" silver dollars, emblems like the "Full Dinner Pail," posters of McKinley as the "Advance Agent of Prosperity" implied promises of employment and good wages in the event of a Republican triumph. Money for needed political organization was lavishly poured out. Manufacturers, in hope of Republican tariffs, contributed to campaign funds and informed their hands on the eve of election of a probable shutdown if Bryan were elected. The appeal to material interest outweighed the appeal to moral sense; and McKinley was triumphantly elected 271 electoral votes to 176, 7,111,607 popular votes to 6,509,052. Mark Hanna claimed his reward in a Republican senatorship from Ohio, the aged John Sherman being made secretary of state to vacate the coveted seat. The politics of the nation seemed to the astute observer to be at last coördinated with the financial interests which were most able to make themselves heard.

The victory of the Republicans

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

C. R. Williams, *Life of Rutherford Birchard Hayes*. 2 vols. Boston, 1914.
C. R. Fish, *The Civil Service and the Patronage*. New York, 1905.
F. L. Paxson, *Recent History of the United States*. Boston, 1921.
P. L. Haworth, *The United States in Our Own Times, 1865–1920*. New York, 1920.
L. D. Shippee, *Recent American History*. New York, 1924.
J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, vol. VIII. New York, 1919.

CHAPTER XXX

UNREST AND CHANGE, 1873–1897

The expansion of the United States in the quarter century 1873–1897 altered fundamentally the adjustments to society of individuals and classes alike. Where the attempt at readjustment took the form of new political parties, new reform movements, it can be described more or less adequately, and used to suggest the similar process of adjustment in the lives of individuals. The process was necessarily marked by the ebb and flow of prosperity, always leaving suffering and discontent as it receded. A period of hard times, unemployment, falling wages and prices from 1873 to 1877 culminated in the strikes of that year and in the Greenback Party. The era of better times that reached the crest in the early 'eighties ended with the difficulties of 1883–1886. The panic of 1893 marked the crashing close of a third era of prosperity to be succeeded by hard times until the Spanish-American War.

The readjustment of the social order

As far as labor was concerned, American workmen in this period were receiving from the European artisans flooding into the country an education in radical economic ideas that were new to them. In earlier periods, the United States had had the new lands of the frontier to allay discontent, and the most radical demand that underpaid labor could voice was for free farms. But in the older, densely populated European nations more radical doctrines had developed; they came to America with the immigrants.

Foreign radical theories

The intellectual father of the present socialist groups is the German economist, Karl Marx. To Marx, the accumulation of capital represented the withholding from labor of a part of the product of its toil. Capital was the stored-up labor of the past, allowed by its holders to coöperate with labor of the present in production only on condition of their receiving a

Socialism

share of the product. The followers of Marx have usually advocated as a remedy for this alleged injustice the control of capital and with it of all industry by the State. The normal socialist is a believer in more rigorous and extensive government.

Anarchism is the fruit of an entirely different type of thought, social rather than economic. The woes of the workman, and indeed of all men, the anarchist traces to the interference with the normal current of their lives by authority. Were government nonexistent, he teaches, the normal unrestrained impulses of men would lead them in the paths of social peace and order. Crime, distress, and suffering represent merely the abnormal and violent breaking out of human nature under the pressure of government and established law. One group of anarchists preaches the violent overthrow and destruction of governments and governors; all anarchists are necessarily at the opposite scale of belief from socialists.

Anarchy

A third doctrine, anarchist in origin and of somewhat later growth, is syndicalism, a belief not dissimilar from that professed in theory by the Bolshevist group in Russia. It teaches that the proper unit of human society is the producing group of workmen, owning and controlling the capital with which they produce. In order to gain control of capital, syndicalist groups, such as the Industrial Workers of the World, advocate persistent warfare on capitalists by strikes with or without provocation, by slack, inefficient, and destructive work, until in despair capital is resigned to the workers.

Syndicalism

Ideas such as these permeated certain parts of the industrial laboring classes in the United States along with the formation of unions more extended and permanent than those of an earlier day. The foundation of the National Labor Union in 1866 revealed an ability of the workers to unite if only temporarily, on national lines. By 1868 the union had 640,000 members and with them sought to enter politics. The Knights of Labor, founded in 1869, was a secret order that soon spread from end to end of the country, organized in lodges based on districts, and not on the trades of their members. A savage rail-

National labor organizations

road strike against a reduction in wages that put Pittsburgh, Baltimore and other places in the hands of mobs for days in 1877 and was only quelled by militia and regulars, indicated the depth of the labor movement necessarily arising out of the new industrial order.

1886: the Haymarket Riot

The year 1886 was, in a sense, the culmination of the earlier phases of the labor movement. A fierce and unsuccessful strike on the Missouri Pacific and other roads practically wrecked the Knights of Labor. At Chicago, a strike at the McCormick Harvester Works was guided by radicals and newspapers advocating extreme anarchy. Chicago, indeed, for the moment was the center of the anarchist movement in the United States. The police tried to suppress a meeting in Haymarket square on May 4, 1886; a bomb was thrown, killing seven and injuring sixty policemen. The courts announced a doctrine that the persons inciting the mob at the meeting and before it were accessories to the crime, and condemned seven persons to be hanged; two had their sentences commuted to imprisonment for life, and were later pardoned by Governor Altgeld.

The labor movement splits

The year 1886 marked the parting of the ways. More or less under cover, thoroughly insignificant in size and importance, the anarchist group has persisted to this day. Syndicalism, represented in our day by the hordes of migrant workers drifting from State to State to harvest crops, to work at lumbering, to work in canning-mills, and to perform other seasonal work, is present as a constant element of disorder. Socialism, organized in the Socialist party, has become conservative and has occasionally, as in 1908, drawn a protest vote of respectable size.

American Federation of Labor

From all these, the ruling labor organization in the United States, the American Federation of Labor, founded in 1887, has diverged. It is essentially a union of crafts; it is made up of a series of national or so-called international unions, each representing a specific trade, carpenters, plumbers, cigar-makers, horseshoers. Each of these national unions is made up of state organizations and of locals containing men actually employed in the craft in question. City and state

federations of labor unite the various local groups. This organization has generally eschewed formal participation in politics, entering it only to combat menacing legislation or court decisions. Its policy is to secure, locally or nationally, higher wages, shorter hours, better conditions, by obtaining them by collective bargains and agreements with employers, the fruit of negotiation or strikes. Its policy looks forward to advance, endless advance, by steps taken by units in the various trades here, there, and everywhere, toward a constantly receding goal of more and more for the workman.

The industrial laborer, as we shall see, not infrequently pooled his interests politically in these years with the farmer in a series of evanescent political parties that sought to win a series of reforms, most of them long since achieved. The laborer had to demand the recognition in law of the eight-hour day as the normal working day, the abolition of competition of convict with free labor, mechanics' lien laws that would enable the workman to levy for unpaid wages on the property on which he worked. Realizing that on certain types of machines child labor could compete with adult labor, and that the influence of steady work on children would be disastrous, he demanded the abolition of child labor. Believing he was better employed and at a larger real wage in flush times, he demanded cheaper money—currency inflation.

Political demands of labor

The farmer in this period was suffering from the results of too rapid agricultural development and a glutted world market. In the days of the Civil War American grain first invaded the markets of the world on a large scale. A decade later American beef followed. Both wheat and beef, produced on cheap land,sold at such low prices as to initiate an agricultural depression in Europe. Under the lure of the new market vast bodies of land in the newer west were turned to agricultural uses. In 1870 the total area under cultivation in the United States was about 189,000,000 acres. In 1880 it had increased to 285,000,000 acres; in 1900 it was 414,000,000 acres. The conquest of these new farm lands was partly the work of the American stock, partly of farmers

Agricultural evolution

driven from Europe by the competition of the fresh American soils. American agricultural produce reached fabulous amounts. Under the load of so huge a supply world prices fell or fluctuated from year to year.

The farmer was always the victim of the succession of good and bad times. In the optimism of high-price eras, he bought farms on mortgage at high prices per acre based on high-crop prices. In hard times, at low-crop prices, he often could not pay the interest on his mortgage with the produce of his high-priced acres. He generally had to go in debt for the money to "move the crop"—that is, to pay his labor in harvest season until the price of the harvested crop was received. Accordingly, there was a yearly stringency in American finance, when money had to be diverted to the rural sections from metropolitan banks, even from Europe. The farmer had to borrow from his local bank; generally he borrowed in bank notes, and as he thought of the loan, he reflected on the unfairness of letting the bank issue him a loan at high interest that represented a doubling of property on which it already enjoyed a return—the United States bonds deposited with the Treasury to secure the notes. Under these circumstances, he listened with approval to proposals that the banks be denied the power of issue, that the United States government issue greenbacks, the money that had won the Civil War, and that it install subtreasuries among the farmers to lend them money on fair terms as they needed it.

The farmers' grievances

Generally a debtor for the money that had helped to buy his mortgaged farm, for improvements in stock and machinery on it, for money to move his crops, the farmer looked with peculiar distrust and anger on the years of contracting currency and falling prices of produce; he could see that he must raise several times as many bushels of grain to pay his debt in the late 'seventies and early 'eighties as in the flush 'sixties; he listened readily to statements that contracting currency and low prices were the result of Wall Street manipulation; and he clamored for currency inflation by greenbacks, free silver, or both.

The farmer demands inflation

Some of his other grievances have been mentioned. He could justly complain of high rates charged by railroads and warehouses for handling his crops, unjust rebates and freight tariffs in moving them, financial chicanery in connection with railroad bond issues and management. As Wall Street control of the railroads was demonstrated, the farmer listened more earnestly to the war cries of "the man against the dollar," and "down with the trusts." The older parties seemed to try to make him forget his personal grievances by frantic attempts to revive the Civil War issues. In politics, old generals in the North waved the bloody shirt, adjuring him to stand by the disfranchised southern negro and "vote as you shot." Old generals of the South adjured him not to hazard the white man's supremacy by leaving the Democratic for the Populist party.

The farmer and the old parties

The Populist party was merely the culmination of a series of farmers' and farmer-labor movements. The National Grange was founded in Washington by a certain O. H. Kelley and a few other government clerks as a fraternal organization, for farmers and farmers' wives, that would promote social intercourse, better methods of farming, and coöperative buying and marketing. In 1871 it first became firmly established in the midst of an agricultural depression due to the rapid extension of the frontier and consequent low-crop prices. The hard times of 1871 and 1873 swelled the membership of the Grange: on it the farmers in eleven western States based independent parties to right their wrongs. In Illinois, the Anti-Monopoly party in 1873 carried 53 counties out of 66 it contested, and ousted a Supreme Court justice who had declared a state railway act unconstitutional. This first spurt of anger spent itself against railroads and warehouses in the Granger legislation passed in the northwest States, and soon repealed in most of them by railroad pressure. An ill-advised excursion into manufacturing farm implements put the Grange heavily in debt, and its membership fell away.

The Granger movement

In the election of 1872, a National Labor party met in convention, adopted a greenback platform, nominated Justice David Davis, and disbanded when he refused to run. In 1876, it was

replaced by an Independent party, which polled but 1 per cent of the votes for its candidate, Peter Cooper. The crisis of 1877, however, gave the party new life. On a program of greenbacks, free silver, no prison labor, no Chinese immigration, it polled a million votes and elected fifteen congressmen. In 1880, as the Greenback party, adding to its former demands woman suffrage and an income tax on the rich, it polled 308,000 votes. The party declined as rapidly as it rose; in 1882 it had but one congressman. In 1884, it nominated Ben Butler for president and polled but 175,000 votes.

The Greenback movement

A new period of low prices or poor crops had already begun in 1883, and out of it arose a new farmers' movement. The Farmers' Alliance had originated in Texas in the middle 'eighties and soon spread into other southern States. A similar organization developed in the North; and though the two did not combine, they coöperated. Between 1886 and 1888, a political alliance developed between the remnant of the Knights of Labor, the Farmers' Alliance, and the Greenbackers. In 1889, it demanded greenbacks issued by local subtreasuries as a substitute for bank notes, free silver, laws against dealing in grain futures, government ownership of railroads. The Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890 failed to satisfy it. In southern States, it seized control of the Democratic party, overthrew the "Rebel Brigadiers"—the old aristocrats who had guided the white man's party; in State after State it elected governors, congressmen, and senators. In the North, where the area of growing pains, radicalism, and discontent had shifted west, since the 'seventies, to the mortgage and grasshopper-infested plains of Kansas and Nebraska, flaming agitators, female and male, like Mary Elizabeth Lease and "Sockless Jerry Simpson," went through the land preaching the Populist crusade, and creating a party which, in Republican strongholds, threw control to the Democrats.

The Farmers' Alliance; the Populists

In 1892, the Populist party formulated demands for legal tender issues, free silver, graduated income tax, postal savings banks, government loans for farmers, the initiative and referendum, direct election of United States senators, one presidential term, and

shorter hours of labor. If it be remembered that the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 allows indefinite currency inflation, it will be seen that nearly all these demands of the radical west of 1892 have been adopted. In the election, the Populists with Weaver and Field as their candidates showed themselves a strong third party. Their strength lay mainly beyond the Missouri River, though in Illinois their influence helped to elect the radical Democratic governor, John P. Altgeld; but they gained 22 electoral votes and, in the nation, a popular vote of a million.

The Populists in 1892

Cleveland, elected president for a second term, forced the Populist issue. How that strong obstinate man, incapable of bending to popular clamor, firmly convinced of the necessity of sound money, forced the issue by the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act and the building up of the treasury gold reserve by selling United States bonds to the Morgans has been told. The hard times that followed the panic of 1893, the railroad strike of 1894, its suppression by Cleveland's threat to use the United States army, all raised the radical excitement to white heat. When radicalism seized control of the Democratic party in the person of Bryan, the Populists indorsed him. When he was defeated, when a new era of prosperity set in, such as the farmer had not hitherto known, Populism and radical movements, based on the laborer and farmer, disappeared for a score of years. Populism, however, had democratized the Democratic party in the South. A brief period of alliances with Republicans on local issues passed away, and the Democratic party remained intrenched in power as the white man's party; but it was dominated by elements from lower orders of society than the aristocrats who had guided it in the first years after reconstruction.

The Populists support Bryan, 1896

Besides the elements that cried out for government action to lift the yoke of oppression from their necks, there were other more conservative elements which felt that there was much in American political life that called for reform. Typical among them were such men as E. L. Godkin who made the weekly New York *Nation* a strong moral force in politics,

Reformers

George W. Curtis, Horace White. Men of social standing, conservative in utterance, they attacked the immoral elements in party control of government and demanded a house-cleaning in politics.

Certain evils were but too apparent to men with knowledge and moral sense. The procuring of franchises and special corporate privileges by railroads or street railway lobbies from city and state governments, the presence of corrupt elements in Congress and the cabinet, were defects, the obvious remedy for which seemed to be the election of better men to office. The deeper difficulty seemed to be the party system, the choice of party candidates by manipulation of party conventions and soap-box primaries, and the appeal to the party voter to support the party nominees, however unfit, on the basis of party loyalty.

Corruption in public life

The party system, therefore, seemed to be a fair point of attack because of the extravagant loyalty it demanded of its adherents. Men like Curtis preached and practiced the duty of independent voting, of deserting party candidates like Blaine who were tainted with political immorality. On the revolters from Blaine in 1884, the indignant party chiefs branded the name "Mugwumps." Rather than bear it, more sensitive workers for the right like the young Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge fell into the ranks behind Blaine.

The Mugwumps

The attempt to purify party politics by legal regulation of party machinery and of the choice of party candidates was a device of the future. In the late 'eighties, the only remedy attempted was reform of the ballot. Hitherto, ballots were unofficial, and were furnished in printed tickets by political parties; this insured votes for the straight ticket and facilitated the stuffing of the ballot box when need arose. In 1888, Massachusetts adopted the so-called Australian ballot, furnished by the election authorities and allowing the voter in secret to choose his candidates out of the various tickets. The system did away with much of the old fraud, and much of the incentive to regular party voting. It has long since spread throughout the Union.

The Australian Ballot

Another point on which the intellectuals laid especial stress was civil service reform, the abolition of the old system in which appointive offices from highest to lowest were made rewards of party loyalty and election work, and the substitution of a system of making appointments to all offices not intrusted with the determination of government policy, on the basis of fitness demonstrated by competitive examination. Its adoption has already been discussed. Essentially, the work of Curtis and his associates cleared the way for the activity of later years, which culminated in the Progressive party of 1912, for the recognition of politics as something more than a game between rival groups of players for control of government for their private advantage.

Civil Service reform

In other ways than politics, the period seemed to offer the promise of improvement of the standards of American life. In no way was this more apparent than in education, especially in the colleges. The colleges of 1870, still teaching the classics and mathematics, the basis of English education for centuries past, underwent a reform that brought them into touch with the purposes of their own day. The period saw their courses enlarged to include the exact sciences, chemistry, physics, biology, and the social sciences, history, economics, and political science; it saw the introduction of modern languages into the curriculum. This humanization was carried out by a few great university presidents; Eliot at Harvard, Andrew D. White at Cornell, James R. Angell at Michigan were at work by 1871. Five years later at Johns Hopkins, Daniel C. Gilman set in operation a new university, its most important part being a graduate school to train men, by research in special subjects, to be worthy to hold college professorships in them. From Johns Hopkins came a group of men with the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, supplementing the men trained to the same degree in the German universities, who introduced exact and scientific methods of study in the physical and social sciences. Often they did not have the breadth and power of the great scientists and scholars of the earlier period—Agassiz, Audubon, George

Reform of university education

Bancroft—but they furnished a trained and energetic staff to the rejuvenated and multiplying American colleges.

College education, indeed, was expanding in all directions. Education for women was undertaken with adequate endowments by the foundation of Vassar in 1865, Wellesley and Smith in 1875, Radcliffe in 1879, Bryn Mawr in 1885. In the West, colleges tended early to the coeducational idea which did not gain ground in the old established schools of the East. The western denominational colleges founded by the dozen to train ministers, with the state universities such as Michigan, Indiana, and Wisconsin, founded in part on the great pioneer ideal that education from low to high was the concern of the State and properly a part of one great system, were supplemented in the period by the so-called Morrill Land Grant Colleges. An endowment of federal lands by the Morrill Act of 1862 was bestowed on each State for the establishment of schools of agriculture and the mechanical arts. Development under these grants has varied. In certain States, such as Illinois and Minnesota, the land grant colleges have broadened into great state universities; in other States they have developed into technical colleges of agriculture and engineering. In either case, they sent out classes of young men trained in engineering and scientific farming. The rejuvenation of the colleges, their increase in numbers, enrollment, endowment, trained staffs and graduates seemed perhaps to promise a deeper revivifying of American life than has actually occurred.

The new colleges

Secondary and primary education, especially in the North, also improved. The kindergarten, introduced into the country before the Civil War, attracted great attention at the Philadelphia exposition. The development of normal schools for training teachers of high caliber, the establishment of rural teachers' institutes for giving a few days' training to teachers of lower grade, the standardization of texts, courses, and methods, the production of up-to-date textbooks at prices to allow their general use, have all raised the standard of American education. The three R's were supplemented by geography, history, grammar;

Improved education

the introduction of manual training and physical exercise was beginning. Compulsory school attendance laws, state subsidies, local taxation, all helped to raise standards. Especially in northern cities, secondary public schools developed, equal in faculty, courses, and thoroughness of work to the very best preparatory schools. In number and attendance they were few in comparison with later developments, but their very presence offered an incentive to higher education.

In the South, due to poverty, to unwillingness to levy taxes for schools, to an old tradition that a man should himself pay for the education of his children, to unwillingness to spend money on schooling for negro children, education lagged behind the North. Schools were taught for short terms, and not efficiently. Schoolhouses, textbooks, and methods of instruction remained primitive. Colleges, checked by the Civil War, did not spring up or grow so rapidly as in the North. There was not, indeed, the development of secondary schools to feed them. Still, in comparison with the former situation, progress was being made.

Education in the South

Popular life, if anything, was becoming more sane and healthy. The development of professional baseball, marked by the formation of the National League in 1876, offered a rival attraction to horse racing and prize fighting even if ethical standards in baseball were not always noticeably higher. The terrific John L. Sullivan, a huge, wild bull of a man inspired by a mad lust of battle, whose savage rushes overthrew opponents by hundreds, who toured the country offering rewards to any man who could stay two minutes in the ring with him, was heavyweight champion from 1882 to 1892. The unregenerate only were supposed to take notice of his activities, but they were legion. In barroom or pool hall a man might lift in pride "the hand that shook the hand of John L. Sullivan."

Professional sport

The generation that went into the colleges after the Civil War found a delight in athletics which their fathers had missed. Intercollegiate sports began to develop—baseball, rowing, and above all, football. By the early 'nineties, an American game had evolved from the English Rugby, which,

Intercollegiate sport

though hard, dangerous, and brutal, appealed to fighting instincts of youth and showed possibilities as a spectator's game. By the end of the period, intercollegiate track-meets were also well established. Indeed, with the growth of college enrollments, intercollegiate sport was giving athletic training to a small number only.

Outside the colleges, also, people were finding outdoor amusements. Lawn tennis came in 1875. The bicycle appeared about 1878, the evolution from a much earlier European fad. It took the form of the high wheel, the rider perched above a five-foot wheel with a small one behind it. Upsets were frequent. Gradually, the modern bicycle, front and rear wheels of equal size, developed.

The bicycle

By the late 'nineties, in cities especially, where there were good pavements, it was a favorite means of exercise and of travel to and from work. Morning and evening the streets were streams of bicycle riders, men and women. On Saturdays and Sundays, they shared the parks and boulevards with the sedately driven horse carriages of the well-to-do.

In the finer things of life, advance was slower. Good taste in music, painting, architecture, sculpture, and the drama was slow to penetrate the masses of the American people. Foreign ob-

Literature

servers ascribed the delay to prudery. Mark Twain's great books, *Innocents Abroad* published in 1869, *Tom Sawyer*, 1876, and the inimitable *Huckleberry Finn* of 1885, were expressions of a genius with a subconscious understanding of the depths of American life; the later ones were bowdlerized by his wife to meet the polite taste of the day. A note of sexual frankness in Walt Whitman's poetry made him taboo for a generation. Bret Harte, his fingers too often just missing the grip on the pinnacle of greatness, was discreet in his delineation in poetry and story of the vanished California of the pioneers. Henry James, the philosophical, and William Dean Howells are almost the only novelists who freed themselves sufficiently from the tastes of the age to survive. The files of *Harper's*, founded in 1850, the *Atlantic Monthly*, 1857, *Scribner's*, 1887, and the *Century Magazine*, 1881, were the magazines of polite society and the intelligent reader of

that age; as one looks them over, they all show the same quality of artificiality and bloodlessness.

In fact, the elements of vitality that one finds in the period's expression of itself were often strictly forbidden by its better taste. Public opinion tolerated Buffalo Bill's Wild West Show which began its career in 1883, a revelation of the vanished romantic west—galloping stagecoach beset by circling hordes of feathered Indians and rescued by the rush of only less picturesque hard-riding cowboys. The corresponding instincts in growing boys were appealed to in the dime novels, lurid tales of western adventure and daring, the struggle of astute detectives with crime, the patriotism of the revolution, the exploits of bandits and train robbers like the James Boys of Missouri, who were household heroes surreptitiously worshiped by millions of lively boys who saved their pennies for the dime novels with their colorful and lurid cover pictures, and read them in secret under the dread of discovery, chastisement, and confiscation.

Popular tastes

The traveling circuses were the outgrowth of the animal and riding shows of earlier generations, grown larger and more impressive. P. T. Barnum left the museum business in 1871 to found the circus that still bears his name. The circuses purported, in exhibits of trained animals, menageries, and equestrian displays, to be instructive; but in the "freaks"—physically deformed persons exhibited in side shows—the coarse "vaudeville" or "concert" that followed the main performance, the disreputable toughs, hangers-on, and gamblers that followed in their wake, they gave plenty of cause for just criticism by the moral. Often a community was the scene of a savage fight between the patrons of a circus and its employees and followers. To the rougher elements appealed the Black Crook and burlesque shows which suggestively revealed the female form to an extent then thought the acme of immorality.

The circus

The legitimate theater had developed. There were numerous companies, many good actors, fewer good plays. An actor like Joseph Jefferson in the famous part of Rip Van Winkle was a household institution from end to end of the United States. In

New York, grand opera was calling a series of great singers like Nordica and Melba whose pseudo-Italian *nommes de guerre* disguised their American or Australian origin. Symphony orchestras were developing, notably at Boston under the patronage of Colonel Higginson, and at Chicago under the musical genius and self-denying devotion of Theodore Thomas. Popular taste chose for itself songs simple in melody and words but with a certain abiding delicacy and charm such as "Sweet Genevieve," and "After the Ball."

The theater

In painting and architecture, America could furnish finer artists and architects than American taste was prepared to endure. Richardson, McKim, Stanford White, worthily carried on the fine tradition of the earlier period in architecture, while American millionaires ensconced themselves in huge brownstone crenellated and turreted castles, and American workingmen built themselves cottages in which they strove for the same effect in what has been irreverently termed "jig-saw gothic." In American homes, the atrocious Currier and Ives prints were yielding to the religious prettinesses of Bouguereau and Hoffman; "dining room pictures" of fruits, game, and fish survive to our own day; only at the end of the period did elaborately carved black walnut furniture retire to the garret in favor of the massive and angular "mission furniture." In the 'nineties, the colored Sunday newspaper supplements, reproductions of flower, fruit, or genre paintings in the manner of the day, made their appearance. Framed, they hung in every home; they were pasted by the hundred in every stable. Yet seldom among them appeared the work of the last artists of the Hudson River School who had set themselves to record in art the spirit of the American landscape: never a Wyant or an Inness in earlier or later manner.

Fine Arts

Yet progress in artistic appreciation there was, marked most graphically by the great expositions. In 1876, in homely buildings in Philadelphia, was gathered a collection of machines and exhibits artistic and otherwise. The crowning glories of the exposition were a Corliss engine of 1400 horse power, and a painting representing a violin hanging on a door, so realistic that it deceived

the eye of the beholder. In 1893, in a Chicago park on the edge of Lake Michigan, American architects created the "White City" as the place of the World's Columbian Exposition. It was a wonderful revelation to the millions who sought it, not merely of people in life, costume, and action from every part of the globe, in every stage of civilization, not merely of replicas of the ships of Columbus and the Vikings, or reproductions of architecture and art from every nation with something distinctive in them to offer, not merely examples of mechanical triumph from all industrial nations, including great cannons from the house of Krupp. Amid green trees, lawns, and wooded islands, architects of genius had created formal courts, fountains, colonnades, vistas, great buildings in spirit more Greek than ancient Greece herself, and supremely lovely: all the more lovely because the slightness of the materials from which they were formed warned the beholder that soon all must vanish as a mirage. Of the millions, young and old who saw it, none can have left without gaining something from the vision.

The Exposition of 1876 and the World's Fair

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

P. L. Haworth, *The United States in Our Own Times, 1865–1920.* New York, 1920.
L. D. Shippee, *Recent American History.* New York, 1924.
F. L. Paxson, *The Last American Frontier.* New York, 1910.
——, *Recent History of the United States.* Boston, 1921.
——, *The New Nation.* Boston, 1915.
S. J. Buck, *The Granger Movement.* Cambridge, 1913.
——, *The Agrarian Crusade* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. XLV). New Haven, 1920.
J. Moody, *The Railroad Builders* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. XXXVIII). New Haven, 1919.
——, *The Masters of Capital* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. XLI). New Haven, 1919.
F. E. Haynes, *Social Politics in the United States.* Boston, 1924.

CHAPTER XXXI

A GENERATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND EXPANSION, 1880–1914

American foreign relations, 1865–1898

Of the foreign relations of their country in the generation between the Civil and the Spanish-American Wars the great mass of American citizens were only intermittently conscious. In European and in North American affairs, indeed, there was little to excite their interest. There were long, drawn-out negotiations with the British government on behalf of Canada over the perennial question as to the rights of American fishermen under the treaty of 1783 and its successors, and over the question of the seal fisheries. To protect these fur bearers from destruction at the hands of pelt hunters who assailed them in the open sea where no power had jurisdiction, the United States vainly negotiated with Great Britain, even advancing the indefensible doctrine that the Bering Sea, bounded on two sides by American territory in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands,was a *mare clausum*—an American lake. The American government had also to settle by diplomatic means the question of the boundary between Alaska and Canada. But over none of these questions was there ever the faintest possibility of arbitrament of war; and the issues had but little interest save to sections. Dealings with continental European states turned on no more important questions than the treatment of their nationals and the conduct of their diplomatic representatives. Italy withdrew her minister in 1891 as a protest against the lynching, at New Orleans, of Italians suspected of Black Hand work; with Russia, the United States strove vainly for many years to secure the recognition of the rights of American citizens of Jewish race. Russia insisted that her municipal law outweighed her treaties, and in 1912 the United States finally denounced her Russian treaty.

American diplomacy, however, in the years before 1898 was put-

ting the finishing touches on a far-reaching and generally consistent national policy in two directions, the Far East, and Latin-America. In the Pacific and the Far East, America had had important trade relations ever since the end of the eighteenth century, but she had never used the national power to support them. Yankee skippers traded safely and prosperously with the Chinese while the British government gathered fleets and armies for the defense of its commercial privileges. In 1844, Caleb Cushing negotiated a treaty of commerce for the United States with China. In 1861, Lincoln sent thither Anson Burlingame as United States diplomatic representative; so profoundly did Burlingame's sense of fair dealing impress the Chinese government that it commissioned him its representative to negotiate treaties of amity with the western nations. With the United States, in 1868, Burlingame negotiated successfully; his untimely death cut short his mission in Europe.

America and the Far East

The United States, however, failed to hold to the high ground of the Burlingame treaty with its clauses permitting free migration. The agitation on the Pacific coast against the competition of Chinese coolies resulted in the Chinese exclusion bill of 1879, vetoed by Hayes, as a treaty violation. A special treaty was, however, negotiated, allowing us to limit or suspend the migration of laborers. In 1894, a new treaty prohibited migration for ten years; since then, under one enactment or another, Chinese of the laboring class have been strictly barred from the United States.

Chinese immigration

To Japan, our attitude was more generous, once we had induced her to break down her two centuries' seclusion and to open relations with the world. In 1846, a naval and diplomatic mission vainly undertook to induce her to accept relations with foreign states. In 1853, Commodore Perry's famous expedition was successful, resulting, in 1854, in a treaty, and two years later in the appointment under it, as consul general, of Townsend Harris, a second great pioneer of American influence in the Far East. In 1858, he secured a treaty of commerce and diplomatic representation which granted to American citizens in

American policy to Japan

Japan the rights of extraterritoriality—freedom from subjection to Japanese courts and legal proceedings. It was ratified at Washington in 1860 by a Japanese delegation whose picturesque appearance caught the public attention.

As Japan struggled to transform herself from a feudal to a modern state and to adopt enough of the western craft in government and war to insure her independence of the domination of the European powers, she found the United States her best friend. The United States, in 1878, was the first power to negotiate a treaty giving Japan control of her tariff, to take effect when other powers should do the same; Great Britain and the United States abandoned extraterritoriality in 1894. The easy triumph of Japan in the war with China in 1894–1895 induced the Great Powers to recognize Japan as a stable, civilized government, and after 1899 to abandon the special privileges of their subjects in her territory. With Korea, the Hermit Kingdom, the United States had entered into relations in 1882. Here and in China and Japan the influence of American missionaries generally tended to raise the prestige of their nation and to inspire trust in it. Japanese and Chinese students found their way to American universities to learn western ideas of government and civilization; to organize her army, however, Japan had recourse to Germany, the great military power.

Rise of Japan

In the Pacific Ocean, the use by American traders of certain island groups as recruiting grounds for their crews or centers of trade, and resulting arrangements with native chiefs by American diplomatic and naval officers, had from an early date given the United States interests which it was much slower to exploit by annexation than were France and England. Samoa is a fair example. When Germany, belated in the race for colonies and flushed with her triumph over France in 1870–1871, attempted to lay her hands on Samoa, between 1884 and 1889, by hoisting the German flag and setting up a puppet chief, she encountered the opposition of Great Britain and the United States. A hurricane, in 1889, which wrecked all the naval vessels of the powers, save one, ensured a peaceful solution of Samoan in-

Samoa


ARCTIC CIRCLE
ALASKA
DOMINION OF CANADA
BERING SEA
MONGOLIA
Peking
MANCHURIA
Port Arthur
CHOSEN (KOREA)
CHINA
UNITED STATES
PACIFIC
MIDWAY I.
TROPIC OF CANCER
Canton
Hongkong
HAWAIIAN IS.
WAKE I.
Manila
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
CHINA SEA
GUAM
MEXICO
VENEZUELA
COLOMBIA
ECUADOR
BRAZIL
PERU
BOLIVIA
ARGENTINA
BORNEO
EQUATOR
NEW GUINEA
OCEAN
SAMOA IS.
TROPIC OF CAPRICORN
AUSTRALIA
NEW ZEALAND
THE PACIFIC

dependence under the guardianship of the three powers. In 1899, the United States acquiesced in German annexation and secured for herself the harbor of Pagopago as a naval base.

Hawaii, at the "cross-roads of the Pacific," had become an important center of trade, with strong colonies of Europeans, Japanese, and Chinese, interested and employed in the sugar and pineapple plantations. The dwindling native population, superficially Christianized, maintained the authority over the archipelago of a succession of native rulers often dissipated, corrupt, extravagant, or as in the case of Queen Liliuokalani (whom the American public learned to call "Queen Lil,") with autocratic tastes truly feminine. In February of 1893, the United States was considering the annexation of the islands, as Queen Lil had been deposed by a provisional government. Cleveland, on taking office, reversed the action of his predecessor and dropped the matter. The next Republican administration, involved in war with Spain in the Pacific, consummated the annexation of the islands to the United States by joint resolution of July 7, 1898.

Hawaii

The important American diplomatic achievements of the period looked to the southward. And a situation had developed there which the old, consistently maintained policy of the United States rendered of vital importance to the nation. When Latin-America achieved her independence of Spain and Portugal, the revolution was the work of a white American upper class, restive under European rule. The revolting colonists of white blood often did not care to admit the socially inferior masses of negroes and Indians to social or political equality with themselves. Inevitably, therefore, the organization of government on this narrow base involved difficulty. Brazil was governed as an empire until 1889 by a scion of the Portuguese royal house. Other American states played for a time with the notion of importing monarchial rulers from the royal houses of Europe. General San Martin, second only to Bolivar among the great liberators, despaired of republican government and favored monarchy. Bolivar himself was sufficiently distrustful to give his support in Bolivia to a system that embodied some of the principles

South American independence

of the British constitution, such as an executive ruling for life. Bolivar, indeed, sought a solution for the ills of the southern world in federalism. His Panama Congress of 1826 was designed, perhaps, as the first step in a federal system among the South American states that might set the power of the United States at defiance, and even draw her into the circle of its authority.

Bolivar could well say in his later years that the revolutionists had but plowed the sea. His Panama Congress failed. The Republic of Colombia saw Venezuela and Ecuador break off into independent nations; the Central American Federation dissolved into five antagonistic little states. Rejecting the counsel of Bolivar, as tending to autocracy, the South American states plunged into republican experiments, inspired by the ideas of the French Revolution or by the example of the United States, that led to one *coup d'état* after another, to seizures of power by dictators, to bloody and decimating wars. Eventually, out of the confusion there developed three strong states, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile in the south. In the north, a half score of weaker states, involved in debts which were the fruit of revolution, of peculation, and of the destruction of foreigners' property, attained to a certain habitual equilibrium. They glanced upward in doubt and fear at the towering form of the mighty Republic of the North. The shield of the Monroe Doctrine which she held before them against European aggression seemed to bear inscribed on its inner side the doctrine of the hegemony of the United States in Latin-American affairs.

Latin America

The Monroe Doctrine, as held at the end of the century, announced the determination of the United States for her own safety, as well as for more altruistic motives, that no European power should seek to subvert the government of an American state; no European nation, even if already established colonially on the American continent, should enlarge her bounds here, whether by friendly negotiation or as the result of a successful war. A resolution of Senator Lodge in 1912 would have extended the Monroe Doctrine to prohibit the leasing of harbor or other rights to a corporation acting for a foreign

The Monroe Doctrine

power. South American publicists have distinguished a collateral doctrine of hegemony—formally denied by the United States—applying especially to the states on the shores of the Caribbean sea; in a word, it concerns America's right to exert pressure on them to meet their financial obligations, to control their fiscal life, and to interfere in their internal affairs.

South America and the Monroe Doctrine

Undoubtedly, some such policy may be deduced from scattered acts of the United States. Leaving aside the later "dollar diplomacy" of Knox—the granting of diplomatic support to American corporations exploiting South American resources—it necessarily follows that if the United States is to guarantee the Latin-American states against the results of defeat in war by European states seeking justice from such irresponsible governments, it must itself see justice done. Most often, such situations have arisen from the failure of the Latin-American states to make good foreign property destroyed in their revolutions, or from the repudiation or defalcation of foreign-owned debts. This has led to the enunciation by two Argentine diplomats of the principles of international law known from their names as the Calvo Doctrine, forbidding the collection of pecuniary claims by armed force, and the Drago Doctrine, of 1902, limiting the Calvo Doctrine to public debts. The United States has never indorsed either one; and indeed their equity is questionable.

The Venezuela question

The outstanding case of the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine on the part of the United States was probably the Venezuela question. Great Britain and Venezuela had long been at odds over the boundary between British Guiana and Venezuela. Cleveland, in his message of 1894, had urged the submission of the frontier to unlimited arbitration, a thing to which Lord Salisbury acting for Great Britain was not disposed. The secretary of state, Richard Olney, on July 20, 1895, signed a dispatch announcing the essential sovereignty of the United States on the American continent. On December 17, 1895, Cleveland in his message recommended the appointment of an American commission to investigate the facts, and the enforcement of their finding with the national power. Indirectly, this was

an ultimatum; but Great Britain was not desirous of a war with the United States and moderate elements in both countries searched for a way out. Ultimately, Great Britain consented to arbitration, in a treaty of February 2, 1897, which embodied the doctrine of prescriptive rights; as finally arrived at, the boundary nearly justified the extreme British claim.

Blaine and Pan-Americanism

An entirely different phase of our South American policy is Pan-Americanism; the revival of it is essentially associated with Blaine in his two terms 1881 and 1889–1892 as secretary of state. His policy called for the mediation of the United States in difficulties between American and European nations, the application of arbitration, for which the United States had become an international sponsor, in disputes between the South American states, and the promotion of more intimate relations and coöperation among them. November 29, 1881, he invited the independent nations of America to meet in Congress to discuss arbitration; his retirement from office, and the War of the Pacific between Chile on the one hand and Bolivia and Peru on the other prevented the execution of the scheme. In 1889, he secured the meeting of the first of the Pan-American Congresses, which, though it accomplished nothing as to arbitration, framed certain protocols and measures of uniformity in such matters as sanitation. It was the first of a series, all representing a more or less liberal and friendly policy between the Latin-American states and toward their northern neighbor. Blaine's policy in some other respects was marked by enlightenment. He hoped, under the McKinley tariff of 1890, for the negotiation of a series of reciprocity agreements with the American states; but the substitution of the tariff of 1894 rendered this impossible.

The problem of Cuba

The turning point of American diplomatic history, not merely in the Caribbean, but in the world, came with the Spanish-American War. Spain still held in the Caribbean the wrecks of her great American empire, the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. In Cuba, so close to her shores, the United States had long recognized a special interest, and a special

responsibility. She not only had to guarantee that no vigorous European power should snatch it from the feeble hands of Spain; she had also to deal with difficulties inevitable from the semi-occasional insurrections, and from Spain's inefficient endeavors to suppress them. In the 'seventies, such an insurrection and the *Virginius* incident had led the United States to the verge of war with Spain. Since then, American investments had multiplied in Cuban sugar and tobacco plantations. With the United States the main market for Cuban sugar, a protective measure such as the Wilson tariff of 1894 could bring the island to an economic distress sure to bear fruit in insurrection. In 1895, the Cubans were again in arms.

Fighting insurgents ensconced in jungles or mountains was difficult, especially when it was impossible to distinguish the peaceful cultivator who wielded his machete on cane by day from the insurgent who used it as a weapon by night. A Spanish governor, General Weyler, to meet the situation devised a scheme of "reconcentration," forcing the suspected inhabitants into inclosed camps where they sickened and died. American indignation at "Butcher Weyler" was aroused as the facts were played up by certain sensational papers; certain of the vested interests who saw their property unused or destroyed, added their clamor. By the end of Cleveland's term in 1897, he had a difficult situation to bequeath to his successor and to the new secretary of state, John Sherman. Under American diplomatic pressure, Spain modified her reconcentration policy, and made some conciliatory advances to the insurgents which were without effect.

Cuba and American opinion

These moderate concessions of Spain were flavored by a certain tartness; she felt that American filibustering expeditions were responsible for at least a part of her troubles. February 9, 1898, a New York paper published a purloined private letter of the Spanish minister in Washington terming the president a tricky politician. The American government demanded his recall; Spain permitted him to resign. Not a week later, on February 15, 1898, the American battleship *Maine*

The "Maine"

was blown up in Habana Harbor with a loss of hundreds of lives. Investigation traced the explosion to an external force. Whether or not it was a mine or bomb manipulated by Cuban sympathizer or Spaniard can never be known.

American public opinion jumped to the conclusion that Spain was to blame, and imperatively demanded war. The reluctant President was pushed toward it by Congress and people. Spain feared the ordeal and did what she could to avoid it; but Spanish public opinion and pride were things which the Spanish ministry had in its turn to face. When it had offered as much as it could in concessions as to the terms on which it would negotiate with the insurgents and retire its armed forces from Cuba, it had not offered enough to satisfy the American people. On April 11, in a message to Congress, McKinley demanded forcible intervention. April 19, Congress passed resolutions calling on Spain to leave Cuba and authorizing the President to compel her by force; to acquit the United States of any selfish motive, they indorsed Cuban independence. Spain had to take up the gage of war.

War with Spain

European public opinion, except in England, was generally favorable to Spain, and held the belief as well that she had good chances of victory. On paper, the Spanish fleet was superior to the White Squadron, the new American steel and armored navy that had been built up since the 'eighties to replace the ancient wooden steamers of Farragut and Goldsborough. The Spanish army supposedly was superior also in numbers and quality. The opinion of Europe was to be sadly undeceived.

Spain and the United States

The naval strategy of the United States was fairly sound. Her Atlantic fleet was divided in two squadrons, each one sufficiently strong to encounter the armored cruisers of Admiral Cervera, who with half the Spanish fleet had been hurried westward from the Cape Verde Islands at the outbreak of war. The people of the Atlantic seaboard quivered under the apprehension of a raid by Cervera and clamored for naval protection. The United States naval command, knowing that Cer-

Naval strategy

THE CARIBBEAN
TEXAS
Jacksonville
New Orleans
Tampa
GULF OF MEXICO
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Key West
TROPIC OF CANCER
Tampico
Havana
Santa Clara
CUBA
Mexico
Vera Cruz
Santiago de Cuba
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
HAITI
JAMAICA
San Juan
VIRGIN IS.
PORTO RICO
Santo Domingo
Kingston
Port au Prince
BRITISH HONDURAS
Belize
GUATEMALA
HONDURAS
Guatemala
Tegucigalpa
San Salvador
SALVADOR
NICARAGUA
Managua
COSTA RICA
San José
Colon
PANAMA
Panama
CARIBBEAN SEA
Port of Spain
TRINIDAD
Caracas
SOUTH AMERICA
VENEZUELA
COLOMBIA
BRITISH GUIANA
PACIFIC OCEAN
100°
90°
80°
70°
60°
20°
10°

vera must, on his arrival, make a Spanish port to coal, awaited him in the Caribbean, and soothed the nerves of the coast towns by assigning them old monitors as useless in defense as in battle. All went according to plan. After a little blundering and hesitation, the navy discovered Cervera's fleet in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba and blockaded it there.

As running into the landlocked harbor might cost vessels that were badly needed, an army expeditionary force was dispatched to land in the neighborhood of Santiago de Cuba and capture the city. The weaknesses of the little United States army and the new volunteer and militia regiments at once became apparent. Army officers, experienced in the handling and supply of a few hundreds of men in frontier posts, were hopelessly at a loss in the simple problem of embarking a few thousands with needed supplies. The volunteers and militia were in even worse disorder. Somehow, the expedition was piled on board ships in Florida and piled off again on the south coast of Cuba under a general so corpulent that he could hardly mount a horse. The disembarked forces threw themselves on the opposing Spanish forces. Supremely brave men accustomed to the use of firearms and to the outdoors dashed at the Spanish lines in a series of combats, Las Guasimas, El Caney, San Juan Hill. Supported only by antiquated artillery using black powder, they routed their Spanish opponents, besieged them in Santiago de Cuba, and forced the surrender of the place on July 17. July 3, Cervera's fleet had dashed out in an attempt to cut through the American blockading squadron, only to be sunk or beached along the Cuban coast.

The capture of Santiago

Santiago decided the war. An American expedition occupied Porto Rico with little difficulty. Spain had still a battle squadron left and turned it toward the Pacific; but the victorious American fleet prepared to follow. On August 12, a protocol for peace between the powers was signed. President McKinley, however, had his mind on other acquisitions than those in the Caribbean.

Peace

On the outbreak of war, the Pacific squadron, under George

Dewey, had slipped out of Hongkong to escape internment, and with no friendly port to repair to had turned to the enemy harbor of Manila in the Philippines. On the first of May, Dewey ran through the mine-strewn channel into the bay of Manila, speedily hammered to pieces the Spanish fleet, and prepared to take the town. A German and an English squadron soon appeared. The German's conduct was frankly provocative. The English captain guardedly hinted that if the Germans came to blows with Dewey, his own course was known only to Dewey and to himself! The German attitude, the likelihood that Germany might acquire the islands from Spain, the desirability of an American base in the neighborhood of Asia, the existence of a Philippine insurrection against Spanish rule, all counseled McKinley to take the islands in the final peace. To salve Spain's pride, a payment of twenty millions was made. In lieu of a war indemnity, Spain ceded Porto Rico; rather than acknowledge the independence of Cuba, she transferred the island to the United States.

Acquisition of the Philippines

The year 1898 marked the turn of the United States to imperialism. That the imperial possessions held as dependencies were small and unimportant as compared with the enfranchised mainland republic was a factor which served to disguise the situation. But in the flush of popularity, acquired from the war, the United States navy was increased until for a time it stood second in the world. The United States army, as a result of the blundering of 1898, acquired some proficiency in the higher command and was much increased in size. The United States from her position, her latent resources, her newly acquired naval strength, her prestige won by the defeat of Spain, was definitely recognized as a world power.

Imperialism

The first problem lay in the organization of the new acquisitions. To the confounding of the international cynicism that had predicted that the United States would easily forget her promises of Cuban independence, the Cuban Republic was established in 1900–1901. Attached to her constitution was the so-called Platt Amendment, a congressional enactment binding

The Cuban Republic

Cuba among other things never to allow any foreign power to involve her independence, never to contract debts beyond her revenue, and to permit American intervention when necessary. The Cubans reluctantly submitted to the conditions, after the explanatory notes which they sought to attach to the amendment had been rejected. Again and again the United States has had to intervene to restore orderly government and elections—but each time she has withdrawn!

Of the other acquisitions of 1898, Hawaii was accorded the status of a territory of the United States, with citizenship for its inhabitants in 1900. Porto Rico, given territorial status in the same year, did not receive citizenship until 1917. When the United States acquired title to the Philippines, the insurrection on the island of Luzon against the authority of Spain had turned against the United States; it was not completely suppressed till 1902. The Supreme Court, in a series of decisions, adjusted to the Constitution the possession of dependencies that may never, in spite of the earlier American colonial policy of the Ordinance of 1787, receive full statehood. It decided that certain fundamental principles of the Constitution extended to the new possessions; but that rights of citizenship and self-government may be extended by Congress at its discretion. The United States then turned its attention to the wild tribes of the islands, never subject to Spain; partly by military force, partly by devices such as substituting baseball for head hunting as a competitive intertribal sport, American authority was extended.

Status of the new possessions

The Filipinos, especially the more civilized sections of the population, have tended always to restiveness under American rule. In 1907, they were accorded the election of the lower house of a legislature; in 1913 they were given control of the upper house. In 1916, the Jones Act, extending the suffrage, promised independence as soon as a stable government could be created. The policy of Governor-General Burton Harrison looked in that direction. In 1920, President Wilson declared that the time had arrived; but the policy of the Republicans, based on the inefficiency of native government in the Islands as

The Philippines

reported by Governor-General Leonard Wood, is apparently to postpone indefinitely the granting of independence.

It was fortunate for the United States that her first steps as a world power were guided by the brilliant John Hay as secretary of state, 1898-1905. Hay had begun his career as private secretary to President Lincoln; he had acquired distinction as a diplomat, a man of letters; he was very much a man of the world, and still an idealist. His greatest achievement, perhaps, was in the Far East. The defeat of China by Japan in the war of 1894 had been the signal for each of the great powers to seize a desirable harbor or province, and to extort from China a treaty granting exclusive privileges of trade, mining, or what not. The result was the Boxer insurrection of 1900, a movement based on a Chinese society, which, with the tacit approval of the dowager empress and the authorities, murdered the German minister and other foreigners, and besieged the Europeans at Peking in the British Legation. A relief expedition of troops from all the great powers was formed which fought its way to Peking, rescued the legations, and plundered the imperial city.

John Hay: The Boxer movement

Meanwhile, Hay in 1899 had adroitly forced from the powers a recognition of the principle of the "open door": that no special and exclusive concessions be extorted by the powers, that the way to trade and investment be left freely open to all alike, and that the territorial integrity of China be preserved. The powers had to content themselves with indemnities extorted from China in lump sums for the damages of the insurrection and the cost of the relief expedition; finding that her share more than paid her just costs, the United States returned to China the surplus, which was used for the education of Chinese youth in American colleges. Hay's principle of the open door, though often enough disregarded, was one of the great diplomatic triumphs of United States history.

The Open Door

The diplomatic storm center of the world remained in the Far East. In 1904, the continued occupation by Russia, of Manchuria, a Chinese province, led to war between Russia and Japan. Com-

mon opinion predicted an easy victory for the Europeans over the Asiatics; but the Japanese fleet proved itself superior to the Russian, the Japanese armies were better handled, and Russia was fatally handicapped by having as its line of supply the tenuous Siberian railroad. The Japanese destroyed the Russian fleets, drove the Russians from the Port Arthur peninsula, and defeated them decisively in Manchuria. President Roosevelt offering his good offices to end the war, peace negotiations were opened at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. It was Hay's last achievement. The treaty recognizing Japan's victory was the final step in the road to her position as a world power. By treaties of 1902, 1905, and 1911, she was allied in defensive pact with Great Britain.

The Russo-Japanese war

The rise of a powerful, warlike, and aggressive Japan, ruled by a noble caste with a lofty sense of personal and national honor, was a factor with which the rest of the world and the United States especially had to reckon. The world saw the possibility of Japan's offering to the subject races of Asia in India and China her leadership in a crusade against the dominant whites. The United States, in particular, saw a rival for the control of the destinies of the Pacific. In great measure with the intention of impressing Japan with the naval power of the United States, President Roosevelt decided to exhibit the high efficiency of the American fleet by sending it on a cruise around the world, with a special call in Japanese harbors.

Japan a world power

An issue had already arisen between the two powers. The old jealousy of the economic rivalry of the Chinese on the Pacific Coast had turned itself against the Japanese. The segregation of Japanese in the public schools of San Francisco in 1906 opened the difficulty. Japan protested with effect against discrimination against her citizens. In 1913, California passed an anti-alien landholding act aimed at the Japanese, who were said to be rapidly acquiring the finest lands of the State. Against this and a similar act of 1920 the Japanese protested; but the Supreme Court of the United States held the law constitutional. The punctilious self-

Anti-Japanese legislation; the gentleman's agreement

respect of the Japanese people was touched; for the purpose of glossing over the deeper question of migration, the so-called gentleman's agreement of 1907 was framed. Japan, in lieu of special legislation excluding her citizens, agreed to keep at home by passport regulations the laboring class to which exception was taken; and the United States agreed to allow Japanese children in schools with the whites.

The Hague: arbitration treaties

Meanwhile, the United States had taken an active part in a project which seemed to hold forth the prospect of a better international day. In 1899, the Czar of Russia had called a conference of the nations to meet at The Hague to discuss the possibility of limiting armaments: the conference adopted certain rules of warfare generally disregarded in the World War; what was more important, it created a court of arbitration to which reference could be had in international disputes. Beginning in 1904, the United States negotiated a series of treaties with foreign powers obligating the parties to submit to arbitration at The Hague all questions except those of high interest or national honor; not until 1908 were treaties on this order ratified by the Senate. In 1907, a second Hague Conference, originally called by Roosevelt, had accomplished work similar to that of the first.

It was in the Caribbean that the new aggressive imperial policy of the United States was made manifest; the question on which it was most clearly revealed was that of the isthmian canal. When, about 1850, she first considered the possibility of such a canal, the United States had discovered that Great Britain considered herself a Caribbean power, and was vitally concerned. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850 recognized the interests of Great Britain in any canal enterprise. For many years nothing was done by either power. Opinion hesitated between the Panama and the Nicaragua routes. Then the meteoric Frenchman, Ferdinand de Lesseps, the builder of the Suez Canal, turned his attention to Panama, obtained a concession from the Republic of Colombia and began work, his attempt to attract American support only drawing from President Hayes the weighty statement that

The Isthmian Canal

the United States could permit no isthmian canal, under alien control.

Tropical fevers decimated De Lesseps' workmen, and wrecked his scheme. Then the discovery, due to the self-sacrifice of American surgeons in Cuba, that fever was transmitted by a species of mosquito, opened the possibility of mastering the disease and the Isthmus. The interest of the United States was great: apart from the question of trade, the fact that she was an imperial power in both the Atlantic and Pacific made it highly important that she be able to pass her fleet rapidly from one ocean to the other. The long cruise of the battleship *Oregon* around South America to join the American fleet in 1898 had been a graphic illustration of the need for a canal.

New interest in the canal

To get a canal, it was necessary first to come to terms with Great Britain. By treaties negotiated in 1900 and 1901, the second ratified by the Senate, Hay and Pauncefote, the British ambassador, agreed to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer treaty; the United States might acquire a site for a canal, might build and fortify it: further, there was a proviso that in tolls charged for passage there should be no discrimination in favor of American ships. The next step, despite advocates of the Nicaragua route, was to purchase of the De Lesseps Company its rights at the Isthmus of Panama for forty million dollars. Then Hay negotiated with Colombia to secure for the United States permission to build; he asked for a 99-year lease on a strip six miles wide. The Colombia senate apparently believing that if it waited until the De Lesseps rights expired, it could have the forty millions to be paid for them, rejected the treaty in 1903.

Canal negotiations

Roosevelt's wrath boiled; he believed the United States was being "held up" and he acted accordingly. Panama as a state of Colombia had been of course anxious to see the canal built. The French, too, were anxious to see the purchase of their rights consummated; so under the auspices of M. Bunau-Varilla, of the De Lesseps Company, a revolution was staged in Panama on November 3, 1903. United States

The Republic of Panama

cruisers refused to allow Colombian troops to land and suppress it; the United States promptly recognized the new republic which, in gratitude, ceded her a ten-mile-wide Canal Zone. Conservative Americans and South Americans denounced the birth of the Republic of Panama "by the Cæsarean section"; but Roosevelt had what he wanted. Under the direction of United States engineer officers, the canal was completed in 1914.

The advance of the United States toward control of the Caribbean was marked in other directions. By an arrangement of 1905–1907, the United States took over the revenues of the Dominican Republic to administer in the payment of that country's debts.

Extension of American dominance in the Caribbean

In 1911, a similar arrangement was negotiated with Nicaragua. In a sense such things were essential. So long as the United States must rattle the saber when European powers proposed to go further than she saw fit in the collection of debts, as she did with Germany in the case of Venezuela in 1903, it became necessary for her to provide for their payment in some way. Yet such financial protectorates undertaken sometimes in behalf of American financial syndicates to collect much more than the value actually received, seemed to jealous South American eyes an extension of political power in the wake of financial control. With Philander C. Knox, secretary of state under Taft, was associated the phrase "dollar diplomacy"—the support by diplomatic means of concessions to American capital of rights to exploit natural resources. The extension by the former liberty-loving republic of her political and financial control over subject races and states to whom she accorded no representative rights, seemed a sinister thing; actually, it was a necessary concomitant of the imperial position of the United States from which even an idealist like Woodrow Wilson was in vain to seek escape.

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

J. F. Rhodes, *The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, 1897–1909*. New York, 1922.

F. E. Chadwick, *The Relations of the United States and Spain*. 2 vols. New York, 1911.

P. J. Treat, *Japan and the United States, 1853–1921.* Boston, 1921.
T. Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia.* New York, 1922.
M. W. Williams, *Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy.* Washington, 1916.
J. B. Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and his Time as Shown in his Own Letters.* 2 vols. New York, 1920.
W. S. Robertson, *Hispanic-American Relations with the United States.* New York, 1923.
P. L. Haworth, *The United States in Our Own Times, 1865–1920.* New York, 1920.
L. D. Shippee, *Recent American History.* New York, 1924.
F. L. Paxson, *The Last American Frontier.* New York, 1910.
——, *Recent History of the United States.* Boston, 1921.

CHAPTER XXXII

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, 1897–1917

Prosperity

For about a quarter century following the accession to power of the Republicans, the United States, with but one short intermission, enjoyed a prosperity almost unexampled in the world's history. With prices following an upward tendency almost uniform until they reached the peak in 1920, with the demands of industrial or warring Europe absorbing greater and greater proportions of the expanding wheat crops, the farmers apparently had reached the golden age. The frontier farming districts of western Kansas and Nebraska now blossomed as the rose and for a time forgot the radical prophets of populism. Mortgages were paid off. Farmers in the older sections sold out, or retired to towns to live on the earnings of tenants. With rural prosperity, a great domestic market for manufactures developed, more important than the foreign one in which American steel and machinery were winning their way. Industry throve; judicious strikes and bargains drove the wages of the skilled laborer higher. Trade unions were expert in keeping down numbers in their unions by apprenticeship or stringent entrance regulations. At the end of the period, labor in certain trades could command almost a monopoly price.

Rising prices

The period of expanding prices may be laid in part to the increase in the world's supply of gold from the mines of the Alaskan Klondike, the scene of a new gold rush in 1897, in part to the expansion of bank-note currency, to the increased use of checks and other evidences of financial transactions; but it came, bringing prosperity to producer and debtor, and pinching the creditor classes who lived on the income from investments, without the desire to win more capital, and who saw the coupons which they clipped from their bonds shrink smaller and smaller in purchasing power. Relative wealth and the prestige it brings

tended, therefore, to fall increasingly into the hands of men fresh from the triumphs of the market, cruder in taste, less capable of appreciating the finer things, more downright in manners. An old leisure class was pushed aside by a new one.

The period saw American high finance reach its zenith—men like E. H. Harriman disposed the means they controlled to achieve the greatest possible direction of capital, and even reached out after supreme control of all the great financial institutions of the country. Public opinion uttered a deterring protest, both at the danger to liberty and at the means employed, which were no longer recognized as justifiable by the public conscience. A period of keen criticism, justified and unjustified, measured and vituperative, was to put capitalism on the defensive until the reaction that followed on the World War.

High finance

The years 1897–1902 mark a period of development in American financial history; they were the era of the great trusts. By consolidation in one industry after another, monopoly or a near approach to it, was designed. The old devices of overpricing properties purchased and lavish overcapitalization were employed. Typical of all these in the public mind were the maneuvers by which the United States Steel Corporation was formed. Under the auspices of J. P. Morgan & Co., one great steel plant and industry after another was persuaded to exchange itself for common and preferred stock of the United States Steel Corporation. Chief among them were the National Tube Company, the Rockefeller ore fleet on the Lakes, and the American Steel and Wire founded by that lurid play boy of finance, John W. Gates. Only the Carnegie Steel Company of Homestead had held out. Carnegie had considered $157,000,000 for his business from Reid and Moore, two earlier promoters who sought to buy him out; he offered it for $250,000,000 to the Rockefellers. When he saw the rival interest had committed itself too deeply to recede, he had used stored-up capital to build new and more efficient tube plants to compete with the trust, and had devised new railways to carry his products to the market. Faced with the ruin of his enterprise, Morgan had been compelled to buy

The Steel Trust

Carnegie out on his own terms—almost 500 millions in stock and bonds of the new trust. When launched, the United States Steel Corporation was full of water. Of Gates, touring the country with boon companions to buy up plants, stories are told of invading an owner's house at midnight, dragging him out of bed and raising bids for his plant a hundred thousand dollars at a time. But after a period of frenzied finance and uncertain stock values, the Steel Trust has attained almost an unequaled position of stability and conservatism. Content to suffer the existence of great competitors like the Inland Steel Company, secure in the ownership of ore and coal, profiting by exact coördination of all agencies in production and distribution, holding a mighty surplus against hard times, the United States Steel Corporation is perhaps the greatest and soundest of the nation's financial organizations.

E. H. Harriman

Even more dramatic were the developments in the railroad world. The commanding figure in the last great period of the exploitation of American railway systems is Edward H. Harriman. His was the development of the device of controlling one railroad, using its cash assets to purchase a controlling interest in another, using that to control a third: when, with the stock of a railroad scattered among small holders, 10 per cent or 15 per cent of it could be manipulated to elect a majority of directors, the indefinitely great powers that could be exercised by a man with Harriman's audacity baffle description.

The Harriman system

Harriman first appeared on the scene when he proposed to reorganize the bankrupt Union Pacific Railroad. A hundred millions were needed, forty-five millions of it to square the road's account with the federal government. Harriman pushed aside Standard Oil and Kuhn, Loeb & Company, assuming the main part of the task himself; he planned to raise the money on the credit of the Illinois Central, an old-established and conservatively managed railroad with high credit, which he controlled. This occurred in 1895. Within two or three years, the Union Pacific was on a sound basis. In 1900, on the death of Collis P. Huntington, Harriman seized control of the Southern Pacific. Soon the Union Pacific, by stock ownership, controlled

the Baltimore and Ohio. With an ocean-to-ocean route, Harriman confronted the Morgan railways.

A rival interest was that of James J. Hill of the Great Northern. In 1896–1898 on behalf of Hill, Morgan had bought the bankrupt Northern Pacific and had begun to reorganize it. Controlling the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy through the Northern Pacific's ownership of its stock, Hill had a road that Harriman desired for the completion of his system. In 1901, he began a stock market campaign to get control of the Northern Pacific. The fight was between Harriman and Hill, the Standard Oil interests and the house of Morgan. The price of Northern Pacific stock soared to $1,000. As more stock had been sold than existed, the warring interests had to agree on a truce or spread ruin around them. Ultimately, Hill retained control; to organize it, he created the Northern Securities Company, a corporation designed to hold the stock of the three Hill lines.

The Harriman-Hill war

The Northern Securities Company marked the flood tide of railway consolidation by the masters of business. In 1904, the Supreme Court of the United States declared the consolidation of hitherto competing systems was a combination in restraint of trade and ordered the company dissolved. Stock of the three railways was distributed pro rata to Northern Securities stockholders: it could be expected, by the laws of inheritance and the chances of business, to scatter gradually into many hands. Harriman died in 1909; his railway empire fell to pieces. In 1913, the Union Pacific distributed the stock of the Baltimore and Ohio among its stockholders. With the opening of the Panama Canal, a shorter water route from east to west coast, and with the recession of the agricultural frontier pushed too far into the arid and semiarid west, the transcontinental railroads came to hard times. Their receipts decreased. Harassed on the one side by public opinion against Big Business, and by stringent state and federal rate regulation, and on the other by the repeated demands of the powerful Railway Brotherhoods for wage increases, the railroads generally fell on evil days. On the eve of the World War, they had let

The railroads pass their zenith

equipments and roadbeds deteriorate and were in bad condition physically and financially.

Meanwhile, the centralizing of the control of capital had been proceeding in another direction in the development of the trust companies, which were really great banks under loose state charters that enabled them to undertake reckless enterprises in floating new corporations or consolidations that the strictly regulated national banks could not touch. For a time, the surplus funds of the great New York insurance companies were used through the trust companies for investment in speculative promotions; thus the watered stock and bonds of new companies were carried until they could be "unloaded" on the public. The investigation engineered by Charles E. Hughes in 1905 revealed a recklessness with money which, in effect, represented men's savings for old age or for family protection; public opinion condemned it severely. Legislation on the part of the State of New York made it thenceforth impossible.

Trust companies

The climax to the whole era of the promotion of new corporate enterprises and mergers came in the so-called money panic of 1907. In general, industries and farmers in the country were prospering. But the issue of securities of speculative value had come too fast for the investors of the country to absorb. As a result, in the fall of 1907, a panic in New York caused the failure of several of the great trust companies; disaster threatened the whole financial system. Under the National Banking Act, considerable proportions of the reserves of western banks were deposited with the great New York national banks. To protect their currency reserves, banks throughout the country paid out cash but grudgingly. To the masses of the people, the panic was brought home by the sudden shortage of currency and the appearance of a new paper money, issued by the local clearing house associations of banks, and based on commercial assets.

The panic of 1907

The panic, though soon allayed, demonstrated the fact that the currency system of the nation, centering, as it had come to do, in the banks, needed a thorough revision to secure greater elasticity. It also brought to a climax

Results of the panic

a growing popular indignation against "Big Business" and "Wall Street."

There was very much to justify it. The methods and ethics of retail business had improved. Many a small business man or storekeeper, though he might have yielded to the temptation of floating and selling millions of watered stock of speculative value, would not willingly have let his customers deceive themselves as to the quality of the goods he sold in a day's course of business. Fiction had developed the type of "Wall Street Man," a strong man who took what he wanted in other people's money or women. In a sense, this type of character was represented by such lurid financial buccaneers as "Bet-You-a-Million" Gates, who was popularly supposed to be willing to gamble for such stakes in corporation finance or in horse racing; another such type was Thomas W. Lawson of Boston, who in a series of magazine articles, full of sound and fury, had attacked the iniquities of the Amalgamated Copper Company which was fathered by H. H. Rogers of Standard Oil. Much misleading and much misunderstood information as to the methods of the higher finance had drifted out to the people through the "muckraking" exposures, as Theodore Roosevelt termed such series as Lawson's and the even more famous *History of the Standard Oil Company*, published serially by Miss Ida M. Tarbell in *McClure's Magazine*.

Criticism of big business

The people grew tired of the type of the financiers. In deference to their displeasure, finance became more quietly conservative. Industry was allowed to catch up with the watered capital of the trust eras. New watered stock issues were checked by state "Blue Sky Laws" and no longer emanated from the lords of finance in the east. The Federal Reserve Act tended to put all banking influence in the hands of Federal Reserve Boards which have not so far been accused of subservience to any of the great financial interests. As the captains of industry died and their stock holdings were distributed among their heirs or sold, capital stock ownership tended continually to become more and more diversified.

Quieter finance

In fact, perhaps with foresight, the great masters of capital now seem content to let the smaller investors enter the stable corporate enterprises that develop raw materials into finished goods. Quietly they secure for themselves the resources yet to be developed. The Guggenheim interests in the northwest and Alaska own vast areas of timber and beds of ore. Land is more and more an inviting investment for men of great wealth.

Capitalists invest in natural resources

In material things of course the era since 1897 has seen tremendous advances of efficiency in industry and business. The incandescent light became the universal illuminant in business and in most homes; the telephone passed from the experimental stage in the 'eighties, won its place in business in the 'nineties, and became so intimate a part of our business and social life that men forgot how much it had added to them. By the beginning of the 'nineties, the typewriter completely replaced the hand-copied letter, saving eyesight incalculably; writing a good hand was no longer a necessary accomplishment to the youth who desired to rise in the world. The development of the use of electric power, whether the power was supplied by coal or by a harnessed river current whose generated power was transmitted hundreds of miles, the use of gas in industry, were all concomitants to the growing elaboration and power of the machine and the engine. What Henry Adams termed the principle of acceleration, speedily develops from the inventor's first successful machine, an improved product beside which the first attempt looks ridiculously slight, feeble, crude, and old.

Inventions

Industry, in our period, learned something of the necessity of good working conditions for effective work. Municipal, state, and federal health departments necessarily made war on filthy sweatshops in the slums of the big cities, and on the undesirable conditions in the Chicago packing houses, described in Upton Sinclair's realistic novel *The Jungle*. Industry found that clean, well-lighted, well-glazed workrooms, rest rooms for employees, and lunch rooms with service, all aided efficiency. Welfare work for employees developed in the same

Factory welfare work

way, sometimes shrewdly attempted as a counterirritant for trade unionism with its steady advance into new fields such as the garment workers. Great strikes in textile mills at Lawrence, Massachusetts, and Paterson, New Jersey, in 1912 and 1913 demonstrated the power of unskilled and underpaid mill hands to strike and to organize under radical auspices.

Material advance, however, merely multiplied the problems that confronted the thoughtful. Many problems appeared to center in the modern city. To the city poured the immigrant millions, a stream ever greater and greater. Outwardly, at least, the migration of the earlier decades appeared to have furnished a sound superstructure to the older American political system. English, Irish, German, Scandinavian seemed to have prospered economically, to have adopted standards of living corresponding to those of older America, to have become loyal American citizens, to have intermarried with the old American stock and harmonized with it. The German and Scandinavian, however, held their native tongues, and read newspapers and heard sermons in them; and foreign language editors and pastors necessarily sought to perpetuate an order of things which assured them a living. Except the English, these elements often banded together under political leaders of their own, and bargained with blocs of votes for offices, and places on party tickets. All the elements, apparently, brought with them old international likes and dislikes which colored their attitude toward American foreign policy. Twisting the lion's tail was too favorite an employment with Irish-American leaders to make possible such close relations with England as American interests might seem to warrant.

The old foreign stocks

If there were questions of this sort arising from the old migrations, there were many more arising from the new. The Italian, who looked forward to a return to Italy to live on his savings, the outpourings of the ghettos of Eastern Europe that found a lodgment in new ghettos in great American cities, and the increasing tide of migration from the subject Austrian nations, from Poland, and from Russia were all serious problems.

The new migrations

With the multiplication of steamship companies competing for emigrants, migration was no longer the adventure, the test of resourcefulness and courage that it had been in earlier days before the paths of world travel were worn so deep. From the time the migrant bought his ticket, often with money sent by a kinsman in America, he was pushed along the lines of easiest movement until he emerged from Ellis Island with America before him. To call the emigrants "the beaten men of beaten races" was unfair; but they were no longer the best of their racial stocks. It was a question whether races so diverse, especially the Asiatic ones, could be absorbed in the American stock. The only tests applied were disbelief in anarchy and polygamy, good health, and possession of a small sum of money. To acts limiting migration passed at the behest of trade unions which feared the new competition, and of Americans solicitous for the supremacy of the old stock, both Taft and Wilson set their vetoes.

The growth of the foreign colonies and foreign political blocs in the great cities accentuated the problems of growth and made their solution more difficult. Social settlements like Hull House multiplied; social uplift work became a profession with schools to train its workers. Responding to expanding population and bounds, American cities extended their systems of parks, playgrounds and schools; they improved streets, lighting, water-supply, and sewage disposal. The engineering problems involved became greater and greater, the financial outlay greater yet. Street-car systems had to be improved by modern equipment, more cars, extended trackage, all on the basis of the watered stock which the earlier pirates like Yerkes and Widener had left. Municipal ownership was sometimes considered; partnership of the city in the earnings of the street-car system was also applied. Regulation of fare was rendered difficult by court decisions affirming the right of invested capital to a fair return on investment. Our street railways are not yet on a sound basis.

Municipal problems

The problem of keeping city governments efficient, city courts and police free of influence, city boards of aldermen free of graft, had proved increasingly difficult despite higher standards of public

opinion. The very intricacy of the machinery necessary to govern municipalities, which sometimes included most of one county or parts of several others, made it impossible to check its working or to demonstrate the existence of suspected inefficiency or corruption. The presence of foreign elements voting *en bloc*, the extension of national political parties into municipal government, increased the difficulty of securing honest and economical government. Smaller cities tried, with fair results, the plan of a city manager, on whose shoulders could be placed all responsibility, or a commission to supervise the whole municipal government. Municipal problems introduced corruption into state government. In State after State appeared the rivalry of city and country—New York City and upstate New York, Chicago and downstate Illinois, Detroit, and rural Michigan. The rural elements tried to postpone the redistricting that would give the rapidly growing city its fair representation, alleging a fear of giving control of the State to masses unfit to exercise it. The argument is undemocratic, but so far the rural districts have maintained their superiority, and cities remain under-represented.

Municipal government

The increasing mass of regulatory legislation required by the increasing complexity of industry and life, called for an ever-increasing number of bureaus, departments, and officials in state and federal government. The national departments had grown since their first establishment with a secretary and a few assistants and clerks, to staffs numbered by thousands at Washington, with ramifications throughout the United States. The burden of expense of government naturally grew greater and greater. The Billion Dollar Congress of 1890 soon became a memory; the tens of billions disbursed by our war-time Congress made it seem almost parsimonious.

Growing complexity of government

The increasing complexity of life mirrored itself in private as well as public organizations. In the period we are considering, national organizations of all sorts developed—of industries and businesses, of advocates of specific reforms, of devotees of some sport or amusement, of fraternal and social orders and societies:

all these provided national and state or local conventions, organizations, committees, and lodges to pursue the multifarious ends of the organization. In a certain sense, they were to be charged to recreation, to the desire of visiting a new place in congenial company, or to gaining an increased sense of self-importance by holding committee positions and offices. Nevertheless, the situation revealed the growing complication of even amusement and recreation.

Complexity of social organization

The development of local societies, clubs, and what not, in the period, far outran even the national organizations. Very significant was the development of women's clubs. The growing elaboration of industrial organization which took out of the hands of women whose husbands did not wish to seem economically unsuccessful the tasks of baking, preserving, or even of cooking the family meals, of making, laundering, or mending the family clothing, left women with a tremendous amount of spare time and energy. It overflowed from their social clubs and clubs for mental improvement. They undertook the amelioration of their communities; naturally they demanded the right to vote.

Woman's new-found leisure

In certain States, they had held it for a long time—in Wyoming since 1890, in Colorado since 1893; in others they had it for certain local officers such as members of school boards. As a result of a determined campaign in State after State, the women suffragists secured for women as much of a franchise as state legislatures could give. On June 5, 1919, they secured from Congress the passage of an amendment to the federal Constitution forbidding denial, on grounds of sex, of the right to vote; this was ratified on August 18, 1920.

Woman suffrage

The age was marked by gifts and bequests to charitable and educational projects as no previous period of the world's history had been. This was in great measure due to the criticism vented upon great wealth acquired by the business methods of the past. In self-justification, business men bestowed large sums. Andrew Carnegie was the great example. Announcing blithely his intention of giving away his money and dying poor, he made himself famous by his

Endowment of charity and education

gifts of library buildings to numerous towns from coast to coast. His name is perpetuated in the Carnegie Foundation at Washington for the promotion of research, and in the Carnegie Endowment Fund.

Similar great foundations for research in the social sciences and medicine bear the names of Russell Sage and of Rockefeller. The latter, whose benefactions to the University of Chicago began in the 'nineties, gave millions upon millions to make it one of the foremost in the nation. He gave even vaster sums to the General Education Board for the promotion of education at large. These are the best known examples; lesser foundations of one sort or another for the promotion of charity, education, social welfare, or denominational religion, are to be numbered by the hundreds. To-day the man known to be rich is actually on the defensive before the numerous causes that demand rather than ask his contribution, as a duty rather than a favor. The fear has often been expressed that such liberality will stifle the free scientific spirit of investigation especially where it comes into social and economic fields in which its discoveries may condemn the masters of great wealth. So far this difficulty has certainly not arisen; but it may well be questioned if the policy of private subvention is as sound as that of public support by taxation.

The great foundations

In dealing more largely with the development of American society in this period, it is necessary first to add a little to what has been said about its material advance. Down to 1917, the American middle class had by various inventions and devices become far more comfortable. The development of apartment buildings in vast numbers, of all degrees of luxury, made possible improved heating systems by steam or hot water; even in the middle-class home, a furnace or heating plant was a great improvement over the old base-burner stove. In the cities first gas and then electricity replaced the kerosene lamp. Bathing facilities developed from the portable tin tub, through the zinc bathtub with running water, to the elaborate porcelain-fitted and tiled bathrooms of the present day.

The improved middle-class home

By 1917, for the well-to-do family the automobile had replaced bicycle or buggy as a means of transportation, and made possible a degree of aloofness impossible in the days when the street car or the suburban railroad train was used by all classes alike. The automobile came into its own. The development in Europe of high-priced cars and of taxis was earlier than in America; but by 1917 the American system of production by standardized parts made possible moderate-priced cars, and even cheap cars like the Ford and the Saxon within the reach of those of limited means.

Progress in tenement and farmhouse

In the poorer sections of the city, what improvement there was had come mainly as the result of the activity of city health officers and civic organizations rather than by any initiative on the part of the dwellers in them; their reaction to the achievement of prosperity was to move into better sections of the town. The farmhouse did not develop as much as it might have done, because of the tendency of the prosperous farmer to let his farm to a tenant and move to town to live on the proceeds. But the rural free delivery mail system, established in 1902, drew the farmer nearer to the great world by bringing his mail daily instead of keeping it until he could find time to drive into town for it; the telephone lifted the burden of loneliness that weighed down the housewife too often into insanity. The stationary gasoline engine relieved the farmer of much of his burden of manual toil; the development of better roads put him in closer touch with neighbors, schools, churches, towns. Progress moved from section to section of the country, the South always lagging behind.

Religion

In our period, the church did not gain; in the life of the individual with the multiplication of other intellectual stimuli and interests, it tended even to lose in importance. In the country districts, it tended most to hold its own in the minds of its members and in its beliefs. In the cities, the country clubs and golf proved too strong a temptation for many of its communicants. To empty pews, city clergymen preached an increasingly liberal gospel that emphasized theological doctrine less and the ethical duties of the individual to society more. Tolerance seemed on

the increase; liberal interpretations of the Bible or church creed grew among the city churches and the young ministers, fresh from liberal theological schools, who aspired to fill them.

The university and college enrollments increased greatly. College was no longer a theological training school, or the playground of the select. Students by hundreds of thousands sought it for a discipline that would help them to achieve greater material success in life, sought it, too, as a stamp of social rank. The fraternity or sorority as a badge of social position, took on new importance; the public at large developed an increasing interest in the branches of college activity which it could understand—football especially. **The colleges**

In spite of this, intellectual standards probably did not suffer greatly. Down to 1917 the college faculties were still adequate for instructing the growing student body with efficiency. Standards, of course, were weakened by the presence of students from homes without college tradition, and with little or no intellectual background. But undergraduate standards were maintained in the large. The training of graduate students and the prosecution of research for enlarging the bounds of science were expanding almost as fast as the undergraduate bodies. Medical and legal education were improving: higher and higher educational standards for entrance to these professions were being set by legislatures or by competition. The doctor who could show four years of college, four years of medical school, and an interneship in a great city hospital had a start in the race over the man whose medical training rested only on a high school course. All in all, the situation seemed to permit of optimism. **Educational progress**

Secondary and primary education were developing also. Schools of education were devising new methods of instruction and training teachers in them; subjects were elaborating from the primary schools up. Drilling in the three R's was pushed to the outskirts and backwoods of the educational field. Employers criticized much of the new education as faddism, complaining of high school graduates who could not spell **The schools**

or add correctly. A movement for vocational education, training in a trade, supplementary to the ordinary schools, was sponsored by these interests, and vehemently opposed by certain educational experts. With the great investments in school buildings, the great prizes to be won by publishers in the sale of school books by the hundred thousand, politics swayed the educational world and left its mark day by day on the schools which the children attended.

Of other intellectual forces, those proceeding from the press need to be considered. The new literate classes were not reading many books save fiction. To cater to their taste, magazines and weeklies sprang up by hundreds. The 'nineties and the early twentieth century had seen *McClure's* and *Everybody's Magazines* reach great circulations by their sensational exposures of big business. Now the field was left almost entirely to fiction magazines. They reached circulations that rendered absurd the small clientele of what advertisers called the "quality group," the mag-

The new magazines

azines of the displaced middle class. *The Saturday Evening Post* as a weekly succeeded in reaching a wide circle of readers, high as well as low, with fiction, feature articles, and editorial comment. Its tremendous circulation enabled it to support itself by huge advertising charges, and of late years to give its patrons a magazine the paper in which could not be purchased for its price of a nickel.

As to newspapers, they tended more and more to decline in numbers and extend in area of influence. The circulation of the

The newspapers

great metropolitan dailies displaced local papers for hundreds of miles around them. Such local newspapers as survived no longer held the services of editors of force and originality, and tended to become feeble copies of the city papers, even when the "boiler plate insides," syndicated news and features, had not crowded out the editor's comment on local news. The metropolitan dailies under force of competition tended always to decrease in numbers, usually through consolidations. The *Chicago Examiner* to-day represents the consolidation, over a period of forty years, of four different papers.

For amusements, by the end of the period sport was increasing its hold on the young of all classes. The professional sports already mentioned held their own, though legislation against boxing and betting drove prize fighting and horse racing from place to place, boxing usually finding, however, a lawful substitute in wrestling. Golf, an exotic in 1890, had by 1917 conquered the country. Young men, middle-aged men, old men, all found needed outdoor exercise in it. Country clubs and courses multiplied outside cities, as additional playgrounds for the wealthy and the well-to-do. The lure of the all-year-round outdoors drew the successful in the middle west to California by hundreds of thousands.

Sport

In the theater, the great development of the period was the motion picture. At the beginning of the century it was only a toy to depict such comic scenes as a man shaving with a dull razor. Mechanical improvement in photographing and projecting made it possible to present real dramas, with settings of landscape or buildings and crowds of people, such as no stage could contain. By 1916, great dramatic spectacles like *Intolerance* appeared. The nature of the films made it possible to multiply them and to show them wherever an audience of a few hundred could gather. In country villages, in converted city stores, theaters developed where at first the charge rarely exceeded five or ten cents.

The movies

As to the spoken drama, comparatively little real advance could be noted. Productions and traveling companies increased; despite Little Theater movements and endowments, the artistic standard of plays which courted the public fancy did not improve. New York tended more and more to be the dramatic center of the country as the center of its wealth and luxury. There, a group of theatrical promoters expert in giving the public what it wanted, dominated the situation. They produced some good plays, and many more musical comedies, steadily progressing in frankness of language and physical revelation; but as late as 1908, the appearance of a barefoot dancer on the stage caused searchings of heart as to the moral issue involved.

The theater

In many ways, indeed, increased frankness of speech, act, and dress were replacing the prudery of the earlier generation. The development of cabarets, offering a selection of vaudeville acts with an opportunity to the audience to drink, dine, and dance, was an innovation at which the strait-laced hesitated.

In the midst of all this were certain great movements of reform. So-called "Temperance" agitation had of course existed long before the Civil War. First revealing itself in the Prohibition party of the postwar period, for which men voted to show their disgust at the nominees of the major parties, it later adopted the policy exemplified by the Anti-Saloon League. It pressed option laws through one state legislature after another; then, in local option elections, it voted larger and larger districts dry; gradually it thus "dried up" State after State. The southern States heartily supported the movement in order to keep liquor from the negro. The Anti-Saloon League gained the financial and moral support of the churches, and of many business men who believed laborers would be more efficient if Blue Monday, the aftermath of Sunday drinking, was eliminated. Dry leaders showed great skill in manipulating a minority between the two major parties in districts where they were nearly equal in strength. By 1917, the Anti-Saloon League had dried up most of the nation outside the cities and was preparing to exert itself for a national prohibition amendment.

The Anti-Saloon League

Besides the prohibition movement, there was in the America of the early twentieth century much more of desire for righteousness and of eagerness to attain it. The general uplift of classes that prosperity brought about, with economic well-being apparently achieved for good, made people impatient to reform the world completely; they aspired to make politics in State, nation, and city, pure and responsive to the people's will, to bring about in everything the rule of righteousness. They looked out on a world comfortable and apparently safe, which only needed the moral law established in it to attain perfection. On this reforming spirit the great political successes of Roosevelt and Wilson were founded.

Optimism

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

B. J. Hendrick, *The Age of Big Business* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. XXXIX). New Haven, 1919.
F. L. Paxson, *The Last American Frontier*. New York, 1910.
——, *Recent History of the United States*. Boston, 1921.
——, *The New Nation*. Boston, 1915.
P. L. Haworth, *The United States in Our Own Times, 1865–1920*. New York, 1920.
L. D. Shippee, *Recent American History*. New York, 1924.
J. Moody, *The Railroad Builders* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. XXXVIII). New Haven, 1919.
J. Moody, *The Masters of Capital* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. XLI). New Haven, 1919.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT AND WILSON

At the end of the nineteenth century the forces of conservatism in American life seemed well intrenched. The Senate, always tending to defer to long service and force of character, was controlled by men like Hanna of Ohio and Aldrich of Rhode Island who firmly believed that the best interests of the country demanded close attention to the wishes of big business. Owing their election to state legislatures which were susceptible to political manipulations and control by party machines they felt little or no dependence upon the people of their States. The appearance among them of liberals like Beveridge of Indiana in 1899 and of radicals like LaFollette of Wisconsin in 1906 could leaven the mass but slowly.

Big business in politics

In the chief magistracy, William McKinley, of facile disposition, much under the influence of Mark Hanna, was in 1900 practically assured of succeeding himself. The country was prosperous; the sting of hard times to goad men into radicalism and populism was absent. Even when W. J. Bryan in 1900 joined to the free-silver cry of 1896 the vague issue of "anti-imperialism," he had no chance against the "Advance Agent of Prosperity" of 1896 who now came to promise "Four Years More of the Full Dinner Pail." McKinley was easily reëlected; but six months after his inauguration he died from the bullet of an anarchist assassin, and one far different from him reigned in his stead.

McKinley

Theodore Roosevelt, born in 1858, was the son of one of the oldest and most aristocratic families of Knickerbocker New York; he inherited wealth sufficient to leave him free to follow what course he would. Graduating from Harvard he entered politics as a member of the New York Assembly, tried his hand at ranching in the west and failed, served as president of the New York Police Board, and was assistant secretary of the navy

Theodore Roosevelt

at the outbreak of the war with Spain. He resigned, raised a volunteer cavalry regiment made up of his associates of the western frontier, and of eastern college men, which caught the popular fancy under the soubriquet of "The Rough Riders." Roosevelt and part of his regiment, dismounted, served gallantly in the Santiago campaign, and though he missed the Congressional Medal of Honor which he sought, he became a popular hero and returned to be elected governor of New York. His independence in that position scandalized Thomas C. Platt, boss of the State, who hastened to push him into the vice presidency to stave off a second term at Albany. Neither McKinley nor Hanna, nor probably Roosevelt himself welcomed this solution; but Platt and the enthusiasm of the rank and file of the convention prevailed, and Roosevelt, elected vice president with McKinley, succeeded him.

The man's personality was the most striking that had been seen in American politics since the days of Lincoln and Jackson. A feeble child, by patient physical training he developed himself into a stocky, robust man, fond of boxing, hunting, and the most strenuous outdoor sports. Possessed of high physical courage, masterful manner, and democratic address, he seemed the very incarnation of virile manhood. Cowpuncher, hunter, prize fighter, railroad engineer, all attracted and were attracted by this magnetic figure. His intellectual powers were remarkable. He possessed most catholic tastes: his studies mastered the minutiæ of natural history; he wrote several creditable books on the history of the United States. He excelled in getting up a subject quickly, and retained amazing amounts of information over his range of interests.

Roosevelt's character

Outwardly, he seemed a savage and unflinching fighter in the cause of right. As a young man in the New York Assembly, as police official, he had fought corruption in politics. He was to proclaim from the housetops the doctrine of righteousness in the political life and business of the nation. Yet he was strangely opportunist. At an early stage of his career he became impressed with the importance of catering to his

Roosevelt an opportunist

political party, and with the hopelessness of securing results if one outstrips one's followers in progress. Thus he had fought the nomination of Blaine on moral grounds in 1884, and then as a good party man had voted for him. Thus his dealing with big business during his administration went not on abstract principles but on an arbitrary classification into "good trusts" and "bad trusts." This fundamental opportunism led him into continual disagreement with his more doctrinaire associates. On them and others who misinterpreted his aims he plastered the epithet "liar" so vigorously that newspaper writers created the "Ananias Club" composed of persons he had thus distinguished. His opportunism at length played into the hands of his opponents, enabling them to discount his crusades for righteousness by pointing out his inconsistencies and defections from principle. He understood keenly the value of publicity. Realizing that Monday morning was a bad time for news in newspaper offices, he often planned his announcements and actions so as to reach the Monday headlines, uncrowded by other excitement. His square face, distinguished by eyeglass and prominent teeth, made cartooning him easy. His brusque and forceful manner, his ejaculations "bully," "dee-lighted," his phrases, "mollycoddle," "strenuous life," "malefactor of great wealth" all assisted his newspaper friends in making him a unique news figure.

Roosevelt and the party machines

The achievements of Roosevelt's administration in foreign policy, and the doctrine of the "big stick" have already been discussed. In domestic affairs his actual accomplishment was less. He had to contend against the inert masses of the Republican machines. His personal popularity in the nation often could not be used to bend to his will the obstinate conservative leaders in House and Senate. One of his notable failures was in pushing tariff reform against the intrenched interests. McKinley had touched its advisability in his last speech. From Iowa in 1902 came a strenuous demand for it which Roosevelt indorsed, but the situation throughout his seven and a half years of office remained unchanged.

He was more successful at other points in dealing with big

business. The suit against the Northern Securities Company which ended in a Supreme Court order that it dissolve, was one of the many prosecutions directed at the "bad" trusts to break them up, usually with qualified success. In the fall of 1902 he swung the "big stick" in settling a great strike in the anthracite coal mines of Pennsylvania that threatened nationwide suffering. Prepared if necessary to use the United States army to take over the mines, he compelled the obstinate operators to submit to arbitrating their differences with their men. His second term in 1906 saw the passage of the Hepburn Act, abolishing free passes save for railroad employees, enlarging the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission, allowing it, subject to judicial appeal, to fix rates, and to enforce uniform accounting systems. The discovery of shockingly unsanitary conditions in the meat-packing plants, which threatened our export trade in meats, and of the widespread adulteration of prepared food and drugs led to the passage in 1906 of the Pure Food Act, establishing federal responsibility for the purity of such preparations entering interstate commerce.

Roosevelt's achievements

Conservation of national resources was another issue dear to the heart of the hunter president. For a century and a quarter unchecked wastefulness in the utilization of the resources of the American continent had been the rule. The pioneer had wrested his farm out of hardwood forests, getting rid of the priceless timber by fire or rot. In later days lumber companies by wasteful processes had stripped millions of acres of pine lands of all salable timber, leaving waste and desolation behind. With the denuded slopes no longer held by the spreading roots of the trees the top soil washed away. No longer held in the soil to seep off gradually, the melting snows of winter and rains of spring poured off the barren hillsides, trenched gullies in fertile fields, and brought disastrous floods in the rivers.

The waste of natural resources

In the early twentieth century it seemed quite probable that unchecked private greed would denude the land not merely of forests but of deposits of coal, oil, and ore, and leave it stripped and bare, its succeeding generations dependent on the bounty of

other lands that had used their resources more carefully. Much of the millions and millions of acres of timber and mineral lands had passed from the government to the hands of private capital. The big business interests apparently were no longer reaping monopoly profits by controlling manufactures. Instead they planned to monopolize the sources of wealth buried in the soil; they were reaching out for the dam sites by which they could control the boundless energy from water power produced by myriad streams. The policy of conservation therefore called for the husbanding by the government of the desirable lands still in its hands and the pushing of projects of reforestation.

Need of conservation

As early as 1891, Congress had authorized the president to withdraw forest lands from private entry. Forty-six million acres had so been withdrawn by Roosevelt's time; when he left office the reserves totaled 172 million acres. In pursuance of his policy he called in 1908 a conservation congress of governors of States and their experts to consider problems involved; he next appointed a committee to investigate and to report fully. At the beginning of Roosevelt's administration the Newlands Act of 1902 had provided for government advance of the necessary money for irrigation projects to reclaim to cultivation semiarid lands of the west. The government has steadily pursued the policy. A further development was the rise of regional understandings among the States themselves as to the utilization of natural resources of water and power sources which they enjoy in common.

Achievements in conservation

Roosevelt's administration was marked also by the establishment in 1903 of a new department and cabinet seat, that of Commerce and Labor. A Department of Agriculture had already been created in 1889. Roosevelt's term also saw the admission of Oklahoma as a State in 1907. As one analyzes the actual achievement of Roosevelt in domestic matters it appears comparatively small. Despite his thunderous propaganda, the conservative elements in Congress were not easily moved and repeatedly they took delight in blocking his cherished schemes.

Minor legislation

They would have been glad to prevent his reëlection in 1904; but the death of Mark Hanna in February of that year eliminated the only rival for the nomination who had the popular standing to compete with him. The Democrats, sidetracking Bryan, nominated Alton B. Parker of New York, a conservative who promptly repudiated the former free-silver opinions of the party. Parker was but a colorless figure beside Roosevelt. His charges of contributions to the Republican campaign fund forced from the big interests were vehemently repelled by Roosevelt, although without his knowledge such contributions had been made. Parker was snowed under in the election, carrying only the solid south; his party seemed on the edge of dissolution.

The election of 1904

More significant than Roosevelt's personal achievements, or even than his qualified principles, was the development, partly behind him, partly independent of him, of a new spirit of liberalism in American politics. The belated fruit of this came in the adoption in 1913 of a constitutional amendment providing for the direct election of United States senators. It had essential expression in state and municipal affairs. Municipal ownership of public utilities, and of street railways especially, was considered in city after city. Brand Whitlock in Toledo, and Tom Johnson in Cleveland represented a finer and more humane sense of the duties of municipal government for the safety and health of city dwellers. In state offices the feeling especially manifested itself in Wisconsin. Here LaFollette, beaten for the Republican nomination for governor in 1896 and 1898 by the party convention, was elected governor in 1900 and senator in 1906. The "Wisconsin idea" was state supervision over organized wealth by regulation of corporations, the levy on profits by an income tax, and the restoration of popular government by direct primaries, which insured the people's control of party machinery. The Wisconsin idea spread to other States in milder form.

The new liberalism

The initiative, referendum, and recall were also reform catchwords, voicing a faith that purity in politics would be achieved through popular control of government. The initiative by the

ballot allowed the people to pass legislation themselves; the referendum, the most generally adopted of the three, allowed them to pass in similar manner on questions of policy, or on laws submitted to them by the state legislature. The recall, most unusual of the three, allowed them to recall to private life an official in whom they had lost faith, even before the expiration of his term. Similar proposals for recall of judges or recall of judicial decisions, spoke a growing skepticism as to the integrity of the courts and their decisions. The new liberalism of the time expressed itself in such weeklies as Louis Post's *Public*. Much of all this liberal agitation Roosevelt approved. Much of it he later characterized as the "lunatic fringe" of a genuine progressive movement. By 1908 the faces of many thoughtful men were set in the direction of universal purity in government, of insuring its obedience to the will of the voters, and of cutting away such things as the tariff by which organized wealth was thought to seize for itself undue privilege with or without the government's aid.

Proposals for reform

The end of Roosevelt's elected term approached. His popularity and the popularity of his policies reached far beyond the rank and file of his party. Strong, enthusiastic elements in it sought to force him to abandon his pledge of 1904 and to face down the opposition to a third term. The President however set himself sternly against any such project, and instead prepared to secure the nomination of a successor who would carry out the Roosevelt policies in the person of William H. Taft. Taft, who had served Roosevelt as governor of the Philippines and secretary of war, was a portly gentlemen of genial nature, possessed of a "judicial mind," and reputed to be an admirable administrator. He seemed to be the man to translate the Roosevelt idealism into actual polity. The delegations to the Republican convention from the party pocket boroughs in the southern States were therefore duly instructed for Taft and without difficulty he was nominated over a group of "favorite sons"—Hughes of New York, Knox of Pennsylvania, Cannon of Illinois, LaFollette of Wisconsin.

Roosevelt's successor

For the Democrats, after the disastrous essay into conservatism of 1904, the logical candidate was Bryan—a Bryan of 48 years, calm, ripe, and experienced. The campaign did not turn into a repetition of the crusade of 1896; the normal Republican majority asserted itself and Taft was duly elected with a working majority in House and Senate. Promptly a special session of the new Congress was called to undertake a revision of the tariff, while Roosevelt to avoid any embarrassment to his successor, plunged into the heart of Africa on a grand hunt for big game. To the dismay of those who had taken it for granted that the tariff revision pledge of the Republican platform implied revision downward, the conservatives prepared a revision as essentially protectionist as the Dingley law it replaced. All eyes turned on the President; when he approved the Payne-Aldrich tariff, and openly defended it in a speech at Winona, Minnesota, the elements that had counted on his liberalism were taken completely aback.

Taft disappoints the liberals

A quarrel between his secretary of the interior, Richard A. Ballinger, and Gifford Pinchot, Roosevelt's chief forester, in which Pinchot accused his chief of turning precious natural resources into the hands of private capitalists, and in which Taft backed Ballinger, added to the dismay of progressive elements. Roosevelt, his hunting trip over, visited familiarly the sovereigns of Europe, and returned to America to voice at Osawatomie, Kansas, in the summer of 1910, the doctrine of a "new nationalism," promising a better chance for the masses at the good things of the world by the restriction of special privilege. The congressional election of 1910 returned a Democratic majority in the lower house, which with Champ Clark of Missouri as speaker passed a revision downward of certain tariff schedules, thus establishing for the party a record of attempted constructive work.

The new nationalism

Throughout 1911 Roosevelt's course appeared uncertain. Manifestly the old intimacy with Taft was at an end. Manifestly also, Taft, with the conservative elements in the party behind him, was preparing for a renomination with the aid of southern delegations. LaFollette of Wisconsin in the winter entered the lists against

him, securing the delegations in Wisconsin and North Dakota. Meanwhile, on January 18, 1912, Roosevelt had privately indicated that he would receive favorably a request which seven liberal Republican state governors were prepared to make, that he seek the Republican nomination; he entered the campaign for delegates to the conventions. Where state laws provided for the choice of delegates by direct party primaries, Roosevelt was generally successful; many seats in the convention were contested by Taft and Roosevelt delegations. With the control of the convention centering in the elements supporting Taft, they were able to seat Taft delegations sufficient to assure him a majority of the convention. The result was a bolt of most of the Roosevelt delegates, who after the nomination of Taft at the Coliseum in Chicago repaired to Orchestra Hall to be addressed by Roosevelt and others and to lay the foundations of a Progressive party, whose program was to be the social justice implied in the new nationalism. At a later party convention in Chicago, Roosevelt was nominated as a Progressive candidate for president on a platform embodying the social reforms current among the liberals of the day.

The Progressive party

Meantime the Democrats had met at Baltimore. As candidates for the party nomination, Judson Harmon, of Ohio, and Oscar W. Underwood, of Alabama, represented the conservative elements in the party. Champ Clark of Missouri, speaker of the House, was the candidate of the Hearst papers, and, while colorless in opinion, inclined to be liberal. The essentially liberal candidate, however, was a man destined in the twelve years of life left to him to become a figure in world history, Woodrow Wilson.

Democratic presidential aspirants

Wilson, of southern birth and education, had received his doctor's degree at the then new Johns Hopkins University, had tried without success the practice of law, and had written a book on congressional government which excited attention as a clear analysis of the actual working of the legislative machine. He had become professor of political science and president of Princeton University, and had written a history

The career of Woodrow Wilson

of the American people distinguished rather for style and interpretation than for scholarly thoroughness. At Princeton in a campaign against aristocratic tendencies in the student body, he had encountered opposition from faculty and trustees, had resigned and had been nominated for governor of New Jersey by the Democrats. In his campaign he enunciated in polished phrases an ideal of democracy, of restoration of control to the people that, once elected, he put into legislation in defiance of the party bosses in the State. He attracted the enthusiastic support of liberals throughout the United States and was put forward as a candidate for the party nomination at Baltimore. On his behalf a minority group came to the convention fired with enthusiasm for their leader and his principles and determined to fight for him to the last ditch.

Fortune and skill favored him. His indorsement of Bryan's bitter denunciation of Tammany influence in the convention necessarily ensured him the support of the Great Commoner. On the forty-sixth ballot the break came, and sufficient delegates turned to him to secure his nomination. Once nominated, his election was assured. The conservative elements in his own party, largely southern, had no reason to desert him for the liberal Roosevelt, and could not desert him for the conservative Republican Taft. The genuine liberals in and out of the Democratic party believed his liberalism more deep-seated than Roosevelt's. Roosevelt made a furious campaign, the bull moose and the bandanna handkerchief serving his followers as badges to stress the manhood of their leader. They endeavored to break down for him the Democratic control of the solid south: actually they carried away a majority of the Republican party, the votes of the three groups being Taft, 3,484,956, Wilson, 6,293,019, Roosevelt, 4,119,507. Wilson received an overwhelming majority of the electoral college: Roosevelt here also ran second to him, Taft receiving only the votes of Vermont and Utah. A Congress, Democratic in both branches, was assured to carry out Wilson's policy.

Wilson's nomination

We have already seen how Wilson appeared to men in 1912.

Seen in the perspective of history, in character, in achievement, in failure, Woodrow Wilson is almost an insoluble puzzle. No other American ever played so great a part as his between 1917 and 1919. No other American has dominated the world's attention even for a moment as Wilson did in December of 1918. No American president save Jefferson and perhaps Washington has ever ruled his party so absolutely as did Wilson. Wilson's prominence must be ascribed partly to outward circumstances that pushed him into high leadership; but without some peculiar quality in the man himself he could not have risen to his opportunity. Beside him, his rival Roosevelt, who most heartily hated and despised him, is a thoroughly simple character.

Wilson as a world figure

Personally, Wilson appears to have been a shy and lonely man of sensitive nature. He made few personal friends, and criticism or opposition from them could easily induce him to discard them forever. He was an orator, a master of words who could appeal to men in the mass, a Democrat in theory; but he could not, like Roosevelt, or like most politicians, seize the personal friendship of the man who passed him on the street; nor apparently did he care to do so. The man awed his countrymen: he seemed to live in a higher world of abstract theory. He appealed continually to abstract principles as his guides of action. He possessed a peculiar power of couching his principles in a phrase or sentence of beauty and charm that eluded literal analysis to exercise almost a magic influence on the hearer.

Wilson's character

Yet here the paradoxes of the man's career begin. He was indeed a theorist and he would fight with all a theorist's obstinacy for every jot and tittle of his ideal. Much of his earlier success probably lay in the moral dominance over his associates and party workers that the singleness of his aims secured him. Yet his theories, which he, and his followers under him, treated as something sacrosanct, under the pressure of circumstances seemed to drift back into something more and more aloof from actual life. As the unfolding situation forced his policies to become specific, his theories saved themselves from

Wilson the theorist

contradiction by becoming nebulous. The doctrine of the New Freedom of 1912 persisted after Wilson had drafted twenty-five million of his fellow citizens into liability for military service 3000 miles from their homes, and had imposed on every detail of their daily lives more minute governmental regulations than the most capricious despot who ever figured in eastern romance.

In foreign policy, his theories sternly bade the American people be neutral in 1914, rejoice in their freedom from war and preparedness for war in 1916, engage themselves to promote a "peace without victory" in January, 1917, war to the death in behalf of democracy not three months later, bind themselves in January, 1918, to the enforcement of a world order based on justice, and in June of 1919 pledge their blood and treasure to the perpetuation of an order of things based on the national interests of the victors. The contradictions at last became too obvious to disregard. "Open covenants, openly arrived at" was but strangely practiced at Versailles. With Wilson insisting that there was not the faintest contradiction between theory and result, when that difference was patent to all, the American people in deep bewilderment at last turned away from their great leader.

Wilson's inconsistent theories

In valuing the man's career, one wonders whether after all he was self-blinded as to the consistency of his theories and achievements, or whether his devotion was not to something deeper far than theory itself. Did the apostle of democracy really believe at bottom that men must be led blindfold by an inspired prophet in ways of progress, and that the prophet must by theory and by phrase hide from them the true goal to which he leads? Everywhere Wilson must be the sole enunciator of policy, the sole determiner of the manner and degree of its execution. Wilson was always the schoolmaster, always the man set on forcing others into the path he thought right. "I am going," he snapped at an Englishman who sought an understanding of his Mexican policy in 1914, "to teach the South American Republics to elect good men." The man who thus assumed a moral responsibility for guiding the lives of people of

What was the real Wilson?

alien tradition on the basis of his own habits of political thought was either the world's greatest doctrinaire or the world's greatest autocrat.

But seven years that might have been seven centuries, so great is the gulf they span, separate the Wilson of 1919 from the Wilson of 1912. In 1912 the world seemed rosy to the liberal.

Wilson's cabinet

True, Wilson's cabinet was not remarkable. It included Bryan as secretary of state because his position in the party demanded recognition; his friendly simplicity, too, might well reassure South America that the era of dollar diplomacy was past. William G. McAdoo, secretary of the treasury, was a brilliant and able man of affairs; later he became Wilson's son-in-law. Josephus Daniels of North Carolina, a newspaper editor of Bryan's following, as secretary of the navy was an easy target for Republican ridicule. Lindley M. Garrison made an efficient secretary of war; the other men in the cabinet, though possessing high ability, had not caught or did not attract the public eye.

Wilson's first achievement was extracting more constructive legislation than has been passed by any other Congress since 1789 from the Democratic Congress, which he called in special session immediately on his accession to office. In part, Wilson's dominance of Congress may have been personal, but other factors helped; he reintroduced the eighteenth-century custom of reading his messages to Congress in person, thereby making them short and telling; the lank theorist inspired awe in the practical politicians around him; the twenty-years' minority of the Democratic party left no figure in it comparable with his, save Bryan.

Wilson dominates Congress

He carried out the pledged reduction of the tariff. The Underwood-Simmons bill passed the House in May, the Senate in September, after a hard struggle by Louisiana interests over reduction of the sugar duties. It carried an income-tax provision for incomes in excess of $4000. It was immediately followed by a financial measure further-reaching than any since 1832, the Federal Reserve Act.

The tariff

With all their famed business efficiency, the Republicans had

left the financial system of the United States in the casual form in which it had grown. The government, still under the subtreasury system, collected and disbursed its revenues in cash, using the national banks to some extent as depositaries. The national banks were under strict federal regulation. The trust companies, financial institutions almost as great, lay outside its authority, subject to comparatively slight state regulation. The massing of the control of bank assets by the captains of big business was obvious under the system, and excited alarm. The anomalous condition of the currency in which greenbacks, silver certificates, Treasury notes of 1890, and national bank notes circulated under government pledge of redemption in gold was not so serious a matter since the expanding business of the country had long since outgrown these: the difficulty was rather that the paper currency could not rapidly expand to greater amounts at need.

The problem of financial organization

The panic of 1907 had resulted in the setting up of a national monetary commission to investigate the whole situation. Its elaborate report centered on a proposed system, in general that of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. As finally enforced, the measure divided the country into twelve districts. In each the banks were expected to join in association to create a Federal Reserve Bank. With these banks, national banks could carry their cash reserves; to them they could turn to rediscount their loans. Over the whole system was a Federal Reserve Board directed informally by the Treasury. By setting rediscount rates high or low, the system could accelerate or slow up the whole business of the country, could check panics and by issuing paper money based on rediscounted commercial assets or granting deposits on them, expand currency at will. From one of the worst managed nations of the world in private finance, the United States became one of the best.

The Federal Reserve System

Other legislation rounded out the Wilson program. The Clayton Anti-Trust Act of 1914 forbade interlocking directorates, and unfair competition of various sorts; specifically it freed labor unions from the provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. A

Federal Trade Commission was organized to supervise the enforcement of the act. A further act of deference to labor was the establishment in 1913 of a distinct cabinet secretary of labor. The Smith Lever Act of 1914 initiated a policy of coöperation of the Department of Agriculture with the land grant colleges in agricultural extension work. The creation of agencies which contributed dollar for dollar with the States in the promotion of educational enterprise marked an extension of federal power in the control of education that accorded ill with the states'-rights doctrines of the Democratic party. An act of 1916 prohibiting the entrance into interstate commerce of goods which were the product of child labor was two years later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

Other legislation

Wilson's supreme triumph with Congress was forcing the repeal of the tolls clause in the Panama Canal Act of 1912. By that clause Congress had practically abrogated the proviso of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty for equal tolls to all nations, by giving American shipping special preference. England naturally protested. In the spring of 1914 the President appeared before Congress and on grounds of international right and morality urged the repeal of the clause; despite strong anti-British feeling he succeeded in gaining for the United States a standing on the highest ground of international honor.

The canal tolls

The same high moral principles had previously involved him in difficulty in Mexico. Porforio Diaz, who had ruled as president, really as armed dictator, for a generation had been well disposed to Americans and American capital. In 1911 he was forced out and his place as president taken by Francisco Madero, a man of liberal principles, hostile to the capitalist influences of the United States. Early in 1913 Madero was deposed and murdered in a revolution in which his general, Victoriano Huerta, had participated, and in which the American minister had played a distinctly complacent part.

The Mexican situation

Wilson on taking office refused to follow the example of European nations and recognize Huerta's government. To him the moral issue was paramount. When Huerta saw fit to maintain

himself by force in a position won by violence, Wilson turned the influence of the United States to harry him out of office in favor of a president elected by the people in an unforced manner. The phrase Wilson applied to his policy, "watchful waiting," tickled his opponents' sense of humor. The question was complicated. British and American oil concessions were involved. The development of a revolution against Huerta led by Venustiano Carranza, with the picturesque ruffian and bandit, "Pancho" Villa, as a subordinate, made it necessary to protect the Texas border in 1916 with militia regiments, supplementing the regular organizations posted there since Taft's day. In 1914 the American army and navy seized Vera Cruz and held it for a time. In 1916 General Pershing was dispatched with a cavalry force in a vain expedition in pursuit of Villa who had raided the American border. Outrages on American property and life in Mexico and on the border were used from the first as bases of the Republican attack on Wilson; but by 1916 the whole question had become a corollary to the overshadowing issues of the World War.

"Watchful Waiting"

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

B. P. DeWitt, *The Progressive Movement.* New York, 1915.
F. E. Haynes, *Third Party Movements since the Civil War.* Iowa City, Ia., 1916.
H. Howland, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Times* (*Chronicles of America*, vol. XLVII). New Haven, 1921.
J. B. Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and his Time Shown in his Own Letters.* 2 vols. New York, 1920.
C. Seymour, ed., *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House.* 2 vols. Boston, 1926.
J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, vol. VIII. New York, 1919.
F. L. Paxson, *The Last American Frontier.* New York, 1910.
——, *The New Nation.* Boston, 1915.
——, *Recent History of the United States.* Boston, 1921.
P. L. Haworth, *The United States in Our Own Times, 1865–1920.* New York, 1920.
L. D. Shippee, *Recent American History.* New York, 1924.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE WORLD WAR: THE DIPLOMATS

I

In the World War the moral issues involved are worth searching after with a view to our future diplomatic policy. If, from the beginning, the war was a crusade of the forces of righteousness and democracy against the powers of military aristocracy and evil, the United States' place with the crusaders was empty from the outbreak of the war; and the remission of the borrowings of our allies would be but a small testimonial of our shame at our sluggardliness. If, on the other hand, the war was the work of economic and political forces, representing self-interest on both sides, it becomes a struggle into which the United States was bound to enter only when she found her interests and honor involved; and her relationship with her allies becomes plainly a plain business issue.

Moral issues in the World War

Before the historical scholars of all nations are able to agree fully as to the causes and the true apportionment of blame for the outbreak of the World War, a generation may pass. Whatever involves the lives and political organizations of men numbered by hundreds of millions is not easy to describe or to appraise in terms of moral values. In 1914 the American people generally knew little or nothing of the recent history of Europe; only gradually as they drew nearer the center of the maelstrom did they gather a little information of the causes that had produced it.

American ignorance of Europe in 1914

After the first years of the twentieth century, the greater powers of Europe were linked in two opposing groups: Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, the Triple Alliance; Russia, France, and Great Britain, the Triple Entente. For offensive participation in world politics, the other nations of Western Europe were too weak in military or naval

The rival groups of powers

strength. In Southeastern Europe was the decaying Turkish Empire from which in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries a brood of small Balkan kingdoms had arisen, Greece, Roumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, sharpened against each other by racial animosities, and frankly client states of the opposing rivals, Austria and Russia.

Of the Great Powers, Great Britain was a very old nation in political and economic development. Her population had increased tremendously in the nineteenth century, in the British Isles, and in the two great self-governing dominions of the temperate zone, Australia and Canada, which still owed allegiance to the British king. Dispersed in garrisons and governments her people held the teeming empire of India, vast domains in Africa, the spice islands of the East, and islands in the Caribbean and the Pacific. Yet England seemed to the imagination of Wilson's ambassador, Walter H. Page, an old and tired nation. She had accumulated great wealth in manufacture and trade and as the world's banker loaned it to the world at a profit. But the United States was outstripping her in manufacture, Germany in manufacture, trade, and shipping. Her millions lived poorly and faced the future with a humorous hopelessness. She had a small but excellent army, and a navy the first in the world.

Great Britain

France, led by her central position in Western Europe to a series of ambitious wars of conquest from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, had emerged from the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 with a population tending to remain almost stationary. Its backbone was a peasant class grouped in small villages, tilling in little tracts their worn-out land, close-fisted, avidly retentive of what they had, resentful to the last degree of attempts to tax them. French manufacturing had declined in relative importance due in considerable measure to unwillingness to scrap machinery outdistanced in efficiency. Save for a few great plants and industries, it was still on a small scale. France had lost rich ore deposits in 1871 when Germany at the end of the Franco-Prussian War had wrested from her Alsace and Lorraine. Military leaders dreamed of "la Revanche," a defeat of the hated German and a recovery of the lost provinces. A repub-

France

lic, based on a legislature elected by the people, she swayed back and forth in political contests between numerous parties—small groups who wished to restore the Bourbon monarchs and remake a Catholic France, advocates of the restoration of the Napoleonic dynasty and another military empire, republicans, anticlericals, radicals, and socialists of various stripes. Based on coalitions of these factions, ministries rose and fell.

If the greatness of France and England seemed to recede into the past, Russia's lay in the distant future. Slavic and Asiatic in origin and culture, only with the nineteenth century had she acquired, mainly from Germany, a veneer of western civilization. She had extended her dominion across Siberia, exacting from the Asiatic tribes which she absorbed allegiance to the czar and recruits for his army. The absolute power of the czar was tempered by the threat of revolution such as had come near overturning it after Russia's defeat by Japan in the Far East. Outwardly the Russian state was magnificent and terrible. The figure of the czar shining with jewels, stood at the head of a vast army, passably organized and trained, at the head of a state with manufactures, railroads and, above all, a mass of population in whose hands seemed to rest the future.

Russia

Germany felt keenly the menace of the Slav horde. From 1618 to 1815, she had been the battlefield of Europe. Swede, Pole, Russian, Austrian, Frenchman, Englishman, and Spaniard had come to fight their battles on her soil, to ravage and devastate her and to decimate her population. Then with the beginning of the eighteenth century, Prussia had developed an excellent army with a stern discipline. Almost submerged by Napoleon's might in 1806, Prussia had recovered to lead Germany in the war of liberation of 1813–1815. Then a series of short, successful wars of aggression with Denmark 1863–1864, Austria 1866, France 1870–1871, had unified Germany into an empire under the rule of the King of Prussia as Emperor. Under the protection of the "good German sword," the strong conscript German army, Germany had prospered and advanced. Patient scientific research developed the technique of industries in dyes,

Germany

in machines, in textiles, in small wares that had come to supply the world's need. German political economists devised means of government insurance and protection to the workers that retarded the growth of socialism among the crowded proletariat with its narrow margin of subsistence. Germany built a great merchant marine which in 1914 was the rival of England's in carrying on world trade.

Yet there were shortcomings. Germany in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had acquired portions of old Poland; in the nineteenth century she had gained by conquest parts of Denmark and France which she claimed as parts of the ancient German Reich, but which had populations in great measure non-German. With the heavy thoroughness which characterized the German government, it set itself to make these people German by teaching their children German in school and by forcing the language into their courts. The only result was to fan high the affec- **German** tion for the old allegiance. Germany, too, had an officer **autocracy** caste, as overbearing and autocratic as it was efficient. The military was exalted above the civilian in all respects. The kaiser regarded himself first of all as head of the army, *Kriegsherr*, warlord. Always above the civilian ministers who guided the domestic and foreign policy of the German state with its Reichstag or legislature were the generals and chiefs of staff and admirals who directed army and navy.

The ardent German nationalists saw with anger that Germany had achieved unity too late to have more desirable colonies than the leavings of dominion over backward races she had **German** taken in Africa and the Pacific in the last quarter of the **nationalism** nineteenth century. Even France, stripped of her old colonial empire in the wars of the eighteenth century, had possessions in the Caribbean, the Pacific, and Indo-China with a large and choice share of Africa. Belgium with the Belgian Congo and its riches in rubber, the Netherlands with the Spice Islands of the East, the Pan-German saw as kindred German states with better colonies than the Reich. Worst of all, when the teeming German population migrated to the United States of America or to Brazil it necessarily transferred political allegiance to the new country even

though by the fostering of language and cultural ties it would keep a sentimental attachment to the German Fatherland.

That England, Germany's lazy rival in manufacture and trade, should have great colonial markets and reservoirs of raw material, great breeding places in temperate climates for men of her race, seemed to the German imperialist an unfair handicap. The German militarist, thinking that England had acquired these possessions by the sword, might hold it only fair that she retain them by the right of the strong man that keepeth his house until he has to yield it to one stronger than he. Generally, however, in the first years of the twentieth century the German was looking for compensation in capitalistic exploitation of Asiatic Turkey. The Berlin to Bagdad Railroad running through territory held friendly to Germany was to be the artery of her new growth. That Britain, always jealous of Russia's approach to her Indian frontier even at the difficult passes of Afghanistan, should permit another and a greater military nation peaceably to approach the Suez Canal, that vital link between England and India, unless pacific intents were clearly indicated, was unthinkable.

Germany seeks a "place in the sun"

Of the remaining nations of the Triple Alliance, Italy had achieved unity as a kingdom only in the second half of the nineteenth century. It had as yet no deeply-laid national tradition of unity and self-government. Its crowding population was already too great for its narrow scope of arable land. It had no supply of ore, oil, or coal to give stability to its manufactures. It exported less than it imported, even of food. Indeed its main export was its labor, that flocked to the United States, lived poorly, and saved its wages for a future life of ease in Italy. Italy had ambitions to rebuild partly the old Roman Empire of the Eastern Mediterranean by conquests on the shore of North Africa, in the Ægean, and in Asia Minor. Italy had no real ties to bind her to the Alliance except the expectation of German support on a career of conquest on the African coast. Austria, the third member of the Alliance, was indeed Italy's worst enemy; France and England inclined to be her friends.

Italy

Austria-Hungary was essentially a catch-all of peoples, an unstable political solution in Central Europe of diverse races. Since the thirteenth century, by war or marriage, the house of Hapsburg had been steadily acquiring and sometimes losing possessions, each attached to the person of its Hapsburg ruler rather than linked to the others by common ties of race, language, or interest. The Hapsburgs' successive losses in Spain, Belgium, and Italy had left the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in 1914 a fairly compact territory in Central Europe peopled by Italians, Serbs, Czechs (Bohemians), Slovenes, Slovaks, Poles, Ruthenians, Roumanians, Germans, Hungarians. These discordant elements were ruled by a peculiar arrangement that left the lesser races subject in Austria to the Germans, in Hungary to the Hungarians. On the recognition of the statehood of these two groups, respectively acknowledging Franz Josef as emperor of Austria and king of Hungary, the dual monarchy was built up. In Bohemia, it was highly industrialized; elsewhere there was still room for agricultural expansion. Austria had no colonies and in her attempt to extend her hegemony among the fragments of the disintegrating Turkish Empire, she had a rival in Russia; the Balkan differences of the two powers resulted in difficulties which ultimately drew their allies to support them in a world war.

Austria-Hungary

In each of these nations, there was a group of politicians which looked forward with complacency to a great European war in which its country should be victorious. To begin with, such a war would probably stifle the radical forces of political revolution in Russia, the socialist forces of economic revolution in Germany, Austria, and France; in France it might establish the monarchy or the empire, in England return to power the imperialists of the Conservative party. Each group nervously played with the chances of success or failure like gamblers hoping to win, yet fearing to lose. Defeat in war would bring forth undoubted national disaster. But success for France might recover Alsace and Lorraine and summon back the old days of military glory of Louis XIV and Napoleon. For Germany, success would mean "a place in the sun," colonies in zones where

Militarist groups and ambitions

her surplus population could thrive, raw materials, new markets, industrial and commercial dominance—"world power or downfall," as one of her generals put the promise of the future for her. To Russia, success might bring an exit to warm water by the Dardanelles, the spoils of Turkey, political leadership in the Balkans. To Austria, it offered the prospect of political peace, the stability of the emperor's throne, and of the ruling class. To England, it might mean relief from the pressing competition of German goods in world markets, and the certainty of undisputed possession of what she already had. In all the industrial and colonial powers, great financial interests saw renewed opportunities for capitalistic exploitation of backward peoples in case of success, and added their backing to the political war-hawks.

Military and naval castes

In each nation, also, there was a military and naval caste fortified by social prestige and position, that had the instinctive desire to practice its profession of war, to gamble with the glorious stakes of life or death, victory or defeat; the class was everywhere confident that its military or naval machine was or could be made the winning one. This class also held itself charged with the duty of military defense of its country, and was prepared to call for a war it believed inevitable at the moment when it had the best relative chances of success. In every country save England, there was a conscript army to which in theory every able-bodied man, at a fixed age, owed one to three years service with its colors; afterward he was liable to serve in a reserve unit and was called out for short recurrent periods of training. In this way the military spirit was extended deep into the population. The military caste in question was weakest in England where popular parliamentary government continually checked its demands. It was strongest in Austria and Germany where it could overrule civil governments and legislatures, and in Russia where the autocratic czar was its figurehead.

Certain acts of Germany about the beginning of the twentieth century, such as the building of a battle fleet which aspired in size to rival England's, and an aggressive diplomatic policy pursued in search of gains in North Africa, in 1905 and 1911, aroused the

fear of France and England. They drew nearer together, abandoned their differences, agreed to divide the naval protection of their coasts, allotting the Channel to the British fleet, the Mediterranean to the French. Their capitalists made great loans to Russia to reorganize and equip her army, and to build military railroads to enable it to be debouched on the German border; similar railroads already built or enlarged by Germany pointed to the French and Belgian frontiers. To make the French standing army equal in size to the German, the French government extended the term of active military service to three years, though this did not go into effect until the outbreak of hostilities. French and British officers concerted joint action by their armies in case of a German invasion of Belgium.

The Triple Entente

Throughout Europe the diplomatic and military classes passed into a state of mutual suspicion and fear. Germany eyed with apprehension the sinister Slav hordes, fearing the day when her skill and efficiency could no longer balance their overwhelming numbers, armed and equipped by French and British intelligence. In those nations they saw the deadly *Einkreisungspolitik*, a settled scheme of throwing encircling coils around the German state that would finally contract to crush it. England and France looked with dread to a great German invasion such as France had suffered in 1870–1871. England, feverishly building battleships to keep ahead of Germany, proposed a "naval holiday"—a joint cessation of building—which the German naval interests refused. In 1912 and 1913 England in negotiation with the liberal German Ambassador Prince Lichnowsky and with the Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg endeavored a settlement of differences that would give Germany the desired opportunity for commercial expansion. In the spring of 1914, Col. E. M. House, as the personal representative of President Wilson, sought to bring Germany and England to an understanding. The Kaiser appeared to be impressed, though talking excitedly of the Slav peril. Sir Edward Grey, the English foreign secretary, hesitated, and as he hesitated, the war came.

The shadow of war

In 1911 and 1913, in Morocco or the Balkans war had seemed

near; in the latter year both Austria and Russia had mobilized locally. Russia was compelled by the situation to give way, much to the damage of her prestige. On June 28, 1914, the heir to the Austrian throne, Franz Ferdinand, was assassinated on a visit to Sarajevo, essentially a city of Serbs under Austrian rule. The assassination plot appeared to have ramifications in Serbia, and Austria on July 23, 1914, having obtained from Germany a blank indorsement of her course, presented to Serbia an ultimatum in which she demanded, under most humiliating conditions, that the assassination plot should be ferreted out by Austrian officials. Russia could not see Serbia so humiliated without further loss of prestige in the Balkans, and moved to her diplomatic support. Sir Edward Grey worked earnestly to find a way to reconcile the disputants. Germany, bound by her promise to Austria, would not accept proposals for a European conference to adjust the matter. Austria and Russia began to mobilize.

Sarajevo

At this point, the military machines with their elaborate plans of mobilization, impossible to check or alter once they were started, assumed control. Diplomatic authorities were pushed aside. It was the nemesis of monarchy that in each of the three countries concerned, the symbols of absolute power rested in the hands of a moral weakling whose decision was made for him at the critical time by irresponsible military chiefs. Political power rested in hands too weak to hold it, and was grasped by irresponsible persons with results that led inevitably to revolution. The military caste in Germany probably believed that her enemies would force a war when they were fully ready and thought it a duty to the Fatherland to strike first. Austria, Germany, Serbia, and Russia were pushed into war. France could not let her eastern ally be crushed, and dared not surrender to Germany the custody of the frontier fortresses that it demanded as the price of neutrality. She looked to England for support.

The militarists in control

Only a small section of English political opinion had ever really envisaged the country's liabilities to France in case of war. There

were no formal treaties but very distinct understandings as to assistance, military and naval. Germany would have agreed to refrain from naval operations on the French coast, but meanwhile the invasion of Belgium by Germany threw the issue open and offered to the English masses the decisive argument for entering the war to which England's diplomatic understandings and selfish interests alike bound her.

Great Britain's decision

The German plan of campaign for a war against both France and Russia was the work of Count Schlieffen, Moltke's predecessor as chief of the general staff. Schlieffen's vision was limited to the distinctly military. The story is told that his attention was once called to the scenery of a beautiful valley. He grunted, "The ground is not suitable for defense, and the river is of no value as a military obstacle," and then relapsed into silence. Schlieffen's plan forbade any immediate offensive in Russia; in her vast areas invading armies would be delayed too long in reaching a decision by battle. In the west, the Franco-German frontier available for military operations was limited. To the south, the Vosges mountains were a barrier impassible to a great army. North of it a series of forested hills—the Grand Couronné de Nancy, the Hauts de Meuse, the Argonne, the Ardennes, cut up the area. The French, too, had fortified the territory with a chain of strong fortresses—Belfort, Épinal, Toul, Nancy, Verdun; Langres and Dijon lay behind them. Here superior numbers could not operate with success.

The plan of Von Schlieffen

Schlieffen, seeing only the military view, had thereupon decided to violate the neutrality of Belgium and Holland, and sweep the German right wing around through Belgium to envelop Paris and the French army's left wing from the southwest. Knowing the movement would force the French to give battle on their own territory, away from their defensive fortresses, he could leave only enough German corps in Lorraine and Alsace to contain the French troops there. "It must come to a fight," he said on his death bed. "Only keep the right wing strong."

The violation of Belgium

The French general staff knew at least the outline of Schlieffen's

plan. They knew that German military railroads were constructed preparatory to a debouchment on the Belgian frontier. But they were not sure that Moltke would think the movement strategically advisable. They came to believe that the German leaders, haughtiest soldiers in the world, despising untrained men, would not wait to embody their reserves, but would strike only with their first-line divisions, trained to the minute. Their force would be little superior to the French. If it invaded Belgium at all it would operate only in the eastern section. The French planned to meet it with "l'attaque brusque," a smashing offensive in Lorraine that would throw the Germans on the defensive.

The French plan of campaign

They were deceived. Moltke undertook to follow Schlieffen's plan; furthermore, he waited to embody the reserve divisions and strike with a much superior force, which needed all the Belgian frontier on which to deploy to the fullest advantage. His start was delayed necessarily; but the famous defense of Liège, contrary to general belief, had nothing to do with it. On the 31st day after mobilization the Germans had reached the line that Schlieffen's plan indicated for that day.

Von Moltke's strategy

Moltke's execution of the scheme was a failure. He failed to seize and hold the initiative; he let the enemy's action determine his—as fatal a mistake as soldier can make. The French attack in Lorraine came to nothing and was given over. But Moltke allowed forces to be drawn from the right wing to hold back the Russians who poured into East Prussia, and to contain the Belgian army. He massed his strength unwisely in Lorraine. A French attack to the north of Verdun drew the German armies thither instead of to the west. German army commanders got out of hand. As a result, by the beginning of September the German right, no longer strong enough to envelop Paris, swung eastward to the north of it, aware that a new French army had appeared on its exposed left.

Von Moltke's failure

Moltke's final decision was for an assault, September 4–8, on the French line in the east from Châlons to Nancy, the fortified areas Schlieffen had planned to avoid. The attack was repulsed;

at the same time, with superior forces, the Allies fell on the western German armies of Von Kluck and Von Bülow and compelled them to retire. The whole action is usually termed the First Battle of the Marne. Both armies extended their flanks northward to protect themselves and outflank their opponents. Ultimately the lines reached the North Sea, the two armies facing each other along a line continuous from the Swiss border to the ocean, leaving practically all of Belgium, and much of the industrial district of northeastern France behind the German lines. The Belgium Relief Commission of neutrals, headed by the American, Herbert Hoover, undertook the task of feeding the civilian populations thus cut off from their normal industrial life.

The Marne

Little change was made by the exertions of either side in these positions until the fall of 1916. Both groups of powers called all their available men to the colors, save in Russia where arms were lacking. Kitchener, in England, began the raising of a great volunteer army, supplemented in 1916 by the draft. On the eastern front, where a small force of Germans with the Austrians made head against the Russians, the fortune of battle swayed back and forth until 1917. The Russians, ill equipped, their government honeycombed with treachery and graft, lost men by the million; the faith of the Russian masses in the czar was shattered. On the southern front, Italy did not join her allies; instead she listened to Allied promises of Austrian spoils, and in the spring of 1915 attacked her former ally. Confronted with the necessity of ascending the slopes of the Alps, she could attempt little more than holding a strong Austrian army. Turkey had joined Germany in 1914; in 1915 and 1916 Bulgaria joined the Central Powers, and Roumania, the Allies.

Three years of war

II

Fascinated, the American people looked on at the mighty struggle. In 1913–1914 life had seemed humdrum and quiet. There was little news, so little that city newspapers were only saved from ruin by the war and the feverish interest with which the people absorbed one war extra after another each day.

Knowing nothing of the forces behind the struggle, the people were inclined to judge it by what they actually saw. And the general tendency was at first to regard it as supreme culpability on the part of Germany. The invasion of Belgium, the deprecating reference of the German Chancellor to the guaranty treaty assuring Belgian neutrality as a "scrap of paper," outraged the public sense of right and wrong. The stories of atrocities committed by the German troops in Belgium—the mutilation of children, the violation of women, the wholesale shooting of men, the burning of towns—considerably exaggerated as to the first two items—appeared to stamp the moral stigma of the government upon its subjects.

Moral censure of Germany

Methods of warfare used by the Germans added to neutral horror. From an early stage of the war, their swift cruisers had slipped out to bombard towns on the English coasts; their huge dirigible Zeppelins bombed not merely armies and supply dumps but great cities like London and Paris. In the spring of 1915, they introduced the use of poison gas, launching a cloud of chlorine on a part of the British lines and advancing through the troops killed and disabled by it. Above all, their methods of submarine warfare seemed horrible and inhuman: but here the United States had to pass from moral condemnation to diplomatic protest.

German methods of warfare

The upper classes in the United States, especially in the east, had believed from the first that it was our duty to enter the war on the side of the Allies. Unfortunately sympathetic with this opinion was the ambassador to England, Walter H. Page; a lovable man of keen literary instincts, and sunny, open disposition, the graciousness and charm of English men and women had him captive from the first. From the outbreak of the war he was more English than the English themselves, assured that the war was a crusade for humanity and democracy against the danger of a brutal domination of the world by a military tyranny. He felt it the moral duty of the United States at least to sever relations with Germany, and chafed at the attitude of his chief, Woodrow Wilson.

Walter H. Page

Wilson, at the outset of the war, proclaimed the neutrality of the United States, and enjoined on the people and sought to practice a neutrality even of thought between the contending forces. His path was not an easy one. While great masses of the population were pro-Ally from conviction, other masses from equally strong conviction were pro-German. Many Germans by birth or descent resented the moral condemnation of their race on what they considered hostile evidence and went just as far in denunciation of the Allies. Irish elements to whom England seemed the oppressor were strongly anti-English. Russian-Jewish groups were similarly inclined to be anti-Russian. On the other side, the representatives of the subject races of the Austrian Empire, including the Italians, were pro-Ally. The dispiriting lesson was apparent that the European races which had sought the United States had brought with language and customs their old racial and national likes and dislikes, and would as citizens of the United States be governed by them to a certain extent.

American opinion and the war

This was embarrassing as a large number of questions threatened our embroilment with combatants on either side. From the beginning, England, taking advantage of her naval superiority, planned to use it in starving out her enemy as she had sought in 1806–1812 to starve out Napoleon. The Central Powers could not produce or obtain from adjacent neutral states quite as much food as they required; they also needed to import fats, cotton, copper, rubber, petroleum, and other raw materials. With the bulk of Russia shutting off Germany, Austria, and Turkey in the east, with the Mediterranean bottled by British control of Suez and Gibraltar, only a blockade of the Channel and the North Sea was needed to starve Central Europe in the end. To enforce such a blockade effectively was easy; to maintain it against neutral opinion was difficult.

Problems of neutrals

To begin with, international law limited sharply the seizure of goods manifestly bound to Germany unless they were contraband. England had to argue that in modern warfare, where armies numbered by millions fought with elaborate and compli-

cated weapons and devices, the same commodities that are used in peace are raw material for war: fats and cotton make explosives; food may feed armies as well as civilians; petroleum and rubber are essential to military motor transportation; copper enters into the manufacture of projectiles. Not merely had England to justify the seizure of such commodities consigned to the German ports she blockaded; she had to justify seizure and detention of such goods if bound to Germany through a neutral port. If needed raw materials could be consigned to persons representing Germany in Holland, Denmark, or Sweden and then shipped over a neutral border into Germany, then all the effect of the blockade would be lost. So England ultimately controlled strictly all shipments into the neutral countries, checking any that were suspicious in origin or consignment, or finally, any above the peace-time consumption of the country in question. It is quite likely that under the system much legitimate trade with these countries was diverted to English merchants, while vessels laden in America were brought to the British base at the Orkneys for examination, detained for months, and finally condemned, turned back, or purchased for Great Britain.

England's restrictions on neutral trade

A somewhat similar case arose with the *Dacia*, a German vessel interned in an American harbor, bought by German interests, transferred to American registry and sent over loaded with cotton to try the issue. To evade the obloquy of her seizure by the British navy, Page suggested to his good friend Sir Edward Grey that she be seized by a French warship. Page indeed was a most unwilling channel for the diplomatic protests launched by the United States government against English interference with American trade, mails, and individuals bound for Germany. He obeyed grudgingly instructions to endeavor to draw from the British government an indorsement of the Declaration of London of 1909 framed by an international congress to prohibit most of the existing British practices. As a result he was soon completely out of touch with Wilson and Bryan, made no attempt to understand Wilson's

The "Dacia;" Page's shortcomings

policy or to present it to Great Britain, and even so far as he could hampered its execution by other men.

The Germans had their own protest to make against American assistance to the Allies, who found us a most valuable reservoir of materials and munitions; we could furnish unlimited food and textiles, thereby releasing English producers for war work. Such plants as the Bethlehem Steel Works could be easily turned to the production of shell casings and various other stages of munitions. To help pay for these purchases, the Wall Street bankers floated a British loan of half a billion in 1915. To the Germans, on the receiving end of American shells and munitions, such supplies seemed bitterly unneutral though they themselves had supplied the South in the Civil War and Mexico in 1914. Of course such munitions were clearly contraband and could be seized by German cruisers; but thanks to the English blockade of the Channel and the North Sea, there were few cruisers at sea and these were busy evading their inevitable capture by British squadrons.

American munitions supplied to England

The Germans, therefore, to check this supply and to harass England with a blockade of their own turned to the submarine. Submarines had actually been used during the Civil War by daring confederate officers against the union blockading fleet. Infinitely improved but still supremely uncomfortable, they were designed by German naval architects to cruise at great distances. It was possible for them to slip past the English blockaders under water, taking their chances of enemy mine fields, and once on the open sea to cruise for ships bound to Great Britain.

The Germans use submarines

In this use of submarines the great difficulty was that the submarine was built to hold but few men and was very fragile. A single well-directed shot would sink her. On her cruising operations if she evaded cruiser, destroyer, and mine, she must sink enemy merchant ships she captured; otherwise they would be retaken in endeavoring to run into a German port to be tried and condemned. Without quarters sufficient for prisoners, the submarine must force the crew of the

German theory of submarine warfare

captured vessel to take to the boats and run their chance of perishing by storm or exposure before being picked up. Moreover, with the possibility of decoy ships and merchantmen mounted with quick-firing guns, a submarine that showed herself on the surface to demand a vessel's surrender ran the risk of being sunk. The Germans, therefore, insisted that their new weapon of submarine warfare demanded new rules of international law allowing the submarine to launch her torpedo to sink the merchantman in question without warning, leaving the crew to escape as it might.

English interference with American commerce, German submarine assaults on American lives—between these two the administration stumbled vainly two years in maintaining American rights. Wilson had hoped by good offices to restore peace in the winter of 1914–1915. In a special diplomatic mission to England and Germany, his friend Colonel House proposed as a basis of adjustment "the freedom of the seas" —the barring of all wars and searches on the seas, leaving them open to commerce. But neither the German nor English government could have made palatable to their people a peace without victory. The Allies, regarding the war as a moral issue raised by German militarism, insisted that a complete discrediting of that militarism must precede any stable peace. There were, too, the secret engagements promising territorial accessions to Russia, and later to Italy, to be taken into account. Future peace drives on the part of the administration became entangled with the development of the submarine controversy.

House essays to make peace

On February 4, 1915, Germany had announced that her submarine war on merchantmen would begin February 18; she alleged it to be a necessary reprisal for the illegal interference of England with neutral trade. February 10, the United States warned her that in case of the loss of American lives she would be held to "a strict accountability." The sinking of the British ship *Falaba*, March 28, with the loss of a single American life; of the *Harpolyce* of the Belgian Relief Commission, April 8; of the *Gulflight*, an American steamer, May 1, with the loss of two Americans, was the subject of diplo-

Germany begins submarine warfare

matic exchanges. While these cases were still in controversy, another incident of submarine warfare threw a lurid light on the issue.

May 1, 1915, the day the great Cunard liner *Lusitania* sailed for the last time from New York, the German embassy at Washington published in the papers a formal warning to American citizens against embarking on British vessels bound to the war zone. Six days later under half steam off the Irish coast, torpedoed by a German submarine, the *Lusitania* went down, carrying with her 1154 men, women, and children, of whom 114 were citizens of the United States.

The "Lusitania"

At this horror a cry for war arose in the eastern United States. Wilson undertook to forestall war by diplomacy. In three successive notes he called on the German government for indemnity and an engagement that the outrage should not be repeated. The German chancellery temporized, first taking the indefensible ground that the *Lusitania* was armed, then that she carried munitions of war. The German foreign office probably wished to give the United States satisfaction, but it could not control the autocratic Von Tirpitz and the navy, determined to carry on their submarine policy at all costs. Bryan fatally hinted to Dumba, the Austrian ambassador, that the notes were for public consumption in the United States: this conveyed to Germany the impression that Wilson was not in earnest, which Bernstorff and Gerard, German and American ambassadors in Washington and Berlin, tried to dispel. Bryan found Wilson's second note too strong for him and resigned June 8, being replaced by Robert Lansing as secretary of state. English opinion, which had hoped the incident would involve the United States in the war, took on a jeering tone. Jests were cast at the President's "note-writing," at an unfortunate phrase in a speech apropos of United States policy toward Mexico: "There is such a thing as being too proud to fight." Such attacks were echoed by his political opponents in the United States.

Wilson's notes

The diplomatic exchanges were punctuated by fresh submarine sinkings. Prominent among them was that of the British liner

Arabic August 19, involving the loss of two American lives. September 1, Bernstorff, who had coöperated earnestly in bringing the governments to an understanding, promised that there should be no more attacks on liners without warning, but on the 4th the British *Hesperian* was sunk, probably by a torpedo, 26 lives including one American being lost. The German government finally disavowed action in the case of the *Arabic*, and acknowledged liability for the *Lusitania*. A month after she did so, on March 24, 1916, the steamer *Sussex* was torpedoed in the channel and 80 persons killed or injured, two of them Americans. April 18, receiving no satisfaction, the United States threatened to sever diplomatic relations. On May 4, the German government announced instructions to its submarine commanders that no merchant ships should be sunk without warning and without saving the lives of passengers and crew.

The submarine controversy

These were the surface negotiations. Under cover, Wilson and House had been pressing a most remarkable scheme. Secretly they proposed to the British ministry through a visit of the colonel's in January–February, 1916, that the United States offer to mediate between the combatants on the basis of a German cession of Alsace-Lorraine and of a grant of Constantinople to Russia, and of colonial concessions to Germany. Should Germany then refuse these terms, as seemed likely, the United States would enter the war on the side of the Allies. The Allies, however, were already committed to despoilment of the German bear once he was caught; House's proposal probably only convinced them that the United States must sooner or later enter the war on their side without limiting them as to terms of peace. Sir Edward Grey therefore affected unwillingness to approach the French on such terms, as they had hitherto made the greatest sacrifices; the whole scheme remained buried for ten years in the papers of the statesmen involved.

House's secret mission, January, 1916

The German government had conditioned its abandonment of submarine warfare on the proviso that the United States should enforce on the British government obedience to the rules of inter-

national law hitherto recognized. Though the American government in reply refused to accept the condition, replying that "Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative," Wilson felt that only a breathing space had been awarded the United States. With his offer of intervention rejected, he endeavored to enforce respect for the laws of neutral trade upon England. Indeed, there were perennial diplomatic problems besides the submarine. The Austrian ambassador had to be got rid of in the fall of 1915 for efforts to foment strikes in American munition plants. The German military and naval attachés had to be expelled for similar reasons. Great Britain continued her inroads on American trade and communication, holding up cablegrams, censoring mail, detaining and seizing merchant ships. A galling thing was the Trading with the Enemy Act under which 80 American firms were blacklisted for alleged connections with the enemy, and imports from them to Great Britain, the carriage of their shipments by British ships, even the coaling in British harbors of vessels laden with their consignments were prohibited. Such measures neutralized in part the feeling in the east against the submarine outrages; the west was generally inert, desiring only to stay out of trouble. The Gore-McLemore Resolution, so known from the names of its proposers, of February, 1916, demanded that American citizens stay off armed merchantmen to avoid trouble. This surrender of national rights was beaten only by Wilson's influence. Later in the year, Congress passed an act permitting the President at his pleasure to lay an embargo on exports; this would have been a deadly blow to the Allies.

Further diplomatic problems

Under such circumstances came the presidential election. Wilson was renominated by the Democrats. The Republicans and the relic of the Progressive party held conventions concurrently at Chicago. The threat of Roosevelt's Progressive candidacy ultimately compelled the conservative leaders of the Republicans to nominate Justice Hughes of the United States Supreme Court. Roosevelt considered him sufficiently progressive and refused to run against him;

The presidential campaign, 1916

the Progressive party disappeared. Roosevelt had long since been keenly critical of Wilson, fastening on his ostensible failure to adopt a more vigorous policy against Germany; and he would do nothing that might interfere with the President's defeat. Hughes' campaign was fatally mismanaged; he was induced to snub the Progressive leader, Governor Hiram Johnson of California; his supporters by silence endeavored to win the German vote, disaffected by Wilson's submarine policy. Wilson on the other hand in a ringing answer of defiance to a pro-German interrogation announced that he would be deeply humiliated if any one like his questioner voted for him. "Since you have access to many disloyal Americans and I have not," he concluded "I will ask you to convey this message to them."

The reëlection of Wilson

Wilson was powerfully assisted by two things. The passage at the President's behest of the Adamson Law compelling the railroads of the country to prevent a strike by large concessions to their employees, gained him the favor of labor. Then his policy appealed strongly to the pacifist elements in the United States that had grown fast in late years, and to the Scandinavians of the farther northwest. "You are not at war but at work," ran his campaign posters, "why change?" As no one knew of the terms of House's mission, his question went unanswered. As a result, seemingly overwhelmingly beaten in the east at midnight of election day, he mustered a great block of votes in the trans-Mississippi northwest that, joined to the solid south, trod close on a majority. The vote of California was in doubt, and not until several days after the election was it evident that Wilson had been reëlected.

Wilson's last effort for peace

He was now at liberty to pursue his attempts for peace with added prestige. The campaigns of 1916 had been indecisive for France and England, disastrous to Russia and Roumania. December 12, 1916, Germany formally made an offer to the Entente to open negotiations. A week later Wilson openly requested the combatant powers to state their war aims. Insomuch as he seemed to derogate from the high moral purpose for which the Allies were waging war—the vin-

dication of democracy and the destruction of German militarism—this roused the bitter indignation of the English public. The Allies however stated their war aims in general terms without mention of the secret partition agreements: Germany reserved hers for a conference. As a last attempt, Wilson in an address before the Senate January 22, 1917, proposed a "peace without victory." Once more the Allies were outraged by the President's disregard of the moral values behind the war; but it was for the last time.

The question as to the sincerity of the German government in its moves for peace in 1916 is open to question; in Germany the civilian statesman in time of war was subject to the military leader. With submarines built in 1916, her naval leaders believed that she could sink enough food ships to starve out Great Britain before the British blockade could throttle her, or the United States could organize its reserves for war. January 9, 1917, her military leaders decided to reopen ruthless submarine warfare on February 1 on the pretext that the United States had failed to make England observe the rules of international law. Wilson, as late as January 4, 1917, regarded the entrance of the United States into the war under any provocation as inconceivable; but on February 3, he broke off diplomatic relations with Germany.

Unrestricted submarine warfare

Page had believed that similar action in 1915 or 1916 would have caused Germany to sue for peace; but now, gambling on a speedy victory, she proposed in spite of American hostility to play for a complete triumph. She had strong resources in the United States: the German element opposed war; the pacifist elements were strong; Wilson's policy of forbearing neutrality, the pacifist arguments of his campaign, had all tended to soften the American determination. In Congress the opponents of war in the Senate, led by Senator LaFollette, filibustered to prevent the passage of an act allowing the President to arm American merchantmen; eventually this was done under an older provision of law; and quick-firing guns and naval gun crews were installed on merchant ships.

American elements opposed to war

That the United States was brought to the point of war even by

the recurrence of the submarine sinkings and the loss of the liner *Laconia* resulted from two things. One was the revolution in Russia, March 11–15, which ended in the czar's abdication and the establishment of a republic. The cause of the Allies was now ostensibly that of liberty versus autocracy. The other was the Zimmerman note, a piece of sublime foolishness sent by the German foreign minister to the German minister in Mexico on January 19, looking, in case of trouble with the United States, to an alliance of Japan and Mexico to recover from us the provinces taken from Mexico in 1846. This was intercepted on the radio by the British secret service, decoded, revealed to the United States and published, February 28. Anti-war elements pronounced it a forgery, to be dumbfounded when Zimmerman naïvely admitted its authenticity.

The Russian revolution; the Zimmerman note

Wilson now moved steadily on to war. He called a special session of Congress to meet April 2; he withdrew the Belgian relief mission. On April 2, meeting Congress, he read a message demanding war with Germany, not against the German people, but against the military autocracy, ruthless, faithless, and sinister, that apparently dominated the German government and directed its policy. On April 6, 1917, the resolution passed with 50 dissenting votes.

The declaration of war

So war came to America. The British encroachments had been on American property, the German on American life, and the United States naturally resented the latter more. Our attempts to bind the Allies to moderate terms of peace as the price of our adhesion had failed; we had to accept the situation as it was. The Germans, reëmbarking on submarine warfare, had deliberately calculated the force of the grips that they and their enemies had on each other's throats. They calculated on their ability to starve England before American help became decisive, or with Russia at last disintegrating as a military force, to beat the western Allies in the field. In effect, they had wagered first that the United States could not overcome the submarine menace sufficiently to supply her allies and armies in Europe, second that she could not put great armies in the field be-

The German gamble

fore the Allies were crushed by divisions from the eastern front. They had laid their stakes on the table blindly; they were ignorant that their opponent's cards included the American destroyer, the Eagle boat, the presence of American divisions like the 2d, 1st, 32d, 3d, and 42d on the western front, October 1, 1918. But being students of the game of war they might have known that as in the game of the Chinese gamblers one may not know until the end how high are the stakes for which he has played and lost.

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

B. J. Hendrick, *Life and Letters of Walter H. Page.* Garden City, N. Y., 1922–1925.

C. Seymour, ed., *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House.* 2 vols. Boston, 1926.

CHAPTER XXXV

THE WORLD WAR: THE WAR WORKERS

As the United States took stock of her assets on the morrow of her declaration of war, she found first, vast wealth, tremendously increased by the three years of neutral trade. She had developed great manufactures to supply the Allies with certain of the devices and weapons of war. She had supposedly mechanical ingenuity and adaptability enough to supply herself with what more she needed. She had stores of food that were to need careful husbanding if they were to meet the needs of her European allies and herself. She had a navy, excellent in size, technique, and personnel, but almost no merchant marine to back it. She had a small professional army of excellent quality, and a somewhat larger force in the National Guard or state militias that had received some training in patrolling the Mexican border in 1916. The rest of her population was singularly untrained and ignorant of modern war. But from the Civil War had descended the tradition of the duty of every able-bodied man to serve his country at need, a moral asset that was a possible basis for a vast army.

America's assets

The real situation was laid open to her by the Allied missions that promptly made their appearance. Optimistic Allied bulletins had led many people to think the war practically won and our enlistment in it merely a gesture of approbation. Little by little they were allowed to gather the real truth. On the western front, the Allies had a considerable but not decisive advantage of numbers. On the eastern front, Russia, beaten again and again, was on the point of collapse; speedy assistance in money and munitions alone could keep her army in the field. The Germans might soon hope to turn their eastern armies to the western front and gain a decision there before the new American armies could arrive. Despite optimistic reports, England was

Plight of the Allies

nearer starvation than Germany; Germany in 1916 had raided the wheat fields and oil wells of Roumania, a state which had joined the Allies only to give the Central Powers an easy and profitable triumph over her. The new submarine warfare was frightfully effective. Weekly sinkings numbered hundreds of thousands of tons. England, short of food, was on strict rations. Unless help in dealing with the submarines arrived soon, unless vessels were lavishly built to replace those lost and to serve as new targets for the German torpedoes, the game would soon be up. Further, British finances were cracking under the strain of war expenditures and vast loans to her allies, and must be shored up.

America's task

In fact, the well-informed in the United States might even see that they had joined a firm on the verge of insolvency, and that either they must use to the full the mighty assets of their country's wealth and strength to put the firm on its feet, or they must expect to meet the claims of the victorious German creditor against the Allies as well as against themselves. The failing man power of the Allies rendered it essential that the United States plan to arm, equip, train, and support in battle across 3000 miles of submarine-infested sea an army numbered in hundreds of thousands or millions. Not a maritime nation, she must in a large measure supply the shipping for the task. At the same time her harvest fields must help feed the populations that her European allies had drawn from the farm to the factory or army, and the people of neutral states like Holland and Switzerland. She must at the same time extend her own industries to the limit and find huge sums with which to finance her allies' campaigns. Otherwise she might expect to see their forces beaten in the field, their morale broken with underfeeding, and their finances fallen into hopeless bankruptcy.

Regulation and propaganda

Not merely organization of the American people such as never before had been undertaken was necessary; the nation had to be taught to acquiesce in the organization. Lectured by Wilson on the New Freedom, it was to learn that in this instance the New Freedom required governmental interference with daily life such perhaps as no nation without

an invader at the gates had hitherto undergone. A people expert in advertising turned naturally to advertising on a grand scale to bring home to the nation the necessity of acquiescence in all manner of regulations hitherto unknown, all kinds of interference with the individual. To make them go down smoothly, appeals to mass psychology, parades, slogans, shibboleths, badges, organization membership, were employed. The docility of the people and the results obtained were marvelous. Always, too, there were the words and phrases of the President to teach acquiescence and cheerful obedience. Sugar might be rationed, but the eloquence of Wilson flowed without stint.

Propaganda was used most cheerfully to make the tasks laid on the United States citizen seem high moral duties that he should be proud to perform. Doing this involved occasional suppressions of truth by means of censorship. While the German was painted as utterly black and depraved, the Allies appeared only as archangels in shining armor. The information that while America was disciplining the stomach, food regulations in rural France were blissfully disregarded, and French farmers fed their wheat to pigs rather than sell it at the fixed price was better not known. A judicious censorship of soldiers' letters from France was, one imagines, not so much to prevent a leakage of military information as to insure the fact that no untoward stories about the Allies should penetrate the American consciousness.

Censorship

In studying the main lines of governmental regulation, the food situation demanded first attention. The deadly inroads of the submarine made it necessary to conserve the remaining merchant tonnage at the disposal of the Allies as far as possible, to substitute for importation of wheat, beef, and mutton from Argentina or Australia, or of sugar from Java, a supply from the comparatively near-by United States. America was called on therefore to furnish 225 million bushels of wheat for the Allies. In future years the farmer might be educated to swing his acreage from corn to wheat. For the present Americans must eat less wheat, more of the corn at which the essentially conservative French housewives looked askance, and above all more fresh or

The food situation

preserved vegetables and fruits. In advance of legislation the President appointed Herbert Hoover, the organizer of Belgian relief, as food controller, May 17, 1917. His name speedily became one to be conjured with in millions of American households. Very adroit was the idea of making every American housewife an enrolled member of the United States Food Administration to enforce its rules upon her helpless family. Patriotic urban citizens and school children everywhere planted war gardens of vegetables. There was a drift of population back to the farms as a patriotic duty. Wheatless days, meatless meals, beefless days, appeared. Restaurants gladly served reduced portions and limited the supply of rolls and bread with meals.

As at the beginning of 1918 it was apparent that Europe demanded still more wheat and meat, wheat consumption in the United States was cut to 70 per cent of normal. After January 28, 1918, bakers were to mix 5 per cent of flour substitutes in wheat flour products; after February 24, 20 per cent. Consumers were to be sold wheat flour only when a stated proportion of wheat substitutes, such as corn and rye flours, were bought with it. The name Victory Bread rendered the standard loaf more palatable. Indeed, with a praiseworthy intention of banning the name of the hated Hun, German pot-roast became Yankee pot-roast, German fried potatoes, Liberty fried potatoes!

Additional food regulations

Of course, long before such stringent regulation became necessary, it had full warrant of law. The Lever Act of August 10, 1917, established food and fuel control. To manipulate the grain market prices and to control stocks, the United States Grain Corporation with a capital of fifty millions was incorporated under the laws of New Jersey—a device to escape government red tape in dealing with the problem. Encouragement of farmers, strict regulation of elevators, strict checking up on retailers became the rule. Sugar was even more mercilessly allowanced than wheat. With special exceptions for canning and preserving fruit, the allowance per person in the course of 1918 was cut to two pounds per month. The spirit

Government food administration

with which the American consumer accepted and aided in the regulation of his diet was one of the magnificent things of the war. In no other belligerent country save England could it have been attained save by utter inability to purchase.

Fuel

For a time, fuel became an even worse problem. Harry A. Garfield had been appointed fuel administrator under the Lever Act. The coal operators had previously set a price for coal thought by consumers to be extortionate, and not until the fall of 1917 did Garfield set it at a figure generally acquiesced in as reasonable, after governors had seriously considered taking over the mines of their States. Little coal had been ordered at the high prices first prevailing. In the late fall, shortages appeared. The terrific winter of 1917–1918 with storms of snow, sleet, and cold almost wrecked the enfeebled railroads. On December 26 the President appointed McAdoo railroad dictator and took the roads into the hand of the government. Coal shipments were held up due to blocked rights of way, lack of cars and locomotives, and choked terminals until on January 15 there were in New York harbor 37 ships unable to clear for France for lack of coal. Cessation of the use of coal in all industries for a few days, curtailment of elevator service, conservation of heat for homes and essential offices and shops, were enforced throughout the nation until spring brought full relief. The next summer saw two or four nights of each week after July 18 decreed as lightless nights, when ornamental illumination was prohibited. The demand for gasoline led to a request in August, 1918, that the use of pleasure cars on Sunday be stopped. Even this the American motorist endured.

Ship-building

The task of the United States in shipbuilding was the impossibly wasteful one of building ships faster than the Germans could sink them. Before our entrance into the war, the demands of the Allies for shipbuilding had led to the development of American plants for building steel ships, notably in the case of the Bethlehem Steel Works. To supply the ships needed to carry American produce in 1916, a Shipping Board Act had been passed, giving the government authority to build up and operate a United States merchant marine. The Emergency Fleet Corporation,

created April 16, 1917, took up the problem. Its work lay in two directions, first to introduce the American system of interchangeable parts to promote the construction of steel ships on the wholesale plan. This was most successfully done. At Hog Island near Philadelphia in ten months after September, 1917, a great shipyard of fifty ways was built up. It turned out its ships like clockwork, its great achievement being speeding up to permit the launching, July 4, 1918, of a torrent of ships completed ahead of time. The second device was building wooden ships. Both systems seemed wasteful; but the emergency was such that if a ship could complete even one voyage with a cargo, it could be considered to have paid for itself. The shipyards enlisted their workers on grounds of patriotic duty; some prize fighters and other professional athletes found them a convenient way of avoiding the rigors of military service.

So vast was the list and the amount of supplies required for modern war that the United States was compelled to regulate the industry that supplied them as no nation had hitherto done. The so-called mobilization of industry had first been considered possible in 1916, when Congress had created the Council of National Defense consisting of six cabinet secretaries and seven civilian experts. To assist it, the American Academy of Sciences had created the National Research Council. April 9, 1917, a General Munitions Board was created, whose functions were taken over by a War Industries Board, organized July 28, 1917. Its task was created for it by the flood of orders being poured in for all imaginable things by the purchasing departments of army, navy, and Allies. Inevitably they resulted in competition for materials and transportation and for labor which was drawn from place to place by offers of higher wages.

War-time demands on industry

The War Industries Board functioned with the aid of a host of civilian experts, many of whom offered their service freely or were paid by their former employers. These were the "dollar-a-year" men, so called because government rule required each of its servants to accept at least that minimum wage. Sometimes they provoked criticism for awarding con-

The War Industries Board

tracts to the firms they had formerly represented. It was indeed a difficult matter to know what to do when the firms most able to supply the goods had sent their men to Washington to serve. To the War Industries Board and its commissions came all government and Allied requests for supplies. One committee then fixed the priority of the need, another the fair price, and on that basis the order was placed and materials allotted for its completion. As a necessary concomitant other agencies had to supervise and sometimes provide funds for enlarging old factories or building new, for housing the employees thus brought together in new industrial centers, and for recruiting labor.

The completion of government control did not come until the Overman Act of May 20, 1918, which in effect authorized the President at will to alter and remake all portions of the executive machinery and to divert appropriations as he saw fit. Under it appeared the Chemical Warfare Service and the Bureau of Aircraft Production. On March 20, the so-called War Cabinet was formed, consisting of the Secretaries of War and Navy, and the chiefs of the Food and Fuel Administrations, the War Trade Board, the Shipping Board, and the War Industries Board. Above all, an Interallied Conference, meeting at Paris November 24, 1917, coördinated all efforts to the supreme need of the situation by the establishment of interallied councils on finance, food, munitions and maritime transport.

The War Cabinet

The huge sums required by the United States for her own needs and to supply over nine billions in loans to her allies were found partly in taxation. The Revenue Act of October 3, 1917, laid on the people a tax ranging from 20 per cent to 60 per cent on the excess profits above peace years due to a state of war, a graduated income tax beginning at 2 per cent on incomes of $1000, with excises on luxuries, alcoholic drinks, tobacco, etc. Internal revenue for 1918 was more than three and a half billions: an even more drastic tax was devised in 1918 but was passed only in February, 1919.

Taxation

For the immediate financing of the war, McAdoo used short-term notes which, sold to bankers, created credits anticipating the

funds obtained from the great liberty loan drives. The First Loan Act was passed April 24, 1917, authorizing the issue of five billions in bonds at not more than 3½ per cent. Only two billions were offered in the first loan; the same appeals to the people to purchase were used as in the Civil War, reënforced with all the machinery of more modern times; quotas based on wealth were assigned to each federal reserve district and to each community. Local pride was aroused to see that the loan went "over the top." The privilege of naming warships and tanks was the prize for the banner subscriptions. Personal solicitation to buy bonds by soldiers and sailors, movie actresses, pretty girls, and stimulating posters, helped fill the quotas.

The Liberty Loans

Each loan after a desperate struggle "went over the top." The first loan limited to two billions was oversubscribed, the second in November of 1917 was oversubscribed by hundreds of millions, yielding $3,807,865,000; the third of the spring of 1918 was $4,175,650,050; the fourth, of the fall of 1918, $6,964,581,250; the fifth or Victory loan, of 1919, $4,497,818,750. In fact the success of the loans was due to a financial device: the banks took great blocks of them and secured the money to pay for them by rediscounting them at the Federal Reserve banks. The bonds thus subscribed involved a series of inflations of the United States currency. As gold payments were suspended, a paper premium for gold did not appear. But silver rose to a premium at which it reached and passed the 16 to 1 ratio while gold was tied inert to the paper currency.

Floating the loans

One very essential reason for scattering bonds so widely was the need of forcing people to save by buying bonds on loans from the banks payable in monthly installments. Such frugality was the best assurance that capital and labor needed for war material production should not be deflected to the manufacture of luxuries demanded by workingmen under the stimulus of high war-time wages. Bonds thus went into the hands of people without experience in financial matters often in greater amounts than could be afforded, so that in very many cases they were sold depreciated as much as 20 cents on the

Sales of bonds to small holders

dollar. Another means of inducing saving was the selling of war savings stamps, 20 of which could in 5 years be redeemed at $100.

Other organizations than the government demanded the people's money. The Y. M. C. A. engaged not too successfully in supplying the army with recreation and canteen service, the Salvation Army, the Knights of Columbus, the Young Men's Hebrew Association all participated in the task in a smaller way. The Red Cross undertook its usual function. France and Italy made no such provision for their soldiers, and American organizations generously undertook to supply it. Hence a series of drives for the funds by the various organizations culminated in the United War Work Drive of November 11, 1918, for $170,500,000 to meet the needs of all the organizations ministering to the fighting men.

Welfare organizations

The falling in line of the American people in these movements was not brought about without pressure. Strikes of course had to be strictly barred and replaced by arbitration agreements. Against any injustice to labor by government or employers, the protest of Gompers, chief of the American Federation of Labor, was voiced emphatically and always with effect. The coercion of men to buy liberty bonds, stern public disapprobation of failure to fall in with war movements as disloyalty, both helped to secure unanimity. The Espionage Act, June 15, 1917, and the Threats against the President Act, February 14, 1917, made possible the internment of suspected aliens, the warning of others from critical zones of war production and transport, and the savage punishment of disloyal speech or act. Attempted draft riots in various centers were sharply prosecuted by district attorneys. The socialists split into pro- and anti-war wings. An attempted convention of groups opposed to the war in the fall of 1917 was harried from State to State. The mayor of Chicago finally allowed it to meet there, and the governor of Illinois sent state troops to suppress it.

The silencing of dissent

The multiplication of war-time organizations is a thing impossible to describe. War agencies by hundreds and hundreds

sprang up in elaborate ramification of the organization at Washington. State councils of defense and other state war organizations at times competed with national ones to secure tasks to keep them busy. Clubs and societies of all sorts were pressed into action; the United States from end to end was a complex of war committees and agencies.

War-time organization

That they should be imbued with a due sense of their own importance and that of their work was inevitable. President Wilson again and again was led into the statement that employment in coal mining, shipbuilding, farming, was as necessary and honorable as service in the tented or dug-outed field. At the expense of the fighting forces slogans developed that this or that would win the war. The reminder of Theodore Roosevelt was badly needed that this war like other wars would be won by the men in the field.

Emphasis on civilian activity

After all, the activities of the various agencies necessarily had as their end the creation of an army and navy. Achievements in this direction may finally be considered.

The army and navy

The American navy since the 'eighties had been kept relatively strong and up-to-date. The ships and personnel were generally as good as any: in numbers they were second only to England and Germany. The navy had been the popular service after the Spanish-American War. In 1916, Congress had adopted a naval program that called for the building in three years of ten first-rate battleships and six battle cruisers, that in ships of the latest design would make the navy first in the world. None of these ships of course was ready in 1917. At the outbreak of the war, the first step was naturally to recruit to war strength by calling in the naval reserves, enlisting men to be made into seamen at training stations like Great Lakes, and the training of more officers; of the latter, especially great numbers were required for duty on transports, and on the numerous submarine chasers.

The navy

With the British fleet then containing the German battle fleet in port, the first duty of the navy was to clear the sea of sub-

marines, and to convoy or protect transports and merchantmen carrying troops or supplies to France. A small flotilla of torpedo-boat destroyers reached Queenstown on May 4, 1917, to assist the British in the submarine hunt. More were sent later with multitudes of the so-called Eagle boats, small, swift chasers. These operated against submarines with depth bombs exploded by a device which allowed the bomb dropped in water to be set to explode at the depth at which the submarine was thought to be lurking. American aviators covered the Channel, watching from above for the shadows under the water that marked submarines. An American admiral devised, and American ships executed, the laying of more than 50,000 mines in a mine barrage to close the area from the Scotch to the European coast through which most of the German submarines got out to sea. By all this activity, the German submarine warfare was checked to a point at which it no longer threatened the severing of sea connections of the Allies. The navy lost comparatively few transports or convoyed ships. A series of raids on American shipping by two great cruising submarines off our Atlantic coast in the summer of 1918 caused great popular excitement and indignation; but they could not vitally affect the fate of war. Finally, an American battleship squadron joined the British Grand Fleet to establish beyond question Allied supremacy in the North Sea.

Naval activities

The creation of an army was a far more difficult matter. The United States army had grown in size and efficiency since the war with Spain; but it was still a very small professional force, too scattered to give its officers experience in the command or staff duties of really large bodies such as the war had brought into being. In 1915 when the country was concerned in plans of defense, Garrison, the secretary of war, had proposed a considerable increase in the numbers of the regular army, and the creation of a territorial force to be recruited at the rate of 133,000 a year for three years by enlistment of volunteers holding themselves liable to short training periods and to service in time of war. The measure was opposed by advocates of the extension of the

The army in 1917

National Guard system. Finally Garrison resigned and the National Defense Act of 1916 provided for the increase over a period of five years of the regular army to 223,000 and of the National Guard to 450,000. It also provided for the establishment of a corps of reserve officers, and of summer training camps for them. The previous year, a few men had been gathered at their own expense at Plattsburg, New York, for a little military training, just enough to let them see how little could be taught them in an emergency. But the demonstration in 1916 that in a few weeks intelligent and educated men could be taught the rudiments of a subaltern officer's duty was our salvation in 1917.

On the outbreak of the war, Wilson forced on Congress a scheme for drafting an army. He put his disapproval on a proposal for a volunteer division of men over military age to be led overseas by Theodore Roosevelt. The argument advanced for the volunteer system was that it drew into the army the finest and ablest men the country might need in industrial life at home. True as this was, a draft system must always create an army far inferior to one of volunteers, by including men unwilling to serve and without the dash and spirit that makes the ideal soldier.

The Draft Act

As finally passed, the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, provided for the registering on June 5 before 4557 local boards of all young men between the ages of 21 and 30; 9,780,535 registered. The local boards assigned to each man a number; and in a great drawing at Washington the priority of obligation to service was determined according to the numbers assigned. September 5, 1917, the first drafts were to report at training camp of a National Army of 500,000 men and an additional number to fill up divisions of the National Guard. Officers for higher grades were supplied from the regular army, for the lower from graduates of officers' training camps held throughout the country, and from officers already enrolled in the reserve corps. The officers' training camp held from May to August consisted mainly of young college men; the second, from August to November, drew many older men. In both cases, three months of the

The first draft

sternest discipline and military training selected men physically, mentally, and morally fit to command.

Meanwhile, the United States had revised the tables of organization of its army. Two hundred fifty-six men made up a rifle company; 12 rifle companies divided in 3 battalions, plus a machine-gun, a headquarters and a supply company, made up a regiment of some 3600. Two regiments and a machine-gun battalion made a brigade. Two infantry brigades, and an artillery brigade composed of one heavy and two light artillery regiments, with engineer, signal, and medical troops made a division of some 27,000. In numbering divisions the numbers 76 to 93 were assigned to the National or Draft Army; numbers 26 to 42 to the National Guard.

Army organization

In each case, brigade and regimental numbers were so assigned that knowing the number of a division one knew also the numbers of all units in it. Divisions were usually embodied territorially, comprising National Guard regiments or drafted men from a given section. Exceptions were the negro units, and the 42d, or Rainbow division, made up of National Guard units from the whole nation. With the exception of the first three divisions, the regular army divisions, numbered from 1 to 25, were made up of skeletonized regular army regiments and filled with drafted men.

For training this army, there were established sixteen National Guard cantonments or temporary camps in the South and sixteen National Army camps of more permanent construction throughout the nation, with various other camps for regular army or special units or services. National Guard and regular army divisions were usually filled to full strength with drafts of conscripted men. To fill up losses in divisions already in action, drafts of replacements throughout 1918 were drawn from the various National Army training camps and sent across. The procedure of some camp commanders who desired to keep their divisions of trained men intact to "make a showing" once they got to France, and who sent over for speedy use on the battlefront men just drafted, often not knowing how to load their rifles, was no less than murder.

The training camps

At the outset of the war, there was much volunteering for service with regulars, marines, navy, and National Guard. As the draft system extended, this was necessarily more and more curtailed, and the administration became more a matter of routine form. The first units sent to training camp were in great measure selected by the boards from the men whose numbers were first drawn unless they could offer good excuse. In the late fall of 1917, however, boards were directed to send out questionnaires and to classify all men into five classes on the basis of replies. Class five was completely exempt. The other classes were determined on the basis of family obligations and industrial value of the registrants. In this order they were to report for physical examination which resulted in the exclusion of a considerable proportion, 5.27 per cent.

Administration of the draft

The appeals of the Allies for more American soldiers in the spring of 1918 speeded up the military program. Class 1 was recruited by the registration on June 5, and August 24, 1918, of 899,279 young men who had come of age since the first registration. The "work or fight" order called men in classes 2, 3, 4 who were habitual idlers or engaged in nonessential employments ministering to the amusement or ease of others, to get into needed war work or lose their deferred classification. Unwillingness to send young married men with children from classes 2, or 3, while men eighteen to twenty-one and above thirty and unmarried were left, and fresh demands from Europe, this time for 80 divisions in 1919, led to the extension of the draft ages by an act signed August 31, 1918, to 18–45. Registration was duly set for September 12, the total registrants being 13,228,000. Classification had begun and the first units had been ordered to entrain for camp when the armistice, November 11, 1918, put an end to the whole movement.

Extension of draft ages

Generally speaking, the draft act was supported by popular opinion; the scheme of putting its enforcement in the hands of local men was a very wise one. There was some failure to register or to report, causing regular drives in the great cities to pick up all men who could not show registration cards and to hold them for exami-

nation as to their status. Not much desirable military material was procured in such fashion. Conscientious objectors to military service offered another problem. The War Department generally was clement in dealing with them where their refusal seemed to arise from genuine scruples, and thereby encouraged some insolent defiance of the authorities. But the material here also was of little account.

Success of the draft

To the task of equipping the army, the energy of many agencies turned. Some kinds of equipment such as field glasses, the optical glass in which came from Germany, were difficult to get. In artillery, the French and English agreed to supply our troops with field and heavy pieces. No better gun could have been had than the French "soixante quinze" or 75-millimeter fieldpiece. The American artillerists showed their admiration of its accuracy and speed of mechanism by loading it on the recoil, much to the horror of their French instructors. The American Springfield rifle, a beautiful arm of precision, the pride of the United States infantry, could not be turned out in sufficient numbers and had to be replaced by a modified English Enfield such as our factories had made for the English—by comparison a clumsy and inferior weapon. Only at the end of the war were our troops fully equipped with the Browning automatic rifle, a weapon worthy to rank with the Springfield. Our divisions were first equipped with the French Chauchat automatic rifle, a heavy, awkward, and inaccurate weapon, which it was difficult to keep men from throwing into the bushes and replacing with a real rifle. The grenades and flares used were generally of French or English origin. In aëroplanes, our manufacturing failure was most apparent. We had boasted our intention of filling the air with myriads of planes. Few indeed of our manufacture reached the front before the armistice. With the great industrial repute of the United States, her achievements in arming and equipping her troops were disappointing. However, despite her supposed previous pacifist tendencies, the quality of the troops she furnished was to exceed by far the candid expectations of friends or enemies.

Military equipment

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

E. L. Bogart, *War Costs and their Financing.* New York, 1921.
H. G. Moulton, *The Financial Organization of Society.* Chicago, 1921.
M. E. Jenison, *The War-Time Organization of Illinois.* Springfield, Ill., 1923.
J. B. McMaster, *The United States in the World War.* 2 vols. New York, 1918–1920.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE WORLD WAR: THE CRUSADERS

On the 26th of June, 1917, the 16th, 18th, 26th, and 28th regiments of United States infantry and the Fifth Marines debarked at St. Nazaire in France. Two weeks before them had come General John J. Pershing, named commander-in-chief of the American Expeditionary Force, with 53 officers, to lay the foundations in France for the staff organization of a great American army; how great could hardly yet be foreseen.

The A. E. F.

Officers and men alike found themselves in a military situation that at first seemed completely strange, seasoned veterans though they were. The exigencies of three years of war had created such a type of combat in France as the world had not seen before. Since October, 1914, the contending armies of Germany and the Allies had faced each other over a long line stretching from the North Sea through the mud of Flanders, across the hills and plains of northern France, down through the Vosges Mountains on the east to the Swiss border. The whole battle line was a maze of trenches and field fortifications used and disused. In commanding places along the line hostile troops faced each other. In active sectors hostile positions might be but a few yards apart, and here from trench to trench men fought with grenades tossed or shot from a rifle. With sharpshooters always ready, to show a head above the parapet in daylight was sudden death.

Trench warfare

Darkness released men's activity. Each side was nervously alert to know what the other was doing; at night, to discover this, patrols groped their way out into no-man's land among belts of barbed wire strung yards deep by either side, and dropped to the ground when flares arose from the enemy trench to illumine all moving objects. Enemy patrols met and fought savagely with grenade and knife. Within the lines, men labored to repair the trenches and dugouts beaten in by the enemy artillery, or to pump out the flooding water and make themselves less uncomfortable amid the seas of sticky mud. At night also, carrying parties

came up through communication trenches or across the open ground, bringing hot food and needed munitions and supplies.

Farther to the rear in other trenches similarly built, lay supporting troops. Miles behind the lines in villages raked by enemy fire or bombed by enemy aviators were billeted reserve elements ready at stated times to relieve the troops in the front or to support them during a general attack. In carefully camouflaged positions, often only too well known to the enemy, were batteries of light and heavy artillery, intermittently firing by map-calculations on enemy trenches, batteries, and roads, intermittently harrassed themselves by gas shells. Gas shells everywhere required men to be on the alert to snap on gas masks at the first hint of danger. Otherwise they paid the penalty in death or ruined lungs.

Behind the lines

Great dumps—open storage places of reserve ammunition, timber, tools, tinned food—lay scattered through this back area. Through the whole ran the nerve system of an elaborate method of communication. At the base ports on the Channel, or ocean, or in the centers of France, were great camps for concentrating troops just debarked or called to the colors, great warehouses filled with all manner of supplies. Overworked railroad lines ran thence to places so near the front as to be in danger of destruction from shell fire. Beyond, ran roads continually shelled by enemy batteries, continually repaired by road gangs; over them passed great truck trains carrying supplies forward, and motor ambulances bringing back the constant stream of wounded. Nearer the front, the roads became too dangerous to permit of motor traffic, and then horse- and mule-drawn wagons picked their way among shell holes or across fields. Closer yet to the lines, everything was carried by men; and the great tree-lined roads of France passed through the Allied trenches, across no-man's-land and into the vast besieged camp that was Central Europe.

The channels of supply

Everywhere at night was darkness. In great cities, all lights showing from above that might guide hostile aviators, lights along the railroads that might sketch their course to air bombers, above all, any lights on the roads where the great swaying trucks ran by the sixth sense of their drivers,

Darkness

were strictly forbidden. Even the flare of matches as marching troops lit their cigarettes might reveal to a bomber the line of a road and the fact that it was in use.

At the front, sometimes, fighting became less casual. An ambitious general would desire prisoners, to learn from them, by third-degree methods, what he could of enemy plans and of the morale, or spirit, of enemy troops. Then came a trench raid in which a "box barrage" of shells or bombs of high explosive, lobbed from trench mortars, cut off a small section of enemy trench from relief. On this, descended the savage infantry raiding parties with bangalore torpedoes to blow holes in the enemy wire, with rifles, knives, and grenades. A score or two of lives on either side was a price thought cheap for a single prisoner.

Trench raids

Sometimes, a general would aspire to seize an enemy trench or some commanding hillock that offered advantage in observing the foe from above. Then a crashing bombardment of high explosive and gas shells wrecked and crushed trenches and the men in them; and in open order the infantry walked forward slowly behind a protective barrage of bursting shells to seize the coveted vantage point and turn the enemy trenches to their own defense. The position once taken, enemy counter-attacks struck it on front and flanks to recover it; enemy artillery lashed the troops that had won it; for weeks the contest over a few acres with imagined advantages of position went on, one side displacing the other in turn, until losses by the thousand had paid the price of temporary occupancy.

Minor offensives

Sometimes, great offensives would be undertaken by one side or the other for political effect or military reasons, as at Verdun and on the Somme in 1916. Then, for days, artillery, light and heavy, mercilessly shelled an area of a few score miles, seeking to ruin enemy trenches, destroy enemy artillery positions, and cut enemy belts of barbed wire. On the appointed day, the bombardment increased in intensity and with the protection of a creeping barrage of bursting shells before them, moving ahead on an exact time-table, great waves of infantry went forward on a front measured by a dozen or twenty

Major offensives

miles, with supporting waves behind them. They fought with such enemy infantry as had survived the bombardment to come out of their deep dugouts; they mastered enemy machine guns. If the attack were successful, they pressed on to a point at which their artillery could not support them with its fire until it had pushed across the shell-torn wastes of no-man's-land and the old trench system.

Meanwhile, enemy reserves had been rushed up, forewarned by the long bombardment; enemy artillery beat at the unprotected assaulting infantry; enemy infantry counter-attacked on their flanks. Strong points in the captured trench system held out and delayed the advance. At last, in such an area, now a blood bath churned with shells, reeking with gas, new trench lines were stabilized in a new position. Hundreds of thousands of lives were sacrificed for a few square miles.

Stabilization

To this situation, military experts had become resigned. They doubted if ever one side or the other could achieve its aim of breaking through the enemy lines completely, and returning to conditions of open warfare and maneuver. They came to expect only that the contest would go on, exhausting the resources and man power of either side until in sheer despair one or the other would sue for peace; or that the siege of Germany by land by the French and English trenches, or Germany's attempted submarine siege of England by sea would succeed so far as to starve one side or the other into surrender.

The war of position

As this doctrine gained acceptance trench systems, especially on the German side, became more and more elaborated. Great belts of barbed wire perhaps a dozen miles behind the lines, guarded by concrete blockhouses pierced for machine guns, positions for great raking machine-gun batteries, concreted and timbered dugouts, twenty feet below the surface to protect troops from heavy artillery shells, appeared everywhere. Trench warfare became a specialized type taught to young officers by the British, at least, to the exclusion of any other. With their troops stationed in fixed trench positions, elaborate orders were issued which assumed to foresee all

Elaborate trench organization

possible contingencies, and to leave nothing to individual judgment. Everything became complex; messages, to give but a single illustration, were sent by flags, flares, lamps, radio, telephone, pigeons, dogs, runners. And everywhere the whole load was placed on the memory of the officers.

The American Sector

For Pershing and his staff, therefore, the first duties were to train the American troops in this new and intricate game, and to build up the organization to supply to a possible great army the material to play it. The latter duty was at first the most important. Certain fundamental considerations dictated decisions. It was manifest that the British would never surrender to an American army the task of guarding the Channel ports or the French the part of the line that covered Paris. If America were to have a reasonably active front on which to operate, she must have it in eastern France, west of the Vosges; specifically it must be in the region of the St. Mihiel salient and the Toul sector. To supply this area, the Channel ports, overwhelmed with supplying the British, or the overworked railroad lines of northern France could not be used. Reliance must be put on the more southern ports, Brest, St. Nazaire, Bordeaux. New docks must be constructed in them, and new warehouses and debarkation camps for hundreds of thousands of men. Improved and equipped so far as possible with American rolling stock, railways from the ports must connect with a region in central France, of supply bases of food, munitions, motors and what not. The famous "American line" had to be developed—Tours, Blois, Dijon, Is-sur-Tille, Langres, Neufchâteau—to bring supplies and men nearer the front. At Chaumont in eastern France was established the headquarters of the A. E. F. To administer this possible future force of millions of men, to keep supplies and replacements running smoothly to the front as needed, to keep wounded moving smoothly back through successive hospitals, an organization of hundreds of thousands must be built up. Supplies must be procured. Artillery, much other ordnance equipment, might come from French and British factories, which, due to the declining number of their troops, no longer had to run

at capacity in order to supply them. Much else, especially food, must come from the United States.

For training, other problems had to be met. It seemed best to adopt the new standard already mentioned of organization for American divisions. Additional artillery, air forces, and other arms were attached to larger commands, corps and armies. American divisions could use various training grounds in France. Corps and army schools at Gondrecourt, at Langres, **Training**



and other places, trained the officers of all grades, who in turn trained their men. Special staff schools trained the officers of the General Staff who were to be placed on the staffs of the various divisions in order to make uniform throughout the armies the

drawing of plans and the framing of orders to give effect to the commands of their generals.

In the training of the officers, however, Pershing insisted on one thing. However much they might be schooled in the niceties of trench warfare, they were also trained in the older American tactics that taught the young officer how to control the rifle fire of his men, that continually confronted him with problems of campaigning in an open country where he had to rely on his own judgment to meet situations on his own responsibility. After the lectures of their French and British instructors on the perpetuity of trench warfare, it seemed to many of them absurd even to suppose that platoon commanders would be out in the open in contact with the enemy; but such training was the salvation of the A. E. F.

Instruction for open warfare

The fall and winter of 1917–1918 were gloomy. Other forces had arrived; to the First Division was added the Second, composed of one brigade of infantry and one of marines; there also arrived from America four divisions of the National Guard, the 26th from New England, the 32d from Michigan and Wisconsin, the 41st from the Pacific Coast, and the 42d or Rainbow made up of detachments from many different States. The 41st was broken up to fill the depleted ranks of the others and to man the S. O. S., the newly constituted Service of Supply. Officers by the thousand were coming over from the training camps in the States, to trudge, rifle on shoulder and ankle deep in mud, over the mile-long hills of Gondrecourt, to sleep in cold barracks.

The winter of 1917–1918

For the troops, hard winter marches in snow and sleet and rain, hard turns of duty in the winter trenches, homesickness, dislike of the French as strange people, all joined with the weather to introduce a strain of pessimism. It was scarcely a secret that French and English officers did not think too highly of their inexperienced allies. The higher commands, indeed, were so hopeless of any effective American staff work that they urged Pershing to brigade the American battalions with French and English units, and intrigued for his re-

Pershing saves the American army

moval when he refused. With the American army thus destroyed to fill the ranks of the British and French, its morale would have died with it. That Pershing insisted on saving the American army to function as a unit probably saved the Allied cause; his wisdom was evident in the next summer when he was repeatedly asked for crack American divisions to do pieces of work too hard for the dispirited French units.

Meanwhile, the American troops, in a small way, had their baptism of fire. Interspersed cautiously at first in small units among French troops, the American divisions had their first experiences in the line, at the beginning in quiet sectors, then in hotter ones. Confused as they were by the intricate and often contradictory teachings of their French instructors, they cheerfully offered their lives in payment for their seeming ignorance of war. Of the men among them, many were professional soldiers to whom war was a trade and one war generally like another, many were young men whom the spirit of adventure had brought in to the service, many more, in the National Guard regiments, were men who conscientiously had taken on their shoulders in time of peace a share of the burden of national defense; many, especially among the officers from the reserve training camps, had been inspired by Wilson's war speeches to offer their lives freely as the price of a regenerated world. Carefully fostered by propaganda in the camps at home, the last spirit appeared in increasing measure among the men who came out.

The crusading spirit

In March of 1918, the campaign opened. The year of 1917 had seen the revolution in Russia and the gradual disintegration of the Russian forces. At heavy costs in men, therefore, France and Great Britain kept up an offensive against the Germans to prevent them from turning their exclusive attention to the eastern front. But by December, 1917, all was over. Under the Bolsheviks, the Russian army became the army of a revolution; to save it for revolutionary use they concluded a peace with Germany at Brest-Litovsk by which Germany unmercifully exploited her fallen rival. In November, the Italian army was all but destroyed by an Austrian offensive, and Allied reën-

Allied reverses, 1917

forcements were needed to support it. Meanwhile, German divisions had been slowly shifted from the east to the west front, giving them by March, 1918, a preponderance over the French and English forces. The French were at the limit of their man power; Lloyd George refused to listen to his military advisers and call older men to the colors. Many of the English officers felt that their machine gun defense could turn any German offensive; the spirit ran through army and nation, "Let them come on."

Britain paid the price of overconfidence in disaster. Ludendorff, the master of German strategy, drew his forces to the British front so quietly that British aërial observers could see no signs of concentration. Then, without a long preliminary bombardment to warn the enemy to bring up reserves, he struck toward Amiens on March 21. His artillery fire crushed the British guns and the machine gun defense. Where scattered detachments held their ground, German infantry units, following tactics of infiltration, crept around them and isolated them behind the advance to be disposed of at leisure. A day saw what had been thought impossible—the line broken.

Ludendorff's offensive, March, 1918

Ludendorff's offensive was finally stopped by Franco-British reserves outside Amiens. His ultimate objectives, the separation of the two armies and the seizure of the Channel ports, were thwarted for the time, but in a second attempt he might have succeeded. In a panic, the Allies gave supreme command of the armies to the French General, Foch. Pershing gave up for the time the formation of an American army and allowed Foch to use the trained American divisions as he would. Lloyd George now summoned Englishmen of middle age to the colors and cried aloud to Wilson for more American troops, actually offering to find the shipping necessary to bring the infantry of six American divisions overseas providing they were used for a time to support the British front; their artillery would be supplied from the British and French surplus.

Allied panic

What were the ends of Ludendorff's strategy in the critical four months that followed cannot certainly be told. Probably he


THE WESTERN FRONT
March - November 1918
Important Railway Lines on American Front and Mezieres Sedan Link
German Front March 20, 1918
German Gains to July 15, 1918
Chemin des Dames
ENGLISH CHANNEL
BELGIUM
GERMANY
FRANCE
LUXEMBURG
Lys R.
Maas R.
Rhine R.
Moselle R.
Somme R.
Oise R.
Aisne R.
Meuse R.
Seine R.
Marne R.
Ourcq R.
Vesle R.
Vaux R.
Cierges R.
Amiens
Cantigny
Montdidier
Noyon
Juvigny
Soissons
Belleau
Château-Thierry
Paris
Rheims
Châlons
Mézières
Sedan
Bantheville
Sommerance
Romagne
Blanc-Mont
Gesnes
Montfaucon
Exermont
Verdun
St. Mihiel
Luxemburg
Metz
Toul
Nancy
Gondrecourt
Neufchâteau
Épinal
Chaumont
Langres
Belfort
50°
48°
2°
4°
6°
8°

hoped to achieve a success that, while it did not destroy the Allied armies, would make the discouraged nations ready for peace on Germany's terms. In France, the so-called defeatist party, willing to end the war with a German peace, was strong. Most of the French army had lost all hope of victory. England's confidence had been cruelly staggered by the blow of March 21. Another such blow and the submarines might make her also ready for a German peace.

Ludendorff's strategy

For a new attack, Ludendorff had a number of rested divisions of good morale available for use in offensive or defensive. Matched against them was a smaller number accumulating in the hands of Foch. On either side divisions would be expended by a single use. A division with full ranks and high spirit put into offensive or defensive came out with decimated ranks of veterans, with war-shattered nerves; time, rest, and replacements were needed to rebuild it. In the last item, Germany and France alike were at the end of their resources. Ludendorff could count his rested divisions as a gambler counts his blue chips, the stakes that could be thrown on the gaming table of war to win or lose for him.

Ludendorff's resources

Apparently, Ludendorff decided that his best game was to exhaust Foch's reserve divisions by a series of offensives that would require their expenditure for defense. The Allied reserve gone, before the Americans arrived in decisive force, he could count on success in the final offensive in which he would expend the last of his shock divisions. He struck accordingly against the British lines on the Lys in Flanders on April 9; his success while considerable was not decisive. Then, striking always where Foch did not expect him, he launched an offensive against the Chemin des Dames on May 27. The Chemin des Dames is a road from Rheims to Soissons, skirting the crests of the hills north of the river Aisne. The great caves and sinks that abound in the region on every hand provided natural dugouts large enough for a regiment. The position was thought so strong that it was weakly held, and on the first day the German offensive swept away completely the tired Allied divisions that held it.

German offensives

Ludendorff had not expected the offensive to go farther than the river Vesle, a tributary of the Aisne and south of it. Certainly he had no thought of reaching Paris. But the Germans swept on triumphantly. They were held up on the right beyond Soissons and by the great natural fortress of Rheims on the left. But they occupied between them a great salient reaching down to the Marne. As a flood becomes shallower and shallower the farther it travels, the offensive lost force. A unit of the Third American Division helped turn it at Château-Thierry on the Marne on June 1. On June 4 the Second Division, somewhat to the northwest of Château-Thierry, relieved a French division in the line, and, in a series of fierce combats in the next month, forced the Germans back a little through the Belleau Wood and at Vaux. Due to the fact that the censor, carefully concealing names of divisions, had let stand the information that marines had taken part in the engagement, and due further to publicity work by marines in the United States, the American public gained the vague impression that at Château-Thierry the marines alone and unaided had turned back the whole German army and saved Paris.

The Americans on the Marne

Ludendorff's unexpected success probably did not inspire him with the hope that the narrow Château-Thierry salient could be made the base for a drive down the Marne Valley on Paris, at least not without much preparation. Before anything could be done with the salient, it must be widened. To break in the Allied lines beside it, on June 9 he struck to the west of the salient. There the First Division assisted in repelling him in what is known as the Montdidier-Noyon defensive. Still planning to exhaust the Allied reserves, and then strike a final blow, probably on the Lys, Ludendorff now began to prepare for another offensive, this time on the east flank of the Château-Thierry triangle, and east of Rheims, in the hope of surrounding the great fortress of Rheims whose mountain bulwark blocked the east base of the salient.

Ludendorff's preparation

Delaying as he did to muster his divisions and prepare his successive offensives, he was gambling that the increase of the

American army in France could not be effective in time. That army was increasing in self-confidence, morale, and numbers. On April 20, it was true, the Germans had raided the 26th Division in the trenches on the St. Mihiel salient and captured at Seicheprey 179 prisoners, a success which they advertised to the Allied world. On May 28, to repair the damage to American prestige, the First Division, in line almost due north of Paris since April, executed an attack which won and held the village of Cantigny. The operation was of value solely as showing that American troops had the training and courage to execute a difficult task. That German communiqués omitted the fact that American troops had executed the attack, enhanced American self-satisfaction in the blow dealt to the enemy's self-confidence.

Cantigny, May, 1918

Service in the trenches in quiet sectors, and exploits like Cantigny, were giving self-confidence to the American troops throughout France despite the hardly disguised ill-opinion of their French instructors. News of American troops movements was carefully concealed from the men, as was most information; but they gradually realized that their numbers were growing. They knew already what divisions were in France in February; now their officers and men returning from schools told of seeing men from this division and that, located in distant training areas. Through April, May, and June, the great liners, painted in fantastic and colorful camouflage designs, had been slipping quietly out of New York harbor at dawn with fresh infantry divisions on board. Five divisions had come in May; ten in June. Cantigny had demonstrated that with a year's training such as the First Division had had, American troops were of admirable quality; future events were to show they could excel with very much less.

The A. E. F. gains self-confidence

Through early July, the Allied armies watched and waited for Ludendorff's next blow. In cantonments throughout France, Americans celebrated the Fourth of July and the French national holiday, July 14. A great parade of units representing all the Allied forces commemorated the day in Paris. Early next morning, Ludendorff struck, for the last time to the east and west of

Rheims. The French opposed to the offensive the policy of the "yielding defense." Leaving the first lines weakly held, they reserved their real defense for the point where the tired German infantry should pass the range at which the artillery could protect it: since the French also discovered in advance the hour of the offensive and disabled the German guns with counter battery fire the failure of the offensive was complete. American troops had a share in the work. The 42d Division was in the line east of Rheims. Units of the 28th, the Pennsylvania Guard, were on the Marne. On the river south of Château-Thierry the Third Division broke the German offensive at a critical spot. The feat of one of its regiments, the 38th, in halting the German attack at the vital point where the roads for their transport diverged south of the Marne, in spite of the fact that the withdrawal of the French left it surrounded on three sides, was as brilliant an exploit as the war had seen. By the 18th of July, close on the news of the repulse of the offensive, the rumor ran through the cantonments of the A. E. F. that the Americans had counter-attacked and broken through.

The last German offensive, July 15, 1918

The news was scarcely exaggerated. Mangin, the hard-fighting commander of the French Colonial army, in position before Soissons, had begged for permission to attack the west face of the Château-Thierry salient which the Germans had not fortified so heavily as was their custom. Pershing urged a sudden blow without warning to the enemy and carried his point with Foch. The First and Second Divisions were rushed up on such short notice that the infantry of the Second was barely in position on the morning of the 18th of July at 4:35 A. M. when the American barrage fell. No long artillery preparation gave the Germans warning, as the First and Second Divisions, on either side of the French Moroccans, plunged forward to the attack.

The American offensive, July 18

The surprise was complete. The first flares appealing for artillery protection arose from the German lines at the moment of the American onset. Driving on in the face of steadily gathering resistance day by day, their units losing touch with higher

command but never ceasing to press forward, by the 21st the outposts of the decimated battalions of the First lay on the heights above Soissons, the key to the German position. The Second had advanced to a position squarely across the Soissons-Château-Thierry road. A desperate spear-thrust had cut the artery of the German defense.

The salient broken

As was inevitable, the Germans began to withdraw from the salient. Ludendorff's reserve divisions were sent in to retard the retreat until munitions could be withdrawn. But now the American divisions were thrown on them in the lower salient to hurry its evacuation. The 26th, the 28th, and units of the 4th pushed in from the west. Relieving the 26th and the 3d, the 42d and 32d drove the picked divisions of the Prussian Guard from the heights along the Ourcq that they had been ordered to defend at all costs. Marching forward by the light of blazing munition dumps fired by the retreating enemy, the Americans at last encountered him placed for obstinate resistance on the line of the Vesle.

Ludendorff evacuates the salient

Ludendorff was given no opportunity to take breath and renew his offensive. On August 8, with the assistance of part of the 33d Division, the British army, which Ludendorff believed had lost its spirit, launched a new offensive that broke the German line and swept steadily forward, for weeks; the 27th and 30th American Divisions participated in its later stages. Mangin with his Tenth Army had pushed the Germans out of Soissons and was sweeping them back to the Aisne. He borrowed the 32d Division of Pershing to break the stiffening German resistance at Juvigny; "Beaucoup Boche, beaucoup machine gun" said the French whom they relieved; but in five days the German defense was breached and a salient forced behind it which endangered any line they might establish south of the Chemin des Dames, and rendered both the Vesle and the Aisne ultimately untenable.

The British offensive of August 8; Juvigny

With 24 American combat divisions in France by August 1, Pershing was at last able on August 10 to establish a distinct First American Army. He looked for an operation in which it

might engage. The elimination of the St. Mihiel salient in the old American sector at once suggested itself. East of the river Meuse is a range of wooded hills, the Hauts de Meuse; with its defensive centers at Verdun and Toul it is one of the bulwarks of France on the east. In 1914 the Germans had seized one part of it, making a salient with its tip at St. Mihiel. As a breach in the defense line of the Meuse, the salient was a continual threat to Verdun and rendered impossible the use of the direct railroad line to the fortress. It was held by about 75,000 Germans, and Pershing planned its reduction as a first essay of the American army staff in the direction of a large operation. Foch gave his consent on the condition that no exploitation beyond the base line of the salient be attempted. Eleven American divisions were brought into line and four put in reserve for the operation.

The St. Mihiel Salient

Forewarned of the affair, the Germans had begun a withdrawal from the salient, which was interrupted by the American attack on September 12. With the German artillery retiring, the operation succeeded with little loss; the 26th and First Divisions meeting each other at the base of the triangle, nipped it off, catching some 16,000 German prisoners and 443 guns in it. Foch's orders alone prevented a fuller exploitation of the success toward the German fortress of Metz.

Reduction of the salient

In late September, the Allies, now assured of ultimate victory, projected a series of assaults on the Central Powers. Offensives were launched in Palestine and Macedonia; and on September 26, French and American armies combined in a grand attack west of Verdun known as the Meuse-Argonne offensive. About 15 miles west of the Meuse is the Argonne forest—the "Oregon forest" as the American soldier miscalled it. It is a densely forested ridge running north and south some 25 miles, rendered difficult by tangled thickets and precipitous heights and ravines. East of it a thinly settled country of rolling ridged hills, occasionally precipitous, as at the Côte Dame Marie, stretches to the Meuse. The Argonne and the country eastward was cut by the battle front, a scene of savage combat in 1916.

The Meuse-Argonne

Supposedly, it was one of the strongest positions of the German line. The Argonne was impregnable, and no one could hold the terrain eastward without it. But a drive would have results. If it penetrated as far as Sedan, it would cut the Mézières-Sedan railroad, the line paralleling the front by which the Germans in the end would have to evacuate their forces in France and Flanders, now slowly retiring before the British.

In assaulting the position, it was planned that an American army should attack between the Meuse and Argonne, a French army west of the Argonne, the expectation being that the Allied advance on either side would force the Germans to evacuate. Very quietly Pershing gathered his forces for the assault. There was not time to bring up the veteran divisions that had participated at St. Mihiel. Of the nine American divisions placed in the front line, only three were experienced—the 4th, the 77th, which was given the task of pushing the enemy retreat in the forest, and the 28th, which was given the hard task of keeping touch between the 77th and the troops outside the forest. So cleverly did the American staff conceal its plans that on the eve of the offensive the German reserve divisions were moved to Alsace to check a feigned attack from Belfort. On the 26th of September, protected by a terrific barrage fired from 3928 guns, the American divisions moved forward, smothering all early resistance.

The offensive of September 26

Evening of the first day found the attack held up only at Montfaucon, a town perched on a commanding hill near the Meuse. That town the 79th Division finally captured on the 27th. But the pace was telling on the divisions farther to the west, the 37th and 35th especially. They were inexperienced, and became scattered and disorganized; their staffs were not good enough to hold them together and direct them. German reserve divisions of the best quality launched savage counter-attacks and by September 29th the 35th, 37th, and 79th were definitely driven back. West of the forest, the French army was held up by Blanc Mont, the bulwark of the German line in Champagne.

The offensive checked

To break the German resistance, Pershing called on his veteran divisions. The Second had been lent to the French and was used to capture Blanc Mont in a terrific piece of fighting that by October 12 had hurled the whole German line as far back as the Aisne. East of the Forest, the First, Thirty-second, and Third Divisions were placed in line to retrieve the gains of the German counter-attacks. In a fierce series of combats the First Division atoned for the failure of the 35th at Exermont, pushing the line north as far as Sommerance before the handful of survivors gave up the rest of the task to the 42d. The 32d Division, in line from September 30 to October 18, hammered its way through the Kriemhilde Stellung, the chief German reserve position, capturing Gesnes, Cierges, Romagne, the Côte Dame Marie, and at last in the Bois de Bantheville occupying a deep-cut salient extending far into the German front.

The breaking of the German resistance

Meanwhile the staff and service of supply had successfully mastered the task of improvising roads across the old front. It was an inferno in which forests stood up as lone sticks bare of vegetation, in which a belt of land was churned by shell bursts into deep mud literally pitted with shell craters three to ten feet deep; where ceaseless bombardment had pounded stone-built towns into gravel heaps. The French grumbled at the delay and wished to replace Pershing and his staff: but the Americans were achieving the seemingly impossible.

The problem of supply

By October 31, it was evident even to the Germans that their cause was lost. Ludendorff's one chance would have been to withdraw the German armies to the French frontier in September. Instead he had merely used up his last reserve divisions, throwing them into the maelstrom in the vain endeavor to stem the grinding plunge onward of the American divisions. Though hammered and decimated by the conflict to the limit of endurance, they were remorselessly beating upon the yielding German forces. In late October with the German monarchy already tottering, Germany asked for terms of armistice and peace.

Germany recognizes defeat

While the Allies deliberated on terms, their attacks did not

cease; their scope became wider. From the sea to the Argonne the German forces were retiring eastward under the Allied advance. In the Argonne they were holding desperately, using all their reserves to keep open the Sedan gateway of escape from France. The American attack had at last gone through the Argonne. American divisions had crossed the Meuse and were driving the Germans north of Verdun. The American attack had become a sort of door swinging northeastward on a hinge to the east of Verdun.

The Allied offensives continue

On November 1, under a barrage so terrific that the sound of it carried the hope of liberty to Allied prisoners in Belgium and western Germany, rested American units made the last assault on the German lines, which everywhere gave way. The American divisions raced north to Sedan in pursuit. Some of them swung across the Meuse to drive the Germans from their last foothold on the Hauts de Meuse, and hurl their retreating armies into the plain of the Woëvre. A final American offensive still further to the east on Metz, which would have made it in turn the pivot of the great swing northeast, was checked by the conclusion of the armistice.

The offensive of November 1

On November 11 at eleven in the morning the armistice went into effect. Rumors and reports of it had earlier run through the American armies. On one night, on a false report of it or in a mad freak, truck lights were turned on and traffic ran on fully lighted roads. It was almost with a sense of anticlimax that the authentic news finally arrived.

The armistice

The front line of November 11 was marked by pickets and outposts of either side who lay grimly watching each other. Past them, like souls released from purgatory, poured a torrent of men, clothed in rags of the uniforms of all the Allies—prisoners released from behind the German lines. Then on November 17, along roads lined by surrendered German artillery and planes, the Allied columns slowly took up their march to the Rhine. The armistice prescribed the occupation by the Allies of three bridgeheads 30 kilometers in radius centering on Cologne, Coblenz, and Mainz. To the middle area

The march to the Rhine

was assigned the American army of occupation: three of its divisions, the First, Second, and Thirty-second, were accorded the honor of positions on the right bank of the Rhine.

Then followed a winter of waiting, relieved by a ceaseless round of drilling and training. Already American troops nearer the ports had been sent home. Establishment of the German republic, the disbanding of the wrecks of her armies, and her final assent to the Treaty of Versailles, rendered any large army unnecessary. In March, April, May, and June division after division was reviewed by the commander-in-chief; its standards decorated, it was then released for the leisurely rail journey to the ports of embarkation and the voyage home.

The winter of 1919

In the United States, the returning troops encountered a population more or less frankly fed up on the war and anxious only to forget it as soon as possible. The hundreds of thousands of men wrecked in health by wounds or illness drifted into government rehabilitation agencies or hospitals. The able-bodied took up the search for a job and the ordinary duties of civilian life. The American Legion, a veteran organization of all branches of the service, drew into its membership a fraction of the discharged men. Yet with the sharp stimulus that smells have on the memory, a puff of wood smoke, the smell of cooking in the open, the scent of gasoline from a hot summer road, might yet serve to recall to the old soldiers of the A. E. F., France and the comrades they had left there.

The end of the A. E. F.

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

S. Thomas, *The History of the A. E. F.* New York, 1920.
F. Palmer, *America in France.* New York, 1918.
——, *Our Greatest Battle, the Meuse-Argonne.* New York, 1919.
A. Woollcott, *The Command Is Forward.* New York, 1919.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE WORLD WAR: THE POLITICIANS

Greater men than Woodrow Wilson have occupied the presidential chair; but none of them has ever enjoyed the commanding eminence in world politics, none has ever been the center of the world drama as Wilson was in the five months following his arrival at Brest, December 13, 1918, on the liner *George Washington*, accompanied by the American delegation that aspired to give the world peace based on informed justice. A world drama the Conference of Paris was to be, heroes and villains often hardly to be told apart, playing their rôles before a chorus of advisers, delegations from small states and oppressed peoples, the world straining to see and hear through its newspapers what was taking place on the stage.

Wilson a world figure

The element of contest so essential to the dramatic was always present at Paris. In and outside the inner Council of Ten, the "Big Four"—representatives of Italy, France, Great Britain, and the United States—struggled with each other; delegations of small nations, racial minorities, special interests, fought for their attention, each urging its own claims. Above all struggled the two contradictory principles of unselfish idealism and national self-seeking. The resulting Treaty of Versailles, strangely blended of international ideals and national interests, has never been ratified by the United States; its results so far are unimportant in the current life of the American people; but it bears so heavily the imprint of the American president that its making, if not its execution, is one of the important chapters of American history.

Idealism and self-seeking

Circumstances made Wilson the incarnation of the idealist principle. Professing the creed of unselfish service to mankind, the establishment of a newer and better world order in which the lower classes would no longer be sent to war by their rulers for

the interest of the few, he had led his nation into the "war to end war" to "make the world safe for democracy." Liberal elements throughout the Allied countries, labor groups in England especially, hearkened to his words and reached across international boundaries to adopt him as a leader. When in November of 1917, Bolshevists in Russia had published part of the sordid secret partition treaties among the Allies, left in the archives by the overthrown Czarist régime, liberal elements revolted with disgust from a war soiled with such self-seeking. Wilson, in an address to Congress of January 8, 1918, had seized the moment to set forth for the Allies in the Fourteen Points a program of world settlement of a better kind. Perforce, the governments of England, France, and Italy had to adopt the new statement of war aims to hold their liberals in support of the war; and the liberals thenceforth looked to Wilson as their surety that the Fourteen Points should be the peace of Allied victory.

The Fourteen Points

The Points deserve statement in detail:

I. "Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view."

II. "Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants."

III. Removal of all economic barriers, and equality of trade conditions.

IV. Armaments reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. Adjustment of colonial claims on the principle that interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

VI. Friendly treatment of Russia and evacuation of her territory.

VII. Belgium to be evacuated and restored.

VIII. All French territory to be freed and invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine to be righted.

IX. Readjustment of Italian frontiers along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary to be allowed autonomous development.

XI. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro to be evacuated, occupied territory restored, Serbia accorded access to the sea, and relations of Balkan states determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality.

XII. Integrity of Turkish parts of Turkey to be assured; other nationalities now under Turkish rule to be secured; the Dardanelles to be open permanently under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish state including territories indisputably Polish, with free access to the sea, whose political integrity, economic independence and territorial integrity are to be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."

Wilson's program was the best earnest of a new order that the world had seen. True it was distressingly vague on certain points—that for instance in which boundaries drawn on lines of nationality are supplemented by those made on economic considerations, or by establishing corridors to the sea. The balancing of the interests of colonial natives with the aspirations of imperial governments would be difficult. Everything depended on the way such principles

Vagueness of the Fourteen Points

were to be interpreted into specific provisions. Even where his phraseology seemed unmistakable, "open covenants, openly arrived at," Wilson was later to offer limiting interpretations under cover of which the old secret diplomacy slipped back at Paris. But, after all, the heart of the Fourteen Points and of the whole peace to Wilson was the League of Nations of Point Fourteen: a free association of the world that would use the whole weight of the world's power to enforce disinterested justice and to right any wrongs without war between nation and nation.

The Fourteen Points had done their work. They steeled liberal opinion in Europe to the great effort of 1918; a sense of condemnation by a world's moral sense even filtered behind the enemy lines to unstring the arms of German soldiers and undermine the morale of divisions of the Prussian Guard. When in October of 1918, the disintegrating German Empire appealed for armistice and peace, the acceptance of the Fourteen Points and assurance that the German government at last spoke in the name of the German people were the general terms which it was forced to accept. Then, under defeat at the front and internal revolution the German might crumbled, the Kaiser fled an exile to Holland, and the German Republic was born. In November and December of 1918, when even the Central Powers had admitted the Fourteen Points, it seemed as though their author came to France a god who by his divine power was about to usher in the golden age. Liberals throughout the world acclaimed him their patron saint; representatives of oppressed peoples appealed to him to do them justice and grant them their desires at the hands of their enemies.

Seeming acceptance of the Wilson program, December, 1918

Wilson's position was not, however, so strong as it might appear. To begin with, it was questionable if he spoke with the united voice of America. Late in October he had appealed to the American voters to elect a Democratic Congress. In view of the fact that many Republican congressmen had heartily supported the war policies, and some Democrats had dissented from them, this appeal from patriotism to partisanship seemed hardly fair; and the election returned a

American opposition to Wilson

Republican majority in both houses of the Congress that would sit after March 4, 1919. Moreover, two influential senators, Johnson of California and Borah of Idaho, had openly opposed his international project. The delegation of commissioners he led to Paris were his own selection, not in any way confirmed by the Senate. Colonel House was still his second self, though prone to suggest the compromise of principles in practical, give-and-take negotiation. His secretary of state, Robert Lansing, versed in the older diplomatic system, had misgivings about many of the President's ideals. Who knew where the "self-determination" of small peoples might end? Of the Republicans selected by Wilson, Henry White left little impress on the treaty; General Tasker H. Bliss was to prove the president's most intelligent supporter.

Another of Wilson's weaknesses was inherent in himself. It was in the nature of the man to work out his own ideas and program, and to insist that his associates accept them without modification or question. War censorships, both the direct one, and that self-imposed by the American people in the crisis, had prevented any general challenge or debate of the President's statement of war aims. He assumed that he spoke the will of America when as a matter of fact few thinking Americans grasped the full implications of his course, and fewer yet would have approved it unqualifiedly on mature consideration, so completely did it diverge from the older American policy of isolation from European affairs. Of his immediate associates on the commission, Bliss, perhaps, came nearest to full sympathy with his aims. Wilson had brought a great staff of experts, scholars in the ethnic map of Europe, in history, in geography, in economics, who for a year past had labored under the direction of Colonel House to accumulate material on which to base a just peace. With their chiefs Wilson occasionally conferred to seek the facts of settlement his principles implied; but he ignored the fact that often the chiefs of divisions were at outs with their subordinates, scholars more able than themselves. In certain cases too, social pressure adroitly exercised through fêtes or the bestowal of foreign decorations obscured the vision of the ablest.

Wilson's intellectual isolation

But even when Wilson sought and found advice in details, the scheme of settlement for which he worked was his own. It was not in his nature to explain it to the people of the world or even to his associated commissioners. And the forces against which he had to battle were so strong and so insidious that he needed all the advice and support that could be had.

Bolshevism

To begin with, the Bolshevist régime in Russia had been frankly contemptuous of the Allies' war for the Fourteen Points, regarding it as the last gasp of bourgeois middle-class industrial government, destined to destroy both itself and the medieval military feudalism against which it battled, and thus to pave the way for the social revolution, the uprising of the lower classes, the "dictatorship of the proletariat," throughout the world. That Bolshevist régime displayed amazing life and energy. Forced to a peace dictated at the point of the bayonet by Germany at Brest-Litovsk in December, 1917, it had merely published to the world the full story of German oppression and bided its time to revenge itself through the infiltration into the German lower orders of communist ideas of absolute rule of the working classes. While English, American, and Japanese armies opposed the Bolshevist régime on Russian soil, ostensibly to protect ammunition stores supplied to the overthrown Czarist régime, and while "white" leaders like Yudenitch and Kolchak headed armies of counter-revolution, it murdered the unhappy ex-Czar and his family, ruled Russia by terror, and scattered the virus of communism among the working classes and armies of both the Central and Allied Powers. Both conservative and liberal statesmen at Paris dreaded the prospect that communism might spread westward.

Foch and the Allied militarists

Communist Bolshevism was not merely dangerous in itself. It was the excuse for many of the reactionary measures urged by the conservative groups to check it. One hazard lay in the personality of Marshal Foch, supreme commander of the Allied armies. Wilson, in outlining to Germany the terms for the armistice, had indicated that they must be such that she could not resume hostilities. Translated by Foch into

facts, the specific provisions were drastic: retirement of the German armies behind the Rhine, leaving the Allies three bridgeheads on the east bank centering at Cologne, Coblenz, and Mainz, occupied respectively by English, American, and French armies; the surrender by Germany of her war material and fleet. It was Foch's intention to renew the armistice, as it expired, from time to time on more and more drastic terms, until finally the armistice itself should become a peace imposed by the victors at the point of the cannon on the vanquished. Everywhere with his consent, in Italy and Roumania, notably, Allied armies pushed forward to occupy by force territory which their nations intended to claim at the peace. In Hungary, French militarists were later to allow a Bolshevist régime as one step in forcing a general movement of the Allied armies across Germany to crush Bolshevism in Eastern Europe—a measure Foch repeatedly urged. On the pretext of establishing a "sanitary cordon" against communism, France armed her new client states in Poland and Roumania, encouraging them in aggression. At the same time, the policy of refusing to sell food supplies to Germany and of continuing the Allied blockade was calculated to turn the German city workers into Bolshevists in sheer desperation.

Foch's plans for a further military exploitation of the Allied victory were repressed. French attempts in the Rhineland to engineer a revolution that would set up a separate republic as a client state of France broke before the steady opposition of the generals of the American army of occupation. Far more serious was the group of diplomats of the older school who thought not in Wilson's terms of the rights of small peoples to autonomy and self-determination, or of the duty of the civilized powers to the backward peoples, but in terms of the acquisition of enemy territory, of desirable military frontiers, of great regions of weak or backward peoples for economic exploitation. Having won the war with the help of Wilson's idealism, they now cynically planned to shelve his ideas and to construct the peace on the lines of the discredited secret treaties.

The old diplomacy

Those treaties now demand consideration. To keep the greedy

Czarist régime in the war in 1915, Great Britain had promised Russia the Dardanelles and Constantinople, reserving for herself the former neutral zone in Persia. In March of 1917, a secret understanding between France and Russia allowed Russia, in the peace, to settle the eastern bounds of Austria and Germany, while France and England settled the western. Russia further promised France Alsace-Lorraine, the Saar coal-basin, not a part of France since the days of Napoleon, and an occupation by French forces of the west bank of the Rhine. With Russia Bolshevist these treaties were not so much an actual menace as an unsavory commentary on Allied diplomacy.

The secret treaties: Russia

More serious were the agreements by which Italy had been brought into the war. Italy with an eye to the main chance had weighed offers from her old allies before embarking on the career of Allied idealism. The Treaty of London of April 26, 1915, promised her her price. Trieste, German districts in the Tyrol, Dalmatia except for the port of Fiume, Valona—it made the Adriatic almost an Italian lake. Roumania was next brought into the war by promises of Transylvania, and the Banat, Bukowina, and part of Hungary. As her pound of flesh included territory with many Serbian inhabitants, the treaty was kept secret from Serbia. Roumania virtuously turned aside the German bribe of Bessarabia from Russia and sought honor on the Allied side.

Secret treaties: Italy, Roumania

Asiatic Turkey and the Near East had been partitioned in hope among Italy, France, Russia, and England by separate agreements in 1915–1916. Of one of these, the oft-mentioned Sykes-Picot Treaty, President Wilson once remarked with fastidious disgust that it sounded like the name of a tea! Clemenceau and Lloyd George were still haggling over the spoils as late as 1919.

Allied partitions of Turkey

Japan had taken advantage of her participation in the war to force on China in 1915 the Twenty-One Demands for various cessions of territory, economic privileges, etc. China had been forced to keep them secret; some of them were modified; enough of the whole had leaked out to alarm the United States; but the

Lansing-Ishii agreement of November, 1917, had later admitted a Japanese special interest in China. In 1914, Japan had seized from Germany Kiao-Chau with the special concessions in the province of Shantung that Germany had enjoyed: she had taken them ostensibly to return them to China; just how and when she refused to say. In February, 1917, she had procured from Great Britain an agreement which recognized her rights in Shantung and in the German islands in the Pacific north of the equator, Japan acquiescing in England's appropriation of the German spoils to the south of it.

Japanese aggressiveness

With the exception of part of the agreements with Japan, the American Department of State knew nothing of these secret treaties. This ignorance was absolutely inexcusable. Those published by the Bolshevists had been reprinted in a few British and American papers, further publication being discouraged for fear of injuring public morale. Balfour, head of the British mission to the United States in 1917, had mentioned the existence of these treaties to House; but House had paid no attention. When these commitments finally came to light at the Peace Conference, Wilson could only argue that the United States was not bound by them and was ready to proceed to a settlement on the basis of facts. But the rights which the nations concerned believed they had acquired were not so easily swept aside.

American ignorance of the secret treaties

The Peace Conference did not begin its deliberations until January 12, 1919. The beaten Central Powers were excluded from any participation until they should be called up to hear the terms accorded them. Twenty-seven states had declared war or broken relations with the Central Powers. From the wrecks of the old empires new states had emerged, like Poland and Czechoslovakia; but it was made clear that the lesser states would be consulted only when their immediate interests were involved. The terms of peace at large would be written by the Council of Ten—two representatives from each of the Great Powers, Japan, Italy, France, Great Britain, and the United States. Japan held carefully aloof from European ques-

The Council of Ten

tions, to strike in with more effect when her own interests were concerned. After March 19 the vital decisions were made by an even smaller group, the Four—Orlando for Italy, Clemenceau for France, Lloyd George for Great Britain, and Wilson for the United States. In the final analysis, the decisions really lay with the last three named.

Orlando was not so greedily imperialist as some others of his countrymen, notably the grim and saturnine Baron Sonnino of whom he stood in great awe, but necessarily he was forced into seeking for Italy what she had been promised by the Treaty of London and even more. Not knowing English, the language common to his three associates, he was at a disadvantage in the give-and-take of the Conference.

Orlando

A far more interesting figure was Georges Clemenceau, a supremely able man 78 years of age, whose memory went back to the humiliation of France by Prussia in 1871. A savage free-lance politician, nicknamed "the Tiger," his own iron will had been essential in keeping France up to her final effort in 1918. Like Orlando, he was less narrowly militant and imperialist than great sections of Frenchmen led by Poincaré and Foch; but both from conviction and political necessity he worked desperately for terms of peace that would cripple Germany so far as to free France from the fear of future invasion. He was an earnest man, conscientiously representing the old school of diplomacy, and at least intelligent enough to understand and to respect the new.

Clemenceau

Lloyd George was essentially a politician. He had begun life as a radical, but his principles changed like a weathercock with the political wind of the moment. A striking, magnetic and lovable personality, he could see the needs of the immediate situation and no more; he anxiously thought of the effect of each principle on his present political situation. He came to the conference fresh from an English parliamentary election in which he had promised to "hang the Kaiser" and to "make Germany pay"—foot the costs of the war to the tune of the astronomical figure of a hundred and twenty billions! How

Lloyd George

far his promises coincided with what was feasible, more important still from his viewpoint, how they met the turn of changing political situations, were questions which like a true politician he let the passing moment decide. To the despair of American commissioners he shifted the representation on minor commissions between liberals and conservatives according to his mood.

Wilson encountered at the outset a reverse much more serious than at first it seemed. European diplomats naturally insisted that diplomatic conversations take place in secrecy. The aggressive American newspaper men present reminded Wilson of his formula "open covenants, openly arrived at." But although news was disseminated through an American press bureau, the conversations of the Council of Ten and the Four remained secret unless the French, for political reasons, let enough leak out to their newspapers to bring pressure on their opponents. The world knew nothing of the situation, and was led by subtle propaganda to blame Wilson for delaying the peace; as a result, his influence began to decline. He was false to his own principle of "taking counsel with the people" and he paid the penalty. For a democratic leader to abandon perfect openness in his dealings with his constituency is in the end sure to cause his defeat.

Wilson submits to secret diplomacy

Wilson's great interest and great hope centered on his League of Nations. If all else in the treaty went amiss, the League, he hoped, would gradually bring forth order and justice. He placed himself on the committee of nineteen that set to work to frame it. Ideas came from various sources; the idea of mutual guarantee by nations was first projected between the United States and certain South American powers in 1915. Proposals of the South African General Smuts and the English Lord Robert Cecil, were grafted in. The central ideas were a mutual guarantee of each member state against unjust wars of aggression in which each state was required to assist by force if necessary in maintaining the League's decisions, a Council of the League made up of the great powers and lesser ones represented

The League of Nations

in rotation to direct the League's activity, and the principle of mandates—that the protection and development of backward peoples be unselfishly assumed by the civilized powers.

The idealist saw in the scheme the protection of the world from future wars; the French wished the League to function with a general staff and compulsory military service as a threat to keep her bugbear Germany from a new war of revenge. Wilson in general had his way. Between February 3 and 13 the covenant of the League was drafted and February 14 it was presented to the Peace Conference by Wilson, who sailed at once for a month's visit to the United States to perform the necessary task of winding up the session of Congress.

The League Covenant drafted

In America, as was to be expected, the League of Nations met with criticism at once. In the first place, Irish and other anti-British interests attacked it as British in origin; no doubt the idea in 1918 had been more prominent in England than in America and much of the covenant itself could be traced to the ideas of British statesmen. Further, it was certainly a partial surrender of American independence and isolation. An outside power could bid the United States draw the sword to execute the mandates of the League; the League might possibly venture to admonish the United States on such matters as its protective tariff, or exclusion of oriental immigration. Had the United States when it was young gone wheresoever it would, only when it was old to have another gird it up and bear it whither it would not? Could not the League's directions interfere with the Monroe Doctrine by which America assumed the guardianship of the western world? Was it possible constitutionally for Congress to delegate to another even the moral right to bid it to make war? Was it not the first step toward merging the United States in a superstate?

American criticism of the Covenant

For reasons largely political, a Republican opposition developed in the Senate, strong enough to defeat the League on a two-thirds vote. Other eminent Republicans like ex-President Taft were for it. Wilson met the opposition with defiance, declaring the

League would be so knit up with the treaty of peace that in rejecting one the Senate must reject the other. To conciliate public opinion, Taft recommended modifications; there should be an amendment expressly protecting the Monroe Doctrine, and others to make it clear the League could not dictate to the United States on any domestic questions and to safeguard withdrawal from the League. In the Commission on the League, the French opposed anything that seemed to draw the United States away from European affairs such as the Monroe Doctrine amendment, or anything weakening Article X, the security article. To satisfy France on these points, a guaranty treaty (never ratified by the United States) was later privately negotiated by which Great Britain and the United States undertook to come to her aid in case of German aggression. Wilson's amendments to the Covenant finally passed.

Amendment of the Covenant

Meanwhile things had been going badly elsewhere for the cause of idealism. In January Lloyd George had tried to divide up the German colonies among the British Dominions that had conquered them, only to be checkmated by Wilson. But during Wilson's month's absence, the conservative forces, unchecked by House or Lansing, rescinded a former resolution that the final military and naval terms should be given Germany, and disarmament should begin, before the final treaty was adopted. Instead, by failing to complete the disarmament of Germany, they could plausibly keep enough Allied forces under arms to force a distasteful treaty on her. The final military and naval terms were therefore reserved to the general treaty. March 14, Foch in the name of French safety demanded a permanent occupation of the line of the Rhine. Thus the French hoped to secure the fall of Germany as a military and industrial rival never to rise again.

The old diplomacy gains

Here Wilson and Clemenceau, early in April, reached a deadlock. Lloyd George gave Wilson no assistance, and on April 7 with the gesture of the gentleman of the old-school comedies who delivers an ultimatum by ringing for his carriage, Wilson cabled

for the *George Washington* to carry his delegation home. Under this threat, a compromise was reached calling for a military occupation for a term of years subject to termination on payment of indemnities or otherwise. The guaranty treaty was part of the same bargain. The French acquired control of the coal region of the Saar Basin subject to a plebiscite in fifteen years. Again Wilson could only hope that the work of the Peace Conference would be undone by the League.

Compromise on the military occupation of the Rhine

No sooner were Clemenceau's demands for crippling Germany to secure French safety adjusted than the question of Italian claims developed. Unfortunately Wilson had already committed himself on the point of an extension of the Italian frontier, for military reasons, over German populations. In April the Italians were insisting on what had been promised them in the Treaty of London, and Fiume in addition; leaping from the sanctity of treaty bargains, to the self-determination of peoples, to justify both grabs. Wilson was doggedly against all concession. Clemenceau and Lloyd George were reluctantly ready to yield to the Treaty of London but hoped to use the demand for Fiume to checkmate it; for the port of Fiume was necessary as an economic outlet to Jugoslavia, one of the friendly states. Wilson issued a public statement April 23 urging Italy to accept the newer principles of international right and abandon her demand for Fiume and what was promised in the Treaty of London. Orlando made the gesture of leaving the conference; Wilson was warmly attacked in the Italian press; but as further American loans were urgently needed, Orlando soon returned. Lloyd George now tried his hand at satisfying the Italians with most comical results. He offered concessions in Asiatic Turkey in lieu of Fiume, found he had stirred up a hornets' nest in the Mohammedan world, and offered Fiume to induce the Italians to forget their Turkish ambitions. The final solutions of the questions came only after the United States had left the stage of European policy and need not concern us.

Wilson opposes the Italian claims

Wilson had been firm with the Italians from a belief that they were bluffing. His advisers could not persuade him that the same thing was true of the Japanese in their demands in China. Early in the Conference, they had stated their claims to the German concessions in Shantung and the German islands north of the Equator. The Chinese leader Wellington Koo, an astute diplomat trained in an American university, cleverly but unsuccessfully opposed the Japanese demands. The Japanese at the end of April let it be understood that they would not sign without Shantung: the compromise was finally reached of allotting it to them on an indefinite pledge of its return to China.

Wilson yields to the Japanese

Again the question of the old diplomacy, secret treaties, and special interests, arose in the partition of the Turkish empire in the Near East. Amid the conflicting claims and economic interests of the great powers, Wilson had proposed a joint commission to visit the Orient and ascertain the wishes of its people. When France and England hung back, he dispatched President King, of Oberlin College, and Charles R. Crane to investigate for the United States. The outstanding fact in their report, made in August but not published until some years after, was that the majority of the people, trusting the disinterestedness of the United States, wished it to hold the mandate for them. But here, as in many other passages of the treaty, the current of events after the waning of American interest in the settlement ran into unforeseen situations.

The King-Crane Commission

The remaining question of importance was that of the reparations to be demanded of Germany. Unquestionably, she was bound to repay the devastation she had wrought in France and Belgium, but how much more? How much of the costs of the war—direct and indirect—to the Allies? The Allied countries had been heartened to the final struggle through the assurance by their politicians that Germany would have to pay the bill. To break the news to them that Germany's capacity to pay was limited, was past the daring of the politicians. France saw the matter in still another light. Desiring as her

Reparations

soldiers did to see Germany destroyed as a military menace and therefore as an industrial power, they hoped to wreck her industries by forcing the cession of essential industrial districts and sources of raw material. They did not care that keeping her poor and weak left her unable to pay.

Indeed, the payment of sums counted in scores of billions of dollars from nation to nation is almost an impossible affair. There is not enough gold in the world to pay such sums, nor would it be to a nation's interest to accept it if there were. To accept payment in goods is to destroy the home demand for the products of home industries. To have German workmen come to France to repair the devastated regions, as was proposed, would take bread from the mouths of French laborers. Only by the shrewdest financing can far smaller sums than billions be passed from nation to nation. The Allies, too, were unwilling to name a specific sum that Germany could pay because its amount would disappoint their own nationals. Partly to evade the issue, partly to keep Germany in economic subjection, the amount was left to be settled in the future. Meanwhile the Germans were to be compelled, in effect, to sign a blank check.

Reparations left indefinite

The American financial experts protested against this system. In the Supreme Economic Council, the body charged with the economic treaty clauses and with the administration of Europe through the treaty period, American experts fought the battle of common sense. Some of the British knew better than to destroy a good customer of past years; but Lloyd George's election pledges led him to turn to financial advisers who urged the crushing of Germany. The American experts were hampered by the consideration that in the back of the Allied mind lay the desire that the United States would cancel the billions that had been borrowed from her. To this, American financiers well knew their people would never consent.

The American position on reparations

So, at last, the peace treaty with Germany approached completion. It was a book of two hundred pages covering questions of

boundaries, reparations, plebiscites, economic measures, and what not. Similar treaties were preparing for peace with Austria, with Turkey, with Bulgaria. The map of Europe was completely changed—there were new states, with uncertain boundaries to be determined by the League of Nations, the plebiscite or the sword; there were free cities, corridors of access to the sea; the gratifying of nationalist ambitions had broken down former economic relations, and more and more elaborate provisions for control of trade routes, supplies of raw material, were necessary in the economic parts of the treaty. Europe beyond the Rhine and the Alps was a turmoil of starving, hating, fighting peoples. Late in May of 1919, the news bureau of the American peace commission could count fourteen small wars in progress. Farther to the east lay Bolshevism, a temptation to desperate peoples with nothing left to lose.

Progress of the treaty; European disorder

The treaty offered Germany was not calculated to promote good will. In point after point it admittedly or impliedly violated the Fourteen Points on the promise of which she had surrendered. The Rhineland was under military occupation to enforce the carrying out of the treaty and perhaps to give France a pretext to seize her coveted Rhine frontier; German territories were divided by the Danzig corridor to give Poland a seaport; German populations in the Saar and elsewhere were subjected to enemy rule and to present or future plebiscites. Lloyd George, as he saw the work of his hands established, developed a panic, lest the Germans refuse to sign and British labor turn on him for prolonging the war; too late he clamored for revision. Clemenceau had obtained too much for French security to assure a genuine peace, too little to satisfy the French militarists. Wilson consoled himself for every shortcoming in the hope that with the League of Nations in operation the situation would improve.

The treaty with Germany

And so on May 7, 1919, the German delegates were summoned to the Trianon Palace at Versailles to receive the treaty. As Clemenceau triumphantly reminded them that the second treaty of Versailles succeeded the first, and Von Brockdorff-Rantzau re-

plied with defiance, an American observer might well think his people had meddled in an international quarrel not their own.

The Germans are compelled to ratify

For a month the German delegates pointed out the iniquities of the treaty, securing no changes save on minor points, and then on June 28, 1919, it was finally signed. Europe might from that point begin to unravel the snarl of 1914; beyond the immediate disposition of the treaty, the question was to interest the United States but slightly.

Wilson had refused to transmit the treaty to the United States Senate when it was submitted to the Germans. It first made its appearance in this country from German sources. The Senate,

Wilson and the Senate

with a Republican majority, was about to consider a treaty framed by plenipotentiaries it had not approved, a treaty that as far as America's part in it was concerned was essentially the work of one man—Woodrow Wilson.

Wilson's mistakes now fell upon him with crushing force. The word "counsel" was always in his mouth; but in the statement of America's war aims, in the choice of the means to attain them, in determining what was essential and what nonessential, he had used his own judgment. On the surface, there were many unsatisfactory things in the treaty. Condoning the Japanese occupation of Shantung and of Yap, the cable center of the Pacific, was a more serious mistake to American statesmen than the oppression of Germany. To a people trained for a generation in the idea of natural isolation, the League of Nations was a fearsome thing to be sounded for possible pitfalls. Wilson hoped that the League would amend the treaty: but did not the Covenant oblige America to spend her blood and treasure on distant fields to maintain a rotten settlement, that as far as Japan was concerned was actually a menace? Wilson could not explain the secret diplomacy of the Peace Congress. He had preached common counsel and openness; his failure to live up to his own preaching was to ruin the cause he had at heart.

American criticisms of the treaty

Probably, there was still an excellent chance for the treaty

could Wilson have admitted frankly that it was full of shortcomings as anything arising from give-and-take among diverse interests must be; but in his conference with senators in August of 1919, he strove to defend the indefensible. In the Senate, three parties developed. There was a minority, mainly Democratic, willing to accept treaty and covenant without change. A majority group of Republicans, led by Senator Lodge, was willing to accept League and treaty with amendments and reservations; a little group, represented by Johnson and Borah, was absolutely hostile. There was, of course, difficulty in amending a treaty or ratifying with reservations. When the Foreign Relations Committee reported some forty-two amendments and reservations, the President advised against their acceptance. On November 19, the treaty with amendments mustered 39 votes against 55; the irreconcilable Republicans voted in the negative along with the Democrats. Without reservations, the treaty was defeated 38–53. Ratifications were exchanged, without the United States, in January of 1920. The League was set in operation without American representatives. A second attempt at ratification failed in the winter of 1920. Wilson refused to sign resolutions declaring the war at an end and not until the fall of 1921, under his successor, were brief treaties concluded with Austria and Germany reserving all rights to the United States.

The Senate rejects the treaty

The defeat of Wilson's settlement was pointed by a personal tragedy. On the third of September, he had set out on a speaking tour to gain popular support for the treaty; on the 26th of September he was smitten with something like paralysis. His mind remained unclouded but bitter: act after act during the rest of his term passed over his veto. He quarreled with one old friend after another. A few years more he lingered; on Armistice Day of 1923 he hurled the taunt of cowardice at the nation that at his bidding had sent 2,000,000 of its sons into the inferno of modern warfare to fight for his ideas; then a few months later he passed into the shadows. Had he succeeded in his aims, history would have written him down the greatest benefactor of

The exit of Wilson

the human race since her record began. Failing as he did, his memory must wait for its proper appraisement until the full story of international coöperation is told.

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

R. S. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement.* 3 vols. Garden City, N. Y., 1922.
R. Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations, A Personal Narrative.* Boston, 1921.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE AGE OF HARDING AND COOLIDGE

The careful student of American politics might have predicted the installation of the Republicans in 1920 with a lease of power which not even inefficiency or corruption could terminate. The great Democratic war president had necessarily been a stern taskmaster, laying ever new burdens on his people in the pursuit of ideals which they neither understood nor had whole-heartedly accepted. At every opportunity of expressing themselves on Wilson's international program, the voice of the people has been overwhelmingly against it. Indeed, in an instinctive reaction from the brilliant idealist, they have chosen as presidents cautious men of average intellect who kept their feet firmly on the ground.

The Republicans in power

For the Democratic nomination in 1920, Governor Cox of Ohio was the victor in a field including McAdoo, the President's son-in-law and the especial exponent of his ideas. As was natural, in a party eight years out of office, a crowd of men competed for the Republican nomination. General Leonard Wood and Frank O. Lowden, war governor of Illinois, had the largest followings in the convention; but allegations that money had been improperly used in their campaigns enabled the little group of leaders to pass over both and to fix the choice of the convention on Senator Warren G. Harding of Ohio. Harding had been an obedient follower of the Republican leaders in the Senate, had been for the war but not too much for it; with the exception of some violent language against Roosevelt in 1912 there was nothing in his record that would offend any one. He was a genial, lovable man, caring little for books, his English exuberant with words and phrases like "normalcy," "the autocracy of service." For victory over Cox all that was necessary for Harding to do was to refrain from blunders; he discreetly pronounced in favor of "an

The election of Harding

association of nations"; he was elected by sixteen million votes to nine million for Cox, and a million and a half more for the minor parties.

Postwar problems

On this administration fell necessarily the most important problems of domestic reconstruction. Something of course had already been done. No sooner was the armistice signed than the government had begun demobilizing its mighty machine, returning industry, commerce, and transportation as speedily as possible to the hands of private persons. Especially noteworthy was the decision regarding the railroads, embodied in the Esch-Cummins Law. The railroads were returned to their former owners, March 1, 1920, a return of 5½ per cent plus ½ per cent for improvements being guaranteed for two years, with a revolving fund for refinancing them and a Labor Board to pass on questions that might result in strikes. An interesting counter-proposal was made by Glenn E. Plumb, a labor leader, to turn the conduct of the railroads over to a board representing the public, the owners, and railway labor.

Industrial reaction

The inevitable reaction from war conditions of flush times, large profits and high wages and prices, came in 1921. In the industries served by unions in the Federation of Labor attempts to lower wages failed; but the prices of farm products, with embattled Europe no longer a customer, fell sharply: the value of farm land fell with them and an agricultural depression ensued that is still with us. Retail prices fell in 1921 but not to the prewar level, even in foodstuffs. A year or two of hard times resulted.

Tariff and immigration laws

The Republican party naturally applied its panacea of a high protective tariff. Temporary protection was accorded in acts of a special session of Congress. The Fordney-McCumber Act, effective September 21, 1922, imposed higher duties than ever before and allowed manipulation of rates to equalize costs of production abroad with those at home. The income tax was successively reduced from 1921 to 1926 with especial attention to relief of large taxpayers. To afford protection to American labor at home, new immigration laws were passed in


125°
120°
115°
110°
105°
100°
45°
40°
35°
30°
25°
115°
110°
105°
100°



RAILROADS in 1920.

1921 and 1924, fixing a yearly quota for every country at a given per cent of its population in the United States at a given period—by the latter act, 2 per cent of the population of 1890; this was designed to encourage the older and supposedly more desirable north European migration.

Harding's administration was soon touched by serious scandal. The Republicans in 1920 had made much of his moderate mental endowments, promising the voters that unlike the imperious Wilson, Harding would surround himself with "the best minds" and from their advice map out the ideal course of action. Of his cabinet, Hughes as secretary of state and Hoover as secretary of commerce were manifestly qualified. Andrew Mellon, one of the richest men of the United States, made an able secretary of the treasury even if benevolent to large wealth; but others of Harding's appointments were unfortunate and worse. C. R. Forbes, appointed head of the Veterans' Bureau, charged with the rehabilitation of disabled soldiers and the administration of war risk insurance, was caught in colossal fraud on the government. Fall, the secretary of the interior, secured the transfer to his jurisdiction from the Navy Department of tracts of oil-bearing public land reserved to supply the navy with fuel, and leased them to great oil interests from which he accepted loans under peculiar conditions. Under Daugherty of Ohio, the attorney-general's office was suspected of corruption in connection with the quashing of indictments and the return of confiscated alien property. Finally Daugherty left office rather than throw the records of his administration open to investigation. Senators Walsh and Wheeler pressed the investigation. In the midst of it, Harding died after a brief illness, August 2, 1923.

Scandal and corruption

His successor was the vice president, Calvin Coolidge of Massachusetts. Coolidge was a typical product of New England country life, silent, shrewd, noncommittal. He had displayed no great gifts in his rise in the political life of Massachusetts; and he had made himself unpopular in Washington political circles as vice president. However, no sooner had he caught the public attention as president than his popularity was assured.

Calvin Coolidge

His background of farm life, his silence, his practicality, endeared him to the average man. His leadership was cautious, not marked by intellectual brilliance. The fact that he came into the presidency untouched by the scandals of Harding's cabinet, enabled the Republicans to discount them in the campaign that followed.

In 1924 Coolidge was easily nominated for president with Charles G. Dawes of Illinois as vice president. For the Democratic nomination, the main contestants were McAdoo, representing the relics of the Wilsonian idealism supported by the forces of militant protestantism and prohibition, and Alfred Smith, the Catholic governor of New York. For one hundred and three ballots a contest went on that was essentially religious, until, finally, the convention nominated a compromise ticket of John W. Davis of West Virginia and Charles Bryan, brother of William Jennings Bryan. Davis was a brilliant man with a fine record as diplomat and corporation lawyer, but the animosities stirred up in the convention insured his defeat. LaFollette and Wheeler headed a radical group of dissent based mainly on farmer-labor dissatisfaction. Coolidge polled 15,725,000 votes; Davis 8,386,000; LaFollette 4,822,000.

Coolidge elected, 1924

One or two of the larger issues of American politics in the post-war period may here be discussed. National prohibition became the law of the land. Prohibition, designed as a war measure, had gone into effect July 1, 1919. Before the war was officially at an end, the national prohibition amendment went into effect January 16, 1920. For federal enforcement of prohibition, the Volstead Act of October 28, 1919, was passed over Wilson's veto; in many States it has been supplemented by state legislation.

Prohibition

So far, the effects of prohibition have been questionable. Millions of the voters of the United States are habitually violating a law of the government; the desire for much alcoholic stimulus in small bulk has turned men, who formerly preferred beer or wine, to gin and whisky drinking. The high prices paid for spirits smuggled into the country or secretly made, have made the bootlegger's profession profitable to a high degree

Results of prohibition

and has introduced the "hi-jacker" or gunman who, with ready pistol, levies forcible tribute on the bootlegger. Bootlegger and hi-jacker can afford to bribe prohibition agents in sums many times as large as their lawful salaries; war between "beer runners" distinguishes great cities like Chicago; an additional source of corruption has entered politics. The attempt to change the daily habits of millions of citizens by law is bound to be a difficult one. Ultimately, it may succeed.

The enforcement of prohibition is only one instance of the steady extension of the authority of government over industry, society, and the individual, in State and nation alike. In part, this is made necessary by the ever-increasing complexity of life; but laws and enforcement bureaus, state and federal, are undoubtedly increasing faster than that complexity, and fast adding to it. And the tendency, also, is for the legislature to abrogate its functions in favor of the administrative bureau, and to pass general permissive statutes which allow administrators to do much as they please, in issuing elaborate regulations which, in effect, are laws. The older notion of the division of the powers of government is breaking down; the judiciary legislates by interpreting laws, and the executive by issuing regulations for their enforcement. In Washington, especially, an almost irresponsible bureaucracy is rapidly growing up.

Bureaucratic government

Government is being complicated, also, by the increasing complexity of society. Organization is becoming very complex: men and women may belong to dozens of different societies and groups, based on their racial, religious, social, and economic affiliations; and organized European-American nationalities, churches, secret orders like the Ku Klux Klan, agricultural groups like the Farm Bureau, can and do bring influence to bear on state or federal government. The agricultural interests have gone farthest, organizing in the national Congress the so-called farm-bloc of senators and representatives especially sensitive to farmers' votes.

Special group interests

These organizations not only try to influence the political governments established by law among us; but in effect many

of them actually are governments, obeyed by their members, and subtracting a portion of allegiance from state and federal authority. Churches, secret orders, commercial associations, in one way or another, bring social or economic pressure to bear on their members to conform to their regulations, and thereby they become essentially governments sharing authority with Congress or state legislature. Indeed, while the American people has evolved no new set of political principles, its practice is departing very far from the old ones. The manner in which our practice has destroyed the doctrine of the separation of the powers of government, written deeply into federal and state constitutions, has already been mentioned. The initiative and referendum mark an abandonment of representative government which in effect means that the people must themselves pass legislation if they cannot elect representatives who will do it. During the war disregard of the liberties ascribed to individual citizens by the individualist theories of the American Revolution was perhaps inevitable though drastic. But decisions of the courts have steadily encroached on the rights of free speech and personal liberty enshrined in our constitutional guarantees. It has been held that "due process of law" in deporting a man who claims to be a citizen may be the decision of an executive commission. Peculiar results have come from our laws regulating political parties and their primaries. In certain States, they have made it possible for groups of voters to call themselves Republicans, vote in the Republican primaries, and elect men to Congress and the Senate as Republicans who steadily refuse to support the party measures or the chosen party leaders. The primary is thus rapidly disintegrating party machines in deference to local interests and is tending to make party government of the traditional sort no longer possible. In short, with political instruments and principles being rapidly discarded or disused, no attempt is discernible to replace them with other principles or institutions conceived on broad lines. Blind and unconscious evolution is remaking our government structure. How, we cannot predict.

Our changing political institutions

In a sense, the only exception to the above statement must be the League of Nations and its advocates. The work of a theorist, the Covenant of the League presents certain clean-cut political principles. Wilson is said to have caught the idea of the League from the Articles of Confederation with their mutual guarantee by the States and the creation of a central representative council for them. That he chose the word "covenant" to use in this connection is a significant survival of the Puritan idea embedded in our constitutional history. Possibly, one may look for the history of the Confederation to repeat itself in world affairs. If Council and advisory bodies prove too weak to maintain the peace of Europe, the World Articles of Confederation may give place to a World Constitution. Men may revive the doctrine of 1787 that sovereignty is divisible; and states may create a central world government, delegating to it sufficient of the sovereign powers to enable it to move with its own might to suppress disorder. Perhaps a further stretch of time may see the equivalent of our Civil War reducing former sovereign nations to local administrative units.

The League of Nations as a political concept

Whether the distrust of the people of the United States in the League of Nations be theoretical or instinctive, it exists most emphatically. The overwhelming election of both Harding and Coolidge has pointed the fact that a candidate suggesting any greater measure of coöperation in world affairs, is carrying a fatal handicap. Officially we have stood aloof while France has made attempt after attempt to enforce the full treaty on Germany and in the Locarno agreement has consented to see the German Republic, purged of its imputed sins, become a member of the League of Nations and even a possible ally. In Europe generally, economic and political order are taking the place of chaos. American unofficial observers have helped by their presence on the boards and committees of the League: the plan of German reparation that paved the way for the Locarno agreement bears the name of Charles G. Dawes, now vice president of the United States. In January, 1926, the

American participation in world affairs

United States Senate with reservations voted to accept the jurisdiction in arbitrations of the World Court of International Justice; but the reservations were not accepted at Geneva. In the defeat of several senators who voted for it, politicians see a ground swell of public disfavor for the step. While American participation in world affairs seems more and more essential, the perverse diplomacy of the Peace Conference is still bearing fruit in the distrust of the American people for anything of the sort.

The Washington Conference, 1921

The one achievement since 1919 has been the Washington Conference of 1921. Suggested by Senator Borah, it took form as a conference of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Holland, and Portugal on naval armament. An agreement was drawn up limiting capital ships for the three naval powers, Great Britain, United States, and Japan, to the ratio 5, 5, 3. The United States scrapped a considerable part of the naval program of 1916, destined to give her the strongest navy in the world: but by refraining from building in rivalry to Great Britain, she forestalled the possible consequences of her enmity. An agreement of Great Britain, the United States, France, and Japan to discuss amicably all differences in the Pacific replaced the English-Japanese alliance which America had come to regard as a standing menace. The Shantung question and that of Yap also were settled. The Conference averted a possible war with Japan. A flurry over the immigration bill of 1924, and its abrogation of the "Gentleman's Agreement" with Japan led to nothing. Without England's backing, with the United States her best customer, Japan doubtless considered the possible gains from a war with us inconsiderable beside the probable and certain losses involved.

Mexico; debt settlements

Otherwise, except in the matter of Mexico, where in 1923 we recognized the government under Obregon that had overthrown Carranza in 1920, we have drifted. The United States has concluded debt settlements with most of its creditors, save France, calling for ultimate payment of much less than the present value of their debts.

Present economic conditions in the United States may next be

briefly touched on. Despite the short period of postwar deflation of 1921, the United States is by far the wealthiest nation on the globe. In billions her wealth is roughly estimated at 500; that of the whole British empire is 230, that of France 100, Russia 60, Italy 20. In 1920, the United States produced 25 per cent of the world's wheat, 52 per cent of its coal, 60 per cent of its cotton, 66 per cent of its oil. Our exports in 1920 were $8,228,000,000—almost seven times what they were in 1898.

American wealth

Generally speaking, organized labor weathered the crisis of 1921 with little deflation; skilled labor commands relatively a much higher proportion of material rewards than 10, 15, or 20 years ago. In the last few years, by means of savage strikes, former sweated industries, such as the garment-workers, have achieved organization and better wages. Laws multiply for the guarding of industry, for the prohibition of undue hours of labor for women, and for prohibition of child labor.

Improved position of labor

Federal acts which have sought to bar or tax products of child labor in interstate commerce have been declared unconstitutional. State acts guarantee the worker compensation from his employer for industrial accidents. Employers, themselves, are discovering that it pays to give their workmen decent working conditions, sanitary shops, rest rooms, and lunch rooms. Industry after industry encourages the worker to become a stockholder. Many industries admit their workers to a voice in determining their working conditions and even in the management of the industry. The best social sentiment of the time as reflected in movements of the churches, looks toward making these conditions universal.

Liberal industrial labor policies

But in many industries such as textile, canning, lumbering, conditions are still bad. Unorganized labor is given low wages and unfair treatment. The great body of migrating workers—possibly as many as ten millions—drifting for seasonal employment from harvest field to canning factory and to lumber camp, is cut off from the hope of home life and may afford a field more fruitful to agitators of syndicalism or communism than hitherto.

Migratory workers

Another serious element in American life is a negro population numbering millions. Of late years negroes have been migrating from southern fields to northern cities, forming great "black belts" and making it possible for employers to postpone the organization of strong trade unions by stirring up antipathy between white and black. Race feeling is as strong as ever, and the black is becoming more self-assertive. He seems, however, unable to develop leaders. As exceptional people of color acquire means, they look down with contempt on their race and either exploit it politically and economically or seek to push themselves into association with the whites. In the future, the black and the migrating worker may be forces to be organized for an attempted overthrow of our present economic and political order. In the year 1919 a radical socialist group split out of the doctrinaire Socialist party. So far, in numbers, it is quite insignificant.

The negroes

The future of migrating labor is knit up with the interest in the country most dissatisfied at present, that of agriculture. The postwar years saw the partial deflation of farm value. The ending of the war demand and guaranteed prices for grain, caused a heavy slump in prices; and many farmers in flush years had bought additional acres at prices as high as $400 or $500, based on what they would return with wheat at $2.60. The farmer in general is exporting more than he did before the war; food prices to the city customer are high, but his returns are often so low as not to pay for his labor. His past reaction in some places has been to blame the middlemen and financiers with whom he deals. In 1915–1916 an organization called the Non-Partisan League was developed by skillful agitators among the farmers of North Dakota, demanding state service to them in handling and grading their grain and financing their crops. In 1918, the group gained complete control of the state government, put their projects into effect and saw them collapse in financial extravagance. The League, meanwhile, had extended its operations to surrounding States. In Minnesota, especially, it sought alliance with malcontent labor groups.

Agricultural dissatisfaction

The Non-Partisan League


125°
120°
115°
110°
105°
100°
45°
40°
35°
30°
25°
POPULATION
by COUNTIES: 1920
Under 2 inhabitants per square mile
2 to 6 " " " "
6 to 18 " " " "
18 to 45 " " " "
45 to 90 " " " "
Over 90 " " " "
115°
110°
105°
100°


90°
85°
80°
75°
70°
40°
35°
30°
25°
90°
85°
80°

The Non-Partisan League was a passing symptom of a deeper discontent which has been skillfully utilized by radical leaders in the farther northwest. It was an important basis of the LaFollette vote for president in 1924 and has sent a series of radical senators to Washington—Shipstead and Magnus Johnson of Minnesota, Brookhart of Iowa. This sentiment of unrest has had lighter expression in farm bureaus that have spread an organization based on the counties across the union. This organization maintains a lobby in Washington and is the reason for being of the farm bloc; locally, it engages in various operations of coöperative marketing and purchasing, designed to save for the farmer the middlemen's profits.

Recent farmers' movements

The trans-Mississippi farmer, however, is demanding still more; with farm mortgages foreclosing and rural banks failing because they are overloaded with farm loans, he is demanding direct help of the federal government in guaranteeing minimum prices for his crops. His representatives in Congress are demanding legislation that will insure him high prices at home by subsidizing the export of his surplus to Europe to be sold below cost. His votes rolled up the LaFollette minority vote of 1924, and supported the congressmen and senators who are again and again read out of the Republican party for bolting its ticket and measures only to appear in Washington with new mandates from their constituents. It is of vital importance to the future welfare of the country that farming be put on a paying basis; but the solution seems to be simplification of industry and cutting out the great number of middlemen.

Demands of the farmers

Socially, the present period is witnessing the essential unification of great masses of the American people on the basis of common amusements and habits of thought. Millions upon millions of American families own automobiles and use them for recreation; and essential unities of interest and thought develop thereby between the owner of the $10,000 Rolls and the $25 second-hand Ford. The motion picture is an amusement sought by the vast majority of Americans; the same films are seen by the educated and the ignorant, the rich and

Social unification of the American people

the poor. The radio has reached the homes of those of moderate means; and by turning a dial, the man in a lonely farm home or ranch can hear the music in a metropolitan opera house or a fashionable restaurant, listen to the cheering at a championship ball game a thousand miles away and hear of each play as it is made, or listen to a political speech. The hard road, the car, the radio, the movie—these things are linking men in America closer together in tastes and interests.

Education

The same thing is true even of higher education; the tens of thousands of students now in our universities are bringing lower and lower intellectual levels of the population in contact, at least, with some of the better intellectual things. Lower education, it is true, in the form of vocational training is tending to become specialized. But the education of the masses is proceeding very fast outside the schools. There is, of course, some danger in this. When education tends to become universal it must encounter the prejudices of the ignorant who refuse to have taught to them things that are counter to their beliefs. The statutes found in several States prohibiting the teaching of evolution are an instance of this.

Democracy of artistic tastes

The United States has, indeed, approached closer to political and economic democracy than any other people in the world's history. Never before have the masses of a nation enjoyed so much money for gratification of their desires as to enable them to impose their moral and æsthetic standards on the fine arts. The culture of the nation is no longer dictated by the tastes of the select few. Great pecuniary rewards await the novelist, the newspaper writer, the movie actor, the professional athlete, the statesman who can hit the public's taste; mediocre ability and an average intellectual standard are a distinct advantage to them. Indeed by the older canons of taste, their performances are mediocre also. Yet newspaper, radio, and monster athletic stadium all serve to push their appeal home. Sometimes, unconsciously, it shadows earlier intellectual states of our history. The fundamentalist, the prohibitionist, are dim shadows of the Puritan in our history. The radical agitator is often reminis-

cent of the men who inspired the American Revolution. To understand these recurring moods as filtered and evolved through the passage of time is one of the chief benefits which the study of history can confer.

The American democracy and the future

In our democracy, there is something very much more valid and sure than this. The people may be deceived, may very easily be made to forget. But slowly, surely, often independently, often defiant of its would-be leaders, it reaches decisions on matters of policy, of morals, of artistic taste. It has decided against a League of Nations, against indecency in life, against certain political charlatans. On these matters, propaganda breaks on it like a wave on rock. Its habits of living, of sport, of the outdoors, its taste, all gradually improve. Democracy, for the present, has lowered the older standards; but our hope for the future must be that the ground swell of a whole people automatically lifting its standards may yet in the end produce something infinitely finer, more solid, more lasting than the culture of the past.

SUGGESTED REFERENCES

H. E. Gaston, *The Nonpartisan League.* New York, 1920.
F. E. Haynes, *Social Politics in the United States.* Boston, 1924.
F. L. Paxson, *The Last American Frontier.* New York, 1910.
——, *The New Nation.* Boston, 1915.
——, *Recent History of the United States.* Boston, 1921.
L. D. Shippee, *Recent American History.* New York, 1924.
P. L. Haworth, *The United States in Our Own Times, 1865–1920.* New York, 1920.
H. U. Faulkner, *American Economic History.* New York, 1924.

INDEX

Abbott, Jacob, 492
Abercrombie, James, 142
Abolition, development of, 345; petitions in Congress, 346, 347; in New England, 391
Abolitionists, oppose annexation of Texas, 363; in Republican party, 397
Academies, founding of in South, 284
Acadia, Massachusetts interferes in, 65; ceded by French, 139; French deported from, 141
Acomenticus, 64
Acts of Trade, 91, 92, 93, 105, 203; in Pennsylvania, 85; in Virginia, 94; in Massachusetts, 98, 99, 100, 101; attempts to enforce, 107, 121, 150; modified, 152
Adams, Charles Francis, 446, 449, 481
Adams, Henry, 578
Adams, John, 162, 170, 176, 265; and Treaty of Paris, 195; on state constitutions, 200; and Massachusetts Constitution, 204–205; vice president, 219; reëlected vice president, 227; elected President, 234; makes peace with France, 236; and election of 1800, 239; opposes disunion, 244
Adams, John Quincy, 275, 294, 303, 307, 308, 313; minister to Russia, 265, 266; and Treaty of Ghent, 279; supports Jackson's Florida raid, 301; vote for in 1824, 309; mistakes of, 310, 311; defeated 1828, 312; and right of petition, 346, 347
Adams, Samuel, 155, 170, 176; doctrines of, 160; opposition to Federal Constitution, 217
Adams, William, and Treaty of Ghent, 279
Adamson Law, 626
Addison, Judge Alexander, impeached, 243
Adelantados, system of, 126
Admiralty Court, established, 150
Admiralty Courts, British, rulings as to West India trade, 252, 253
Adventure, The, 129
Aëroplanes, 644
Africa, 5, 6, 123, 145
Agassiz, Louis, 547
Agriculture, surplus population from in England, 14; revolutionized by the reaper, 384; development in the West, 393; developments in, 517, 518, 519; depression in, 694, 695; prosperity in, 572
Agriculture, Department of, created, 594
Aircraft Production, Bureau of, 636
Aisne-Marne offensive, 658, 659
Aisne lines, 655, 656, 662
Alabama, 137, 299, 342, 352, 477; a state 1819, 293; Georgia cedes claim to, 311; secession of, 416; reconstruction in, 477
Alabama, The, escape from British authorities, 447, 448; settlement of claims, 480
Alabama River, 127
Alamo, The, 361
Alaska, 578; purchase of, 479
Albany, 104, 112, 131, 138, 183, 184, 285, 386; formerly Fort Orange, 80; charter of, 81
Albany Congress, 140
Albany Regency, The, 307
Albemarle, Va., 194
Alcott, Bronson, 391
Alcott, Louisa M., 389
Aldrich, Nelson, 590
Alexander I, Czar of Russia, 255
Alien Act, 236, 237
Aliens, treatment in World War, 638
Allatoona, Johnston at, 463
Alleghany Valley, settled by Scotch-Irish, 112
Allied debts, desired cancellation of, 680; settlement of, 692
Allston, Washington painter, 282
Alsace, feigned offensive in, 661
Alsace-Lorraine, 607, 611, 672; Fourteen Points on, 667
Alta California, *see* California
Altgeld, Governor John P., 540, 545
Alton, Ill., Lovejoy killed in, 345
Amalgamated Copper Company, 577
Ambrister, Robert, executed, 301
Amelia Island, 301

America, named, 7
America, Central, occupied by Spain, 8
American Expeditionary Force, 646, 650, 651, 652, 653, 657, 664
American Federation of Labor, 540, 541, 638, 686
American Legion, 664
American party, *see* Know Nothings
American Revolution, origins of theories of, 76; American argument, 145, 151, 152, 155–163; British argument, 157; course of, 171–197; constructive problems of, 198; ideals of, accomplished, 213, 226; theories of, abandoned, 690
American Sector, France, how determined, 650
American System, The, of Henry Clay, 298, 306
Amherst, Lord, refuses to serve against Americans, 180
Amidas, Captain Philip, 18
Amiens, France, 654
Amusements, 587, 588
Anarchism, tenets of, 539
Anarchists, at Chicago, 540
Anderson, Robert, at Fort Sumter, 419, 420, 423, 424
André, Major John, execution of, 192
Andros, Sir Edmund, 82, 83, 85, 102, 103
Angell, James R., 547
Anglican Church, 117; establishment of, 12, 13; Gilbert's colony to conform to, 17; attacked by Puritans, 37; restored 1660, 71; character of clergymen, 118, 119; attempted persecution in Virginia, 166; disestablished in Virginia, 201; disestablished in North Carolina, 203
Anglicanism, 118, 119, 284
Anglicans, in Revolution of 1688, 73; loyalists among, 171; oppose convention in Pennsylvania, 202
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, end of, 692
Anguilla, 93
Anjou, France, 158
Annapolis, Md., 110
Annapolis Convention, 211
Anne, Queen, 73
Antietam, battle of, 440
Antigua, 93
Anti-Japanese legislation, 567, 568
Anti-Masonic party, 330
Anti-Nebraska Democrats, and the Republican party, 397, 398
Antinomianism, 49, 50, 54, 83
Anti-Saloon League, 588
Anti-Slavery Society, 345
Anti-trust legislation, 603
Apalachee River, 128
"Appeal of the Independent Democrats," 396
Appeals, from colonial courts, 109
Appomattox, 466
Apprenticeship, in colonial America, 116, 117
Aquidneck, 56
Arabic, sinking of, 624
Aragon, 4, 5
Arapahoe, The, troubles with, 497
Arbitration, application of, with Great Britain, 480; international, urged by United States, 560
Arbitration Treaties, negotiated by United States, 568
Arbuthnot, Alexander, execution of, 301
Archer, Gabriel, in Virginia Colony, 21
Architecture, development of, 282
Ardennes, France, 615
Argall, Captain Samuel, attacks French settlements, 34
Argentina, 558
Argonne, France, 615, 663; Argonne Forest, 660, 661
Argyll, Duchess of, 447
Arkansas, 95, 137, 138, 352, 471, 482; a State 1837, 392; secession of, 427; reconstructed government of, 471; abolition of slavery in, 472
Arlington, Earl of, 96
Armada, Spanish, defeat of, 16
Armed neutrality, formed against England 1780, 192; and United States, 232
Arminian doctrines, 38
Armistice, asked by Germany, 662; aftermath of, 663; terms of, 671
Armstrong, General John, urges seizure of Texas, 249; Secretary of War, 272; and Bladensburg, 277
Army, United States, condition in 1812, 269; volunteers in war of 1812, 270; Army of the Potomac, 436–438; Army of Virginia, 439; in Civil War, 452, 455, 456, 519; Indian policy of, 497; reorganized, 564; in World War, 639, 640; selective service, 641; revised organization of, 642; recruiting of, 643; difficulties in equipping, 644; condition in 1917, 630; division numbers of, 642
Army of Occupation, 664

Arnold, Benedict, expedition to Quebec, 180, 181; raises siege of Fort Stanwix, 184; treason of, 192
"Artemus Ward," American satirist, 389, 390
Arthur, C. A., jests about bribery, 489; removal from New York Custom House, 525; nominated for vice president 1880, 527; succeeds to presidency, 528; administration of, 529
Articles of Confederation, *see* Confederation
Ashburton, Lord, instructions on Oregon, 358
Ashburton Treaty, and Oregon, 358
Ashley River, 88, 89
Assembly, evolution of, in Maryland, 33; in Carolina, 89; of Pennsylvania, 85, 202; in colonies, 108, 124
Assembly of divines, 61
Association, adopted by First Continental Congress, 170; enforcement of, 171, 172
Assumption of state debts, 221; how secured, 222; burdens South with taxes, 224
Astor, John J., fur trader, 267, 302, 358, 493
Astoria, 267
Astrolabe, invention of, 5
Atcheson, Senator D. R., on repeal of Missouri Compromise, 396, 398
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fé Railroad, 510, 512
Atheism, decline of, in 'fifties, 390
Atlanta Campaign, 462, 463, 465
Atlantic and Pacific Railroad, 498
Atlantic Monthly, The, 390, 550
Attorney-General, office created by Act of 1789, 220
Audubon, J. J., 547
Augustine, St., announces City of God, 2
Austin, John, theory of sovereignty, 318
Austin, Moses, and Texas Colony, 360
Austin, Stephen F., 360, 361
Australian Ballot, adoption of, 546
Austria, 133, 142; and Holy Alliance, 303; Webster's policy toward, 381; emigration from, 521
Austria-Hungary, in World War, 612, 614, 617, 653; Fourteen Points on, 667; peace treaty with, 681, 683
Austrian Succession, War of the, *see* King George's War
Automobile, development of, 584
Azores, The, 93, 150
Bacon, Nathaniel, 96–97
Bacon, Roger, medieval scientist, 5
Bacon's Rebellion, 94–97
Baja California, *see* California
Balance of trade, 91, 92
Balfour, Arthur, 673
Ballinger, R. A., 597
Baltimore, Md., 110, 122, 289, 385, 413, 414, 439, 459; British attack, 277; growth of, 285; 6th Massachusetts mobbed in, 427; strike of 1877 in, 540
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 289, 385, 386, 509, 510, 512, 575
Baltimore, Charles, Lord, boundary controversy with Penn, 84; deprived of Maryland, 103–104; recovers Maryland, 108; *see also* Sir George Calvert, Cecilius Calvert
Bancroft, George, 389, 548
Bank of the United States, First, 222, 223, 241, 296
Bank of the United States, Second, 295, 296, 372; Marshall on constitutionality of, 315; and Jackson, 328–332; end of, 332
Banking, principles of international, 507, 508
Banks, constitutional question touching, 225; attitude of Northwest and Southwest to, 293; in United States, 295; dealings of Treasury with, under Crawford, 308; controlled by Second Bank, 328; increased recklessness of, 350; failure of, in Panic of 1837, 351; newer state constitutions on, 335; Civil War effect on, 454; note issue taxed, 455
Banks, Nathaniel P., 401, 437, 439, 467; turns Republican, 399; Republican leader, 402; at Port Hudson, 461
Baptists, churches, 117, 119, 284; in Connecticut, 287; changing attitude on slavery, 343; in the 'fifties, 398
Barbadoes, 26, 86, 87, 93
Barbary states, navy used against, 242
Barbuda, 93
Barlow, Captain Arthur, 18
Barlow, Joel, 282
Barn burners, The, 373
Barnum, P. T., 551
Baronies, in Carolina, 88
Barré, Colonel Isaac, opposes Stamp Act, 149

Barron, Commodore James, 254, 261
Barrow, Henry, executed for Separatism, 39
Baseball, professional, 549
Bastrop Grant, 250
Bates, Edward, candidate for 1860 nomination, 413; in Lincoln's cabinet, 422
"Battle of the Rams," 449
Bayard, J. A., 275, 279
Bayonne Decree, 262
"Bear Flag State," in California, 368
Beauregard, P. G. T., fires on Fort Sumter, 424; commands at Bull Run, 431; at Shiloh, 434, 435; relations with Davis, 458
Beauséjour, Fort, 141
Beckwith, Major George, 230
Bedford, Duke of, 149; faction of, 147, 164, 198
Belfort, France, 615, 661
Belgian Relief Commission, 617, 628
Belgium, 125, 692; invaded by Germany, 613, 616, 618; Fourteen Points on, 667
Bell, John, presidential candidate 1860, 414
Belleau Wood, 656
Bellomont, Earl of, governor of New York, 129
Bemis Heights, battle of, 184
Benjamin, Judah P., 457, 458
Bennington, battle of, 184
Benton, Thomas H., 369, 396; public land policy of, 295, 325–326; on Foot's Resolution, 317; on expunging, 332, 333; on Oregon, 358
Bent's Fort, 394
Berceau, capture of, 236
Bering Sea, 554
Berkeley, Admiral G. C., 259, 261
Berkeley, Lord John of Stratton, 82, 89; sale of Jersey, 83; proprietor of Carolina, 87
Berkeley, Sir William, governor of Virginia, 25; engages in fur trade, 95; and Bacon's Rebellion, 96–97
Berlin Decree, 254, 255, 264, 268
Berlin to Bagdad Railroad, 610
Bermudas, 93
Bernstorff, Count Johann Heinrich von, 623, 624
Berrien, J. M., 313, 314
Bessemer, Henry, 491
Bethlehem Steel Works, 634
Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor von, 613
Beveridge, A. J., 590
Béxar, 359
Bicycle, popularity of, 550
Biddle, Nicholas, and Second Bank of United States, 328, 329, 330–332
Big Black River, battle of, 461
Big Four Railroad, The, 508
Bigot, François, intendant of New France, 141
Bill of Rights, 217; absence of, in Federal Constitution, 217; demanded by Anti-Federalists, 218; of Virginia constitution, 202
Biloxi, Miss., 136, 137
Bimetallism, argument for, 502, 503
Birney, James G., 332
Bishop, colonial, proposed, 118, 119; in New France, 135
Black, Jeremiah S., 418, 420
Black Belts, The, 393
Black Crook, The, 551
Black Hawk War, The, 325
Black Rock, 272
Black Warrior, case of the, 383
Blackbeard, *see* Teach
Bladensburg, battle of, 277, 310
Blaine, James G., 381, 524, 527, 528, 546; nominated 1884, 529; defeated, 530; Pan Americanism of, 560
Blair, F. P., Jr., 428, 477
Blair, F. P., Sr., editor of the *Globe*, 314, 322, 330, 402
Blair, Montgomery, 422, 423, 465
Blanc Mont, France, 661, 662
Bland, R. P., 526, 536
Bland-Allison Act, 526, 532
Blennerhassett, Harman, 250
Blennerhassett's Island, 250, 251
Bliss, Tasker H., 669
Block Island Indians, 63
Blockade, in war of 1812, 253, 274; Lincoln's proclamation of, 430; in World War, 619
Blocs, formation and nature of, 689, 690
Blois, France, 650
"Bloomsbury Gang," 147, 172
"Bloudy Tenent of Persecution," 58
"Blue Sky Laws," effect of, 577
Board of Customs, created, 153
Bois de Bantheville, France, 662
Boise, Fort, 394
Bolingbroke, Viscount, Deist, 119
Bolivar, General Simon, 302, 557, 558
Bolivia, 560
Bolsheviks, 670, 671, 681; withdraw Russia from War, 653; publish secret treaties, 666
Bonhomme Richard, captures *Serapis*, 192

Bonus Bill, of Calhoun, 297
Booth, John Wilkes, 467
Borah, Senator W. E., opposes League of Nations, 669; opposes Treaty of Versailles, 683
Bordeaux, France, 650
Border ruffianism, 400
Border states, population in the 'fifties, 393; and coercion 1861, 416; their decision 1861, 427; policy of conciliating, 428; alienated by emancipation, 442; Union congressmen from, 452
Boston, 54, 60, 64, 102, 110, 111, 120, 123, 153, 154, 155, 157, 167, 283, 287, 288, 391; trade of, 98; colonial, 109; appeals to Continent, 169; siege of, 173; topography of, 174; British evacuate, 176; new trade to Pacific, 230; population 1820, 285; trade, 286; anti-abolitionist riots, 345; trade with California, 360; railway building from, 386; foreign elements in, 521; symphony orchestra, 552
Boston Massacre, 155
Boston Tea Party, 168, 169
Boston, The, 236
Boundaries in 1763, 196; British demand rectification, 279; adjusted 1818 and 1819, 301, 302; United States-Mexico, 371; Northwest, settled by German Emperor, 480
Bounties, for Civil War enlistments, 455, 456
"Bounty-jumpers," 456
Bouquet, Colonel Henry, 148
Bowdoin, Governor James, suppresses Shays's Rebellion, 210
Bowling Green, Ky., 433
Boxer Insurrection, 566
Boyle, Captain Thomas, 278
Brackenridge, H. H., 282
Braddock, General Edward, defeat of, 141
Bradford, William, 24, 63; governor of Plymouth, 41; buys out investors, 42
Bragg, General Braxton, 443, 458, 461, 462, 463
Branch, John P., Secretary of the Navy, 313, 314
Branding, abolished as punishment, 355
Brandywine, battle of, 185
Branford, 82
Brazil, 8, 77, 126, 557, 558
Breckinridge, John C., presidential candidate, 414
Breed's Hill, 174
Brest, France, 253, 650, 665
Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 653, 670
Brewster, William, 24, 40, 41
Bridgeheads, on the Rhine, 663, 664
Bridger, Fort, 394
Bristol, 13, 29, 122
Bristow, B. H., 524
British colonial system, and South Carolina, 291
British commerce, harassed by privateers 1814, 278
British debts, treaty provisions regarding, 196; alleged treaty violations, 208, 227; referred to joint commission, 232, 233
British Empire, 145, 156, 157, 196
British Fort, on the Appalachicola River, 301
British Isles, Napoleon declares blockaded, 255, 256; Captain Boyle declares blockaded, 278
British Navy, and war of 1812, 274, 277
Brock, General Isaac, 270
Brockdorff-Rantzau, Count von, 681
Brook Farm, 335
Brooke, Lord, 63
Brookhart, Senator S. W., 695
Brooklyn, held by Washington, 181
Brooks, Preston, assault on Sumner, 400
"Brooks and Baxter War," 482
Brougham, Henry, 268
Brown, General Jacob, 272, 273, 275
Brown, John, 400, 412
Brown University, 116, 334
Browne, Charles Farrar, "Artemus Ward," 389, 390
Browne, Robert, doctrines of, 39
Browning automatic rifle, 644
Browning, O. H., 474
Brownism, 39
Brunswick, 183
Bryan, Charles, 688
Bryan, W. J., 595, 620; Democratic candidate 1896, 536; campaign of 1900, 590; campaign of 1908, 597; Secretary of State, 602; resignation of, 623
Bryant, William C., 282, 389
Bryn Mawr, 548
Buccaneers, 93, 129
Buchanan, James, 358, 366, 372, 380, 382; elected president 1856, 401–402; effects of election, 404; and Lecompton constitution, 408; and secession, 417
Buckner, S. B., 434, 536, 537

"Bucktails," 288
Buell, Don Carlos, at Shiloh, 434, 435; Kentucky campaigns, 443
Bülow, General von, 617
Buena Vista, battle of, 369, 370
Buffalo, 272, 285, 386
Buffalo Bill's Wild West, 551
Buford, John, 459
Bukowina, 672
Bulfinch, Charles, 282
Bulgaria, enters war on side of Germany, 617; peace treaty with, 681
Bull Run, battle of, 431
Bunau-Varilla, Philippe, 569
Bunker Hill, battle of, 174, 175
Burgoyne, General John, capture of, 180; mission in 1777 campaign, 183; campaign, 184, 185; effect of capture on France, 186
Burlingame, Anson, 555
Burlington, New Jersey, 83
Burnside, General A. E., Fredericksburg campaign, 442; military arrests under, 451; in Eastern Tennessee, 461
Burr, Aaron, 244, 282, 290, 296; and election of 1800, 239; and disunion plot of 1804, 244–245; conspiracy and trial, 250–251
Business, attracts men from politics, 388, 389; ethics of, 489, 505; new tendencies of, 577, 578
Bute, Earl of, ministry of, 164
Butler, Senator A. P., assailed by Sumner, 400
Butler, General B. F., 441, 470, 544
Byllynge, Edward, 83
Byrd, Col. William, 95

Cabarets, 588
Cabinet, evolution of the, 220
Cable, George W., 435
Cabot, George, 241
Cabot, John, 130; discoveries of, 9
Cabral, Pedralvarez, discovery of Brazil, 8
Caciques, 88
Cadamosto, Luigi, 6
Cadillac, Antoine de, 136
Cadore, Duc de, 264
Cahokia, Ill., 136
Cairo, Ill., occupied by Union forces, 428
Calendar act, 107
Calhoun, John C., 238, 266, 283, 300, 301, 307, 308, 322, 330, 368; early nationalism of, 291; Bank Bill of, 296, 297; Bonus Bill, 297; vice-presidential candidate, 310; defeats Tariff of 1827, 312; breaks with Jackson, 314–315; on nullification, 316; on state sovereignty, 318–320; and abolition publications, 346; slavery resolutions of, 348; Secretary of State, 364; on compromise of 1850, 375; death, 377
California, 358, 364, 368, 372, 374–375, 376, 395, 402, 483, 491, 494, 497, 587; Spanish occupation delayed, 359; illicit trade with, 360; state organized, 375; and Compromise of 1850, 378; a state, 394; early New England trade to, 493; anti-Japanese legislation, 567–568; in election of 1916, 626
Calvert, Cecilius, 31
Calvert, Sir George, 30
Calvert, Leonard, 33
Calvert, *see also* Baltimore, Lord
Calvo Doctrine, 559
Camden, battle of, 188
Cameron, Don, 525
Cameron, Simon, 402, 413, 422
Campbell, Justice J. A., 423
Campbell, Colonel William, 188
Campbellites, 285
Camp meetings, 285
Canada, 110, 133, 137, 141, 145, 147, 207, 228, 272, 276; attempt to seize, 180–181; attempted conquest 1812, 269; Hull's invasion, 270
Canal Zone, Panama cedes to United States, 570
Canning, George, 262, 265, 274, 303
Cannon, J. G., 596
Canon law, 12
Cantigny, France, 657
Cantonments, divisional, 642
Cape Ann, 43
Cape Blanco, 6
Cape Boyador, 6
Cape Breton Island, 139
Cape Cod, 34
Cape Fear, 127
Capital, increase of, 387, 388; confused with money, 500, 501
Caribbean Sea, policy in, 568, 570
Carleton, Sir Guy, 181; governor of Canada, *see also* Dorchester, Lord
Carnegie, Andrew, sells to Steel Trust, 573; philanthropic foundations of, 582, 583
Carnegie Steel Company, 517, 573
Carolinas, The, 115, 138, 191; charter of, 87; settlement of, 89; a bulwark against Spain, 128; *see also* North Carolina, South Carolina
Caroline, case of the, 354

Carpetbaggers, 476, 477
Carranza, Venustiano, 605, 692
Carroll, Charles, 509
Carteret, Sir George, 82, 83, 87
Carteret, Philip, as governor of New Jersey, 82
Cartier, Jacques, 9, 130
Cass, Lewis, presidential candidate, 373; and Compromise of 1850, 377; in Buchanan's cabinet, 418; resigns, 419
Cassville, battle of, 462
Castile, 4, 5
Castle Pinckney, 417, 418, 420
Castle, William, 155
Castlereagh, Lord, 268
Cattle country, The, 496
Caucus, The, 306; attacks on, 308; supplanted by party convention, 323
Cecil, Lord Robert, contributions to League of Nations, 675
Cedar Creek, battle of, 465
Cemetery Ridge, 459
Censorship, use of, 1917–18, 632
Central America, exploited, 125; illicit trade to, 128; British-American diplomacy in, 382
Central American Federation, dissolution of, 558
Central Pacific Railroad, 497, 510
Central Railroad of Georgia, Morgans control, 512
Century Magazine, 550
Cerro Gordo, battle of, 370
Cervera, Admiral Pasqual, 562, 563
Ceuta, 5
Chambersburg, Pa., 464
Champlain, Lake, 275
Champlain, Samuel de, founds Quebec, 130, 131
Champion's Hill, battle of, 461
Chancellorsville, battle of, 459
Change of Base, The, 438
Channel Islands, 158
Chapultepec, battle of, 370
Charles I, King of Great Britain, 26, 30, 60, 74; religious policy, 37; claims divine right, 39; dissolves Parliament 1629, 44; and Long Parliament, 60; execution of, 71
Charles II, King of Great Britain, 26, 59, 79, 82; restoration of, 71; limited powers of, 72; and Massachusetts Bay, 98
Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, 125, 126
Charles River, 43
Charleston, S. C., 89, 111, 112, 122, 128, 153, 191, 193, 231, 291, 320, 413, 424; tea consigned to, 168; capture of, 188; importance of, 285; railroad projects, 386; problem of forts at 1860–61, 417–418
Charleston and Hamburg Railroad, The, 386
Charlestown Neck, 173, 174
Charters, early English uses of, 14; regarded as compacts, 159; Carolina, 89; Connecticut, 98, 99, 199; Massachusetts, 101, 102, 169; Pennsylvania, 84, 85; Rhode Island, 98, 99, 199
Chartres, Fort, 148, 166
Chase, S. P., 396, 402, 403, 413, 423, 464, 477, 482; financial policy of, 452–455
Chase, Samuel, partisanship in enforcing Sedition Act 237; impeached, 244
Chasseur, The, 278
Château-Thierry, France, 656, 658
Chatham, Earl of, *see* William Pitt
Chattanooga, Tenn., 443; campaign, 461, 463
Chauchat automatic rifle, 644
Chaumont, headquarters of A. E. F., 650
Chauncey, Isaac, 270
Chemical Warfare Service, 636
Chemin des Dames, France, 655, 656, 659
Cherokee, The, and Tennessee settlements, 190; nation of, and Georgia, 294, 307; removal of, 325
Chesapeake, the, *Leopard* attacks, 254
Chesapeake affair, 254, 255, 261, 262, 265
Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad, 312
Chesapeake Bay, 185; De Grasse in, 194–195; in war of 1812, 277
Chester, Pa., assembly at, 85
Cheves, Langdon, 266, 291, 297, 315, 328
Cheyenne, The, troubles with, 497
Chicago, 379, 392, 395, 510, 515, 517, 638, 689; resents Kansas-Nebraska Act, 397; foreign elements, 521; symphony orchestra, 552; and downstate, 581
Chicago and Northwestern Railroad; 508, 511
Chicago and Rock Island Railroad, 511
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad, 375, 511
Chicago Examiner, 586

Chicago Times, Burnside's suppression of, 451
Chickahominy River, Porter driven across, 438
Chickamauga, battle of, 461, 462
Chickasaw, The, removed by Jackson, 325
Chihuahua, 370
Child labor legislation, declared unconstitutional, 604
Chile, 558, 560
China, 5, 131, 679; overland route to, sought by French, 132; trade of New England to, 286; relations with, 555, 566; Japanese demands on, 672, 673
Chinese exclusion, 520; vetoed by Arthur, 529; progress of, 555
Chippewa, battle of, 275
Chivington, Colonel J. M., massacres friendly Indians, 497
Choctaw, 294, 325
Chowan River, settlement on, 86
Christina, Fort, Swedish post on Delaware, 78
Chrystler's Farm, battle of, 272
Church Covenant, Separatist doctrine, 39; origin of Mayflower Compact, 41, 43
Church and State, in Massachusetts Bay, 45; in Connecticut, 54; in New Haven, 55; separation of, 199
Churches, government of, in Massachusetts Bay, 47, 48; in 'fifties, 398; social life of, 489; relative importance declines, 584, 585
Churubusco, battle of, 370
Cierges, France, 662
Cincinnati, Ohio, 285, 392; anti-abolitionist riots at, 345
Circus, 283, 551
Cities, development and problems of, 384, 385, 387, 579, 580, 581
Civil Service Reform, 528, 529, 531, 547
Civil War, cause of, 426–468; effect of, on athletics, 389; effect on state banking systems, 454–455; English opinion of, 446, 447; economic aftermath, 506; political survivals of, 489, 523; tariffs, 494
Claiborne, William, 33, 34
Clarendon, Earl of, 87, 99
Clark, Champ, 524, 597, 598
Clark, George Rogers, 231; plans to seize Detroit, 189; conquest of Illinois, 190
Clark, Dr. John, 56, 59
Clark, William, 248, 302, 493
Classification, of public lands, 295
Clay, Henry, 266, 301, 303, 308, 309, 310, 322, 328, 336, 351, 354; and Treaty of Ghent, 279; American System, 298; candidate 1824, 306; compromise with South Carolina, 320; Distribution Bill, 326–327; and the Second Bank, 329; and election of 1832, 330; breaks with Tyler, 353; and annexation of Texas, 364–365; and Compromise of 1850, 376, 377; influence of, 381
Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 603
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, The, 382, 568, 569
Clayton Compromise, 374
Clemenceau, Georges, 672, 674, 677–678, 681
Cleveland, Ohio, 392, 516, 517
Cleveland, Grover, character, 529; first administration, 530–531; defeated, 1888, 532; reëlection, 533; second administration, 534–535; in election of 1896, 536; Populists oppose, 545; opposes Hawaiian annexation, 557; and Venezuela, 559, 560; and Cuba, 561
Clinton, De Witt, 307, 308; and election of 1812, 276; and Erie Canal, 287–288
Clinton, George, 203, 290; Republican candidate for vice president, 227; faction in New York, 218, 239, 245; and election of 1808, 258
Clinton, Sir Henry, 184, 188, 195
Clipper ships, 386, 387
Cobb, Howell, 418, 420
Coblenz, 663, 671
Coddington, William, 56, 57
Cohens *vs.* Virginia, 315, 316
Coinage, function of, 499
Coinage Act, 1707, 107
Coinage ratio, changes in, effects of, 502, 503
Coke, Sir Edward, 39
Colbert, Jean-Baptiste, 133–135
Cold Harbor, battle of, 463
Colleges, colonial, 116; of early nineteenth century, 283; in the 'fifties, 390; development 1873–97, 547, 548; and sport, 549, 550; for women, development of, 548
Colleton, Sir John, 86, 87
Colleton, Peter, governor of Carolina, 89
Collins Line, failure of, 387
Cologne, 663, 671
Colombia, Republic of, 558, 568, 570
Colonies, policy of the Stuarts to-

ward, 91; England, staple for, 92; choicest in the tropics, 93; virtually represented in Parliament, 157; war debt of, 161
Colorado, settlement of, 394; statehood delayed, 496; railroad building in, 510, 511; woman suffrage in, 582
Colorado Midland Railroad, 510
Columbia River, reached by Lewis and Clark, 248; proposed British boundary, 493
Columbia, S. C., 319
Columbia, The, 267
Columbia University, 116, 224, 390
Columbiad, The, 282
Columbus, Christopher, 7
Commerce and Labor, Department of, created, 594
Commerce of the Prairies, 360
Commission government, trial of, 581
Committee for Plantations, 60
Committee of the States, 206
Committee on the conduct of the war, 450
Committees of correspondence formed, 167, 168; evolve into governments, 171
Common Law, nature of, 11, 12; versus Royal authority, 39
Compact theory of government, advocated by Levellers, 75; statement of, 159
Compass, adoption of, 5
Compromise of 1850, 378, 379, 396
"Concessions" of New Jersey, terms, 82; granted Carolina, 87
Concord, battle of, 172
Confederacy, formation of the, 416, 417; Seward negotiates with, 423, 424; begins hostilities, 424; unanimity of opinion in, 426; English opinion of, 446, 447; problems of, 450, 456; Conscription Act of, 458; loss of morale, 1865, 466
Confederate army, inefficient supply of, 457; seize federal forts, 420, 421; reverses in West, 433, 434; at Shiloh, 435
Confederate battle flags, attempted return of, 531
"Confederate Brigadiers, The," 529, 531, 544
Confederates, disqualification of former, under reconstruction acts, 477
Confederation, Articles of, 191, 206, 211, 212; weakness, 192; end of, 219; *see also* Congress of the
Confiscation Act, of 1861, 431
Congregational church, migration westward, 391
Congregationalism: origin, 39; decay of, 117, 118, 119; in New England, 284, 287; disestablished, 305; views on slavery, 341
Congress, confederate, nature, 417, 450; confiscation acts of, 431, 432
Congress of the Confederation, distrusted, 179; peace party in, 191; weakness of, 205, 206, 207; organization and powers, 206; calls Philadelphia Convention, 211; submits Constitution to the states, 217
Congress, First Continental, 162, 169, 170, 198
Congress, Second Continental, 173, 199; movement toward independence, 176, 178; flees to Baltimore, 182; treats with Indians, 189; advises states to form constitutions, 200; reason for authority of, 205
Congress of United States, 218, 219, 221–225, 242, 247–248, 249, 253, 255, 256, 263, 266–268, 278, 299–300, 306, 316, 320, 322, 324, 328, 331–332, 346–347, 348, 353, 373, 406–407, 421, 431–432, 441, 451, 452, 453–455, 469, 470, 471, 473, 474, 476–477, 479, 481, 484, 502, 503, 515, 526-527, 562, 565, 594, 602–604, 628, 639, 641, 668–669, 676, 689; House of Representatives, 219, 221, 222, 244, 329, 365, 373, 374, 375, 396, 401, 412, 421; how chosen, 213; election of 1800 in, 239; election of 1824 in, 309; influence over President, 336; gag rule, 346; impeaches Johnson, 475; Senate, 219, 220, 243, 244, 268, 311, 312, 329, 364, 365, 373, 374, 375, 395, 401, 412, 421, 479, 525, 627; how chosen, 213; censure of Jackson, 332, 333; influence over President, 336; equilibrium between free and slave states, 343; and abolition petitions, 346; and Stanton's removal, 475; in 1900, 590; direct election of, 595; opposition to League in, 676, 677; and Treaty of Versailles, 682, 683; and World Court, 692
Congress, provincial, of North Carolina, 203
Conkling, Roscoe, 524, 525, 528
Connecticut, 52, 53, 62, 64, 65, 81, 103, 108, 109, 151, 210, 217, 258, 483, 510; evolution of government in, 54; expansion of, 78–79; charter

of, 98–99; and James II, 102; colonial, 123; origin of government in compact, 159; news of Lexington in, 173; sea-to-sea claims, 191; retains charter till 1818, 199; part in Philadelphia Convention, 212–213; state school fund, 284; control by Congregational clergy, 287
Connecticut Compromise, 213
Connecticut River, 34, 65, 77, 79, 109
Connecticut Valley, 52, 285
Conscientious objectors, how treated, 644
Conscription, federal, 1863, 455, 456; confederate, 458; *see also* Draft and Selective Service
Conservation, 593, 594, 597
Conservatives, and the sub-treasury, 351; democratic faction, 354–355
Constantinople, 672
Constellation, 236
Constitution of the United States, imperial system of, 145, 198; enforcement provisions, 212, 214, 215; framers' views of, 216; states consider, 217–218; in effect, 219;
interpretations: strict construction, 226; federalist, 237; loose construction, 240; Supreme Court, 243; Marshall's, 315–316; Republican, 316; Webster's, 317; Madison's and Livingston's, 318; Calhoun's, 376; Southern, 415, 416;
literary style, 282; undemocratic, 306;
provisions regarding: slavery on high seas, 347; impeachment, 475–476; election of president, 483; treason, 251; dependencies, 565;
amendments, 421–422, 484–485; 14th, 473, 474, 477, 481, 482; 15th, 479, 481, 482; 17th, 595; 19th, 582
Constitution of Cherokee Nation, 311
Constitution of Confederate states, 416, 417
Constitution of Illinois, 1818, on slavery, 299
Constitution of Massachusetts, 1780, on slavery, 298
Constitution of Mexico, 361
Constitution of Missouri, on free negroes, 300
Constitution of Virginia, 1830, 290
Constitution, 273, 274
Constitutional conventions, necessity of, 201; in Massachusetts, 204
Constitutional Union ticket, 414
Constitutions, state, problems of, 198–199; liberalism in, 335; *see also* Franchise
Continental Army, reorganization of, 186
Contraband, British definition of, 619, 620; Butler's application, 441
Cook, Captain James, 302
Cooke, Jay, aids flotation of bond issues, 454; failure of, 507, 510
Coolidge, Calvin, 691; succeeds Harding, 687; character, 687–688; elected president 1924, 688
Cooper, Anthony Ashley, 87, 89
Cooper, James Fenimore, 282
Cooper, Peter, 544
Copenhagen, 255, 263
Corinth, Confederates retire on, 434, 435; capture of, 443
Cornell, A. B., 525
Cornell University, 547
Cornwallis, Earl, at Princeton, 183; in South, 188; campaign of Carolinas, 193; in Virginia, 194, 195; surrender, 195
Coronado, Francisco de, 9
"Corporal's guard," Tyler's, 354
Corpus Christi, 367
"Corrupt Bargain," 309
Corruption, in post Civil War Period, 478, 489; in legislative bodies, 515
Cortereal brothers, 130
Corvée, in New France, 134
Côte Dame Marie, 660, 662
Cotton, John, 49, 50, 58, 61, 62
Cotton, an "enumerated article," 92; in South Carolina, 291; in North Carolina, 291; decline of price and nullification, 315; importance of, after 1790, 339; adaptation of, to slave labor, 341; factor in the Civil War, 430, 431; factor in confederate finance, 457
Cotton gin, 291, 339, 491
Cotton States, abstain from Peace Convention, 422
Corwin, Thomas, 367
Council for New England, origin, 35; patents issued by, 42, 43; end of, 60
Council of appointment, New York, 203, 288
Council of censors, Pennsylvania, 202
Council of League of Nations, 675
Council of National Defense, 635
Council, Privy, under Tudors, 11; in Pennsylvania, 85, 202; in Virginia, 95, 111

Council of revision, New York Constitution, 204
Council of Ten, 665, 673, 675
County, unit of Virginia local government, 29; unimportant in New England, 68
Coureurs de bois, 135
Coutume de Paris, Law of New France, 134
Covenant, significance in League of Nations, 691
"Covenant of Grace," 49, 50
Cowpens, The, Tarleton defeated at, 193
Cox, J. M., democratic candidate, 1920, 685; defeated, 686
Crane, Charles R., 679
Craven, Lord, 89; proprietor of Carolina, 87
Crawford, William H., 300, 307, 310; candidate for presidency 1816, 296; charges against, 308; vote for in 1824, 309; and spoils system, 313
Credit instruments, effect on value of money, 500
Credit system, of selling public lands, 294
Creeks, uprising of, in 1813–14, 278, 294; treaties with, 311; removal of, 325
Creole, case of the, 347
"Crillon, Count Edward de," 268
"Crime of '73," 502
Crisis, The, 316
Crittenden, Senator J. J., 382, 421
Crittenden Compromise, 421
Crittenden Resolution, 433
Croghan, George, 139
Cromwell, Oliver, 49, 61, 71, 84, 96
Croquet, 389
Crown Point, 142
Cuba, 93; proposed emancipation in, 310; projects for annexation, 382, 383; revolt in, 479; United States' interests in, 560–561; insurrection in, 561–562; Republic established, 564–565
Culpepper, Lord, 96, 97
Cumberland Gap, 114, 115
Cumberland Presbyterians, 285
Cumberland River, 128, 138, 430, 433, 434
Cumberland Road, as internal improvement question, 297, 298, 324
Cummings Point, 420
Cunard Line, 387
Currency, depreciation of continental, 192; and Second Bank, 328; economics of, 499; demand for inflation, 503, 542
Currier and Ives prints, 488, 552
Curtis, Justice B. R., 406
Curtis, George W., 546, 547
Cushing, Caleb, 555
Custer, General G. A., massacre of, 497
Czechoslovakia, 673

Dacia, case of, 620
Dale, Sir Thomas, governor of Virginia, 23
Dalton, battle, 462
Dan River, Greene escapes across, 193
Dana, R. H., 360
Daniels, Josephus, Secretary of the Navy, 602
Danzig corridor, 681
Dardanelles, 672
Dartaguiette, Pierre, 139
Dartmouth College, 116
Dartmouth College case, Marshall's decision in, 315
Darwin, Charles, 447
Daugherty, H. G., 687
Davenport, John, 54
Davis, David, 481, 484, 543
Davis, Jefferson, 376, 379, 449, 450, 464; and Lecompton, 408; on slavery in the territories, 412; President of the Confederacy, 416; influence over Buchanan, 419–420; as war president, 457–458; removes J. E. Johnston, 463; capture of, 467
Davis, John, seeks Northwest Passage, 67
Davis, John W., democratic candidate 1924, 688
Dawes, C. G., vice president, 688
Dawes Plan, The, 691
Deane, Silas, 185
Dearborn, General Henry, 269, 270, 272
De Barras, Count Louis, 195
Debt Act, of 1732, 107
Debts, United States, funded, 210, 221
Decatur, Stephen, captures *Macedonian*, 273
Declaration of Independence, 179, 202, 226, 282
Declaration of Indulgence, 73
Declaration of London, 620
Decrees, of Napoleon, 263, 264, 265; effects of, 256; repeal delayed, 264; unrepealed, 266–268; falsity of repeal, 268–269

Deerfield, raid on, 139
Defeatists, in allied countries, 655
De Grasse, Admiral, 194, 195
Deism, 119, 390
De Lancys, in New York politics, 110
Delaware, 85, 110, 151, 206, 239, 289, 298, 312, 330, 349, 427, 483; a proprietary colony, 108; won over to independence, 177; constitution, 202; ratifies Federal Constitution, 217; abolition of slavery in, 472
Delaware, Lord, rescues the Virginia Colony, 23
Delaware River, 34, 77, 79, 84, 85, 102, 182, 184, 195; Dutch and Swedish posts on, 77, 78; campaigns of 1776 and 1777 on, 180
de Lesseps, Ferdinand, 568, 569
Democracy, growth of, 113, 240, 287, 305; in state constitutions, 335; distrust of, 217, 224
Democratic party, formation of, 322, 328, 333, 334; public land policy, 326, 327; convention of 1832, 330; convention of 1835, 348; and the sub-treasury, 351; election of 1840, 351, 352; and Tyler, 354; and nationalism, 356; and claim to Oregon, 358; convention of 1844, 365; political generals appointed from, 368; and the Wilmot Proviso, 373; and Compromise of 1850, 377, 379; in the South, 394; and Kansas Nebraska Act, 396, 397; election of 1854, 398; election of 1856, 399, 400, 401, 402; position in 1857, 404; and Dred Scott decision, 407; and Lecompton issue, 408, 409; election of 1858, 410, 411; Convention of 1860, 413, 414; and secession, 418, 419; and the war, 426, 427, 428, 429, 440; alienated by emancipation, 442; opposition to the war, 452; election of 1864, 464, 465; election of 1868, 477; and Liberal Republican movement, 481; election of 1872, 482; election of 1876, 482, 484; acquiesce in Hayes's election, 484; control of the South, 485; tariff policy of, 498; and the Greenbacks, 503; postwar issues of, 523; strongholds of 1880, 527, 528; defeat in 1890, 533; election of 1896, 535, 537; election of 1904, 595; election of 1912, 598, 599; and Treaty of Versailles, 682, 683
Democratic Review, The, Douglas' organ, 380
De Monts, Sieur, 34
Denmark, 6, 192, 256, 609; attempted purchase of West Indies from, 479
Denver, founding of, 495
Denver Pacific Railroad, 511
Desertion, from Union army, 456
De Soto, Hernando de, 9, 127
Detroit, 148, 189, 190, 227, 269, 392, 581; founded, 136; Hull surrenders, 270; abandoned by British, 272
Dewey, George, at Manila, 563, 564
Diaz, Bartholomew, 8
Diaz, Porforio, 604
Dickinson, John, 160, 173, 176, 202; draws up Articles of Confederation, 206
Dijon, France, 615
Distribution, Clay's bill for, 326, 327; Act of 1841, 353
District of Columbia, 376; slave trade in, 346, 376, 378, 472
Dix, John A., Secretary of the Treasury 1861, 420
Dixon, Archibald, 395
"Doesticks," American humorist, 389
Dollar diplomacy, 559, 570
Dominica, 93
Dominican Republic, financial arrangement with, 570
Donelson, Fort, 433; capture of, 434
Dongan, Thomas, 102; governor of New York, 81, 82
Doniphan, A. W., 370
Dorchester, Lord, 228, 229, 232; *see also* Carleton, Sir Guy
Dorchester, Mass., emigration from, 52; fortified, 174, 176
Dorr War, 334
Douglas, Stephen A., 347, 379, 380, 400, 428; and Compromise of 1850, 377, 378; repeal of Missouri Compromise, 394, 395, 396; revolt on Lecompton, 408; and election of 1858, 409–411; candidate 1860, 412–413; death, 426–427
Dover, annexed to Massachusetts, 63; water power developed, 391
Draft bill, discussed by Congress 1814–15, 277–278
Draft riots, in New York City, 455, 456
Drago Doctrine, 559
Drake, Francis, 14, 16
Drayton, W. H., 154, 162
Dred Scott case, 404, 407
Drew, Daniel, 509
Drexel, Morgan & Co., 507
Dry farming, development in West, 519

Duane, William J., Secretary of the Treasury, 331
Dudley, Thomas, 45, 70
Duke's Laws, promulgated by Nicolls, 80
Dulany, Daniel, 160
Du Lhut, Sieur D. G., 136
Duluth, Jay Cooke's investments in, 507
Dumba, Dr. Constantin, 623, 625
Dunmore, Lord, 171; governor of Virginia, 176; flight of, 189
Dunmore's War, 189
Dunraven, Earl of, 496
Duquesne, Fort, 140, 141
Durham, Bishop of, Powers measure for Palatinate of Maryland, 31
Dutch, on the Hudson, 34; expelled from the Connecticut, 63; rivalry with Connecticut and New Haven, 65; colony of New Netherland, 77–79; English capture, 78; reconquer New York, 81; settlements in New Jersey, 83; in Pennsylvania, 85; in carrying trade, 92, 93; navigation acts affect, 94; wars 1664–1674, 99; in New York, 112; and fur trade, 131, 132
Dutch East India Company, 77
Dutch Reformed Church, in colonies, 117
Dutch West India Company, 77, 80
Dutchman's Point, 227
Dyewoods, an "enumerated article," 92

Eagle boats, 640
Early, Jubal A., Shenandoah campaigns, 464, 465
East Florida, American aggressions in, 300, 301
East India Company, 19, 22, 145; model for Virginia Company, 19; measures for relief of, 168
East India trade, of New England, 286
East Jersey, 83, 102, 107; *see also* New Jersey
Eaton, Theophilus, 54
Eaton, W. H., 313, 314
Ecuador, 558
Edict of 1696, 136
Education, in New England, 68; in Colonial America, 116; Ordinance of 1787 on, 209, 210; development of, 283–284, 391, 547–549; scientific methods, 585, 586
Edward VI, church policy of, 13
Edward, Fort, 184
Edwards, Jonathan, 116, 117
Edwards, Ninian, 308
Eighteenth Infantry, 646
Eighth Massachusetts, arrives at Washington, 427
El Caney, 563
Elections, *1796*, 234; *1800*, 239–240; *1804*, 245; *1808*, 258; *1812*, 276; *1824*, 306, 307, 309; *1832*, 329, 330; *1836*, 348, 349; *1840*, 351, 352; *1844*, 365; *1848*, 373, 374; *1852*, 380, 381; *1856*, 401, 402; *1860*, 413, 414; *1862*, 451; *1863*, 462; *1864*, 464, 465; *1866*, 474; *1868*, 477; *1872*, 481, 482; *1876*, 482, 485, 524; *1880*, 527, 528; *1884*, 529, 530; *1888*, 531, 532; *1890*, 533; *1892*, 533; *1894*, 535; *1896*, 535–536, 537; *1900*, 590; *1904*, 595; *1908*, 596, 597; *1910*, 597; *1912*, 597–599; *1916*, 625; *1920*, 685–686; *1924*, 688
Electoral College, Harrington's theory, 76; for choosing president, 214
Electoral Commission, and election of 1876, 483, 484
Electric power, use of, 578
Electric street cars, 515
Electricity, revolution caused by, 384
Elevated railroads, 515
Eliot, Charles, 547
Eliot, John, apostle to Indians, 99
Elizabeth, Queen of England, 11, 13, 16, 37, 106
Elkhorn River, 173
Elkins, W. L., 515
Elliot, Jesse, 270
Ellsworth, Oliver, 213
El Molino del Rey, 370
Emancipation, 310, 341, 442; proclamation, 441, 443, 448, 451
Embargo, under Jefferson, 256, 257, 259, 262, 263, 267, 286; Congress proposes on exports, 625
Emergency Fleet Corporation, 634, 635
Emerson, Ralph W., 282, 283, 391
Emerson, Dr., owner of Dred Scott, 404
Emerson, Mrs., 406
Endicott, John, 43, 62, 70
Enfant, Major Pierre Charles L', designer of Washington, 241
Enfield rifle, 644
Enforcement act, of 1808–9, 257; of 1870, 481, 482
England, 4, 9, 10, 14, 125, 191; first interest in New World, 16; and Armada, 17; Great Civil War, 33, 60, 71, 83; staple for colonies, 92;

possessions in West Indies, 93; merchants of, long credit of, 121; kings of, lords of other domains, 158, *see also* Great Britain
English, W. H., proposes compromise on Lecompton, 408, 409
Englishmen, immigration of, 519–521; rights of, claimed by Americans, 158
Entail, abolished in Virginia, 201
"Enumerated Articles," nature of, 92
Épinal, France, 615
Episcopalians, in Connecticut, 287; attitude on slavery, 343
Erie Canal, 307, 349; effect of, 287–288; route to the west, 293; route of New England migration, 392
Erie, Fort, 227, 275
Erie, Lake, 266, 270; explored by French, 135; control of, 275
Erie Railroad, 386, 509, 512
Erskine, D. M., 255, 262, 263
Esch-Cummins Act, 686
Espionage Act, 638
Essex, case of, 253
Estaing, Comte d', 187, 188
Eustis, William, 269
Everett, Edward, vice-presidential candidate, 1860, 414
Everybody's Magazine, 586
Excise tax, proposed by Hamilton, 222
Exermont, 662
Exeter, 63
Ex parte Milligan, Supreme Court decision, 475
Expunging Resolution, The, 332
Extra territoriality, 556
Ezra Church, battle of, 463

Factors, Scotch, control colonial trade, 121
Factory, sanitation, 578, 579; system in New England, 286
Fair Oaks, battle of, 438
Fairfax, Lord, 174
Falaba, sinking of, 622
Fall, Albert, 687
Fall River, 391
Fallen Timbers, Wayne's victory at, 228
Falmouth, burning of, 175
Far East, 1, 3, 5, 555–557, 566–568
Far West, development of, 493; travel to, 494–495
Farm bloc, demands of, 695
Farm Bureau, 689, 695
Farmer-labor movements, 541
Farmers, basis of the Republican party, 224, 225; grievances of, 513, 542, 543
Farmer's Letters, of John Dickinson, 160
Farmers' Alliance, 544
Farragut, Admiral D. G., 435, 465
Fauchet, J. A. J., 234
Federal Reserve Act, 577, 602, 603
Federal Reserve Banks, float Liberty Loans, 637
Federalism, 296, 316, 317; decay of, 286; New England, 305
Federalist, The, significance, 218
Federalists, 217, 218, 225, 227, 233, 238, 241, 242, 243, 245, 250, 256, 268, 269, 276, 288, 289, 292; evolution of party, 223–224; pro-British policy, 231, 232; policy 1798–1800, 236–237; fall of the, 240; disunion plot, 244; and Louisiana Purchase, 248; opposition to embargo, 258, 259; fête F. J. Jackson, 263; oppose war of 1812, 267, 273, 274
Fenwick, John, 83
Ferdinand of Aragon, 125, 126
Ferguson, Major Patrick, 188, 189
Fessenden, W. P., 464
Feudalism, 3, 4, 7; in Fundamental Constitutions, 88; in New France, 131
Fifty-four forty or fight, 358, 372
Filipinos, restiveness of, 565, 566
Fillmore, Millard, 380, 401; succeeds to Presidency, 378; candidate 1856, 402
Fine arts, development of, 116, 550, 552
First American Army, 659, 660
First Division, A. E. F., 652, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 662, 664
Fisher's Hill, 465
Fish, export to West Indies, 122
Fisheries, New England, 65, 93, 286; French, 130; in Treaty of Paris, 196; question of, in 1815, 279, 280; rights confirmed, 302; seal, 554
Fisk, James, 509
Fiume, 672, 678
Five Forks, battle of, 466
Five Nations, *see* Iroquois, 131
Flanders, German offensive in, 1918, 655
Fletcher *vs.* Peck, decision in, 245
Florida, 127, 128, 143, 145, 208, 231, 303, 441, 477; settled by Spaniards, 8; reconquered by Spain, 190; boundary by Treaty of 1783, 196; disputed boundary, 233; settled 1795, 234; was it part of Louisiana?

248–249; neutrality violated 1814, 301; statehood, 392; secession of, 416; election of 1876 in, 483, 484
Florida, The, 447, 448, 480
Florida Blanca, Count, directs Spanish policy, 185, 190
Flour, colonial trade in, 122
Floyd, John, 330
Floyd, John B., 418, 420, 434
Foch, Ferdinand, general-in-chief, allied armies, 654, 655, 658, 660, 670, 671, 674, 677
Food Administration, 633, 634, 636
Food supply, problem of 1917, 632
Foot, Senator S. A., 317
Foot's Resolution, 317, 318, 326
Football, evolution of, 549, 550
Foote, H. S., 379
Forbes, C. R., 687
Forbes, General John, captures Fort Duquesne, 142
Force Bill, The, 320
Ford's Theater, 467
Fordney-McCumber Tariff, 686
Foreign affairs 1861–65, 445–449; under Grant, 478, 479, 480; lack of interest in, 554
Foreign elements, location of, 520, 521
Foreign policy, Hamilton's 223; Republican, 245; Jackson's, 327–328; 1850–55, 381
Forest law, 12
Forrest, N. B., confederate cavalry leader, 443
Forster, W. E., 447
Forsyth, John, 310, 327
Fortification Bill, 328
Forty-first Division, 652
Forty-niners, The, 375
Forty-second Division, 642, 652, 658, 659
Foster, Augustus J., 265, 266, 268
Four, The, 665, 675
Fourteen Points, Wilson's, 666–667, 668, 670, 681
Fourth Division, 659, 661
Fox, Charles James, 193, 195, 253
Fox, George, 83, 84
Fox, Gustavus V., 423, 424
Fox's Blockade, 253, 255
Frame of Government, issued by Penn, 85
France, 4, 112, 125, 136, 185, 186, 190, 195–196, 232, 233, 255, 256, 262–265, 266, 268, 269, 303, 613, 616, 626, 653, 665, 666, 692; attempts at colonizing, 9; possessions in West Indies, 93; in 16th century, 130; rivalry with England, 137–143; Republicans side with, 226; relations with, 227; war with Great Britain, 230; hostilities with, 1798, 236; under Napoleon, 245–246; rights in Louisiana, 248; nonintercourse with, 259; Jackson and, 328; coerces Mexico, 363; relations with Texas, 364; and Texan annexation, 366, 367; Seward wishes war with, 423, 431, 457; need of cotton, 430; Civil war policy of, 445, 446; relations with, 479; position of, 607–608; German conquests from, 609; plan of campaign 1914, 615; American welfare work in, 638; on defensive 1918, 655; secret treaties of, 672;
  France on Council of Ten: 673; represented by Clemenceau, 674; guaranty treaty to, 677; attitude toward Germany, 679, 680; Rhenish ambitions, 681
Franche-Comté, 125
Franchise, in Virginia, 95; property qualifications for, 116, 119, 200, 201, 203, 305; federal provisions for, 213; extension of, 284; in Pennsylvania, 289; manhood, 202, 203, 305
Franciscans, 127, 358, 359
Franco-Prussian War, 607
Franklin, battle of, 466
Franklin, Benjamin, 152, 202; character of, 119, 170; imperial scheme of, 162; wins French support, 185, 186; and Treaty of 1783, 195, 196; in Philadelphia Convention, 211
Franklin, General W. B., 442
Franklin, William, governor of New Jersey, 176
Franz Ferdinand, assassination of, 614
Franz Josef II, 611
Frayser's Farm, battle of, 438
Frederick the Great, 142
Fredericksburg, battle of, 442
Free Democrats, oppose Kansas Nebraska Act, 396
"Free ships free goods," 192, 232
Free Silver, 503, 532, 533, 534, 535
Free Soil Party, 373, 374, 381, 397
Freedman's Bureau Bill, 472, 473
Freedom of Conscience, Roger Williams and, 48
Freedom of the press, 117, 201
Freedom of speech, 450, 451, 638
Freeport Heresy, 411
Frémont, John C., 404, 437, 439; in

California, 368; Republican nominee 1856, 401, 402; emancipation order of, 440; nomination 1864, 464
French, influence among Iroquois, 81; in Illinois villages, 189; in Louisiana, 359
French alliance, 1778, 186
French and Indian War, 139, 148, 150, 161
French Broad River, 115, 138
French Canadians, loyal to Britain, 181
French Colonial Army, 658
French Directory, and United States, 235
French Empire, 129–138
French Moroccan Division, 658
French Republic, 226, 230
French Revolution, 223, 226, 231
Freneau, Philip, 226
Frick, H. C., 517
Fries, John, 238
Frobisher, Martin, seeks Northwest Passage, 17
Frolic, captured by *Wasp*, 274
Frontenac, Count, Governor of New France, 135
Frontenac, Fort, 142
Frontier, in New England, 66; significance of, 112–114; intellectual characteristics of, 114; under-representation of, 114, 199; adequately represented in Pennsylvania Constitution, 202
Fuel administration, 634, 636
Fugitive slaves, 214; law, 376, 378, 379, 383, 421
Fulton, Robert, 287, 315
Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, 76, 87, 88, 89
"Fundamental Orders" of Connecticut, significance, contents, 53
Fur trade, New England, 42, 65; Virginia, 95, 96; colonial, 115, 122; French, 131, 165; nature of, 132; English, 138, 139; Spanish, 165; British control of, 208, 229; in Northwest, 228; and Jay's Treaty, 232–233; American acquisition of, 266–267; in Far West, 493
Furniture, Duncan Phyfe and, 282

Gadsden, Christopher, 154
Gadsden Purchase, 395
Gag resolution, 346
Gage, General Thomas, 169, 172, 174
Gaines, General E. P., crosses Mexican border, 363
Gaines's Mill, battle of, 438
Gallatin, Albert, 259, 266, 269, 275; financial achievements, 241; and Treaty of Ghent, 279
Galloway, Joseph, 161, 170
Galloway's Plan, 162, 170
Galvez, Governor Bernardo, conquers Florida, 190
Gálvez José de, occupies upper California, 359
Gama, Vasco da, reaches India, 8
Gambier, Lord, and Treaty of Ghent, 279
Gardner, Colonel J. L., 419
Garfield, H. A., fuel administrator, 634
Garfield, James A., nomination of, 1880, 527; assassinated, 528
Garrett, President John W., 509
Garrison, L. M., Secretary of War, 602; proposes territorial army, 640–641
Garrison, William L., 345
Gas, use in industry, 578
Gas, poison, 618
Gasoline, use limited, 1918, 634
Gates, Horatio, 184, 186; defeated at Camden, 188
Gates, John W., 573, 574, 577
Gates, Sir Thomas, 23
Geary, Governor J. W., of Kansas territory, 400
General Education Board, 583
General Munitions Board, 635
General staff, of A. E. F., how trained, 651, 652
General warrants, prohibited by Virginia Bill of Rights, 201
Genesee, wheat fields of, 287
Genêt, Edmund, French minister, 227, 230, 231
Genoa, 4, 5
Gentleman's Agreement, The, 567, 568; abrogated, 692
George III, King of Great Britain, 156, 195, 198; obstinacy, 172; responsibility for Revolution, 196, 197; insane, 265
George, Fort, 272
George Washington, 665, 678
Georgia, 112, 121, 154, 211, 309, 342 348, 441, 477, 482; in 18th century, 111; Spanish missions in, 127; founding of, 128; loyalism in, 172; overrun by British, 188; sea-to-sea claims, 191; ratifies constitution, 217; western land claims, 233; Yazoo frauds, 245; frontier in 1790, 292; Indians removed from, 294; and Adams' Indian policy, 311;

and the Indian nations, 325; favors slavery, 341; and Compromise of 1850, 379; secession of, 416; reconstruction delayed, 479
Gerard, James W., 623
German nationalists, arms of, 609
German Republic, 664, 668
Germans, in Pennsylvania, 85, 110, 289; in 18th century America, 112; migration of west, 392, 393; in Republican party, 402; and election of 1864, 465; immigration of, 519–521; characteristics, 579
Germantown, battle at, 185
Germany, 133, 607, 613–617, 630–631; aggressive Pacific policy of, 556–557; hostile attitude at Manila, 564; rebuffed in Venezuela, 570; position and achievements, 608, 609; subject nationalities, 609; hopes of, 611–612; aggressive policy, 612; campaign of 1914, 616, 617; blamed by American opinion, 618; protests American supplies to Allies, 621; and submarine warfare, 622; American anger at, 623; submarine pledge of, 624; abandonment of submarines, 624, 625; conditional peace offer 1916, 626, 627; submarine warfare unrestricted, 627; and treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 653; offensives of 1918, 654–658; asks armistice, 662; accepts Fourteen Points, 668; Foch's harshness to, 670, 671; problem of reparations, 679, 680; and peace treaty, 680, 681; United States makes peace with, 683
Gerry, Elbridge, 235
Gesnes, 662
Gettysburg, 449, 459, 460
Ghent, Treaty of, 279, 280
Gibbons *vs.* Ogden, Marshall's decision, 315
Gibraltar, 190
Giddings, J. R., 347
Gilbert, Sir Humphrey, 17, 18, 19
Gilded Age, The, 490
Giles, William, obstructive policy, 259, 266, 267
Gilman, D. C., work at Johns Hopkins, 547
Gilmer, J. A., 422
Girondins, 231
Girtys, The, 189
Gladstone, W. E., 449
Glass, manufactures of, 121; Townshend duties on, 153
Globe, The, 322, 390; Jackson's organ, 314; in election of 1832, 330
Godkin, E. L., 545
Godoy, Count Manuel, and Pinckney's Treaty, 234; delays cession of Louisiana, 247
Gold, value of, 499–501; standard: established, 380, 502, 503; Cleveland maintains, 534–535
Gold Democratic party, 536, 537
Golden Gate, The, United States desire for, 366
Golf, development of, 587
Goliad, 359
Gómez, Estevan, 130
Gompers, Samuel, 638
Gondrecourt, 651, 652
Good Hope, Cape of, discovered, 8
Good Hope, Fort, Dutch post at Hartford, 63
Gore-McLemore Resolution, 625
Gorges, Sir Ferdinando, 35, 59, 60, 63, 64, 98, 99, 101
Gorton, Samuel, 57, 61
Gosnold, Bartholomew, 18, 19
Goulburn, Henry, and Treaty of Ghent, 279
Gould, Jay, 509
Governors, in Pennsylvania, 85; Virginia, 201; North Carolina and Maryland, 203; Massachusetts, 204; proprietary, approved by crown, 108; quarrels with assemblies, 124; paid out of Townshend duties, 153
Graduation of public lands, 325, 380
Grain, colonial trade in, 122
Granada, 7
Grand Banks, fisheries of, 9, 130
Grand Couronné de Nancy, 615
Grand Opera, rise of, 552
"Grandfather clauses," 485
Granger legislation, 513, 514
Granger movement, 519, 542, 543
Grant, U. S., 439, 443, 523, 524, 527; character, 433, 478; criticized for Shiloh, 435; Vicksburg campaign, 460, 461; at Chattanooga, 462; Virginia campaign, 463, 464; pressure on Lee, 465; at Appomattox, 466, 467; and Stanton's removal, 475; as President, 477, 479; and civil service reform, 528
Graves, Admiral Thomas, 195
Gray, Asa, 447
Gray, Captain Robert, discovery of Columbia River, 267, 302

"Great American Desert," 293, 294, 357, 395
Great Britain, 146, 190, 192, 196, 215, 231, 232, 233, 236, 247, 255, 256, 261, 262, 263, 274, 275, 613–615, 626, 637, 653, 665, 666, 692–693; old colonial system of, 123, 124; contest with Spain in America, 127; imperial rivalry with France, 137–143; nonintercourse with, urged, 169; retains western posts, 207; Hamilton advocates good relations with, 223; Federalists side with, 226; relations with, 227; policy toward United States, 230; opposes Napoleon, 246; naval policy of, 251; nonintercourse with, 259; New England aids in War of 1812, 276; and Convention of 1818, 302; and West India trade, 327, 328; and slavery, 347, 348; relations with, 354; and the Oregon question, 356, 357, 358; coerces Mexico, 363; relations with Texas, 364; and annexation of Texas, 366, 367; Central American interests of, 382; outstrips our merchant marine, 387; need of cotton, 430, 431, 457; relations with, 1861–65, 446, 449; sympathy of lower classes with North, 448, 449; relations with, 479; and the *Alabama* Claims, 480; diplomatic relations with, 554; and Japan, 556; controversy with, over Venezuela, 559, 560; friendly attitude, 1898, 564; and Isthmian canal, 568, 569; protests canal tolls, 604; situation 1914, 607; hopes of, 612; American sympathy with, 618; use of blockade, 619, 620; loan floated in 1915, 621; and neutral trade, 622, 625; and offensive of March, 1918, 654; on defensive in 1918, 655; and secret treaties, 672; Japanese agreement with, 673; on Council of Ten, 673; represented by Lloyd George, 674; and French guaranty, 677
Great Lakes, fur trade of, 65, 136; boundary, 196; route to west, 293, 392; training camp at, 639
Great Northern Railroad, 510
Great Salt Lake, Mormon colony on, 394
Greater New England, 102, 103
Greeley, Horace, 402, 464, 482
Green, Duff, editor of *Telegraph*, 314
Green Bay, 132, 136
Greenback Party, The, 544
Greenbacks, issue of, 453; projects based on, 503; provision for redemption, 525
Greene, Nathanael, 173, 187; campaign of Carolinas, 193
Greenland, Norse discover, 6
Greenville, Treaty of, 229, 293
Greenwich Bay, 65
Greenwood, John, executed for Separatism, 39
Gregg, Josiah, *Commerce of the Prairies*, 360
Grenville, George, 149, 198; faction in ministry, 149, 152, 162, 164, 165
Grenville, Sir Richard, 14
Grenville-Bedford Ministry, 149, 164; its fall, 152; policies of, 162
Grey, Charles, 253
Grey, Sir Edward, 613, 614, 620; and House's secret overtures, 625
Groseilliers, Sieur des, 132, 138
Grundy, Felix, 266
Guadalupe Hidalgo, treaty of, 370, 371
Guadeloupe, 93, 143
Guale, 127
Guerrière, 265, 273
Guggenheims, interests of, 578
Guildford Court House, battle of, 193
Guilford, 82
Gulf states, competition in cotton growing, 291; demand for slaves, 342; Confederates in, surrender, 467
Gulflight, sinking of, 622
Gunboats, Jefferson devises, 242; use at Forts Henry and Donelson, 434
Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, prestige of Sweden under, 78

Habana, 143
Habeas corpus, suspension of, 451
Hague Conferences, The, 568
Haiti, 93
Hale, John P., 373
Half breeds, 527
Hall, Fort, 394
Halleck, General H. W., 433, 439, 443
Hamilton, Alexander, 217, 218, 226, 232, 233, 234, 235, 241; financial policy, 221–223; character, 224; on constitutionality of Bank, 225; and British agents, 230; war policy, 236; and election of 1800, 239; opposes disunion, 244; killed in duel with Burr, 245; fixes coinage ratio, 502
Hamilton, Andrew, defends freedom of press, 117

Hamilton, Governor Henry, of Detroit, 189; captured by Clark, 190
Hamilton, James A., 329
Hamilton, Paul, 269
Hamlin, Hannibal, 413, 464
Hammond, George, 232, 235, 236
Hampton, Wade, 272
Hampton, founded by Massachusetts, 63
Hampton, Va., British at, 277
Hancock, John, 155, 211, 217
Hancock, Winfield S., Democratic nominee 1880, 527
Hanna, Marcus A., 535, 537, 590, 591
Hanover, House of, character, 74
Hapsburg, House of, 125, 130
Harding, W. G., 691; nomination, 685; election, 686; scandals under, 687
Harlem Heights, Washington retires to, 182
Harlem Railroad, 508
Harmar, General Josiah, expedition of, fails, 228
Harmon, Judson, 598
Harper's Ferry, Brown's raid on, 412; captured by Jackson, 440; garrison of, 459
Harper's Magazine, 390, 550
Harpolyce, sinking of, 622
Harriman, E. H., 573, 574, 575
Harrington, James, political theories, 76, 85; influence, 88
Harris, Townsend, 555
Harrisburg, Pa., 459
Harrison, Benjamin, elected president 1888, 531, 532; defeated 1892, 533
Harrison, Burton, 565
Harrison, William H., 266; campaigns of, 270; victory of the Thames, 272; Indian policy, 293; secures Land Act of 1800, 294; candidate 1836, 349; and election of 1840, 351, 352; death, 353
Harrison's Landing, McClellan retires to, 438
Harte, Bret, 550
Hartford, 63
Hartford Convention, demands of, 276; New England attacked for, 317
"Hartford Wits," The, 282
Harvard College, 116, 390; University, 547
Harvey, Sir John, Governor of Virginia, 25
Hat Act, 1732, 107
Hauts de Meuse, France, 615, 660, 663
Hawaii, United States annexation of, 557; status defined, 565
Hawkins, John, 14, 16
Hawthorne, Nathaniel, 100, 389
Hay, John, as Secretary of State, 566, 567, 569
Hay-Pauncefote treaties, 569
Hayes, R. B., 483, 555; election of, 484, 524, 525; on Isthmian canal, 568, 569
Haymarket Riot, 540
Hayne, Robert, 238, 319; debate on Foot's Resolution, 317
Head-right, system of acquiring land in Virginia, 27
Heath, Sir Robert, grant in Carolina, 86
Hegemony, doctrine of, 559
Helena, Montana, founding of, 495
Helper, H. R., *Impending Crisis*, 412
Henderson, Richard, his Kentucky Colony, 166
Hendricks, T. A., 483
Henry IV, King of France, 130
Henry VII, King of England, policy, 11
Henry the Navigator, explorations of, 5, 6
Henry, John, letters of, 268
Henry, Patrick, 160, 201, 202, 284; radical resolutions of, 151; leader of Virginia upcountry, 167; opposition to Federal Constitution, 217
Henry, Fort, capture of, 433, 434
Hepburn Act, 593
Hesperian, sinking of, 624
Hesse-Cassel, mercenary troops from, 175
Hicks, Governor T. H., of Maryland, 427
Higginson, Colonel Henry Lee, 552
Hill, Isaac, member of Kitchen Cabinet, 314
Hill, James J., 510, 575
Hobkirk's Hill, battle of, 193
Holland, *see* Netherlands
Holt, Joseph, 420
Holy Alliance, The, 303
Homestead Act, The, 518, 519
Homestead exemption, in Wisconsin constitution, 335
Homestead, Pennsylvania, 517
Hood, J. B., 458, 463, 465, 466
Hood, Admiral Samuel, 194, 195
Hooker, Joseph, 442, 458, 459, 462
Hooker, Thomas, 52, 53

Hoover, Herbert, 617, 687; food administrator, 633
Horse racing, 389, 488, 587
House, Col. E. M., 613, 677; mission of 1914–15, 622; secret mission 1916, 624; on peace delegation, 669; ignores secret treaties, 673
House of Commons, *see* Parliament
House of Lords, *see* Parliament
House of Representatives, *see* Congress
Houston, Sam, and San Jacinto, 361, 364
Howard of Effingham, Lord, governor of Virginia, 97
Howe, Lord, commands British fleet at New York, 181
Howe, Sir William, 174, 175, 181, 183, 184, 185, 188
Howells, W. D., 550
Huckleberry Finn, 550
Hudson, Henry, 34, 77, 138
Hudson Bay, 129, 132; English occupy, 138; Americans barred from region, 232
Hudson River, 34, 110, 181, 182, 183; fur trade of, 65; discovery of, 77; campaigns of 1776 and 1777, 180; engagements on, 187
Hudson River Railroad, 508
Hudson River School, of painting, 282, 552
Hudson's Bay Company, 138, 139, 493; in Oregon, 358
Huerta, Victoriano, 604, 605
Hughes, C. E., 596, 687; insurance investigation, 576; candidate 1916, 625; defeated, 626
Huguenots, Florida colony destroyed 1565, 9, 127; in Carolina, 89; along seacoast, 112; barred from New France, 134
Hull, Isaac, captures the *Guerrière*, 273
Hull, William, 269, 270
Hull House, 580
Hundred Associates, 134
Hungarians, United States attitude toward, 381, 382
Hungary, 671, 672
Hunter, General D., emancipation order recalled, 441
Huntington, Collis P., 511, 574
Huron, Lake, discovered, 132
Hurons, French allied with, 131; Jesuits among, 132
Hutchinson, Anne, 48, 49, 50, 56
Hutchinson, Thomas, 154, 216; argues for supremacy of Parliament, 160; quoted, 162; and tea episode, 168, 169

Iberville, Sieur d', 136
Iberville River, designated boundary of Louisiana, 248
Iceland, Norse discover, 6
Idaho, a territory 1863, 495; farming difficulties in, 519; a state 1890, 533
Illinois, 95, 137, 166, 293, 294, 297, 309, 325, 352, 402, 427, 428, 451, 491, 494, 581, 638; territory, 292; pro-slavery forces, 299; Constitution of 1848, 335; internal improvement mania, 349; state bank of, 350; delayed railroad building in, 386; New England migration to, 391; peopling of, 392; Republican party formed in, 397, 398; election of 1858 in, 409, 411; opposition to war in, 452; Granger legislation in, 513; foreign element in, 520, 521; Granger movement in, 543
Illinois Central Railroad, and settlement of Illinois, 392; finances Union Pacific, 574
Immigration, causes of, 333, 334; increase of 1870–90, 519; problems of, 579, 580; Laws, 1921, 1924, 686, 687; restriction and Japan, 692
Impeachment, of judges, 243; nature of, 475, 476
Impending Crisis, by H. R. Helper, 412
Imperialism, growth of, 564, 570
Impressment, by British, 251, 253, 254, 279
Imprisonment for debt, abolition of, 335
Income tax, 454, 602; of July, 1861, 431; of 1894, 534; and World War, 636; reduction of, 686
Indentured servants, how procured, 27; disposal of, when freed, 28; settle in North Carolina, 95; in Indiana and Illinois, 299; disappearance of, 340
Independent party of 1876, 544
Independent Treasury, *see* Subtreasury, 351
Independents, Radical, *see* Levellers
India, 4, 5, 7, 17, 126, 137, 143, 145
Indian, problem, 147; buffer state, proposed, 228, 229, 280; department, 149, 165; cession treaties 1784–1789, 227; negotiations, 1793, 228; agents, peculations of, 497
Indian Territory, removal of Indians to, 325

Indiana, 293, 294, 297, 349, 350, 402, 427, 451, 483, 491; territory, 270, 292, 299; state university, 283, 548; constitution of 1851, 335; New England migration to, 391; formation of Republican party in, 397; opposition to war in, 452
Indianapolis, 392
Indians, 115, 148, 149, 184, 189, 228, 229, 233, 234, 292, 301; how named, 7; in Virginia, 95, 96; in New England, 99, 100; diplomacy toward, 110; British policy toward, 208, 227; American policy toward, 227, 293, 294, 311, 324, 325, 333, 497; removal to trans-Missouri, 395; in the Far West, 496, 497; *see also* names of tribes
Indigo, an "enumerated article," 92, 121
Industrial Workers of the World, 539
Industry, mobilization of, for war, 635, 636
Ingham, S. D., secretary of the treasury, 313, 314
Initiative, 595, 596, 690
Inland Steel Company, 574
Inness, George, 552
Instructions, of royal governors, 109
Intendant in New France, 135
Interallied Conference, 636
Interior Department, Indian policy of, 497
Internal improvements, 296, 297, 298; in Pennsylvania, 289; interests of northwest and southwest, 293, 295; in campaign of 1824, 308; Adams' policy, 311; constitutional question, 323, 324; and the Whigs, 336; state systems, 349, 350
Internal Revenue Act, Civil War, 454; World War, 636
Interstate Commerce Act, of 1887, 530
Interstate Commerce Commission, establishment of, 514; powers enlarged, 593
"Intolerable Acts," passed, 167, 169
Inventions, development of, 578
Iowa, 294, 518; constitutions of 1844 and 1846, 355; a state 1846, 392; migration to, 391, 393; anti-Nebraska movement in, 397; Granger legislation in, 513; foreign element in, 520, 521; demands tariff revision 1902, 592
Ireland, 77, 92, 93, 111, 145, 158
Irish, immigration of, 520, 521; anti-English sentiments of, 579
Iron and steel, 120, 121
Iroquois, 81, 110, 114, 131, 132, 133, 136, 139, 191
Irrigation, development in West, 519; and Newlands Act, 594
Irving, Washington, 282, 389; *Knickerbocker's History of New York*, 78, 259
Isabella, Queen of Castile, 7, 125, 126
Island No. 10, captured, 435, 439
Is-sur-Tille, France, 650
Isthmian Canal, 382, 568–570
Italians, immigration of, 520, 521
Italy, 264, 622, 638, 665, 692; withdraws her minister 1891, 554; position of 1914, 610; joins Entente, 617; military disaster 1917, 653, 654; Fourteen Points on, 667; military activity of, 671; and Secret Treaties, 672; and Council of Ten, 673; represented by Orlando, 674; demands of, 678
Iturbide, Agustin de, 302

Jackson, Andrew, 294, 305, 316, 336, 348, 365; defense of New Orleans, 278, 279; and Florida, 301; life and character, 307, 308; vote for, 1824, 309; and the Corrupt Bargain, 310; campaign of 1828, 312; as President, 313; and nullification, 319, 320; forms a national party, 322; Indian policy, 324, 325; public land policy, 325, 327; French policy, 328; and the Bank, 328, 333; the Bank veto, 329, 330; and removal of deposits, 332; achievement, 337; and Mexico, 363
Jackson, Mrs. Andrew, 312
Jackson, Claiborne, secessionist governor of Missouri, 428
Jackson, Francis J., 263, 265
Jackson, Stonewall (T. J.), 438, 440; joins Confederacy, 429; valley campaign, 437; outflanks Pope, 439; at Chancellorsville, 459
Jackson, Michigan, formation of Republican party at, 397
Jackson, Miss., battle of, 461
Jackson's Hole, 358, 493
Jacobins, 231
Jamaica, 93
James I, King of Great Britain, 24; religious policy, 37; claims divine right, 39; "connives" at Plymouth, 42
James II, King of Great Britain, 71, 83, 85, 86; attempts to restore Catholicism, 72; dethronement of, 73; granted New York, 79; attitude

toward New York, 81; grants New Jersey, 82; friend of Penn, 84; attempts colonial consolidation, 94
James, Duke of York, *see* James II
James, Henry, 550
James Boys, The, 551
James River, 96, 437; fall line of, 95; McClellan's change of base to, 438
Jamestown, 28, 96, 97, 127, 128; unhealthy site, 20; assembly meets at, 24
Japan, 628; and Commodore Perry, 382; relations with, 555–556, 566–568; Twenty-one Demands, 672, 673; on Council of Ten, 674; demands Shantung, 679; relations with, 692
Java captured by *Constitution*, 274
Jay, John, 191, 203, 204, 218, and Treaty of 1783, 195, 196; quoted, 205; and Jay's Treaty, 232
Jay's Treaty, 229, 232, 233, 234, 255
Jefferson, Joseph, 551
Jefferson, Thomas, 78, 160, 194, 234, 242, 244, 254, 255, 269, 288, 289, 316; quoted, 122; drafts Declaration of Independence, 177; and Virginia legislation, 201; and ideals of the Revolution, 202; and Ordinance of 1784, 209; character, 225, 226; principles, 226; foreign policy, 230; and election of 1796, 234; and Kentucky Resolutions, 237; policy, 238; and election of 1800, 239, 240; as President, 241; attack on judiciary, 243; reëlection of, 245; ideas of foreign policy, 246; and Florida, 249, 250; and Burr, 250, 251; retaliatory measures, 253; recommends embargo, 256; and embargo enforcement, 257; end of term, 258; end of career, 259; policy satirized by Irving, 259–260; and University of Virginia, 283
Jenkinson, Anthony, seeks route to Far East, 17
Jesuits, 127, 132, 135, 136, 358, 359
Jewish citizens, rights in Russia, 554
Johns Hopkins University, graduate instruction at, 547
Johnson, Andrew, 477, 496; vice presidential candidate, 464; reconstruction policy, 471; policy defeated, 474, 475; acquittal, 476
Johnson, Herschel V., vice presidential candidate, 414
Johnson, Senator Hiram, 626; opposes League of Nations, 669; and Treaty of Versailles, 683
Johnson, Magnus, 695
Johnson, Colonel R. M., 266, 272, 348
Johnson, Samuel, 192
Johnson, Tom, 595
Johnson, Sir William, 139, 141, 166
Johnson, William S., 213
Johnson, Fort, 424
Johnston, Albert Sidney, commands in West, 433; retires to Corinth, 434; killed at Shiloh, 435
Johnston, Joseph E., 436, 458, 460–462, 467, 525; at Bull Run, 431; replaced by Lee, 437, 438; Atlanta campaign, 463
Joliet, Illinois, and steel, 517
Jolliet, Louis, 135
Jones, John Paul, captures *Serapis*, 192
Jones, Commodore T. A. C., 364
Jones, William, 297
Jones, Willie, 111
Jones Act, 565
Joseph, King of Spain, brother of Napoleon, 262
Judges, colonial, paid out of Townshend duties, 153; tenure, North Carolina, 203; tenure, Massachusetts, 204; proposal for removal of, 244
Judiciary, in state constitutions, 199; in New York, 204; federal, 211, 215; in newer states, 335; acts, 220, 239, 242
Jugoslavia, importance of Fiume to, 678
Jungle, The, by Upton Sinclair, 578
Jury, common law status of, 12
Justices of the Peace, under Tudors, 11; in Virginia, 29; in Maryland, 32
Juvigny, France, 32d Division at, 659

Kanawha River, 114
Kansas, troubles in, 398, 400, 401, 407; campaign issue, 401–402, 411; railroad building in, 510–511; extension of farms in, 519; Populists in, 544
Kansas-Nebraska Act, 394, 395, 396, 397, 494
Kansas Pacific Railroad, 511
Kaskaskia, 136
Kearny, S. W., Santa Fé expedition, 368
Kearny, Fort, 394, 494
Kelley, O. H., 543
Kellogg, W. P., 482
Kelly, William, steel process used by, 491

Kendall, Amos, member of Kitchen Cabinet, 314; and abolition publications, 346
Kenesaw Mountain, 463
Kennebec River, 79
Kent Island, 33
Kentucky, 115, 189, 190, 208, 228, 279, 289, 297, 298, 309, 330, 349, 381, 414, 443, 482, 491; Henderson's colony in, 166; settlement in, 207; Burr in, 250; admission of, 1792, 292; Constitution of 1850, 335; state bank of, 350; held in union, 427, 428; abolition of slavery in, 472
Kentucky Resolutions, contents of, 237; Calhoun and, 316; interpretation of, 318
Kentucky River, Indian boundary pushed to, 166
Keppel, Admiral Augustus, refuses to serve against Americans, 180
Key, D. M., 525
Key, Francis Scott, and *The Star Spangled Banner*, 277
Kiao-Chau, seized by Japan, 673
Kidd, Captain William, 129
Kieft, Wilhelmus, Dutch governor, 78
Kindergarten, introduction of, 548
King, President H. C., 679
King, Rufus, 211, 258
King George's War, 139, 140
King Philip's War, 65, 99, 100
King William's War, 139
King-Crane Commission, 679
King's College, *see* Columbia
King's Mountain, 189, 190
Kitchener, Earl, 617
Kluck, General von, 617
Knickerbocker's History of New York, 78; a satire on Jefferson, 259; distinction of, 282
Knights of Columbus, war service of, 638
Knights of Labor, 539, 540, 544
Knights of the White Camelia, 476
Know-Nothing Party, in campaign of 1856, 398, 399, 401
Knox, Henry, 182, 187
Knox, P. C., 559, 596; and dollar diplomacy, 570
Knoxville, 461, 462
Koerner, Gustavus, 465
Kolchak, Vladimir Vasilievich, 670
Korea, American relations with, 556
Kriemhilde Stellung, 662
Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 574
Ku Klux Klan, 476, 689; act, 481
Labor, prosperity of 1897–1920, 572; and the World War, 638; improvement in conditions, 693
Labor, Department of, created, 604
Labor Unions, development of, 334, 539, 540; *see also* Trade Unions
Laboring class, rise of, 334
Labrador, 302
Laconia, sinking of, 628
Lafayette, Marquis de, joins Washington, 186; Virginia campaign, 193, 194, 195
La Follette, Senator R. M., 590, 596; policies, 595; and election of 1912, 597; filibuster 1917, 627; third party 1924, 688; following of, 695
Laird's, and confederate rams, 449
Lake Borgne, 279
Lake Champlain, 110, 207, 269; campaign on, 272
Lake Erie, 140
Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railroad, 508
Lake Shore Railroad, The, 386
Lamar, M. B., President of Texas, 364
Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, 110
Land, companies seek Maryland's support, 191; grants, in New France, 134; policy, Penn's liberal, 85; speculation in, 111, 113, 166–167; *see also* Public Lands
"Landed States," 191
Landgraves, title under Fundamental Constitutions, 88
"Landless States," 191
Lane, Joseph, vice presidential candidate, 414
Langres, 615, 650, 651
Lansing, John, 216
Lansing, Robert, secretary of state, 669, 677
Lansing-Ishii Agreement, 672, 673
Laramie, Fort, 394, 494
Large State Plan, *see* Virginia Plan
La Salle, Sieur de, 133; enterprize of, 135; Texas colony, 359
Las Guasimas, 563
Latin America, relations with, 557, 563
Laud, William, Archbishop of Canterbury, 59
Law, John, 136, 137
Law of God, Puritan emphasis on, 38, 39
Law of Nature, in Declaration of Independence, 177
Law Schools, 283
Lawrence, 272

Lawrence, Kan., proslavery attack on, 400
Lawrence, Mass., strike at, 579
Lawson, Thomas W., financial exposes by, 577
League of Nations, promised in Fourteen Points, 667, 668; American opposition to, 669; genesis of, 675; provisions, 676; American criticism of, 676, 677; Wilson's faith in, 681; American misgivings, 682, 683; theory of, 691
Leatherstocking Tales, J. F. Cooper, 282
Leavenworth, Fort, 394, 494
Lecompte, Judge, S. D., 400
Lecompton Constitution, framing of, 407; Buchanan approves, 408; in Congress, 409
Lee, Arthur, 185
Lee, Charles, 182, 184
Lee, Henry, 187
Lee, Richard Henry, 177, 201, 217
Lee, Robert E., 370, 442, 465; joins Confederacy, 429; plans of 1862, 436; commands against McClellan, 438; invasion of Maryland, 439; campaigns of 1863, 458, 459; Virginia campaign, 463, 464; surrenders at Appomattox, 466, 467
Lee, Fort, 182
Leet men, in Carolina, 88
Legal education, in 1815, 283
Legislatures, colonial, nature of, 107; in state constitutions, 199; John Adams on, 200; in Virginia, 201; in Pennsylvania, 202; in North Carolina, 203; senators elected by, 213; corruption in, 387, 388, 515
Leipzig, battle of, 275
Leisler, Jacob, in New York, 104, 105
Leopard, attack on *Chesapeake*, 254, 262
Lesser Antilles, European possessions in, 93
Letter to Governor Hamilton, 318
Levant, trade with, 13, 286
Levellers, 75, 76
Lever Act, 633
Lewis, Andrew, Virginia land speculator, 167
Lewis Meriwether, 248, 302, 493
Lewis, Major W. B., member of Kitchen Cabinet, 314
Lewis and Clark, exploration by, 248
Lexington, battle of, 172, 173
Lexington, Kentucky, naming of, 173; branch of Second Bank at, 328
Liberal Republican movement, 481, 482
Liberalism, growth of, 595, 596
Liberator, The, 345
Liberty, rescue of, 155
Liberty Bonds, sale to small purchasers, 637, 638
Liberty of conscience, 58
Liberty Party, and campaign of 1840, 352
Licenses, Napoleon's system, 264
Lichnowsky, Prince, 613
Lieutenant General, in French colonial system, 133
Liliuokalani, Queen, 557
Lincoln, Abraham, 397, 402, 403, 415, 438, 450, 451, 508, 555; candidate for senate, 409; life, 410; senatorial election 1858, 410, 411; nomination of 1860, 413; inauguration of, 422; solution of Fort Sumter problem, 423, 424; call for troops, 426, 431; holds Kentucky in the Union, 428; as a military leader, 429; difficulties with McClellan, 436; and emancipation, 440, 442; relations with his generals, 458; reëlection of, 464, 465; assassination of, 467; place in history, 468; reconstruction policy, 470, 471
Lincoln, General Benjamin, captured at Charleston, 188
Lincoln-Douglas Debates, 381, 410, 411
L'Insurgente, capture of, 236
Litchfield, Connecticut, law school at, 283
Literature, development of, 116, 282, 283, 389, 586
Little Belt, The, 265
Little Big Horn, The, massacre of, 497
Little Tennessee River, 115, 138
Little Theater, movements, 587
Livingston, Edward, 320, 328, 331; interpretation of constitution, 318; secretary of state, 327
Livingston, R. R., 203; purchase of Louisiana, 247; and Florida, 249
Livingston family, in New York politics, 110
Lloyd-George, David, 654, 672, 674, 675, 677, 678, 680, 681
Locarno, 691
Locke, John, political writings, 76, 87
Locofocos, 333, 334; and the subtreasury, 351; Democratic faction, 354, 355.
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 530, 546; exten-

sion of Monroe Doctrine, 558; and Treaty of Versailles, 683
Logan, John A., vice presidential nominee 1884, 529
London, 13, 29, 115, 122
London Company, *see* Virginia Company
Long, S. H., 493
Long Island, 36, 50, 79, 80, 81, 510; battle of, 181, 185
Long Parliament, 60, 71
Longfellow, Henry W., 283, 389
Longstreet, Judge A. B., 283, 292
Longstreet, James, 460, 462
Lookout Mountain, 462
Lopez, Narcisso, filibustering expeditions to Cuba, 382
Lorraine, French offensive in, 616
Lost Mountain, 463
Louis XIII, King of France, 130
Louis XIV, King of France, 72, 133, 135
Louis Philippe, King of the French, 328
Louisbourg, 139, 140, 142
Louisiana, 137, 143, 208, 231, 241, 249, 250, 251, 299, 300, 309, 359, 477, 482; acquisition of, 246–248; importance, 248; boundaries, 248, 249; a state 1812, 293; against tariff of 1816, 297; secession, 416; Lincoln's reconstruction of, 470, 471; abolition of slavery, 472; election of 1876 in, 483, 484; Hayes's policy in, 524
Louisiana Purchase, British traders barred from, 267; does it include West Florida? 300; slavery barred in north of 36° 30′, 300
Louisville, Kentucky, 285
Louisville and Portland Canal, vetoed by Jackson, 324
Lovejoy, Elijah, murder of, 345
Lovelace, Francis, governor of New York, 81
Lowden, Frank O., 685
Lowell, James R., 389
Lowell, Mass., 391
Lowndes, William, 266, 291, 315
Loyal League, 476
Loyalist Legion, Tarleton's, 193
Loyalists, Congress advises disarmament of, 176; treaty provisions regarding, 196
Ludendorff, General Erich, 654, 658, 662
Ludwell, Governor Philip, in Carolina, 89
Lumber, colonial export to West Indies, 122; and Boston trade, 286
Lundy's Lane, battle of, 275
Lusitania, sinking of the, 623, 624
Lutheran, church in colonies, 117
Lyon, Nathaniel, 428
Lyons, Lord, 447
Lys, 655

McAdoo, W. G., 602, 636–637, 685, 688
McClellan, George B., 427, 429; organizes Union army, 433; Peninsular campaign, 436–438; army withdrawn, 439; Antietam campaign, 439–440; removal of, 442; Democratic candidate 1864, 464–465
McClure's Magazine, 577, 586
McCormick, C. H., 517
McCormick Harvester Works, strike at, 540
McCulloch *vs.* Maryland, Marshall's decision in, 315, 328
McDonough, Thomas, on Lake Champlain, 275
McDowell, General Irvin, 429, 431, 436, 437, 439
McDuffie, George, 315
Macedonia, 660
Macedonian, captured by Decatur, 273
McGillivray, Alexander, Creek chief, 233
McHenry, James, 236, 239
McKean, Thomas, 202
Mackenzie, Alexander, 302
McKim, C. F., 552
Mackinac, 136, 138, 227, 266, 272, 493; British capture, 269
McKinley, William, 563, 564, 591, 592; elected President 1896, 535; and war with Spain, 561, 562; assassinated, 590
McKinley Tariff, 533, 560
McLane, Louis, Secretary of State, 327, 328, 331
Maclay, William, diary of, 220
McLean, John, postmaster general, 312; justice Supreme Court, 406
Macomb, Alexander, 275
Macon, Nathaniel, 263, 290
Macon's Bill, number two, 263, 264
Madeira, 92, 150
Madero, Francisco, murder of, 604
Madison, James, 201, 211, 217, 218, 221, 230, 232, 242, 246, 261, 262, 266, 274, 275, 296; on the constitution, 216; on the Bank, 225; and

Virginia Resolutions, 237; policy, 238, 259; elected President 1808, 258; foreign policy, 264, 265; and War of 1812, 268, 269; reëlected 1812, 276; flight from Bladensburg, 277; vetoes Bonus Bill, 297; annexes Florida, 300; constitutional interpretation, 318
Magna Charta, its significance, 10
Magoffin, Governor Beriah, of Kentucky, 428
Mails, abolition publications barred from, 346
Maine, 97, 98, 101, 109, 330; English settle in, 39; granted to Gorges, 59; charter of 1639, 60; absorbed by Massachusetts, 64; British conquests in, 276; settlement of, 286; frontier influences, 291; a state, 300; international boundary settled, 354; Republican party formed in, 398
Maine, The, incident of, 561, 562
Mainz, French bridgehead, 663, 671
Malvern Hill, battle of, 438
Manassas, 431, 436
Manchester, 391
Manchuria, Russo-Japanese War in, 566, 567
Mandamus, writ of, 242
Mandates, principle of, 676
Mangin, General Charles M. E., 658, 659
Mangum, W. P., presidential candidate 1836, 349
Manhattan Island, 77, 131, 181
Manifest Destiny, 356
Manila, 143
Manila Bay, battle of, 564
Manila galleon, The, 359
Manors, in Carolina, 88
Manufacturing, slow colonial growth, 120, 121; fostered by Continental Congress, 170; in Pennsylvania, 289, 391; in New England home industries, 109, 286, 391; embargo fosters, 257; protection to, 277, 297; statistics of, 1870–1900, 518; in South, 457, 519
Marbury *vs.* Madison, Marshall's decision, 242
March to the Sea, The, 465
Marcy, W. L., 380, 382, 383
Marietta, Ohio, 292
Marines, United States, 652
Marion, Francis, 188
Marne, first battle of, 617; river, 656
Marquette, Father Jacques, 135
Marshall, John, 217, 235, 239, 243, 244; chief justice, 242; decision in Fletcher *vs.* Peck, 245; definition of treason, 251; decision as to Indian states, 294; nationalist interpretation of Constitution, 315, 316; decision in Worcester *vs.* Georgia, 325
Martha's Vineyard, 79, 99
Martial law, enforced on civilians, 451; trial of Lincoln's assassins by, 467
Martin, Governor Josiah, of North Carolina, 176
Martin, Luther, 216
Martinique, 93
Marx, Karl, doctrines of, 538, 539
Mary, Queen of England, church policy of, 13
Mary II, Queen of Great Britain, wife of William of Orange, 73
Maryland, 26, 36, 84, 94, 108, 111, 115, 118, 121, 122, 151, 172, 206, 211, 239, 276, 298, 330, 312, 349, 402, 428, 440, 459, 482; charter, 30, 31; government, 31, 32, 33; contests with Virginia, 33, 34; Toleration Act, 33; economic and political status, 34; Revolution of 1688 in, 103, 104; eighteenth century, 110, 111; leader of landless states, 191; conservative constitution, 203; forces land cessions by the States, 208; ratifies constitution, 217; free primary schools, 284; in 1815, 289; held in Union, 427; abolition of slavery, 472
Mason, George, 201, 207, 211
Mason, J. M., 447
Mason, J. Y., 382
Mason, Captain John, 59, 60, 63, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103
Mason and Slidell, incident of, 447
Massachusetts, 35, 50, 52, 53, 57–59, 64, 65, 108, 109, 114, 122, 151, 176, 200, 210, 245, 292, 300, 334, 349, 381, 398; autocratic government in, 46; evolution of government, 47; and Roger Williams, 48; and Ann Hutchinson, 49, 50; dominates New England, 59; and England 1644–1646, 61; expansion of, 62, 63; absorbs Maine, 64; in Acadia, 65; and Charles II, 97; violation of Acts of Trade, 98; under James II, 102; general court, 101, 160, 216; end of royal government in, 169; army adopted by Congress, 173; sea to sea claims, 191; Constitution, 204; in Philadelphia Convention,

211, 212; Bill of Rights, 215; ratifies Federal Constitution, 217; disunion sentiment in, 258; refuses to aid War of 1812, 275, 276; shipbuilding, 285; politics 1807–1815, 286; Constitution of 1780 abolishes slavery, 298; protests gag rules, 347; foreign elements in, 521; adopts Australian ballot, 546
Massachusetts Bay Company, 43; charter, 44; transfer of corporation to America, 45; quo warranto against, 60; charter voided, 101, 102
Massasoit, 100
Matagorda Bay, 136
Mather, Cotton, and witchcraft, 118
Mather, Increase, 103
Maumee River, 228
Maumee Valley, 228
Maverick, Samuel, 98
Maximilian, Emperor of Mexico, 479, 480
Mayflower, 40
Mayflower Compact, 41, 43, 70
Mayhew, Jonathan, apostle to Indians, 99
Maysville Turnpike, vetoed by Jackson, 324
Mazarin, Cardinal, 133
Meade, G. G., 462; and Gettysburg, 459
Medical education, 283
Meigs, Fort, 270
Mein, John, 154
Melba, Madame Nellie, 552
Mellon, Andrew, 687
Menendez, Pedro, occupies Florida, 127
Mennonites, 112, 117
Mercantilism, a commercial policy, 91, 93; French, 133
Merchant marine, how promoted by mercantilism, 92; American, declines, 387
Merchant ships, arming of, 627
Merrimac River, 43, 63; fur trade of, 65; valley of, 103; shipbuilding, 285
Merrimac, The, 436, 437
Merry, Anthony, Burr and, 250
Methodism, extension of, 117, 284
Methodists, in Connecticut, 287; views on slavery, 341, 343; in the 'fifties, 390
Metz, 660, 663
Meuse-Argonne offensive, 660, 663
Meuse River, 660, 661, 663
Mexico, 127, 340, 372, 373; Burr plans conquest, 250; passed in population by United States, 285; and Texas, 360, 361; character, 362, 363; relations with, 364; resents annexation of Texas, 365, 366; French ambitions in, 446; policy toward, 479; situation in, 604, 605; German overtures to, 628; relations with, 692
Mexico, Gulf of, 136
Mexico, War with, 125, 356, 357, 367
Mexico City, 127, 285, 369, 370
Mézières-Sedan Railroad, importance of, 661
Miami River, 228
Miantonomoh, 56, 57
Michigan, territory, 283, 292; constitution of 1850, 335; and internal improvements, 349; early railroads in, 386; New England migration to, 391; a state 1836, 392; abstains from Peace Convention, 1861, 422; foreign elements in, 520, 521; representation in, 581
Michigan, Lake, visited by Nicolet, 132
Michigan, University of, 391, 547, 548
Michigan Central Railroad, 386, 508
Michillimackinac Company, 267
Mifflin, Thomas, 202
Milan Decree, 255, 264; fraudulent repeal, 268
Milburne, Jacob, rebellion of, 104
Militia, 179, 270, 275, 276
Mill Springs, battle of, 435
Mills Tariff Bill, 531
Milnes, H. M., 447
Milroy, R. H., 437
Milwaukee, 392
Mine barrage, 640
Mining booms, in the Rockies, 495, 496
Minnesota, 393, 497, 513, 520, 521, 694
Mint, United States, 222, 502
Minuit, Peter, governor of New Netherland, 78
Miranda, Francisco de, and Spanish America, 236
Missionary Ridge, 462
Missions, Spanish, 358, 359
Mississippi, 299, 325, 342; a state 1817, 293; territory, 300; Georgia cedes claim to, 311; repudiation in, 351; and Compromise of 1850, 379; secession, 416; reconstruction delayed, 477; reconstruction in, 479
Mississippi, University of, 390

Mississippi Company, 136
Mississippi River, 129, 132, 135, 136, 143, 196, 233, 234, 247, 272, 278, 279, 280, 434, 435, 460, 461; navigation of, Congress offers to yield, 191
Mississippi Valley, 285; fur trade of, 65; danger of a French colony in, 247
Missouri, 294, 298, 309, 352, 396, 404, 405, 414, 440, 482, 494; admission of, 298, 300; and Compromise of 1850, 378; a state 1821, 392; held in Union, 427, 428; abolition of slavery in, 472; and Liberal Republican movement, 481
Missouri Compromise, 298, 300, 374–376, 421; repeal of, 394, 395; declared unconstitutional, 406
Missouri Pacific Railroad, strike on, 540
Missouri River, artery of fur trade, 137, 267, 493
Mobile, 137, 386, 430; Congress extends jurisdiction over, 249
Mobile Bay, 465
Mohawk Valley, 110, 114, 183
Molasses Act, of 1733, 123
Molly Maguires, 490
Moltke, Helmuth von, 615, 616
Money, function of, 499; confused with capital, 500, 501; *see* Banking, Currency, Gold
Monitor, The, 436
Monk, George, *see* Albemarle, Duke of
Monmouth, battle of, 187
Monopoly price, application of, by trusts, 506
Monroe, James, 183, 235, 253, 254, 260, 266, 269, 276, 277, 298, 300, 303, 306; and purchase of Louisiana, 247; and Florida, 249; and election of 1808, 258; elected President 1816, 296
Monroe Doctrine, The, 302, 304; development, 558; South American view, 559; and League of Nations, 676, 677
Montana, farming difficulties in, 519; territory, 495; state, 533
Montcalm, Marquis de, 141–143
Montdidier-Noyon defensive, June, 1918, 656
Montenegro, Fourteen Points on, 667
Monterey, 369
Montfaucon, France, 661
Montgomery, Richard, 180, 181
Montgomery, Alabama, 416, 417; first confederate capital, 431
Montmorency River, 142
Montreal, 9, 130, 132, 135, 143, 181
Moravian Church, in colonies, 112, 117
Morgan, General Daniel, defeats Tarleton, 193
Morgan, Harry, 129
Morgan, J. H., confederate cavalry leader, 443
Morgan, J. P., 507, 508, 510, 517, 575
Morgan, J. P. & Co., 507, 508, 511, 512, 573, 574
Morgan, Junius S., 507
Morgan, William, 330
Mormons, The, 394, 494, 496
Morrill Land Grant Act, 548
Morrill Tariff, The, 498
Morris, Gouverneur, 203, 211, 242
Morris, Robert, 202
Morris Island, 424
Morristown, 183
Morton, O. P., 524
Motley, J. L., historical writing of, 389
Moultrie, Fort, at Charleston, S. C., 418, 419, 420
"Muckraking," Roosevelt's phrase, 577
Mugwumps, The, 530, 546
Municipal ownership, 595
Munn *vs.* Illinois, 514
Murfreesboro, battle of, 443
Mutual guarantee, origin of, in League of Nations, 675

Nacogdoches, 359
Nancy, France, 615
Nantucket, 79, 99
Napoleon I, 246, 247, 248, 250, 256, 262, 263, 274, 275; decrees of, 254, 255
Napoleon III, Civil War policy of, 445, 446
Narragansett Bay, 48, 100
Narragansetts, 99, 100
Narváez, Panfilo de, 127
Nashville, 307, 328, 466
Nashville Convention, The, 378
Nassau, Fort, foundation of, 77
Natchez, 137
Natchitoches, 137
Nation, The, 545
National Army, The, division numbers of, 641, 642
National Army Camps, 642
National Bank Act, 454, 455
National City Bank of New York, 517
National Defense Act, 641
National Guard, condition in 1917,

630; and National Defense Act, 641; division numbers of, 642; divisions arrive in France, 652
National Labor Party, of 1872, 543
National Labor Union, 539
National League, formation of, 549
National Republicans, 332; convention of, 330
National Research Council, 635
National Tube Company, 573
National Union Convention, 474
Nationalism, reflected in mercantilist policy, 91; in the West, 296; challenged by sectionalism, 298; development of, 305; defended by Webster, 317; of Jackson, 320; and the Democratic party, 333; spirit of, in the Jackson era, 356
Naturalization Act of 1798, 236
Naval limitation, 692
Naval stores, 92, 121, 291
Navigation Act, of 1663, 121; of 1696, 107; *see also* Acts of Trade
Navigation Acts, *see* Acts of Trade
Navy, United States, in Revolution, 192; Republican policy toward, 241–242; in War of 1812, 269, 273, 274, 276; asset to North, 429, 430; increase of, 564; world cruise, 567; condition 1917, 630, 639; world war service, 640
Nebraska, 511, 519, 544; territory organized, 395; statehood, 496; foreign elements in, 321
Negroes, 110, 111, 340, 341, 393, 429; removed by British 1783, 227, 233; effect of slavery on, 344; citizenship in Dred Scott Decision, 405; troops, South employs, 458; problem of, after 1865, 470; and reconstruction, 473, 476, 477, 478, 482; disfranchised in the South, 484; problem, 694
Nelson, Justice Samuel, 405, 423
Netherlands, The, 40, 93, 125, 126, 192, 264, 692
Neufchâteau, France, 650
Neutral trade, question of, 229, 279; fraudulent, 263
Nevada, statehood in, 496
Nevis, 224
New Amstel, renamed Newcastle, 80
New Amsterdam, 259; renamed New York, 80
New England, 36, 61, 89, 93, 115, 117, 119, 139, 159, 172, 179, 180, 210, 223, 239, 258, 274, 277, 288, 292, 297, 298, 305, 309, 312, 317, 330, 334, 339, 341, 452; explored 1602–1605, 19; early colonization, 34, 35; economic and social life, 65–68; education in, 68; settlement, 103; colonial trade of, 122, 123; and West India trade, 230; and War of 1812, 267, 275–277; in 1815, 285–287; railroad development in, 386; development of manufactures, 391; migration from, 392; foreign elements in, 521
New England Confederation, 64, 65
New England Emigrant Aid Society, 398; and Kansas, 400
New France, 134, 135
New Hampshire, '60, 97, 98, 102, 103, 173, 176, 207, 330, 352; granted to Mason, 59; expansion of Massachusetts in, 63; made a separate province, 101; advised to form a provisional government, 176; constitution of 1776, 199; constitution of 1784, 200; ratifies Federal Constitution, 217
New Harmony, community at, 335
New Haven, 52, 62, 64, 65, 159; foundation of, 54, 55; church and state in, 55; absorbed in Connecticut, 55; expansion of, 78
New Jersey, 36, 81, 118, 151, 172, 176, 179, 183, 195, 210, 239, 312, 349, 402, 451, 462, 483; grant of, 82; divided, 83; 18th century, 110; constitution of, 202; ratifies constitution, 217; character of, 288; constitution of 1844, 335; fusion ticket in, 1860, 414; foreign elements in, 521; *see also* East Jersey, West Jersey
New Jersey Plan, 212
New Mexico, 358, 359, 376, 377, 396, 421, 520; did slavery exist in? 374; forms state constitution, 375; Compromise of 1850, 378
"New Nationalism, The," 597
New Netherland, 65, 77, 78, 79, 81, 99
New Orleans, 136, 137, 143, 189, 208, 234, 247, 278, 279, 285, 295, 386, 395, 430, 435
New Providence, 61
New Spain, viceroyalty of, 127; northward extension of, 359
New York (province and state), 36, 81, 84, 86, 102, 108, 112, 115, 118, 119, 122, 139, 151, 153, 169, 171, 177, 181, 191, 207, 210, 217, 228, 239, 244, 245, 258, 275, 276, 277, 287, 288, 292, 305, 307, 309, 312, 313, 374, 483, 509, 576, 581; Revolution of 1688 in, 103, 104; slow

growth, 109, 110; loyalism in, 172, 179; constitution of, 203; contest over Constitution in, 218; state school funds, 283, 284; state university of, 283; New England migration to, 286; and internal improvements, 349; agriculture of, 391; migration from, 393; anti-Nebraska movement in, 398; fusion ticket fails in, 1860, 414; and election of 1862, 451; opposition to war in, 452; general banking act of 1838, 454; foreign element in, 520, 521; election of 1884 in, 530
New York City, 80, 81, 104, 110, 111, 117, 122, 123, 154, 155, 157, 167, 168, 180, 182, 183, 187, 191, 195, 267, 386, 387, 510, 515, 525, 552, 581; formerly New Amsterdam, 80; largest on continent by 1825, 285; rise of, 288; growth of, 391; draft riots in, 455, 456; foreign elements in, 521
New York Central Railroad, 508
New York Central System, 508, 511, 512, 516
New York Courier, 330
New York Evening Post, 390
New York Tribune, 390, 402, 409
Newcastle, formerly New Amstel, 80, 84
Newfoundland, 302
Newlands Act, 594
Newport, R. I., 56, 109, 112, 123, 154, 183, 187, 188, 194, 195, 388
Newspapers, colonial, 117; metropolitan, develop, 390; developments in, 586
Newtown, 46, 50, 52
Niagara, 141, 227, 269, 270, 272, 275
Niagara, Fort, 272
Nicaragua, proposed canal route, 382, 568; financial arrangement with, 570
Nicholas, R. C., 201
Nicholas II, Czar of Russia, calls Hague Conference, 568; murdered, 670
Nicholson Act, contents, 253
Nicholson Letter, 373
Nickel Plate Railroad, The, 509
Nicolet, Jean, 132
Nicolls, Colonel Richard, 79, 80
Nonimportation, 153, 155, 170; agreements, 151, 154; acts, 276, 277
Nonintercourse Act, 259, 264
Non-Partisan League, 694, 695
Nootka Sound, 302
Nordica, Madame Lillian, 552
Norfolk, 111, 255
Normal schools, development of, 391, 548
North, effect of embargo on, 257; character of agriculture 1790, 338; growth of manufactures, 339; opposes annexation of Texas, 364; and Wilmot Proviso, 373; irritated by Fugitive Slave Law, 379; and Compromise of 1850, 379; railroad development in, 386; opposition to Kansas-Nebraska Act, 396; educational development in, 548
North, Lord, 195, 197; Prime Minister, 165; concessions to America, 186
North Anna River, 463
North Carolina, 94, 95, 109, 111, 114, 121, 127, 154, 166, 175, 176, 193, 208, 212, 228, 239, 290, 291, 292, 477; founded, 86; nature of, 89; a royal province, 108; loyalism in, 172; constitution of, 202; postpones ratification, 218; cedes Tennessee, 233; secession of, 427; Lincoln's reconstruction of, 471
North Dakota, 518, 533, 694
Northern Pacific Railroad, 498, 507, 510, 512, 575
Northern Securities Company, 575; dissolved, 593
Northwest Passage, Gilbert seeks for, 17; Hudson's search for, 77
Northwest Territory, 111, 227, 289, 292, 393
Norton, John, 62
Norwich, 13
Nova Scotia, 34, 127, 141
Nueces River, boundary of Texas claimed by Mexico, 367
Nullification, and Kentucky Resolutions, 238; controversy, 315–320; ordinance, 320

Obregon, President Alvaro, 692
Offensive of August 8th, 659
Offensive of July 15, 1918, 658
Offensive of July 18th, 658, 659
Officers' Training Camps, 641, 642
Ohio, 114, 139, 227, 228, 250, 270, 284, 297, 307, 349, 491, 494; New England migration to, 286, 391; a state 1802, 292; constitution of 1850, 335; early railroads in, 386; formation of Republican party in, 397; and election of 1862, 451
Ohio Company, 140, 209
"Ohio Idea," The, 503

Ohio Supreme Court, dissolves Standard Oil Company, 516
Oklahoma, 294; admission of, 594
Oldham, John, 63
"Olive Branch Petition," 173
Olney, Richard, 559
Ontario, Lake, 269, 270, 272, 275
"Open Covenants," 666, 668, 675
Open Door Policy, of John Hay, 566
Opequon Creek, battle of, 465
Orange, Fort, renamed Albany, 77, 78, 80
Order of the Star Spangled Banner, 398
Orders in Council, of 1793, 232; of Jan. 10, 1807, 255; of Nov. 11, 1807, 255; effect of, 256; repeal sought, 262, 263; recall demanded, 265; withdrawn too late, 268; repeal offered, 274
Ordinance of 1784, 209
Ordinance of 1787, 145, 374, 375; evolution of, 208–210; slavery prohibition, 299; policy of, abandoned, 565
Oregon, 372, 374, 395, 493, 499; American title to, 267; joint occupation, 302; controversy with Great Britain over, 356–358; campaign issue 1844, 358; settlement of controversy, 366, 367; a State, 394; election of 1876, 483, 484
Oregon, significance of voyage of, 569
Oriskany, 183
Orlando, Signor Vittorio Emanuele, character, 674; Wilson's contest with, 678
Orleans, Island of, 247
Orleans Territory, 300
Osawatomie, Kan., Roosevelt's speech at, 597
Osborn *vs.* The Bank, 328
Ostend Manifesto, The, 382, 383
Oswald, Richard, negotiates with Franklin, 195
Oswegatchie, 227
Oswego, 142, 183, 227
Otis, James, 150, 160, 162
Ottawa River, 131
Ouiatenon, 137
Ourcq River, 659
Overman Act, 636
Over-representation, of country towns in New England, 287; of tidewater Virginia, 290; of tidewater South Carolina, 291
Owen, Robert Dale, 335
Owen, William, in Carolina, 89
Pacific Ocean, 131; Japan's position in, 567; German Islands partitioned, 673; Japan demands islands in, 679
Pacific Railroads, and repeal of Missouri Compromise, 396; projects for, 494; and the cattle country, 496; building up, 497; multiplication of, 498
Pacific States, foreign elements in, 520
Pacificism, in United States, 626, 627
Packard, S. B., 524
Packing industry, 578, 593
Page, W. H., 607; ambassador to England, 618; sympathy for English, 620
Pakenham, Sir Richard, and Oregon question, 366
Palmer, John M., 536; opinion of Grant, 435
Palmerston, Viscount, 449
Palo Alto, battle of, 367
Panama Congress, Bolivar's design in, 558
Panama Canal, The, 568, 570; effect on railroads, 575; repeal of tolls discrimination, 604
Panama, Republic of, 569; how formed, 570
Pan-American Congress, 310, 560
Pan-Americanism, 560
Panhandle Railroad, The, 510
Panic of 1837, 349–351
Panic of 1873, 503, 506, 507
Panic of 1893, 533, 534
Panic of 1907, effects of, 576
Paper money, issues prohibited 1751, 107, 123; state issues of, 192; popular demand for, 210; effect of, on prices, 500
Paris, 615, 656, 657
Parish, unit of Virginia local government, 29
Parker, Alton B., 595
Parkman, Francis, historical writing of, 389
Parliament, of England and Great Britain, 10, 24, 26, 76, 77, 106, 107, 120, 123, 146, 147, 149, 151, 155, 156, 160, 161, 166, 169, 172, 177, 196, 197; House of Lords of, 10, 146; House of Commons of, 10, 11, 106, 146, 152, 157, 193, 268
Parliament of Carolina, 88, 89
"Parson's Cause," in Virginia, 167
Party machinery, development of, 323
Pascataquack, 64

Pastorius, settlement in Pennsylvania, 85
Paterson, William, 212
Paterson, N. J., strike at, 579
Paterson Plan, 212
Patroonships, nature of, 78
Patterson, General Robert, 431
Pauncefote, Lord, 569
Payne-Aldrich Tariff, Taft defends, 597
Peace Convention, 421, 422
"Peace without Victory," 627
Peach Tree Creek, 463
Peking, relief expedition to, 566
Pemberton, J. C., 458, 460, 461
Pendleton, George H., 503
Peninsular Campaign, 436, 438
Penn, William, 21, 73, 85, 86, 108, 110
Pennington, W. S., elected speaker, 412
Pennsylvania, 83, 110, 112, 115, 121, 122, 141, 151, 166, 169, 172, 179, 189, 211, 212, 222, 238, 239, 243, 258, 292, 304, 309, 323, 349, 391, 398, 402, 414, 451, 459, 491; boundary controversies, 84; development of, 85, 86; a proprietary colony, 108; frontier element in, 114; won over to independence, 177; constitution of, 202; in Federal Convention, 211, 212; ratifies Constitution, 217; education of the poor in, 284; in 1815, 289; protectionist interests of, 498; foreign element in, 520, 521
Pennsylvania, University of, 116
Pennsylvania Railroad, The, 386, 509, 510, 512
Penobscot River, 63
Pensacola, 420, 421, 430
Pension bills, Cleveland's vetoes of, 531
Pensions, under Harrison, 532
Pequot, Fort, 1637, 63
Perceval, Spencer, 255, 265, 268
Perdido River, 300; claimed as boundary of Louisiana Purchase, 249
Perry, Commodore M. C., 555; breaks down Japanese isolation, 382
Perry, O. H., victory on Lake Erie, 271, 272
Perryville, battle of, 443
Pershing, John J., 646, 654, 658, 660; pursuit of Villa, 605; Commander of A. E. F., 650; insists on training in open warfare, 652; insists on formation of American army; 653, organizes First American Army, 659; French wish to remove, 662
Personal Liberty Laws, 399; and Crittenden Compromise, 421
Peru, 560; viceroyalty of, 127
Peters, Hugh, 61
Petersburg, 95, 463, 466
Petition, right of, and abolition petitions to Congress, 346, 347
Philadelphia, 77, 84, 110, 111, 120, 122, 153, 155, 168, 170, 173, 182, 184, 185, 186, 187, 202, 241, 277, 288, 391, 515; founded 1682, 85; capital located at, for ten years, 222; population of, 1820, 285; foreign elements in, 521
Philadelphia Convention of 1787, 211, 216; Hamilton's course in, 224
Philadelphia Exposition, 552, 553
Philanthropist, The, office wrecked, 345
Philip, son of Massassoit, 100
Philip II, King of Spain, 126
Philippine Islands, 143; acquisition of, 564; desire for independence, 565; revolt in, 565
Phœnix, John, American humorist, 389
Phyfe, Duncan, 282
Pickens, Andrew, 188
Pickens, Fort, problem of, 420, 423
Pickering, Judge John, impeachment of, 243
Pickering, Timothy, 239, 276; controlled by Hamilton, 236
Pickett, G. E., charge at Gettysburg, 460
Piedmont, of Virginia, 95; settled by Scotch-Irish, 112
Pierce, Franklin, 368; elected President 1852, 380, 381; President, 382, 383; and Kansas, 399
Pierpont, Governor F. H., 470
Pike, Zebulon, 493; explores Southwest, 248
Pike's Peak, gold rush to, 394, 495
Pilgrims, 24, 35; escape to Leyden, 40; settle at Plymouth, 41; *see also* Plymouth
Pillory, abolition of, as punishment, 335
Pillow, G. J., escapes from Fort Donelson, 434
Pinchot, Gifford, 597
Pinckney, Charles, and Florida, 249
Pinckney, Charles, Cotesworth, 235, 239; and election of 1804, 245; and election of 1808, 258

Pinckney, Thomas, and Spanish treaty, 234
Pineda, Alonzo, 127
Pinkney, William, 253; negotiations in England, 262; takes inamicable leave, 265
Pirates, 93, 129; in North Carolina waters, 89, 90
Pitt, William, 141–143, 152, 161, 164, 197
Pittsburgh, 140, 148, 189, 285, 289; and steel production, 517; strike of 1877, 540
Pittsburgh & Fort Wayne Railroad, 510
Plains of Abraham, battle of, 143
Plan of Union, The, 284
Plantation, The, 39, 110, 111; dominates Virginia, 28, 29, 95; extension to Southwest, 293; economics of, 340; influence of, increases, 393, 394
Platt, Thomas C., 528, 591
Platt Amendment, 564, 565
Platte River, French and Spanish on, 137
Plattsburg, N. Y., 275; training camps at, 641
Plumb, Glenn E., 686
Plumb Plan, 686
Plymouth, 24, 35, 47, 48, 52, 57, 62, 63, 64, 99, 102; progress of colony, 41; fur trade, 42; evolution of government, 42, 43; *see also* Pilgrims
Plymouth Company, 19, 35; colony in New England fails, 20, 34
Pocasset, *see* Portsmouth, 56
Poe, Edgar Allan, 283, 389
Poincaré, Raymond, 674
Pointe-au-Fer, 227
Poland,609, 673; Fourteen Points on, 667
Poles, foreign element, 521
Polk, James K., 355, 372, 373, 375; elected President, 365; wishes California and Texas, 366; aims in Mexican War, 368
Polly, case of the, 252
Polo, Marco, visits China, 5
Ponce de Leon, 127
Pontiac's Insurrection, 148
Pony Express, The, 495
Pools of railroad rates, 513
"Poor Whites," of the South, 393
Pope, John, captures Island No. 10, 435; and Second Bull Run, 438, 439
Popular music, taste in, 552
Population, of New England Colonies, 109; of Middle Colonies, 110; of Southern Colonies, 110, 111; of the South in the 'fifties, 393; analysis of statistics, 519, 521; population, urban, growth of, 521
Populist party, and election of 1890, 533; endorses Bryan 1896, 536; evolution of, 543–545
Port Hudson, surrender of, 461
Porter, Fitz-John, defeated at Gaines's Mill, 438; disgrace of, 439
Porter, Peter B., 266
Porto Rico, 93, 560; occupation of, 563; as part of United States, 564; organization of, 565
Portolá, Gaspar de, discovers San Francisco Bay, 359
Portolano, use of, 5
Portsmouth, N. H., 109, 123, 154; Branch of Second Bank at, 328
Portsmouth, R. I., 56, 57
Portsmouth, Treaty of, 567
Portugal, 4, 5, 6, 126, 256, 692; empire of, 8, 126
Post, Louis, 596
Post Office Act, 1710, 107
Potomac Canal, The, 385
Potomac River, 114, 222
Pownall, Thomas, imperial scheme of, 161
Prairie du Chien, British capture, 272
Preëmption, 325, 326; laws providing for, 326; established, 353, 354
Presbyterian Church, 62, 71, 117, 119, 390; advance of, 284; attitude toward slavery, 343
"Presbyterian Plot," 98; checked by Massachusetts, 62
Prescott, W. H., historical writing of, 389
President, The, 265
President and the *Little Belt*, 265
Presidios, The, and Spanish expansion, 358
Prevost, Sir George, defeat at Sacketts Harbor, 272
Price, Sterling, 370; advocates secession of Missouri, 428
Prigg *vs.* Pennsylvania, decision in, 379
Primary education, 283; growth of, 284; development, 548, 549, 585
Prince Consort, The, 447
Princeton, victory at, 183
Princeton University, 116, 390
Pring, Martin, 18, 19
Privateering, 233; American, 176, 273, 274, 275, 278, 286; French, 230, 231, 235, 256
Prize fighting, 488–489, 549, 587

Proclamation, Jackson's, to South Carolina, 320
Proclamation of 1763, 148, 167
Proctor, General Henry, 270, 272
Progress, idea of, 120
Progressive Party, formation of, 598; campaign of 1916, 625
Prohibition, National, progress of, 588; enactment of, 688; effects, 689
Promontory Point, Utah, 497
Protection, 297, 316, 339, 372; opposed by South, 298; and the Whigs, 336; and Republican platform 1860, 413; economics of, 498, 499
Providence, R. I., 56, 123, 154
Prussia, 142, 192, 304
Public, The, 596
Public lands, 292; Hamilton's proposals for sale, 222; interest of west in, 293; policy, 294, 295; Adams' policy, 311; Jackson's policy, 325; Democratic policy, 327, 333; Clay's Distribution Bill, 326, 327; increasing sales, 349, 350
Public utilities, exploitation of, 514, 515
Pure Food Act, 593
Puritanism, 45, 98, 288; experiments in government, 36; doctrines of, 38, 39; political tendencies, 39; contribution to American institutions, 52; estimate of, 68–70; decline of, 118
Put-in Bay, 271
Putnam, Israel, 173

Quakers, 84, 114, 202; tenets of, 62; in New Jersey, 83, 288; in North Carolina, 89; pacific influence of, 173; in Pennsylvania, 289; anti-slavery doctrines, 341
Quarter sessions, functions of, 11
Quebec, 130, 131, 132, 139, 142, 181; Cartier reaches, 9
Quebec Act, 149, 166, 167
Queen Anne's War, 139
Quit rents, in Pennsylvania, 85
Quitman, J. A., 376

Radcliffe College, 548
Radisson, Sieur, 132, 138
Railroads, speculative growth of, 349; evolution and problems, 385, 386; and the west, 393; transcontinental need for, 394, 395; confederate, inadequacy of, 457; development, 492, 493; receiverships of, causes, 511; discriminatory rates, 512; and the farmer, 513; mileage increase, 514; and rebates, 516; as western landlords, 519; development, 574–576; regulation of, 593; strike averted 1916, 626; taken over by Wilson 1917, 634; American, in France, 650; return to private hands, 686; *see also* under names of railroads
Railway Brotherhoods, 575
Raleigh, Sir Walter, 14, 19, 22; colonial interests, 18
Rall, Colonel Johann, 182
Rambouillet Decree, 264
Ranches, cattle, reason for, 496
Randall, A. W., 474
Randolph, Edmund, 211, 234
Randolph, Edward, 100
Randolph, John, of Roanoke, 245, 266, 291, 309; and impeachment of Chase, 244; revolts on Florida purchase, 249; comment on Nicholson Act, 253
Randolph Plan, *see* Virginia Plan
Rappahannock River, 439, 442; Spanish colony on, 127; Chancellorsville campaign, 458, 459
Ratford, Jenkin, 254
Rawdon, Lord, at Hobkirk's Hill, 193
Raymond, battle of, 461
Reading Railroad, The, Morgans control, 512
Reaper, The, revolutionizes agriculture, 384, 385; and western agriculture, 393; improvements in, 518
Rebates, use of, by Standard Oil, 516
Recall, 595, 596
Recall of judicial decisions, 596
Reconstruction, Lincoln's policy of, 468; constitutional problem of, 469; economic, 470; acts for, 474, 475; progress of, 476, 477; undoing of, 481, 482
Reeder, A. H., 400; Governor in Kansas Territory, 399
Referendum, 595, 596, 690
Regulator Movement, in North Carolina, 203
Religion, in 18th century America, 117–120; Ordinance of 1787 on, 209; in 1815, 284; in the 'fifties, 390
Religious liberty, in Virginia Bill of Rights, 201
Removals from office, under Jackson, 313
Reparations, problem of, 679, 680
Republican party (first), 225, 227, 235, 336, 238, 245, 249, 256, 258, 259, 276, 288, 289; development

of, 224, 225; and election of 1800, 239; transformation of, 240; policy in 1801, 241; attack on judiciary, 243; foreign policies, 262, 263; and War of 1812, 277; Virginia's leadership in, 290; retained in power, 1816, 296, 297; principles of the, 305
Republican party (second), 404, 409, 412, 415, 421, 422, 423, 428, 429, 440, 452, 473, 475, 477, 478, 498, 523, 682, 683; formation of, 397; election of 1856, 399, 400, 401, 402; and Dred Scott Decision, 407; and Lecompton issue, 408, 409; and election of 1858, 410, 411; election of 1860, 413, 414; and secession, 418, 419; election of 1864, 464, 465; election of 1876, 483–485, 524; abandons reconstruction, 484–485; strongholds of, 528; defeat in 1890, 533; election of 1896, 535–537; Philippine policy, 565; election of 1916, 625; in power, 685, 686, 687
Repudiation, of state debts, 351
Resaca, battle of, 462
Resaca de la Palma, 367
Research, university activity in, 585
Resumption of specie payments, 525
Revivals, in colonial America, 117; of 1800, in the west, 285
Revolution of 1688, 91, 94, 102, 103, 106, 146, 156, 158
Reynolds, J. F., 459
Rheims, France, 655, 656, 658
Rhine River, march to the, 663; bridgeheads on, 663; boundary demanded by Foch, 677
Rhineland, military occupation of, 681; French attempt to establish Republic in, 671
Rhode Island, 52, 61, 62, 77, 103, 108, 109, 119, 122, 151, 159, 173, 199, 207, 210, 228, 414; formation of, 55; government in, 57; evolution of, 58; charter of 1663, 59, 98, 99; not admitted in New England Confederation, 64; and James II, 102; not represented in Philadelphia Convention, 211; Federal Constitution defeated in, 218; end of charter of 1663, 334
Richardson, H. H., 552
Richelieu, Cardinal, 130, 133
Richmond, Virginia, 95, 251, 285, 436, 437, 438, 466, 515; confederate capital, 431
Right of Search, and the slave trade, 347
Rio Grande, 248, 249; boundary claimed by Texas, 367
River-and-harbor bill, vetoed by Arthur, 529
River Raisin, American defeat at, 270
Roane, Spencer, strict constructionist, 316
Roanoke Valley, The, 290
Robbins, Jonathan, case of, 238
Robinson, Charles, Free State leader in Kansas, 399
Robinson, John, minister of Scrooby church, liberalism of, 40; death of, 42
Rochambeau, Comte de, 194
Rockefeller, John D., 491, 516, 517; educational endowments by, 583
Rockingham, Marquis of, 195; ministry of, 152, 164
Rodgers, Commodore John, cruise of, 273
Rodney, Sir George, 194
Rogers, H. H., 577
"Rogers groups," 488
Rolfe, John, introduces tobacco culture, 26
Rollo books, The, 492
Romagne, France, 662
Roosevelt, Theodore, 530, 546, 567, 577, 588, 600, 639, 641; and Panama Canal, 569, 570; career, 590, 591; character, 591; achievements, 592–4; election of 1904, 595; makes Taft his successor, 596, 597; seeks Republican nomination 1912, 598; election of 1912, 599, 625, 626
Rose, George, mission of, 261, 262
Rosecrans, W. S., 443, 461
Roumania, 617, 626, 631; and Fourteen Points, 667; military activity, 671; and Secret Treaties, 672
Ruffin, Edmund, 424
Rule of War of 1756, 231, 232, 252, 253, 262
"Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion," 530
Rural free delivery, effects of, 584
Rush, Richard, public land policy, 311
Russell, Lord John, Adams' threat of war to, 449
Russell, Jonathan, and Treaty of Ghent, 279
Russia, 13, 142, 192, 266, 274, 275, 612–615, 617, 622, 626, 630, 653, 670; claims in Northwest, 302; and Holy Alliance, 303; friendly attitude 1861–65, 445; Alaska bought from, 479; foreign elements from,

521; treaty with, denounced, 1912, 554; war with Japan, 566, 567; position of, 608; revolution in, 628; and Secret Treaties, 672
Russian Jews, immigration of, 520, 521
Russo-Japanese War, 566, 567
Ryan, Thomas F., 515

Saar Basin, 672, 681; French occupy, 678
Saba, 93
Sacketts Harbor, 272
Sagadahoc, colonized 1607, 34
Sage, Russell, 583
St. Augustine, 111, 127, 128
St. Barthélemy, 93
St. Clair, Arthur, 184; defeat of, 228
St. Croix River, 79, 102; DeMont's settlement at, 34
St. Eustatius, 93
St. Joseph, Mich., 136
St. Lawrence River, 130, 136, 137, 143; explored by Cartier, 9; Vermont's trade egress, 207; campaign on, 1813, 272
St. Leger, Colonel Barry, 183
St. Louis, Mo., 392, 395, 510; British attack, 1780, 190; fur trade to Far West, 358; trade to West, 493; foreign elements in, 521
St. Louis and San Francisco Railroad, 510
St. Lucia, 93
St. Lusson, Sieur de, takes possession of the west, 135
St. Marks, Florida, Jackson occupies, 301
St. Mary's, Md., founded 1634, 31
St. Mihiel, France, 661; salient at, 650; taken by First Army, 660
St. Nazaire, France, 650
Salem, 43, 48, 109
Salem witchcraft, 118
Salisbury, Marquis of, 559
Salt Lake, Mormons at, 494
Saltillo, Mexico, 369
Salvation Army, war service of, 638
Samoa, controversy over, 1884–1899, 556, 557
Samoset, 35
San Antonio, Texas, 359, 361
San Domingo, 247; annexation fails, 479
San Francisco, Cal., Bay discovered by Portolá, 375
San Jacinto, battle of, 361
San Jacinto, The, 447
San Juan Hill, capture of, 563
San Luis Potosí, Mexico, 369
San Martin, General José de, 302, 557
Sandwich, Earl of, 147
Sandys, Sir Edwin, 24, 41; controls Virginia Company, 22; plans, 23
"Sanitary Cordon," Foch wishes, 671
Santa Ana, A. L. de, 361, 369, 370; character, 362
Santa Elena, 127
Santa Fé, N. M., 359, 370; trade to, 360, 493; capture of, 368
Santa Fé Trail, 493
Santiago Campaign, The, 563
Santiago de Cuba, battle of, 563
Sarajevo, 614
Saratoga, 189, 388; social display at, 490
Saturday Evening Post, The, 586
Sault Ste. Marie, Mich., 135
Savage's Station, battle of, 438
Savannah, Ga., 430; capture of, 188; railroad projects, 386; capture of, 466
Savannah River, occupied by Spain, 127
Say and Sele, Lord, 61, 63
Saybrook, Conn., 63
Scalawags, 476, 477
Scandinavians, characteristics of, 579; migration to west, 392, 393; immigration of, 520, 521
Schenectady, N. Y., French raid on, 139
Schlieffen, Count, plan of, 615; failure of execution, 616
Schurz, Carl, 525
Schuyler, General Philip, 184
Schuylers, in New York politics, 110
Schwab, Charles, 517
Scire Facias, writ of, 1684, 101
Scolvus, John, reaches America 1476, 6
Scotch-Irish, in Pennsylvania, 110; character of, 111, 112
Scotland, 93
Scott, Sir William, decision in the case of the *Polly*, 252; decision in the case of the *Essex*, 253
Scott, Winfield, 273, 275, 420, 422, 423; Mexican campaign, 369, 370; presidential candidate 1852, 380, 381
Scribner's Magazine, 550
Scrooby, England, Pilgrim Church at, 40
Seabury, Samuel, 171
Seal fisheries, diplomatic question of, 554
Secession, right of, asserted by Calhoun, 318; in 1850, chances of, 379,

380; preparation for 1850–1860, 380; of South Carolina, 415; theory of, 415, 416
Second Division, A. E. F., 652; at Belleau Wood, 656; offensive of July 18, 658, 659; captures Blanc Mont, 662; crosses Rhine, 664
Secondary education, 283; growth of, 284; development, 548, 549, 585
Secret Treaties, The, 666; terms, 671, 672; American ignorance of, 673
Sectionalism, and slavery, 298, 300; growth in economic interests, 338
Sedan, France, 661, 663
Sedgwick, Theodore, 241
Sedition Act, 237
Seicheprey, France, 657
Seigneuries, in New France, 134
Seignories, in Carolina, 88
Selective service, opposition to, checked, 638; administration of, 643; extension of, 643; value of material from, 644; execution of Act, 641, 642
Senate, New York and Maryland, 203; federal, direct elections for, 595. *See also* Congress
Senatorial courtesy, in appointments, 528
Separation of powers, in Virginia Bill of Rights, 201
Separatism, 39
Serapis, capture of, 192
Serbia, Austrian ultimatum to, 614; Fourteen Points on, 667; ignorant of secret treaties, 672
Sergeant, John, 330
Serra, Junipero, 359
Serurier, J. M. P., 266
Service of supply, formation of, 652
Settlers' committees, use of, against speculators, 326
Seven Pines, battle of, 438
Seven Years' War, *see* French and Indian War
Seventh New York Regiment, arrives at Washington, 427
Seventy-ninth division, captures Montfaucon, 661
Sevier, Colonel John, 188
Seward, William H., 396, 413, 424, 467; Republican leader, 402; and Douglas, 409; in 1860–61, 418; secretary of state, 422; policy suggested by, 423; and Emancipation Proclamation, 441; Mexican policy, 479
Seymour, Horatio, Democratic candidate 1868, 477
Shaftesbury, Earl of, *see* Cooper, Anthony Ashley
Shakers, practices of, 335
Shannon, Governor Wilson, of Kansas Territory, 400
Shantung, China, 682; seized by Japan, 673; Japanese demand, 679; adjustment, 692
Shawnee Prophet, The, 266
Shays's Rebellion, in Massachusetts, 210, 211
Shelburne, Earl of, 197; western policy, 164, 165; Prime Minister, 195; peace policy, 196
Shelby, Colonel Isaac, 188
Shenandoah Valley, 292, 466
Shenandoah, The, 480
Sheridan, P. H., and Shenandoah campaign, 465, 466
Sherman, John, 537; and resumption of specie payments, 525; financial successes, 526, 527; seeks nomination, 1880, 527; seeks nomination, 1888, 531; secretary of state, 561
Sherman, Roger, 213
Sherman, W. T., 467; and Atlanta campaign, 462, 465
Sherman Anti-Trust law, modified, 603
Sherman Silver Purchase Act, 532, 533, 545; repeal of, 534
Shields, James, 368, 397, 437
Shiloh, battle of, 434, 435
Shipbuilding, 121; in pioneer New England, 66; in New England, 285; 1917–1918, 634
Shipping Board, represented in war cabinet, 636
Shipping Board Act, 634
Shipstead, Senator Henrik, 695
Shirley, Governor William, 141
Sidney, Sir Philip, 14
Silver, as a standard of value, 499, 500; fluctuation of value, 501; demonetization of, 502; free coinage of, demanded, 503; demand for coinage of, 526
Silver Republicans, 537
Sinclair, Upton, 578
Sinking fund, failure of, 222
Sioux, Minnesota massacres by, 497
Sixteenth Infantry, 646
Sixth Massachusetts Regiment, mobbed in Baltimore, 427
Slade, William, 347
Slaughter House Cases, The, 482
Slave Trade, colonial, 122, 123; abolition of, deferred, 214; under Amer-

ican flag, 347; abolition of, in District of Columbia, 376; abolished in District of Columbia, 378; prohibited by confederate constitution, 417; and Crittenden Compromise, 421
Slavery, 290, 298, 299, 342, 347; Jefferson hesitates to attack in Virginia, 201; exclusion of, from the west, 209, 210; Constitution of 1830 perpetuates it in Virginia, 290; South Carolina's care for, 291; causes divergence of Northwest and Southwest, 293; used against John Q. Adams, 310; importance of, in sectional divergence, 338; colonial attitude toward, 340, 341; sociological argument for, 342; biblical argument for, 342, 343; economic and social defects of, 344, 345; how far protected on high seas by municipal law? 347; laws against, suspended in Texas, 360; in the territories, 374, 406–407, 412, 421; effect on literature, 389; and the churches in the 'fifties, 390; Republican attack on it, 401; under confederate constitution, 417; English attitude toward, 446, 447; abolition of, 472
Slaves, Federal ratio in counting, 214
Slidell, John, 367; confederate emissary to France, 445, 447
Sloat, Commodore J. D., 368
Slums, problem of, 489; improvement of, 584
Small State Party, 212
Small State Plan, 212
Smith, Alfred, 688
Smith, Caleb, 413, 424; in Lincoln's cabinet, 422
Smith, Captain John, character of, 20; estimate of, 20, 21; leaves Virginia, 23; maps New England, 34
Smith, Joseph, the Mormon prophet, 494
Smith, Kirby, 467; invasion of Kentucky, 443
Smith, Robert, thwarts Madison, 1809, 259
Smith, Samuel, thwarts Madison, 1809, 259
Smith, Sir Thomas, 22, 24
Smith College, 548
Smith-Lever Act, 604
Smuts, General J. C., contributions to League of Nations, 675
Smyth, General Alexander, 270
Socage, free and common, land tenure in English colonies, 134
Social reform, 335
Social service, 580
Socialism, 540, 694; tenets of, 539; and World War, 638
Society, in Virginia, 290; effect of riches of 'fifties on, 388; of the 'fifties, 389; in the post Civil War Period, 487, 490; increasing complexity, 581, 689
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, 118
Soil exhaustion, effect of plantation system on, 340
Soil restoration, in Virginia, 290
Soissons, France, 655, 656, 659
"Soixante-quinze," The, 644
Sommerance, France, 662
Sonnino, Baron, character, 674
"Sons of Liberty," 151; Barré's phrase, 149
Sothell, Seth, in Carolina, 89
Soulé, Pierre, 382, 383
South, The, 258, 297, 298, 346, 376, 377, 380, 396, 399, 400, 401, 408, 418, 419, 545, 549; effect of embargo on, 257; public education in, 284; retention of slavery in, 299; and tariff of 1828, 312; character of agriculture, 1790, 330; growing importance of slavery to, 338; planters of, financed by northern capital, 339; and Compromise of 1850, 379; in the 'fifties, 393, 394; and railroad-building, 386; expansionists of, 394; distrust of North, 412, 413; and election of 1860, 414; attitude, 1860–1861, 415; military assets of, 428, 429; deficiency in material resources, 457; economic problems after 1865, 470; abolition of slavery in, 472; corruption in; 478; conditions in, 1872–1876, 482, and election of 1876, 483; and negro disfranchisement, 485; agricultural development, 519; politics, 1877–1897, 523; Populists in, 544
South America, 8, 125, 128, 304
South Carolina, 114, 121, 127, 151, 170, 172, 193, 212, 292, 312, 336, 341, 352, 375, 379, 441, 477; royal province, 107, 108; 18th century, 111; advised to form provisional government, 176; won over to independence, 177; British conquer, 188; constitution of 1776, 199; constitution of 1778, 200; ratifies federal Constitution, 217;

in 1815, 291; influence on Calhoun's theories, 310; and nullification, 315–320; and election of 1832, 330; in election of 1836, 349; secedes, 1860, 415, 416; agents at Washington, 418, 419; seizes forts at Charleston, 420; Lincoln's notice to, 424; devastated by Sherman, 466; negro misrule in, 478; election of 1876 in, 483, 484
South Carolina Exposition and Protest, 316, 317
South Dakota, 518; a state, 1889, 533
South Mountain, battle of, 440
Southampton, Earl of, 24
Southern Pacific Railroad, 512; Harriman controls, 574
Southern Railway, Morgans control, 512
Spain, 5, 7, 8, 93, 111, 133, 137, 143, 186, 189, 208, 228, 233, 234, 247, 250, 251, 262, 264, 265, 275, 300, 301, 302, 303, 359, 423; empire of, 125–129; Atlantic seaboard colonies of, 127; policy of, 185; western policy of, 190; and United States, 191; and Treaty of 1783, 195, 196; extent of Louisiana under, 248, 249; Treaty of 1819, 301; relations with, 382, 383; *Virginius* affair, 479; relations with, 560, 561; war with, 561–564; terms of peace, 564
Spanish-American War, 560, 564
Spanish Main, pirates of the, 93
Spanish Succession, War of the, *see* Queen Anne's War
Specie payments, suspended, 1814, 296; suspension of, 1861, 453; resumption of, 526, 527
Specie circular, The, 350
Spoliations, French, payment of, 328
Sport, 488, 489, 549, 550, 587
Spottsylvania Court House, 463
Springfield, Mass., 64
Springfield rifle, The, 644
Spy, The, by Cooper, 282
Stalwarts, The, 525, 527
Stamp Act, 149, 151, 156, 160, 164; repeal of, 152
Stamp Act Congress, 151, 152
Stanbery, Henry, 474
Standard of value, money as, 499
Standard Oil Company, 491, 515–517, 574; as banker, 517; supports Harriman, 575
Standardized parts, Whitney's use of, 492
Stanton, E. M., 420; Johnson attempts to remove, 475
Stanwix, Fort, 166; Treaty of, 183
"Staple," The, principle of, 92, 93
Star of the West, incident of, 420
Star Spangled Banner, The, origin of, 277
Stark, John, at Bennington, 184
State Councils of Defense, 639
State, Department of, created, 219
State sovereignty, and the federal Constitution, 216; South Carolina doctrine of, 291; Calhoun's doctrines of, 376; application of theory, 1860–1861, 415; and theories of reconstruction, 469
State Universities, appearance of, 391; development, 548
States, jealousies of, 205; how formed under Ordinance of 1787, 209, 210; their interposition to check unconstitutional acts of Congress, 238; question of formation from Louisiana Purchase, 248; can Congress prescribe limitations to, on admission? 299, 300; and internal improvements, 323; interpreters of powers of Congress? 316; rights of, 318; under confederate constitution, 417; effect of Civil War on, 484; in the west, 496
Steam, revolution caused by, 384
Steam navigation, monopoly of, defeated, 315
Steamboat, significance of, 281
Stedman, Fort, 466
Steel, cheap production of, 491
Steel industry, development of, 517
Stephen, James, *War in Disguise*, 252
Stephens, A. H., 379; Vice President of the Confederacy, 416
Stephenson, Fort, 270
Steuben, Baron von, 186; disciplines American Army, 187
Stevens, Thaddeus, theory as to nature of impeachment, 475, 476
Stewart, A. T., New York store, 388
Stoeckl, Edward de, Russian Minister, 445
Stone, Charles P., 422
Stone River, battle of, 443
Stowe, Mrs. H. B., and *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, 389
Strict construction of the Constitution, advocated by Republicans, 225; and internal improvements, 297; Crawford an advocate of, 307; and the Democratic party, 333
Stuart, Gilbert, painter, 282
Stuart, John, Southern Indian superintendent, 166

Stuarts, kings of Great Britain, 103; colonial policies, 91, 104, 105
Stuyvesant, Governor Peter, 65, 78, 79, 80
Submarines, German use of, 618, 621; sink without warning, 622; unrestricted warfare reopened 1917, 627; effectiveness of, 631; tactics used against, 640
Substitute brokers, of Civil War, 456
Subtreasury, The, forced through by Van Buren, 351; and election of 1840, 352; reënacted, 1846, 372; survival of, 603
Suffrage, *see* Franchise
Sugar, use limited 1917–1918, 632, 633
Sugar Act, 150, 151, 160
Sullivan, General John, 182
Sullivan, John L., 549
Sullivan's Island, in Charleston Harbor, 418
Sumner, Charles, 379, 396, 400, 402, 447
Sumter, Thomas, 188
Sumter, Fort, 418, 419; problem of, 423; fired on, 424; fall of, 426
Superior, Lake, 131, 132
Supreme Court, 379, 567; jurisdiction of, 215; established, 1789, 220; as arbiter of Constitution, 238, 242; Republicans deny power to interpret Constitution, 316; and Second Bank, 328–330; and slavery in the territories, 374–375; and Dred Scott Case, 404–407; Republicans attack, 407; reconstruction decisions, 482; on railroad regulation, 514; declares income tax unconstitutional, 534; defines status of dependencies, 565
Supreme Court, of Missouri, and the Dred Scott Case, 404, 405
Supreme Economic Council, 680
Surplus, division of, among the states, 350
Survey Bill, for internal improvements, 298
Susquehanna River, 459
Sussex, sinking of, 624
"Swartwout, to," 352
Sweden, 192, 266
Swedish colonization, 78, 83, 85
Swedish West India Company, 78
Sykes-Picot Treaty, 672
Symphony orchestras, 552
Syndicalism, 539; contemporary forms of, 540
Taft, W. H., 580; elected President, 596, 597; administration of, 597; renominated 1912, 598; and election of 1912, 599; suggests amendments to League of Nations, 677
Talleyrand, C. M. de, the XYZ affair, 235; and Louisiana Purchase, 247; and Florida, 249
Tallmadge, James, opposes admission of Missouri, 299
Talon, Jean, 135
Tammany Hall, 387
Taney, Roger B., 464; Secretary of the Treasury, 331; and Dred Scott Case, 405–407
Tanner, "Corporal," 532
Tarbell, Ida, 577
Tariff, passed by First Congress, 219; Pennsylvania and, 289; and South Carolina, 291; and west, 295, 296; of 1824, 298; in campaign of 1824, 308; sectional alignments in 1828, 311, 312; of 1827, 312; of 1828, 312, 319; and nullification, 315; of 1832, effect on South Carolina, 319; Jackson's position on, 323; of 1842, 353; of 1846, 372; of 1862, 454; question of the, 498; reform proposed, 529; made an issue by Cleveland, 531; of 1890, 532, 533; reform of, urged by Roosevelt, 592; revision of, 597, 602; of 1922, 686
Tarleton, Banastre, defeated at the Cowpens, 193
Taylor, Dick, 467
Taylor, J. W. 310
Taylor, John of Caroline, on States' rights, 316
Taylor, Zachary, 367, 368; at Buena Vista, 369; elected President, 374; policy on the territories, 375, 376; death of, 378
Tazewell, Senator, L. W., 322
Teach, Captain, 129
Tecumseh, 266, 272, 348
Telegraph, The, 314
Telegraph, transcontinental, 497
Telephone, effect on rural life, 578, 584
Teller, Senator H. M., 537
Tempest, The, origin of, 23
Tennessee, 208, 278, 279, 297, 298, 348, 381, 414; settlement, 190, 207; and Spanish intrigue, 233, 234, admission 1796, 292; secession, 427; Lincoln's reconstruction of, 470, 471; abolition of slavery in,

472; ratifies Fourteenth Amendment, 474
Tennessee River, 115, 128, 138, 430, 433, 434; reached by Virginia traders, 95
Tennis, 550
Tenure of Office Act, terms of, 474; and Johnson's impeachment, 475, 476
Territories, Ordinance of 1787 and, 209, 210; Northwest, 292; Indiana, 292; Michigan, 292; Illinois, 292; slavery in, 374–376, 406–407; slavery abolished in, 472; in Rocky Mountain region, 495–496
Texas, 136, 249, 354, 355, 358, 359, 363, 364, 365, 376, 392, 420, 472, 482, 496, 605; considered part of Louisiana by Napoleon, 248; American claim surrendered, 301; annexation of, urged, 356; campaign issue, 1844, 358; settlement in, 360; independence of, 361; annexation of, 366, 372; paid to relinquish claim on New Mexico, 378; Compromise of 1850, 379; reconstruction delayed, 477; reconstruction, 479; foreign elements in, 520
Texas *vs.* White, 482
Texas Pacific Railroad, 498, 511
Thames, battle of the, 272
Thanatopsis, by Bryant, 282
Theater, the, slow development of, 283; in post Civil War period, 488, 1877–1897, 551, 552; development 587
Third Division, at the Marne, 656; on July 15th, 658
Thirtieth Division, with British, 659
Thirty-eighth Infantry, exploit at the Marne, 658
Thirty-fifth Division, 662; checked by Germans, 661
Thirty-first degree, boundary of Florida, 196
Thirty-second Division, arrives in France, 652; drives Prussian Guard from the Ourcq, 659; breaks German resistance at Juvigny, 659; breaks Kriemhilde Stellung, 662; on east bank of Rhine, 664
Thirty-seventh Division, checked by Germans, 661
Thirty-third Division, participates in British offensive, 659
Thomas, George H., 435; at Chickamauga, 462; at Nashville, 466
Thomas, Jesse B., introduces Missouri Compromise, 300
Thomas, P. F., 420
Thomas, Theodore, 552
Thompson, Jacob, 418, 420
Thompson, J. Edgar, President of the Pennsylvania R. R., 510
Thoreau, Henry, 282, 283, 391
Thoroughfare Gap, 439
Threats against the President Act, 638
Ticonderoga, 141, 175, 181, 184
Tilden, S. J., 483
Times, The, sympathizes with Confederacy, 446
Tippecanoe, battle of, 266
Tirpitz, Admiral von, submarine policy, 623
To a Water Fowl, by Bryant, 282
Tobacco, 94, 121; culture in Virginia, 26, 27; taxation of, 29, 30; enumerated article, 92; and economic decay of Virginia, 290
Todd, Mary, Lincoln marries, 410
Toleration, 58, 59; in Maryland, 30; Maryland Act of 1649, 33
Tom Sawyer, 550
Tompkins, D. D., 275
Toombs, Robert, 376, 379, 400
Toombs Bill, The, 401
Topeka Constitution, 399–401
Tordesillas, Treaty of 1494, 8
Tories of American Revolution, generally a minority, 179; guerilla warfare in South, 188–189
Tories, English of 19th century, 255, 257, 261, 265, 268
Tory party, 72; decays after 1714, 74
Toul, France, 615, 650, 660
Tours, France, 650
Towns, New England, 204, 391; character, 66–68; Andros' attack on, 102; social life, 286, 287
Townshend, Charles, 153, 162
Townshend Acts, 153, 156, 164; repeal of duties, 155
Traction systems, 514; exploitation of, 515
Trade and Plantations, Board of, 107
Trade Unionism, 540, 541, 579; and restricted immigration, 580
Trading with the Enemy Act, blacklists American firms, 625
Transcontinental railway systems, formation of, 511
Treason, defined, by Marshall, 251
Treasury, Department of, created, 219
Treasury notes, used to finance War of 1812, 277
Treaty, of 1763, 149, 167; of 1778, of

U. S. with France, 230, 232; superseded, 236; of 1783, 196; both sides protest violations, 227; of 1806, terms, 254; of Ghent, 279–280; in campaign of 1824, 308; of 1819, 308; with Spain, 301; of Washington, 480; of London, 672, 674; demanded by Italy, 678; of Versailles, 664, 665, 680–682
Trench raids, 648
Trench warfare, 617; character of, 646; organization of, 650
Trent Affair, The, 447
Trenton, victory at, 182, 183
Trial by jury, in Virginia Bill of Rights, 201
Trieste, 672
Trinity Church, 110
Triple Alliance, The, 606, 610; powers of, 608–611
Triple Entente, The, 606, 612; powers in, 607–608
Troup, Governor G. M., of Georgia, defies Adams, 311
Trumbull, Lyman, 397, 435, 481; elected senator from Illinois, 1855, 410
Trust, legal definition, 516
Trust companies, abuses of, 576
Trusts, The, 515, 517, 573–574
Tryon, Governor William, 203; of New York, 176
Turkey, 13, 126, 610, 611, 617, 667, 672, 678, 679, 681
Turnbull, R. J., author of *The Crisis*, 316
Twain, Mark, 490, 550
Tweed Ring, The, 387
Twenty-eighth Division, on July 15, 658; in Aisne-Marne offensive, 659; in Meuse-Argonne, 661
Twenty-eighth Infantry, 646
Twenty-One Demands, The, 672, 673
Twenty-seventh Division, with British, 659
Twenty-sixth Division, arrives in France, 652; reverse at Seicheprey, 657; in Aisne-Marne offensive, 659; at St. Mihiel, 660
Twenty-sixth Infantry, 646
Twiggs, General D. E., surrenders United States troops to Confederates, 420
Twiller, Wouter van, Dutch governor, 78
Two Treatises of Government, by John Locke, 88
Two Years Before the Mast, and the California trade, 360
Two-thirds Rule, in Democratic Convention, 365
Tyler, John, 336; and election of 1840, 351, 352; succeeds to Presidency, 353; seeks election, 354; and annexation of Texas, 364–365
Typewriter, The, 578

Ulster, 111
Uncas, 57
Uncle Tom's Cabin, 389, 488
Underwood, O. W., 598
Underwood-Simmons Tariff, 602
Union League, 476
Union Pacific Railroad, 497, 510, 511, 575; Harriman reorganizes, 574
Union Party, election of 1864, 464, 465
Unitarianism, tendency to, 118
United States, captures *Macedonian*, 273
United States Food Administration, effectiveness, 633
United States Grain Corporation, 633
United States Steel Corporation, formation of, 573, 574
United War Work Drive, 638
Universalism, 118
Universities, increased enrollments, 585
University of Virginia, significance, 283
Upshur, Abel, 364
Utah, 376, 377, 395, 396; Compromise of 1850, 378; territory established, 494
Utopian communities, of the 'forties, 335
Utrecht, Treaty of, 128, 138, 139, 141

Vallandigham, C. L., proceedings against, 451
Valley Forge, 186, 187
Valona, 672
Van Buren, Martin, 288, 307, 314, 330, 331, 354, 381; goes over to Jackson, 310; Secretary of State, 313, 327, 328; elected President, 348; and Panic of 1837, 349, 350; and election of 1840, 351, 352; opposes Texan annexation, 364; defeated for nomination, 1844, 365; candidate, 1848, 373
Van Buren Democrats, 374; and the Wilmot Proviso, 372, 373
Van Rensselaer, General Stephen, failure of, 270
Van Rensselaer, patroonship, 78

Van Rensselaers, in New York politics, 110
Vancouver, George, 302
Vandalia, projected colony, 165; Virginians oppose, 167
Vanderbilt, Cornelius, 506, 508, 509
Vanderbilt, W. H., 508, 512
Vanderlyn, John, painter, 282
Vane, Sir Harry, 49, 50, 61
Vassar College, 548
Vaudreuil, Marquis de, 141, 143
Vaux, France, 656
Venezuela, 558; controversy with Great Britain over, 559, 560; and Monroe Doctrine, 570
Vera Cruz, 369; French seizure of 363; navy occupies 1914, 605
Verdun, France, 615, 660, 663
Vérendrye, Sieur, 137
Vermont, 109, 184, 207, 228, 258, 276, 334, 349, 381; frontier influence on, 291, 292; protests against gag rules, 347; anti-Nebraska movement in, 398
Verrazano, Giovanni, 130
Vesle River, 656, 659
Vespucci, Amerigo, why America was named for him, 7
Veterans' Bureau, scandals in, 687
Vice admiralty, courts, 107, 153
Vicksburg, 430, 443; Farragut at, 1862, 435; capture of, 460, 461
Villa, Pancho, 605
Villard, Henry, and the Northern Pacific, 510
Vincennes, 137, 190
Vinland, discovered, 1000, 6
Virginia, 18, 19, 26, 89, 95, 114, 115, 118, 121, 122, 127, 128, 138, 141, 151, 160, 166, 172, 179, 190, 192, 193, 208, 211, 221, 222, 225, 226, 237, 258, 289, 290, 292, 309, 471; charter of 1606, 19; mortality in, 20; difficulties of, 22; House of Burgesses in, 24; sickness, 24; a royal colony, 25; tobacco in, 26; indentured servants in, 27, 28; economic and political form 28, 29; legislation on tobacco, 30; contests with Maryland, 33; in 1660, 34; hardships under Acts of Trade, 93; seventeenth century, 96; eighteenth century, 111; cause of Revolution in, 166; sea-to-sea claims, 191; Constitution of 1776, 200, 201; economic distress, 210, 211, 290; in Federal Convention, 211, 212; ratification contest in, 217; embargo hastens decay, 258; earlier attitude on slavery, 341; and election of 1840, 352; and election of 1860, 414; Peace Convention called by, 421; secession of, 427; War time division of, 470; abolition of slavery in, 472; reconstruction delayed, 477; reconstruction in, 479
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, significance, 238
Virginia City, Montana, founding of, 495
Virginia Company, 20, 26, 40, 41; Charter of 1606, 19; Charter of 1609, 22; Charter of 1612, 22; quo warranto against, 25
Virginia Dynasty, 290, 305, 307
Virginia Plan, 211
Virginia Resolutions, contents of, 237; interpretation of, 318
Virginius, episode of, 479, 561
Vocational education, 586
Volstead Act, 688
Vosges Mountains, 615

Wabash River, 228
Wade, Benjamin, 379, 396, 402
Wade-Davis Bill, pocketed by Lincoln, 471
Walker, Robert J., governor of Kansas, 407
Walpole, Horace, comment on Stamp Act, 149
Walsh, Senator T. J., 687
Wampanoags, 99
War, Department of, created, 219
War Cabinet, formation of 1918, 636
War finance, principles of, 452, 453; of Civil War, 453, 454
War in Disguise, 252
War Industries Board, 635, 636
War of 1812, 268–280; how financed, 277; effect on New England, 286; fosters nationalism, 305; Jackson's part in, 307, 308
War of the Pacific, 560
War savings stamps, 638
War Trade Board, represented in War Cabinet, 636
Warehouses, abuses of, 513, 514
Warner, Chas. D., 490
Warwick, R. I., founded by Gorton, 57
Washington, George, 140, 142, 166, 167, 185, 192, 193, 207, 224, 225, 226, 233, 289; character, 173, 174; takes command, 175; forces evacuation of Boston, 176; attempts defense of New York, 181; campaign of the Jerseys, 182, 183; confidence

in, 186; and Yorktown campaign, 194, 195; and Philadelphia Convention, 211; unanimously elected President, 219; as President, 220; unanimously reëlected, 227; and Genêt, 231; refuses a third term, 234; commander-in-chief, 236; death, 238
Washington, Fort, captured by British, 182
Washington, D. C., 241, 250, 254, 277, 378, 436, 437, 439, 459, 464
Washington, a state, 1889, 533
Washington Conference, The, 692
Wasp captures the *Frolic*, 274
"Watchful waiting," 605
Watertown, Mass., 46, 52, 53
Wayne, Anthony, 293; Indian successes of, 228, 229
Wayne, Justice J. M., 405
Weaver, J. B., 545
Webb, J. W., 330
Webster, Daniel, 319, 322, 336, 354, 381; reply to Hayne, 317; and Second Bank, 329; and slavery on the high seas, 347; presidential candidate, 1836, 349; remains in Tyler's cabinet, 353; seventh of March speech, 377; death of, 380, 381
Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 354
Weed, Thurlow, 402
Weiser, Conrad, 139
Welde, Thomas, 61
Welles, Gideon, in Lincoln's cabinet, 422
Wellesley College, 548
Wellesley, Marquis, 265
Wellington, Duke of, 275
Welsh, in Pennsylvania, 85, 289
Wentworth, Governor John, of New Hampshire, 176
West, The, 135, 148, 250, 293, 311, 317, 498; opposition to Federal Constitution, 217; decline of British influence in, 266, 267; public education in, 284; New England migration to, 286; in 1815, 291; economic difficulties of, 295, 296; nationalism of, 296; public land policy of, 325; and Compromise of 1850, 377; land speculation in, 1830–1836, 349; growth of, 392, 393; railroad overbuilding in, 511; agricultural progress of, 519; Populists in, 544
West Florida, Livingston tries to buy, 247; American aggressions in, 300, 301
West India Company, French, 135
West India Trade, 253; with mainland colonies, 93, 122; illicit, to French and Spanish islands, 128, 150; nonintercourse with British islands, 1774, 169, 170; with British islands, lost, 1783, 210, 230, 233; with French islands, opened, 231; British regulations permit, 252; effect of loss on New England, 286; Virginia wheat in, 290; with British islands, reopened, 327, 328
West Indies, 93, 123, 137, 139, 145, 147, 185, 194, 347, 479
West Jersey, 83, 102; a royal province, 107; *see also* New Jersey
West Point, treachery of Arnold at, 192
West Shore Railroad, 509; building of, 511
West Virginia, 483, 491; establishment of, 427; McClellan's victories in, 433; admitted to Union, 1863, 470
Western Posts, Great Britain retains, 207, 227; surrendered, 232; effect of surrender on Northwest, 292
Western Union Telegraph Company, 515
Westinghouse air-brake, 492
Weyler, General Valeriano, 561
Weymouth, Captain George, 19
Wheeler, W. A., 483, 484
Wheeler, Senator B. K., 687, 688
Whig party, American, of 19th Century, 324, 326, 327, 328, 356, 369, 379, 380, 398, 410, 411, 414; formation, 323, 336, 337; diverse elements in, 348, 349; and election of 1840, 351, 352; break with Tyler, 353, 354; opposition to Mexican war, 367, 368; and election of 1848, 373, 374; and Compromise of 1850, 377, 379; and election of 1852, 380, 381; and Kansas-Nebraska Act, 396; destruction of, 397
Whig party, English, 72, 74, 76, 129, 253, 265
Whigs of the American Revolution, 179; generally a minority, 188
Whipping, abolition of punishment, 335
Whisky Insurrection, suppression of, 222
White, Andrew D., 547
White, Henry, on Peace Delegation, 669

White, Horace, 546
White, Hugh L., presidential candidate, 1836, 348, 349
White, Rev. John, 43
White, Stanford, 552
White Plains, N. Y., 182
Whitefield, George, 117, 118
Whitlock, Brand, 595
Whitman, Marcus, 358
Whitman, Walt, 550
Whitney, Eli, invents cottin gin, 339; use of standardized parts, 491, 492
Whitney, William C., 515; and development of navy, 531
Whittier, J. G., 389
Widener, Peter, 515
Wilderness, The, 436, 458, 459; campaign of 1864, 463
Wilhelm II, German Kaiser, 613, 668
Wilkes, Charles, 447
Wilkinson, James, 208, 269, 272, 296; betrays Burr, 250, 251
William and Mary, King and Queen of Great Britain, 104, 105, 116
William and Mary College, 116
William of Orange, 73
William Henry, Fort, 141
Williams, D. R., and repeal of embargo, 258
Williams, Roger, 52, 61; opinions, 48; founds Providence, 56; patent for Rhode Island, 57; on liberty of conscience, 58
Williamsburg, Va., 28, 111
Wilmington, Delaware, 78
Wilmington, N. C., 111, 193
Wilmot, David, 373
Wilmot Proviso, 372, 373, 376, 378
Wilson, Henry, Republican leader, 402
Wilson, James, 217
Wilson, John, 49, 50, 52, 70
Wilson Tariff, 1894, 534; and Cuban insurrection, 561
Wilson, Woodrow, 580, 588, 613, 620, 636, 639, 654, 655, 688; Philippine policy, 565; and imperialism, 570; career, 598, 599; election of, 599; character and ideals, 599–600; contradictions, 601; real purpose, 601–602; administrative achievements, 602–604; policy of neutrality, 619, 620; and the *Lusitania* notes, 622; efforts for peace, 622; secret proposal that America join Allies, 624; reëlection of, 626; last efforts for peace, 626, 627; and the World War, 631, 632; and selective service, 641; world position in 1918, 665; Fourteen Points of, 666, 668; course at Paris, 669, 670; and Secret Treaties, 672, 673; and League of Nations, 675, 676; work undone in absence, 677; compromises with Clemenceau, 678; concessions to Japan, 679; faith in League of Nations, 681; responsibility for Treaty of Versailles, 682; collapse of, 683; death of, 683; place in history, 684; program rejected by American people, 685; inspiration for Covenant of League, 691
Wilson's Creek, battle of, 428
Winchester, General James, 266; defeat at River Raisin, 270
Winder, General W. H., and Bladensburg, 277
Wingfield, Edward, 21
Winnipeg, 137
Winona, Minn., Taft defends tariff at, 597
Winthrop, John, 46, 52, 53, 70; character, 44; leader in Massachusetts Bay, 45; and Anne Hutchinson, 49, 50; death, 62
Wirt, William, 300; Anti-Masonic candidate, 1832, 330
Wisconsin, included in Illinois Territory, 292; and Blackhawk War, 325; Constitutions of 1846 and 1848, 335; New England migration to, 391; statehood, 392; formation of Republican party in, 397; abstains from Peace Convention, 422; and election of 1862, 451; Granger legislation in, 513; foreign element in, 520, 521
Wisconsin, University of, 391, 548
"Wisconsin Idea, The," 595
Witchcraft, 118
Woëvre plain, 663
Wolcott, Oliver, 239; Secretary of the Treasury, 234; controlled by Hamilton, 236
Wolfe, General James, 142, 143
Woman suffrage, development of, 582
Woman's colleges, 335
Woman's rights, 335
Women, collegiate education for, 548; increasing public activity of, 582
Wood, Leonard, 566, 685
Woolens Act, 1699, 107
Worcester *vs.* Georgia, Marshall's decision in, 325
"Work or fight" order, 643
Working men's party, 330

World Court, American acceptance of, frustrated, 692
World War, moral issues in, 606; America's judgment on, 617, 618; American sympathies divided, 619; United States enters, 628; situation in 1917, 630–631; Revenue Act of 1917, 636; local organization for, 639
World's Columbian Exposition, 553
Writs of Assistance, question of legality, 150; validated by Townshend Acts, 153
Wyant, A. H., 552
Wyoming, farming difficulties in, 519; a state, 1890, 533; woman suffrage in, 582
Wythe, George, 201

XYZ affair, 235

Yale College, 116, 119, 390; and Connecticut politics, 287
Yancey, W. L., 376
Yap, 682, 692
Yates, Richard, war governor of Illinois, 428
Yates, Robert, 216
Yazoo frauds, 245
Yazoo River, 137; and boundary of Florida, 196
Yeardley, Sir George, 23
Yerkes, Charles T., 515
York, Canada, 272
York River, McClellan's line of advance, 436; McClellan abandons as base, 438
Yorktown, 180, 436; campaign of, 1781, 194, 195; siege of, 1862, 436
Youghiogheny River, 114
Young, Brigham, 494, 497
Y. M. C. A., war service of, 638
Young Men's Hebrew Association, 638
Yudenitch, General, 670

Zenger, John Peter, trial of, 117
Zimmerman note, The, 628
Zollicoffer, General F. K., defeat of, 435



E178.P35
The United States
3 0629 0080294 0
E
178
P35